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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report, emanating from a project commissioned by the FIRST Initiative, considers the 
impact of the implementation of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (CFT) controls on financial inclusion in five countries (Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, 
Pakistan and South Africa). Based on these findings, it develops a set of guidelines to assist 
the authorities in developing countries to design effective AML/CFT regimes that are compliant 
with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and supports financial inclusion.  
The report and guidelines will be of benefit to countries striving towards the dual goals of 
protecting their institutions against money laundering and the financing of terrorism as well as 
extending financial inclusion, irrespective of whether protective measures are being considered 
in the process of implementing or amending AML/CFT controls to meet the Forty Nine 
Recommendations of the FATF or in order to meet other, related international requirements, 
such as those set out in the 2000 United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised 
Crime or the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 
The project was supervised and guided by a steering committee consisting of representatives 
from the FIRST Management Unit, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UK‟s 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), the South African National Treasury, the FinMark Trust and Professor Nikos Passas, 
an acknowledged world expert on AML/CFT standards and implementation. 
Key findings 
1. The pursuit of financial inclusion and the pursuit of an effective AML/CFT regime are 
complementary and not conflicting financial sector policy objectives. The objective 
with financial inclusion is that individual clients, particularly low-income clients currently 
excluded from using formal financial services, must be able to access and on a sustainable 
basis use financial services that are appropriate to their needs and provided by registered 
financial service providers. Without a sufficient measure of financial inclusion, a country‟s 
AML/CFT system will thus safeguard the integrity of only a part of its financial system – the 
formally registered part – leaving the informal and unregistered components vulnerable to 
abuse. Measures that ensure that more clients use formal financial services therefore 
increase the reach and effectiveness of the AML/CFT controls.  
2. The imposition of AML/CFT controls can and did have an impact on access to and 
usage of financial services in the countries concerned. The most vulnerable clients are 
those who lack the prescribed identification documents, undocumented migrants and 
clients of institutions (such as money services businesses) whose links with formal 
financial institutions are severed for AML/CFT reasons. AML/CFT controls also tend to 
increase transaction costs which can cause financial institutions to withdraw from low-value 
transactions and client markets using these. Impact differed from country to country 
depending on the design of the national AML/CFT framework. 
3. Countries are finding ways to limit AML/CFT risk while promoting financial 
inclusion. .Two complementary strategies are being following by regulators. Firstly, they 
apply reduced controls, especially money laundering controls, to lower risk transactions. 
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The most common is limiting the verification of client identity for low value transactions or 
products. Secondly, where countries do not have either the public or private capacity to 
apply full AML/CFT controls at once, they sequence implementation across financial 
institutions and transactions based on perceived risk. 
A development path 
The five countries included in the study are at very different stages of AML/CFT 
implementation. Mexico and South Africa are FATF members. Indonesia passed its AML 
legislation in 2002. Kenya has published an AML bill for public comment while Pakistan has 
issued a presidential decree enacting AML/CFT controls. Both Kenya and Pakistan have 
previously issued prudential regulations dealing with money laundering control. 
The study found that, despite different starting points, the implementation of AML/CFT controls 
in the five countries appears to follow a similar development path. A country would set out to 
comply with the FATF standards by promulgating a law and regulations which are typically 
based on international templates rather than domestic circumstances (phase 1). As the 
financial supervisor and financial institutions seek to implement these controls, they would 
come up against capacity constraints and obstacles which either exclude or discourage clients 
from using formal financial services, or which tend to make it difficult for financial institutions to 
serve certain categories of clients (phase 2). In phase 3 regulators respond to these pressures 
by applying two types of adjustments: (1) existing controls are re-calibrated on a risk-sensitive 
basis, and/or (2) sequencing the implementation of controls across sectors, transactions or 
entities based on the available resource envelope This development path may repeat itself as 
different aspects of the AML/CFT regime are developed. 
Risk appreciation 
The authorities base the application of reduced controls and the sequencing of implementation 
on an explicit or implicit appreciation of the risk involved.  
The countries reviewed tended to separate their assessment of money laundering (ML) and 
financing of terrorism (FT) risk. As far as ML is concerned one or a combination of three risk 
considerations were used: 
 Lower value means lower risk (the predominant factor and applied in all five countries); 
 Transactions with a cross-border element are regarded as entailing higher risk; and 
 Transactions or institutions which link to the formal payment system are seen to hold 
higher risk for the financial system than transactions or institutions which are not linked (for 
example third tier banks in Indonesia who do not have direct access to the payment 
system). 
In countries where mobile banking and mobile payments are already introduced (the 
Philippines and South Africa) the regulators decided to limit the perceived risk through 
transaction caps rather than stifle the development of these business models. However, in 
none of the countries was there evidence that the risk-based adjustments to AML controls were 
made on the basis of an assessment of actual risk based on intelligence or law enforcement 
experience. 
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Where countries did criminalise terrorist financing and imposed CFT controls, the only risk 
consideration used was the identity of clients and institutions known for their links to terrorist 
organisations. 
Sequenced implementation 
None of the countries included in the study has the capacity to implement all of the FATF 
recommendations at the same time across all sectors or even only those areas identified as 
high risk. Accordingly, and by force of circumstance, differentiated levels of AML/CFT controls 
have emerged within each country. These levels do not signify a static state, but stages in the 
progression towards a comprehensive regime. Broadly speaking, five levels of implementation 
were observed: 
1. No AML/CFT controls in place: This is normally the case where the sub-sector is not 
subject to any financial sector supervision. 
2. Coverage: entails basic registration of financial services providers, ensuring that they 
become visible to the supervisor and their information accessible to state agencies. 
Example: Money Transfer Operators in Mexico. 
3. Traceability of customers and transactions: requires basic customer identification 
procedures (even though verification may be limited) and standardised record-keeping. 
Example: savings and credit cooperatives and microfinance institutions in Kenya. 
4. Profiling, verification and monitoring: require more extensive verification of customer 
identity, extended profiling of customers and the pro-active monitoring of transactions for 
suspicious activity. Example: commercial banks in Indonesia. 
5. Advanced verification and interdiction: is possible where the national identification system 
and capacity of financial institutions enable verification with high levels of integrity to be 
performed and suspicious individuals and transactions can be prevented from using the 
formal financial system. Example: Although none of the five countries have yet reached 
this level, the national identification system in Pakistan has this capacity. 
Progress along this sequence can be facilitated by market-facilitating reforms. For example, it 
was found that countries with strict controls relating to entities who may transfer money (South 
Africa, Kenya and Indonesia) had less AML/CFT coverage of total transfers than countries with 
liberalised regimes (Mexico and Pakistan). 
Observed impact on financial inclusion 
Financial inclusion is affected not only by AML/CFT controls, but also by other factors. 
Non-AML/CFT factors: Affordability was found to be the most significant barrier to inclusion for 
transaction bank accounts in all the countries reviewed. Significant proportions (Indonesia 
75%, Kenya 95%, Mexico 64%, Pakistan 85%, and South Africa 33%) of the adult populations 
in the respective countries are excluded from access to transaction bank accounts due to the 
cost thereof relative to their income. Affordability was also found to be a significant barrier for 
remittances transactions processed by regulated service providers. Furthermore, regulations 
across all five sample countries effectively prohibit financial institutions from opening accounts 
or conducting transactions for undocumented migrants. This affects an estimated 2.5-4.1m 
undocumented migrants in South Africa and at least 800,000 in Kenya. These non-AML/CFT 
barriers to inclusion do not remove the imperative to minimise barriers resulting from AML/CFT 
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regulation as AML/CFT barriers may become pronounced as the other factors are being 
addressed. 
AML/CFT factors: From the client side, the most prominent barrier to inclusion was customer 
due diligence (KYC) regulations requiring identity and address verification. Large groups of 
adults in these countries are unable to provide such details. In South Africa 1.75m individuals 
do not have any identity document and in Kenya it is estimated that as much as 95% of adults 
will not be able to prove their residential address as required in the published AML bill. 
Increased process and documentation requirements also discouraged clients from using formal 
financial services. From the supplier side, there is now sufficient evidence that many well 
supervised financial institutions are severing their business relationships with informal and 
unsupervised institutions through the combined effect of potentially huge financial implications 
of contraventions of AML/CFT laws (criminal penalties, reputational damage and potential civil 
liability) and limited profit opportunities. Banks are closing the accounts of money services 
business in the USA. Similarly, banks are declining to serve centros cambiarios in Mexico. The 
increased transaction costs imposed by AML/CFT compliance on small, low-value transactions 
have also lead a number of financial institutions to withdraw from certain low-income markets. 
Mitigating responses: The three countries which have enacted comprehensive AML/CFT 
regimes – Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa – have mitigated the impact of AML/CFT 
controls on financial inclusion through a number of measures. These include: 
 Requiring limited verification for low-value transactions or for products which limit 
transaction values to specified thresholds (where attempted transactions exceed these 
thresholds, full verification is required before further transactions can be processed); 
 Allowing in specific cases verification of client information against third party databases 
accessed independently by the financial institution (this can also facilitate non-face-to-face 
client acquisition in mobile banking business models); 
 Compensating for simplified verification procedures (where national identification 
infrastructure is deficient) with more extensive client profiling to support monitoring of 
activity to identify deviations from the profile supplied; 
 Reduced or streamlined record-keeping requirements to reduce costs, e.g. permitting 
records to be kept electronically; 
 Allowing longer timelines for overall compliance, for example client re-identification if 
financial institutions are able to identify and prioritise high-risk client categories. 
Drivers of impact 
The level of impact of similar AML/CFT controls was found to differ across countries and is 
determined by a number of country specific factors and characteristics: 
1. Limitations in the national identification infrastructure which either excluded individuals 
through lack of documentation or made it more costly for financial institutions to achieve 
verification; 
2. Limited government capacity in financial sector supervision and law enforcement which 
limits their ability to formalise the economy, undermines the implementation of AML/CFT 
controls and increases the compliance risk for regulated institutions dealing with the 
unregulated/unsupervised sectors; 
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3. The structure, capacity and incentives of formal financial institutions which cause them to 
apply the controls more conservatively than intended by the regulator; 
4. Large-scale usage of informal financial services which make it easier for clients to opt out 
of formal financial providers if AML controls become too costly or inconvenient; 
5. Linkages to international financial markets which lead foreign-controlled domestic 
institutions to apply AML controls designed for developed rather than developing countries. 
Towards guidelines 
It is recommended that the following general principles should guide the design of a regulatory 
framework that seeks to support both effective AML/CFT controls and financial inclusion: 
1. Where the FATF recommendations allow flexibility and tailoring, AML/CFT measures 
should be attuned to the domestic environment, especially domestic AML/CFT risks; 
2. AML/CFT controls should be proportionate to the prevailing or likely risks; 
3. AML/CFT obligations of public and private institutions should not exceed the capacity of 
those institutions. If their capacity falls short of what is required by an effective domestic 
policy or by the FATF standards, capacity increases must be closely managed and 
AML/CFT obligations gradually increased in accordance with the resultant improvements in 
capacity. 
4. While all stakeholders must uphold the law, law enforcement is primarily the responsibility 
of the state. The state must not privatise law enforcement by unnecessarily shifting law 
enforcement responsibilities to private institutions. 
The following nine guidelines have been formulated based on the observed experience in the 
sample countries: 
Guideline 1:  Develop a policy  
Before an AML/CFT regime is enacted or even if already enacted, the domestic financial sector 
policy-maker or regulator should consider the interaction between imposing AML/CFT controls 
and financial inclusion. Policy makers should guard against adopting templates or regulations 
imposed in other jurisdictions without first considering the appropriateness and potential impact 
of those regulations in their own jurisdictions. 
 
Guideline 2:  Follow a consultative and flexible approach 
Getting the balance between effective AML/CFT controls and financial inclusion right will 
require regulators to consult on an ongoing basis with the key interest groups. These include 
financial institutions, both registered and unregistered, law enforcement agencies, as well as 
other national agencies, notably those responsible for the national identification infrastructure. 
 
Guideline 3: Assess and define the risk 
The financial sector policy-maker, relevant regulators, and law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, must assess the domestic ML and FT risks drawing upon information provided by 
the agencies concerned as well as formal and informal financial and other relevant institutions. 
The identified risks must be mapped to financial sub-sectors, institutions, transactions, client 
categories or other relevant characteristics (e.g. geographic area) to produce a risk framework 
and resultant priorities for regulation and control. 
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Guideline 4: Identify excluded and vulnerable groups 
Identify the levels of financial exclusion as well as the main causes for such exclusion in order 
to scope the potential impact of AML/CFT controls on financial inclusion. Excluded groups refer 
to all those persons who do not use financial services provided by financial institutions 
registered with the relevant supervisors of financial services and typically include the poor, the 
informal and undocumented migrants. 
 
Guideline 5: Assess the domestic resource envelope 
The imposition of AML/CFT controls which cannot be implemented within the domestic 
resource envelope tends to increase financial exclusion without contributing to effective 
AML/CFT risk management. Key national resources to assess include (1) the capacity of 
financial services providers (eg their systems), (2) the capacity of the financial sector 
regulator/supervisor (including the FIU if one is already established), and (3) the coverage, 
integrity and accessibility of the national or other identification systems. 
 
Guideline 6: Reduced control for lower-risk transactions 
Where the risk of money laundering (as opposed to the risk of the financing of terrorism for 
which no risk-scaling model has yet emerged) is lower, reduced controls can be applied to 
facilitate financial inclusion. These adjustments aim to mitigate or reduce the inability or 
difficulty for clients to provide documentary evidence to verify identity or residential address; 
compliance costs for financial institutions flowing from systems requirements; and CDD and 
record-keeping obligations (notably a requirement to keep physical records, especially for 
once-off transactions). 
 
Guideline 7: Risk-based sequencing of AML controls 
Where countries do not have the capacity to implement full and effective AML/CFT controls on 
all relevant transactions and institutions all at once, a sequencing approach can be followed. 
The level of controls imposed must be scaled to the capacity of the regulator and the 
institutions involved. Sequencing and scaling must be coupled with a framework to manage an 
increase in the required capacity to ensure that the international standards are reached. 
Guideline 8: Promote market-based reforms facilitating formalisation 
The twin objectives of effective AML/CFT controls and financial inclusion can be greatly 
enhanced by market incentives that contribute to (1) formalise informal or unregistered 
providers of financial services and/or (2) migrate users of informal financial services to formal 
or registered providers. Although such reforms are not strictly part of AML/CFT regulation, their 
short-term impact on both objectives may be more significant than the actual AML/CFT 
regulation and should be favourably considered by regulators seeking to implement AML/CFT 
controls. 
Guideline 9: Develop the national identification infrastructure. 
If a country‟s national identification infrastructure and other private databases lack coverage, 
integrity or is not easily and cost-effectively accessible to financial institutions for verification 
purposes, the state should address the deficiencies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Fighting international crime and ensuring international security necessitate the combating of 
money laundering and the suppression of the financing of terrorism. Since the late 1980s, the 
international community has committed itself to ensuring that every jurisdiction adopts laws and 
procedures that thwart the laundering of the proceeds of crime. From the late 1990s, and with 
increasing urgency after 11th September 2001, similar commitments have been made in 
respect of financing of terrorism. 
Global uniformity has been a key element of the strategy to prevent money laundering and to 
suppress financing of terrorism. Early in the process, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
formulated Forty Recommendations for the control of money laundering to guide countries in 
the adoption and enforcement of appropriate laws. These recommendations have developed 
into the international standard for money laundering control. The Forty Recommendations were 
subsequently revised and, in 2001, following the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
supplemented with Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. Both these sets of 
recommendations, jointly known as the Forty Nine Recommendations, are now used by the 
international community as best practice standards for individual countries‟ laws and 
procedures against money laundering and financing of terrorism. The Recommendations have 
ensured a large measure of conformity between the relevant anti-money laundering ("AML") 
and combating of financing of terrorism ("CFT") systems of countries around the world. 
The Recommendations were drafted with a measure of flexibility to allow developed and 
developing economies to implement them in a context-sensitive manner. Due to a variety of 
reasons, developing countries have not always utilised this flexibility and simply fashioned their 
AML/CFT frameworks on the models of developed countries. This lack of context-sensitive 
implementation has given rise to unintended negative consequences. 
The possibility that the indiscriminate implementation of AML/CFT regulation (in developed and 
developing countries) may lead to financial exclusion and undermine the development of the 
financial sector, gave rise to this study. Financial exclusion risks undermining the social and 
political stability and economic development of these jurisdictions and leaves the excluded with 
little choice but to make use of informal financial services. By creating larger unmonitored 
sectors of the economy, this directly undermines the purpose of the international scheme, 
namely, to increase international safety and stability. 
As a result, this project was commissioned by the FIRST Initiative
1
 to (1) assess the impact of 
the implementation of international anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) standards on financial inclusion in developing countries and, (2) to 
develop a set of tools or guidelines to assist the authorities in developing countries to design 
AML/CFT regimes that are compliant with FATF standards, but that will not impact unduly on 
financial inclusion. The project is supervised and guided by a steering committee consisting of 
representatives from the FIRST Management Unit
2
, World Bank
3
, International Monetary Fund 
                                                     
1
 The Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) Initiative is a significant $53m multi-donor program, supporting capacity 
building and policy development projects in the financial sector. FIRST is a joint initiative being undertaken by the World Bank, the IMF 
and a number of bilateral development agencies. These include DFID (UK Department for International Development), CIDA (Canadian 
International Development Agency), SECO (the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland), MFA (the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands), and Sida (the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). 
2
 Represented at various meetings by Subhrendu Chatterjee, Mark St Giles, Jayyad Malik and Rudi van der Bijl. 
3
 Latifah Merican Cheong and Raul Hernandez-Coss. 
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(IMF)
4
, the UK‟s Department for International Development (DFID)
5
, the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP)
6
, the South African National Treasury
7
, the FinMark Trust
8
 and 
Professor Nikos Passas, an acknowledged world expert on AML/CFT standards and 
implementation. 
The project entailed a cross-country study of five countries – Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, 
Pakistan and South Africa – and three smaller case studies of mobile banking in the 
Philippines, the regulation of money service businesses in the US and the adjustment of CDD 
requirements in the UK to avoid exclusion. 
This document presents the findings of the study and is set out as follows: 
 Section 2 sets out the scope of the project and provides an overview of the analytical 
framework applied; 
 Section 3 highlights the key findings of the country studies and case studies (details are 
summarised in Appendix A); 
 Section 4 notes the observed evolution of AML/CFT regimes in the sample countries; 
 Section 5 notes the drivers of AML/CFT impact on inclusion identified in the countries 
reviewed; 
 Section 6 outlines the impact on inclusion and mitigating responses identified in the sample 
countries; and 
 Section 7 concludes with the proposed guidelines based on these findings.  
The detailed information and data on individual countries are contained in Appendixes B to F, 
with a summary table in Appendix A. Please note that the information contained in the report 
and appendixes is stated as at the dates of the respective country visits, except where key 
data, such as the contents of a bill, only became available subsequently. The key findings of 
the country studies in section 3 are not referenced to prevent repetition. Readers are referred 
to the references contained in the relevant appendixes. 
 
                                                     
4
 Represented at various meetings by Chee Lee and Maud Bökkerink 
5
 Represented at various meetings Doug Pearce, Valsah Shah and Martin Alsop 
6
 Represented by Jennifer Isern 
7
 Represented at various meetings by Jonathan Dixon, Nkosana Mashiya and Raadhika Sookoo 
8
 Represented by Jeremy Leach 
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2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analytical framework comprises key assumptions which underpinned the work, the scope 
definition and a working concept of financial inclusion and the driving forces which impact upon 
it. 
2.1. ASSUMPTIONS 
Two key assumptions were made to direct the study away from assessing the level of 
compliance with the FATF Recommendations (which fell beyond the scope of this study) and 
focus on the impact of different levels and stages of implementation on financial inclusion: 
 AML/CFT regulation need not impact unduly on financial inclusion. The FATF 
Recommendations provide sufficient scope for individual countries to tailor AML/CFT 
regimes to suit their circumstances. If a country implements the FATF Recommendations 
in such a context-sensitive manner, it will not impact unduly on financial inclusion in that 
country.   
 Laws are implemented. This project does not assess the extent to which countries comply 
with the FATF Recommendations. The assumption is that where a country has enacted an 
AML/CFT regulatory regime (comprising the entire spectrum of legal directives and 
guidelines), it will in due course be fully implemented. Where countries have implemented 
the FATF Recommendations, but are not yet effectively enforcing the regulatory regime, 
we do not evaluate the level of implementation, but do assess both the actual impact of 
partial implementation as well as the potential impact of full implementation. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly, both partial and full implementation can have an impact 
on access to financial services, albeit through different dynamics. Secondly, financial 
service providers and transactions that operate cross-border will often require compliance 
with laws even when such laws are not actively enforced, to ensure that the institutions are 
legally compliant and are able to maintain correspondent relationships. 
2.2. SCOPE 
In order to ensure that the study achieves it objectives while remaining practical, the following 
focal points where chosen. 
Focus on the vulnerable client categories. The analysis focused on three particularly vulnerable 
client categories: The poor, the informal and undocumented migrants (as well as the financial 
services providers serving these groups). As the most vulnerable client categories, these 
consumers can be seen as the “lowest common denominators”, implying that if they have 
access to financial services, higher-income households will also have access. The specific 
definition of poverty used is not important as the focus is on those households at the lower end 
of the income distribution who are excluded from access to a particular financial service.  
Focus on access by individuals rather than legal persons. The study focused on access to 
financial services by individual persons, rather than legal persons. The recommendations are, 
however, also relevant for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) who often transact 
through the owner or are faced by similar challenges as individual clients.  
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Focus on deposit accounts and money transfer services. The study was limited to two financial 
services, deposit accounts and money transfer services, offered by bank or non-bank financial 
service providers. These services are extensively used by lower-income consumers and have 
been found to be particularly vulnerable to the introduction of AML/CFT regulation. In addition, 
a broader scan was also conducted to consider the way in which credit and insurance products 
may be affected but no evidence of any significant impact was found.  
Regulation and supervision. For the purposes of this study, formal financial services are 
defined as those provided by financial service providers which are registered with a regulatory 
body for the provision of such services. This definition of formality is, however, not always easy 
to apply and was not found to be a useful delineation for this analysis. For example, in the case 
where formal institutions are regulated but not supervised in practice (i.e. regulation exists but 
is not enforced) such institutions are often treated in a similar manner to informal entities by the 
regulated FSPs. In the implementation of AML/CFT regulation, this was found to be a critical 
issue affecting the relationship between large FSPs and small unsupervised (but regulated) 
FSPs. 
Focus include formal and informal. The primary focus of this study is on the formal financial 
sector. It is, however acknowledged that the informal financial sector plays a critical role in 
financial sector development. Informal providers may provide a low-cost distribution 
mechanism for formal products (e.g. informal savings clubs that share the cost of one bank 
account, which may be unaffordable for any individual member of the group) or may offer 
completely informal products without any relationship with formal providers (e.g. informal 
insurance not linked to a formal financial institution or money transfers conducted by 
hawaladars). From an inclusion perspective, the objective is to facilitate the development of the 
formal sector while at the same time (and where appropriate) preserving the critical services 
provided by the informal sector. It is important to note that informal does not necessarily mean 
illegal. If no regulatory framework exists that criminalises a specific informal financial activity, it 
is unregulated rather than illegal. 
Country selection. The criteria used to determine the sample of countries included in this study 
reflect a variety factors identified as potentially determining the degree of impact on financial 
inclusion of implementing the FATF Recommendations. These criteria can be grouped in four 
categories: 
 Development and character of the banking sector; 
 Nature and extent of remittances; 
 Demographic characteristics relevant to AML/CFT and access; and 
 AML/CFT risk. 
By applying these criteria a short-list of 12 countries was identified that reflected sufficient 
variety to provide a basis for generalised conclusions. The final selection, determined by the 
project Steering Committee, aimed to ensure a sufficiently diverse (also geographically) base 
of evidence for the development of guidelines within the budget constraints of the project. It 
also took into account the practicalities of conducting research in the respective countries. The 
result of this was a list of five countries: Kenya, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa. 
In addition, three smaller case studies on interesting developments in other countries were 
identified that could add value to the tools being developed by this project. These related to 
mobile banking in the Philippines, the regulation of Money Service Businesses in the USA and 
the adjustment of client due diligence requirements in the UK to avoid exclusion. 
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2.3. FINANCIAL INCLUSION: ACCESS, USAGE AND MARKET EFFICIENCIES 
The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of AML/CFT regulation on financial 
inclusion. Financial inclusion is ultimately about whether individual consumers (particularly low-
income consumers) can access and on a sustainable basis use financial services that are 
appropriate to their needs. Inclusion is affected by factors impacting on the individual directly 
(demand-side) as well as on the institutions providing the services (supply-side) (ultimately to 
impact on the inclusion/exclusion of the individual). These impacts may explicitly exclude 
individuals from using a particular service (referred to as access barriers) or it may discourage 
users from using (referred to as usage barriers) a particular service even if they are not 
explicitly excluded. Similarly, impacts may exclude or discourage FSPs from providing a 
particular financial service to the lower-income market (referred to as market efficiency 
barriers). Ultimately financial sector policy not only aims to ensure that users (and FSPs) are 
not excluded from the formal financial sector, but also that they are incentivised to use formal 
services and actively do so.  
Accordingly, the analytical framework considers the potential impact on three dimensions of 
financial inclusion: access to financial services, usage (or take-up) of financial services and 
other aspects of market structure and efficiency. These concepts are explained below. 
Access to financial services can be defined as the ability of individuals to obtain and, on a 
sustainable basis, use financial services that are affordable, usable and appropriate to their 
financial needs (Genesis Analytics, 2004b). The methodology used to assess access typically 
focuses on factors that may exclude individuals from being able to use a particular product. 
Five drivers of access have been identified (Porteous, 2004): 
 Proximity. This considers how far a person must travel to access the service concerned 
and is usually defined in terms of the time required and/or the cost of travel.  
 Affordability. This will differ across financial products, but the basic premise is that people 
are likely to be excluded from a particular financial service if the cost of using the service 
exceeds a critical threshold relative to their monthly income and/or the value of the 
transaction9. This also relates to the concept of value which we include under the usage 
factors.  
 Appropriate product features. The features of the service should be appropriate to the user 
and be able to meet the user‟s particular needs for the financial service. For example, 
some deposit accounts incentivise or explicitly set limited deposit or withdrawal activity10, 
which may not be suited to an informal trader who needs to deposit cash on a daily basis. 
 Appropriate terms or eligibility requirements. These are defined as eligibility requirements 
imposed by financial service providers beyond what is dictated by regulation. Contractual 
terms imposed by financial service providers may inappropriately exclude specific 
categories of users from utilising the service. For example, some deposit accounts may 
require minimum balances, levels of income or formal employment, which may exclude the 
poor and/or unemployed. 
                                                     
9
 The benchmark typically used for deposit accounts is that bank charges should not exceed 2% of household income. See Genesis 
(2005) for a more detailed discussion on this benchmark. For remittance products this is more complicated as the cost also relates to 
the underlying value of the transfer. Money transferred often support subsistence at the receiving end and, therefore, transfers are not 
optional. Differences in cost of transfers is, therefore, likely to affect the choice between formal and informal channels but not the value 
or the occurrence of the transfer (see Freund & Spatafora (2005)). In terms of the country evidence, the cost of formal transfers in a 
number of cases exceeds 10% of the value transferred, which is clearly problematic from an affordability point of view.   
10
 By, for example, only allowing a limited number of withdrawals/deposits and applying higher charges if this number is exceeded. 
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 Regulation. Regulation may inadvertently exclude specific groups of people (e.g. if 
regulation requires migrants to provide proof of legality of stay, thereby excluding 
undocumented migrants), or increase the cost of serving particular client groups (e.g. 
requiring banks to open physical files for clients even if account balances are low and 
transactions limited). 
Usage of financial services. While the concept of access is focused on explicit barriers, the 
concept of usage focuses on factors that may discourage taking up or using formal financial 
services even if they do not present an explicit barrier. In some cases individuals may decide 
not to use a particular product even if they are not excluded from doing so. This does not 
simply refer to an arbitrary decision but to the fact that individuals are exercising their (often 
rational) judgement on the value of the product and its ability to meet their needs. This 
judgement is exercised within a complex set of considerations, constraints and priorities. It, 
however, remains the consumer‟s decision as they are not explicitly excluded by the actions of 
a third party. A number of usage drivers have been identified:  
 Value. When considering the cost of a savings account the access analysis may conclude 
that the account is not unaffordable relative to the income level of the consumer. However, 
considering the interest an individual derives from the savings account it may be revealed 
that the costs (while not exclusionary) results in a negative return on a small savings 
balance. Even though the consumer is not excluded based on cost, they would be rational 
to decide not to use this product as it does not offer any value to them. 
 Relative cost. In addition to considering the affordability and value of the product in terms 
of absolute cost, decisions on using specific products are also driven by the cost relative to 
alternatives. In the case of remittances, a reduction in the cost of the formal sector 
remittance may make this look affordable. However the cost of the informal sector product 
may still substantially less than that of the formal. It would be rational for the consumer to 
decide to use the informal product even though they are not explicitly excluded from using 
the formal one. 
 Hassle factor. Convenience plays a major role in consumers‟ choice of service provider. In 
addition to the potential cost advantage of informal remittance product, it may also be more 
convenient to use as it does not require any paper work and can be done by a simple 
telephone conversation. 
 Perceptions and familiarity. Reciprocal negative perceptions between formal FSPs and 
low-income clients may discourage use of formal products. FSPs often perceive the poor 
as unprofitable clients who require much time to serve and with whom their wealthier 
clients do not want to associate in their branches. Low-income clients in turn feel 
intimidated, ashamed or not respected when dealing with formal FSPs and, therefore, 
choose to use alternative (informal) providers who welcome their business.  
 Transaction culture. If consumers are used to conduct transactions in a certain manner, it 
may be difficult to convince them to change (e.g. encouraging use of formal remittance 
providers when the use of informal hawaladars to send money is entrenched). However, it 
is likely that this is driven by perceived value (or lack thereof) rather than simply resistance 
to change. 
 Resistance to documentation. In many cases, clients are sceptical of processes that 
require the presentation of official government documents because they prefer to remain 
below government‟s radar. This may be because of tax evasion, but also because of 
cultural or socio-political reservations.  
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Although it is difficult to quantify the impact of these drivers, the country reviews have found 
that they have a significant impact on take-up and use of financial products. In addition to 
impacting on access, government process and regulation, including AML/CFT controls, also 
impact on these usage drivers. Financial sector policy should ultimately consider both usage 
and access. It is of little benefit to facilitate access by the poor to financial services if steps are 
not taken to increase attractiveness and actual usage of the products. In the case of bank 
accounts, the benefits of increased financial security for the individual and intermediation for 
the broader economy are only achieved if individuals actually use the product. 
Market efficiencies. In addition to access and usage factors, there are also supply-side 
factors which impact on financial inclusion. Market efficiency factors operate at the level of the 
financial institution and impact on the nature and extent of services being offered to lower-
income clients and the competitive dynamics in the market. These factors include market and 
regulatory forces and may limit or discourage entry and operation of players in the low-income 
market. Examples of regulatory impacts on the supply-side include: 
 Increased costs of low-value transactions that undermine their already marginal 
profitability, leading to a withdrawal from the low-income market;  
 Regulation that prevents or delays the introduction of new models and technologies by 
imposing unnecessarily strict requirements; 
 Regulatory bias against small institutions that undermines competition and innovation and 
ultimately increases costs for the consumer; and 
 Regulation that (intentionally or unintentionally) undermines relationships between formal 
and informal FSPs. Given the important distribution role that informal FSPs can play, this 
will have a significant impact on inclusion.  
Many factors impact on access. Even though the focus of this study is on AML/CFT regulation, 
the impact of AML/CFT on financial sector development should not be considered in isolation. 
The analysis shows clearly that there are numerous factors that impact on access and usage 
many of which do not relate to AML/CFT. Various other areas of regulation also impact on the 
market and, in general, FSPs are still currently viewing the profitability of serving the low-
income market with some scepticism. As result, even where low-income products are made 
available, limited marketing and sales effort may, therefore, undermine take-up. This situation 
is, however, changing. Increased effort is invested into removing or reducing regulatory 
barriers and new models and technologies are improving the viability of serving low-income 
markets. Potential AML/CFT barriers that may currently be one contributing factor to exclusion 
may become pronounced as the other factors are being addressed. Accordingly, these non-
AML/CFT barriers to inclusion do not remove the imperative to minimise barriers resulting from 
AML/CFT regulation.  
With this as basis, we now proceed to consider the findings from the country studies. The next 
section provides an overview of the country context, before the subsequent sections highlight 
the cross-cutting findings and proposed guidelines. 
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3. COUNTRY CONTEXT 
This section provides a brief overview of the experience of the five countries included in this 
study with the implementation of AML/CFT controls. 
3.1. INDONESIA11 
The Indonesian case shows the interplay between restructuring following the Asian crisis and 
the adoption and evolution of an AML/CFT regime. In particular, it illustrates the benefit of a 
flexible AML/CFT regime which focuses on high risk areas and is tailored to the capacity of the 
banking sector. 
Bank Indonesia issued the first regulations regarding the application of KYC principles in June 
2001, but this was insufficient to prevent Indonesia‟s listing by the FATF as one of the Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) in the same month. In response, the Indonesian 
government immediately undertook to adopt and implement a comprehensive AML/CFT 
system as a matter of urgency. In 2002, Law 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money 
Laundering was enacted, which criminalised money laundering and created reporting and 
record-keeping obligations for financial institutions. It also established the Indonesian financial 
intelligence unit (PPATK)
12
. A number of staff members of Bank Indonesia were seconded to 
the PPATK to establish the new agency and, by late 2003, the PPATK was operational. The 
money laundering control law was amended in 2003 to broaden the STR reporting duties and 
criminalised the financing of terrorism. Another amendment to the Act is currently being 
prepared to increase the powers of the PPATK and extend the reporting obligations to a 
number of non-financial businesses. In 2005 Indonesia was removed from the NCCT list with 
special monitoring continuing until February 2006. 
During the same period, the Asian crisis of 1997/1998 halved the number of private banks 
through mergers and liquidations. Government recapitalisation of the banking system 
amounted to an estimated 50% of GDP (McLeod, 2003). Given the severity of the crisis, 
central bank policy shifted from the privatisation drive of the mid-1990s to stability, good 
governance and consolidation, which is currently still the focus. A positive spin-off of the post-
crisis restructuring and mergers is that many banks have acquired advanced new IT systems. 
These systems are able to deal with the requirements of AML/CFT regulation with limited 
additional cost.  
The Indonesian financial sector is large and diverse, spanning three tiers of banking service 
providers: 131 commercial banks, 2 000 BPRs or “peoples banks” and more than 11,000 MFIs 
(including 5,300 village cooperative banks or BKDs). Although included in financial regulation, 
the BKDs are effectively unregulated in practice. Furthermore, no AML/CFT regulation is 
currently enforced on the second and third tiers of institutions as these are considered to 
present low risk. The state-owned bank, BRI, dominates provision of banking services to lower-
income households and is doing so profitably. Operating through 4,600 village units, the bank 
has 30m account holders, making it the largest bank (by number of accounts) in Indonesia. In 
addition, the BPRs have an estimated 6m account holders. The clients of BRI and the BPRs 
are estimated to make up as much as two thirds of all bank clients. However, banking 
                                                     
11
 The full country study with data references can be found in Appendix A 
12
 Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan. 
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penetration remains low with between 20% and 30% of adults estimated to have a savings 
account. 
The AML regime as promulgated reflects an understanding of banking and bank capacity. For 
example, the regulations stipulate that banks are required to have a management information 
system in place but does not require these systems to be electronic or of a particularly 
advanced nature
13
, which may be prohibitive for small players and unnecessary given the level 
of risk such players pose. The audit/traceability role of account monitoring is emphasized 
rather than real-time detection capability
14
. 
The country has a ubiquitous identification system. The integrity of the system is however often 
questioned and no uniform national identity number exists. CDD regulation requires upfront 
identification (verified generally in respect of Indonesian citizens with the widely available 
identity card, the KTP) as well as re-identification of current clients. In recognition of the 
limitations of the KTP, the regulation requires profiling information to be collected to allow 
monitoring of the account. The profile information is retained and the profiling information 
reflected on the KTP is verified with reference to the KTP. The government is in the process of 
improving the identity infrastructure. In support of re-identification efforts in respect of existing 
customers, Bank Indonesia initiated a marketing campaign to explain the reasons for re-
identification and to inform the public that all banks will require the same information of clients. 
Walk-in clients remitting or receiving an amount below Rp100m ($10,870) were exempted from 
KYC requirements. The average remittance amount is estimated to be about $250. However, 
in 2006 Bank Indonesia introduced a regulation requiring all new money remitters to be 
licensed and all existing money remitters to apply for licences before 31 December 2008. 
Licensed money remitters are required to identify and verify the identities of all remitting and 
receiving parties. In the new regime the Rp 100m exemption to the KYC requirements has 
fallen away.  
It is estimated that between 3m and 5m mostly female domestic workers on 2-3 year contracts 
in the Middle East and South-East Asia remit between $3bn (lower estimate - formal only) and 
$15bn (upper estimate – including informal) per year. Based on these figures, at least 50% and 
as much as 80% of remittances may flow through informal channels or is carried in cash (by 
friends or by the worker at the end of her contract). Given the vulnerability of low-skilled 
migrant workers, the Indonesian government has launched initiatives to support workers 
abroad and encourage use of formal remittance channels. All migrant workers are required to 
use a government-approved placement agent that provides training, arranges the required 
documentation and can support the worker if she is treated unfairly by her overseas employer. 
Since June 2006, workers are also obliged to open a bank account before they leave for their 
working destination in an effort to introduce them to the formal sector. For this purpose, 
government (through the employment agencies) have formed alliances with commercial banks.  
Despite these efforts, there are a number of reasons why informal flows remain high. Illegal 
Indonesian workers (as many as 2m) are not able to use the formal remittances system 
because of documentation requirements in the sending country. The shorter contract term for 
Indonesian migrants also means that the minimum amount is sent home while the worker is 
                                                     
13
 According to the 2003 guidance issued by Bank Indonesia, the system can either operate manually or automatically. 
14
 As explained by the head of the PPATK (2006): “No country can prevent bombings by doing financial analysis. What we can do is 
backward analysis. Once the bomb explodes, and the police find a lead, we can trace their financial transactions. So, our function is 
more to facilitate the police investigation.” 
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abroad and the bulk is brought home in cash at the end of the contract. Furthermore, the use of 
informal channels is also inadvertently fostered by the agency system. The worker is in many 
cases introduced to an employment agency through a broker, who often also finances their 
initial costs of going abroad. The worker is then initially forced to send a proportion of earnings 
to the broker to settle their debt and, at an additional fee, the broker can also deliver money to 
their homes. After the debt is cleared, this practice is often continued. The convenience of 
dealing through informal channels and cash carrying, therefore, weighs against the use of 
formal channels. Commercial banks are now looking at using the agency basis to extend loans 
to workers going abroad. This will reduce the dependency on brokers and may facilitate an 
increase in formal remittances. 
3.2. KENYA 
Kenya has not yet enacted a dedicated and comprehensive AML/CFT law. In 1994, money 
laundering was criminalised in anti-drug legislation
15
. In 2000, the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) issued prudential guidelines under the Banking Act, setting out basic AML rules for 
commercial banks. From this time on, banks began to implement practices and procedures to 
comply with their AML/CFT obligations. In January 2006, the CBK issued more comprehensive 
prudential guidelines relating to money laundering. The prudential guidelines apply to all 
institutions licensed under the Banking Act
16
. In 2003, the Kenyan government constituted a 
14-member task force under the lead of the Ministry of Finance to prepare an AML bill. The Bill 
was gazetted during 2006 and re-gazetted in April 2007, but is unlikely to be enacted before 
the elections in 2008. The publicly available bill in conjunction with interviews with the task 
force was used to assess its potential impact on financial inclusion. 
The Kenyan AML bill applies an ambitious “one size fits all” approach to a wide range of 
financial institutions. Whereas the current prudential guidelines apply only to banks, the Bill in 
its current form will also apply to Postbank, savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), all 
MFIs, money remitters (formal and informal), insurers and cell phone value transfers. Although 
the bill allows for the tailoring of regulations to the risk (and capacity) of different financial 
institutions, the task force has indicated that no exemptions are currently planned. 
Commercial banks in Kenya have traditionally served a narrow market of middle and upper 
income clients and have applied exclusionary terms such as high minimum balances to their 
products. Only 19% of Kenyans had a bank account (including Postbank clients) through a 
formally regulated financial institution in 2006. A further 8% used a financial product from a 
SACCO or MFI (FinAccess, 2006). The impact of the AML bill on commercial banks is 
therefore likely to be limited as their clients will have little difficulty to comply with the 
requirements. The impact will be more pronounced for commercial banks such as Equity and 
K-Rep which are now targeting the poor. In April 2007, Equity Bank was serving 1.1m low-
income clients and asserted that it had captured 31% of all account holders in Kenya (Muiruri, 
2007). 
The biggest impact on financial inclusion is likely to flow from the CDD requirements. New 
clients will be required to present proof of identity, residential address and source of income 
(even more onerous than the requirements in South Africa – see Section 3.5). Address 
verification is likely to be particularly problematic as it is estimated that only 5% of the 
                                                     
15
 Anti-Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1994 
16
 Postbank is exempted from the Banking Act and operates independently under the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Act, 1978. 
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population will be able to produce a utility bill
17
 as proof of address. As a result, low-income 
clients (of which Equity Bank alone has more than 1m) will need to use the alternative provided 
of having their address (or “living location” where there is no address) verified by a government 
official. This will increase the inconvenience cost and is likely to discourage rather than 
encourage clients from accessing formal financial services. 
Postbank, which has the largest reported base of accounts (1m active accounts and a further 
1m inactive accounts) in the country, is not subject to the current prudential guidelines relating 
to money laundering. As a result, its AML compliance is lower than that of commercial banks. 
Its KYC procedures require only sight of a national identity card but no documents proving or 
verifying address or source of income/occupation, it does not keep all records required of 
commercial banks and it does not monitor or report suspicious transactions. If the AML bill 
extends to the Postbank
18
, it will require re-identifying 1m predominantly poor and rural clients, 
obtaining copies of records and complying with reporting duties, which will be expensive and 
difficult given the client profile. No exemption for Postbank is currently planned. 
SACCOs, of which there are about 3,600 in Kenya with 2.2 million members, and MFIs (that 
can now start providing deposit-taking services under the Microfinance Act) have even more 
limited capacity to comply with the requirements as set out in the Bill
19
. SACCOs provide basic 
savings and loans services to members, as well as a linkage to the formal payment system 
through their keeping accounts with commercial banks. About 90% of SACCOs hold their 
accounts with the Co-operative Bank. If they cannot meet the compliance requirements, the 
SACCOs could run the risk that their accounts will be closed by commercial banks trying to 
avoid the risks of non-compliance and large sanctions being imposed (in the same manner in 
which the accounts of MSBs are being closed down in other countries). About 1.4m members 
of SACCOs and MFIs do not have their own bank accounts and would only have indirect 
access to a bank account through their SACCO or MFI (FinAccess, 2006). These individuals 
would, if SACCO and MFI bank accounts were closed, thus loose their link to the formal 
financial sector. Furthermore, the draft AML/CFT regulations that apply to institutions licensed 
under the Microfinance Act are just as restrictive as regulations that apply to banks with respect 
to the identification of clients. New clients will be required to present proof of identity, residential 
address and source of income. 
The Central Bank of Kenya Act restricts cross-border money transfers to banks or specifically 
licensed operators. Currently only commercial banks, Postbank and the Kenyan post office, as 
well as Western Union and MoneyGram (acting as agents of Postbank and the commercial 
banks) are licensed to conduct cross-border transfers. As a result, competition in the formal 
remittances market is limited and this is reflected in charges which extend to 12-17% of the 
value of the transfer, significantly higher than the cost of informal operators who typically 
charge less than 5%. The high cost of formal remittances has fuelled a large informal 
remittance market estimated to be at least as large as formal flows. Although outflows may be 
significant, industry players estimate Kenya to be a net remittance receiving country. If applied 
in the intended way to remittance services, AML/CFT legislation will also have a direct negative 
                                                     
17
 Although a utility bill will be sent to an individual‟s postal address (which may differ from their residential address), the utility bill is 
likely to contain the residential address that is being billed for certain services. 
18
 There is a difference of opinion on this point: Postbank has indicated that it will not be covered by the new Bill; the task force is clear 
that it will. On the explicit wording of the publicly available bill, Postbank is covered. 
19
 Microfinance institutions are also required to comply with the Microfinance (Deposit-taking microfinance proceeds of crime and anti-
money laundering) Regulations, 2007 which require verification of identity, residential addres and employment/source of income. 
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impact on access to new remittance services such as M-PESA that is currently being being 
rolled out in Kenya by Vodafone and Safaricom. 
The AML/CFT bill in its current form also extends to informal remitters. To date, no attempt has 
been made to formalise the informal remittance sector or encourage informal remitters to 
register. 
3.3. MEXICO 
Mexico provides rich experience in the interplay between AML/CFT controls and financial 
inclusion. It has a liberalised market for remittance services and a tiered banking system. The 
level and coverage of AML controls applied to these various financial institutions have changed 
significantly over the past decade. The deposit-taking sector is divided into the commercial 
banking sector and the so-called “popular finance” sector. The existence of the latter is partly 
the result of the loss of confidence in commercial banks, but also reflects an explicit attempt by 
government to create the regulatory space for multiple entities to operate in the market. The 
regulatory facilitation of the popular finance sector was also done to widen the options 
available to consumers of financial services. 
Mexico, a FATF member, was the first of the five countries reviewed in this study to adopt AML 
controls. Money laundering was criminalised in 1996 and a Financial Intelligence Unit under 
the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) was established in 1997. International terrorism and the 
financing of terrorism were officially criminalised in September 2006 through amendments to 
the Federal Penal Code. In 1997, one set of general AML regulations applicable to banks, 
casas de cambio (money exchange houses), insurance companies, stock brokerages, bond 
institutions and limited objective financial institutions (SOFOLES) was introduced. Money 
remitters and centros cambiarios (money exchange centres of which the activities are limited to 
foreign exchange transactions below $10 000 and that cannot wire money cross-border) were 
brought into the AML regulatory net only in 2004, although their activities remain unregulated 
for other purposes. 
Mexico follows a scheme of institutional regulation of the financial sector, i.e. different laws 
exist for various types of financial institutions, even though they may perform similar types of 
transactions. A general obligation to impose AML controls was therefore inserted into the 
relevant financial sector laws, with each law referring to a set of general AML regulations to be 
promulgated. One set of general regulations applicable to all institutions subject to AML 
controls was issued in 1997. This general set of regulations was refined in 2000. Since then 
the regulators have promulgated several sets of AML controls, each applying to a different 
category of financial institution. In each case the regulations have been tailored on a risk-
sensitive basis to the differing realities that the respective financial institutions face, e.g. 
varying levels of capacity and systems, and different types and values of transactions. This 
gradual evolution continues and is especially prominent in regulations for banks and cajas 
(popular finance institutions) that were enacted in November 2007. Before the latter set of 
regulations was enacted, the same AML/CFT regulatory burden applied to commercial banks 
and popular loan and savings entities.  With the new regulations, a more appropriate and less 
burdensome system has been created for the popular savings sector. Requirements regarding 
client identification and automatic alert systems were customized according to different entities‟ 
activities.  The regulations for cajas distinguish between two groups of cajas – a first group of 
Type 1 entities and a second group consisting of Type 2, 3 and 4 entities. These entities differ 
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in terms of their asset and deposit base with Type 1 entities being much smaller. They will 
therefore be subject to lesser controls than Type 2, 3 and 4 entities. 
Large, commercial banks have not been actively targeting the low-income market. Foreign 
ownership of Mexican banks exceeds 75% of banking sector assets (prominent foreign-owned 
banks include HSBC, BBVA Bancomer, Banamex and Santander) (CNBV, 2006). This is a 
direct result of the Mexican government‟s attempt to facilitate recapitalisation after the financial 
sector and banking crisis during the mid-1990s. Many of the foreign banks concede that the 
low-income market is not their direct target market and, since their internal AML policies are set 
at their international headquarters, they have to apply controls which are usually stricter than 
domestic controls. A recent CGAP report, focused on assessing the availability of savings 
services, concluded that “the prospect of traditional commercial banks reaching down on a 
large scale to serve low-income clients is not likely in the near future”. (Klaehn, Helms & 
Deshpande, 2006: 8). This was confirmed by conversations with various commercial banks 
that see the payroll market (formally employed individuals) as their primary interest. This non-
face-to-face client acquisition strategy is executed without KYC by the bank – the KYC process 
is effectively outsourced to the employer. 
The onus of broadening financial inclusion has largely fallen on the popular finance sector. A 
number of financial institutions, in various legal forms (credit unions, SOFOLES
20
, caja de 
populares and caja de sociedades
21
) and regulated under at least two different acts are 
providing valuable savings and credit services to the low-income market. The Mexican 
government has identified the popular finance sector and its formalisation process as one 
vehicle through which diversity (to facilitate growth in the low-income market) in the financial 
sector can be achieved. 
The differentiated AML controls issued to cover these institutions, apply reduced controls to 
lower-risk transactions. For example, for certain entities full KYC (providing proof of identity 
and residential address) for occasional or walk-in clients for cross-border wire transfers need 
only be applied for amounts exceeding US$3,000
22
. Above this threshold, the financial 
institution will be required to open a physical file, with copies of the verified identity document 
and proof of residential address, for the sender. Some institutions need not open physical files 
for accounts with balances or transactions below $3,000 (centros cambiarios) and $5,000 
(Banco Azteca). However, the requirement to check the names of low-income clients against 
lists of PEPs is considered too onerous, given the particularly broad legal definition of PEPs in 
Mexico. 
Differentiation of AML controls by institutions has not only had benefits for financial inclusion, 
but has also created some problems. Institutions serving the same clients and performing the 
same transactions are subject to different controls and different levels of supervision. This is 
especially pronounced in remittance market in the uneasy relationship between casas de 
cambios and centros cambiarios. While casas de cambios are strictly regulated and 
supervised, with large minimum capital requirements applying, centros are essentially 
unregulated and unsupervised (although they are required to register with the national tax 
authority, SAT
23
). Given their largely unregulated nature and a perception of high risk, banks 
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 According to the IMF (2006a: 4), SOFOLES can be defined as “nondeposit-taking specialised credit institutions. 
21
 Popular savings and credit institutions 
22
 It is important to note that this threshold has been decreased from US$5,000 to US$3,000 for banks in the new regulations that apply 
to institutions regulated under the Credit Institutions Act. 
23
 By December 2007, SAT had registered 2,212 centros cambiarios (SAT, 2007). 
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have started to close the bank accounts of centros cambiarios, thereby excluding them from 
the formal payment system. This will affect the ability of the centros cambiarios to form the last 
link in the remittance chain. 
Mexico is the largest remittance-receiving country in Central and Latin-America and one of the 
top three remittance-receiving countries in the world
24
. During 2005, remittances to Mexico 
totalled US$20 billion (2.6% of GDP) – the result of 58m remittance transactions with an 
average value of US$341 each (Banco de México, 2006). The Mexican government, through 
the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, has been an active facilitator of formal remittance flows. 
Efforts to capture remittance flows through formal channels have included active lobbying for 
wide acceptance of the Matricula Consular card by American banks as proof of identity (in the 
opening of bank accounts and sending of remittances) for Mexican migrants without formal US 
documents proving legal residency (Institute for Mexicans Abroad, 2006). As a result of this 
and other initiatives it is estimated that only about 10% of remittances between the US and 
Mexico flow through informal channels. 
3.4. PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is under significant pressure to pass an AML bill. In 2002, a working group was 
formed to draft the AML law. The purpose of this law is to clarify the offence of money 
laundering
25
, create an FIU and bring Pakistan‟s AML regime in line with international best 
practice. The bill is currently before Parliament, but its contents are not publicly known. Until 
the AML bill is passed, the current AML legal framework consists largely of prudential 
regulations. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has issued prudential guidelines (under the 
Banking Ordinance and covering banks and money exchange companies) to be consistent with 
the FATF recommendations. These guidelines cover the areas of KYC policies, record-
keeping, due diligence of correspondent banks and reporting of suspicious transactions. 
Separate guidelines have been issued for Micro-finance (MF) Banks. 
The guidelines applicable to MF banks are fewer and more flexible than those applicable to 
commercial banks. Commercial banks have to KYC clients by obtaining a copy of their 
Computerised National Identification Cards (CNIC), their service cards (if they are employed) 
and must also have a formal introduction from a third person who can be trusted. Illiterate 
persons must produce a photograph and fingerprints. MF banks, in contrast, are only required 
to determine the true identity of clients and, although it is suggested that MF banks try to obtain 
the CNIC of clients, this requirement is not rigid. No AML requirements have been set for 
institutions like Post Bank and the Central Directorate for National Savings (CDNS) outlets that 
sell CDNS product/accounts. There are, however, general instructions developed by the CDNS 
under guidance from the Ministry of Finance, which seeks to establish a framework to 
„encourage‟ institutions to know their clients better before they deal with them. These 
instructions are not related to the AML regime. When selling a CDNS product or opening an 
account, what is required is an introduction and verification of identity by the CNIC. 
Extending financial inclusion is a key objective of the SBP. In November 2005, the SBP 
introduced a basic bank account (BBA) that all banks are compelled to offer to clients. The 
BBA allows a limited number of free transactions and a limited number of free deposits. 
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 During 2004, only India and China received greater absolute remittance flows. However, from a relative perspective (i.e. remittance 
flows expressed as percentage of GDP), Mexico is not one of the largest remittance receiving countries. 
25
 The provisions of the AML bill are in addition to the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, the Anti-terrorism Act and the National 
Accountability Ordinance. 
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However, take-up has not been significant. This may be as a result of a very limited push by 
banks to market the product and other factors (such as a lack of disposable income) which 
keep the poor out of bank branches. Moreover, for most of the major banks the focus now is 
not on extending access, but rather on installing modern systems and practices following large-
scale privatisation of banks during the past few years. 
In the absence of a comprehensive AML/CFT law, the impact of AML/CFT implementation on 
usage has been muted due to a number of reasons. Firstly, commercial banks find themselves 
hampered in their attempts to re-identify existing clients since the prudential regulations do not 
provide for account closures by the banks where clients fail to comply with the controls. 
Furthermore, the ability of banks to report suspicious transactions remains limited by the 
dictates of client confidentiality. Secondly, usage of bank accounts in Pakistan is limited and 
individuals that currently use bank accounts derive from higher-income groups and, as such, 
have less difficulty to comply with KYC requirements. Thirdly, the bulk of the adult population 
has already been issued with the new CNIC. This new national identification system, managed 
by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is efficient and maintains high 
levels of integrity. As at June 2006, 52m adults (65% of the adult population) have been issued 
with CNICs since the system became operational in October 2001. 
Re-identification of existing clients has posed a major problem. The deadline for re-
identification was 30 June 2006, but was likely to be extended as banks were struggling with 
the re-identification process. One of the largest banks, with significant rural reach, has only 
been able to re-identify 30% of their clients and expects difficulties in re-identifying the 
remaining clients (particularly rural clients). The regulator has offered relief by allowing banks 
to re-identify clients without physical contact and by verifying identity against the NADRA 
database. The cost to banks of performing this process is however very high. NADRA is a self-
financing parastatal and earns its keep from user fees and other services sold. 
Pakistan is a major remittance receiving country. The inflow of remittances is a major source of 
foreign exchange for the country. The SBP has thus made considerable (non-AML related) 
efforts to increase the flow of remittances through formal channels. These include (State Bank 
of Pakistan, Exchange Policy Department, 2006): 
 Reducing transfer costs. A subsidy equivalent to SAR25
26
 ($6.70) for every remittance 
transaction sent through bank channels where the transaction is converted to rupees and 
where there is no charge to the sender or recipient is paid to banks. 
 Increasing competition. The creation of a regulatory framework to facilitate formalisation of 
money changers by registering such institutions as either category A foreign exchange 
companies (who can remit money cross-border and trade in foreign exchange) or category 
B operators who cannot remit cross-border, but can buy foreign exchange and sell rupees. 
 More attractive exchange rate. Reducing the differential between the official exchange rate 
and the kerb rate. 
 Support for Pakistanis abroad. The establishment of a loyalty programme (through the 
Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF)) for Pakistanis working abroad to support, amongst 
other things, the sending of money through formal channels. 
 Improving efficiency of the formal channels. A code of conduct for formal channels was 
drafted, requiring, amongst others, a maximum delivery time through formal channels of 48 
hours (rather than the reality of 2 to 3 weeks). 
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Despite the government‟s efforts to increase formal flows, informal flows remain high. About 
1m households are estimated to receive remittances through formal channels, whilst 4.6m 
households receive remittances through informal channels (Genesis estimates based on 
various assumptions). Thus, use of informal channels is almost five times more than use of 
formal channels, although by value it is estimated that about equal amounts go through the 
formal and informal channels. As there do not seem to be barriers to using formal remittance 
channels, it would seem that the use of informal remittance channels is largely driven by issues 
like familiarity, habit, culture, convenience, relative cost and resistance to documentation. 
Furthermore, informal hawala systems are deeply embedded in trade and cultural 
relationships. Despite the strict money exchange registration regime, we could not trace any 
law enforcement steps taken against unregistered operators. 
For AML purposes, money exchange companies only have to verify the identity of the senders 
of remittances in excess of $10,000 (per transaction). This is quite a generous exemption and 
assists in facilitating outward flows. However, within the Pakistan context this threshold is of 
less importance since it is mainly a receiving country and thus dependent on the AML regimes 
of sending countries. 
3.5. SOUTH AFRICA 
Compared to the other developing countries that were studied, the interplay between financial 
inclusion and AML controls received most attention from policy-makers in South Africa. Drug-
related money laundering was criminalised in 1992 and laundering from any type of offence in 
1996. The money laundering control law (the Financial Intelligence Centre Act or FICA) was 
passed in 2001 and the money laundering control regulations came into force on 30 June 
2003. From that date, registered financial institutions were required, amongst others, to identify 
and verify the identity of all new clients. South Africa has a tradition of strong financial sector 
regulation and compliance for formal financial institutions, especially banks. The introduction of 
AML controls, however, added significant new compliance burdens for financial institutions. 
These burdens increased in 2005 when the terror financing laws took effect. 
During the same period that the government was putting in place the AML regime, the cause of 
promoting financial inclusion gained strong momentum. The exclusionary effect of apartheid 
locked many poor South Africans out of the formal financial system and mainstream financial 
institutions have traditionally not been geared to servicing the poor. Post-1994, following the 
advent of democracy and as part of a broader movement to empower black South Africans, the 
new government has sought to make the financial sector more accessible. Negotiations within 
the financial sector resulted in the creation of the Financial Sector Charter (the Charter) in 2003 
in which the banking industry committed itself, amongst others, to the provision of access to 
basic banking services to 80% of lower-income consumers by 2008. Since these targets 
impact directly on the ability of banks to secure government and other contracts, they are 
actively pursued by formal financial institutions. The government also committed itself to 
amend any regulations that inhibit compliance with the Charter. 
From this commitment to access was born the Mzansi bank account, a savings account with 
basic transaction capability aimed at the low-income market, launched in collaboration by the 
big four banks and Postbank in October 2005. The AML regime presented a major obstacle to 
launching the Mzansi account. The FICA regulations prescribe that the identity of natural 
persons must be verified by means of an identity document and by comparing the person‟s 
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residential address details with documentation that is reasonably practical to obtain and can 
reasonably be expected to achieve such verification. Although South Africa has a national 
identification system and most adults hold ID documents, there are problems with the integrity 
of the system. A recent investigative television program estimated that up to 25% of issued ID 
documents could be fraudulent (Special Assignment, 2006). The additional verification 
requirement relating to residential address was imposed to compensate for this weakness and 
to limit the opportunity for identity fraud.  
The need for documentary verification of physical address proved insurmountable for many 
South Africans. Only approximately 44% of the population has a residential address (i.e. does 
not live in an informal settlement or in rural areas on communal or farm land where it is difficult 
to attach “an address” to the dwelling) (Genesis Analytics, 2004a). This amounts to just more 
than 4m addresses out of 9.1m households. The drafters of the AML regulations did in fact 
identify address verification as a potential obstacle for the poor to access financial services. As 
a result, the regulations were drafted to include a specific exemption (Exemption 17) which 
relieved institutions of the obligation to obtain details of and verify residential addresses if the 
financial product in question met certain stringent criteria. These criteria were drafted in 
consultation with the banks. Banks gave their input into this process based on the needs of 
their existing clients. As a result the conditions proved impractical for the majority of the 
financially excluded. Banks therefore found it difficult to verify key details of their low-income 
clients, both new and existing clients, whom they were required to re-identify. Moreover, the 
banks‟ compliance officers tended to interpret the AML regulations narrowly rather than widely, 
even further restricting the leeway which the regulations allowed them.  
The banks therefore approached the regulator for relief and guidance. The regulator responded 
by amending Exemption 17 to make it more appropriate for low-value accounts and 
transactions. This amendment was based on actual market research and an analysis of the 
needs and reality of the financially excluded. The amended Exemption 17 dispenses with the 
need to obtain and verify a client‟s residential address in respect of accounts for which the 
balance does not exceed R25,000 ($3,300) and in which individual transactions do not exceed 
R5,000 ($660). The exemption also applies to single transactions below the threshold and 
money transfers within the Rand Common Monetary Area (CMA). The amendment of 
Exemption 17 facilitated the eventual launch of the Mzansi account which has brought more 
than 3m people into the formal financial sector over the past two years (Banking Assocation, 
2006)
27
. The regulator also issued guidance notes for banks to address the uncertainty around 
acceptable documentation and other areas of uncertainty.  
Whilst identifying new clients caused major challenges, it was the re-identification of existing 
clients that proved most difficult. Parliament decided that the re-identification process should 
be concluded within a year after the Act took effect. As the deadline for the completion of the 
re-identification process approached, the banking industry approached the Minister of Finance 
for an extension of the deadline, in the absence of which banks estimated they would have to 
freeze 80% of their accounts, a step posing great systemic risk to the banking system. In the 
event, the Minister of Finance issued a temporary and conditional exemption reflecting a risk-
based approach. This exemption required banks to categorise their clients in terms of risk, and 
then re-identify high-risk clients within a few months, medium-risk over a longer period and low-
risk clients over an even longer period. The banks were given discretion to categorise their 
                                                     
27
 It is important to note that the 3m figure is a slightly controversial statistic as there are some issues around d ouble counting and 
already banked individuals opening Mzansi accounts to benefit from lower costs. 
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clients as they saw fit. The re-identification deadline expired in September 2006 and indications 
are that banks succeeded in re-identifying the majority of account holders at costs estimated to 
be between R750m ($105m) and R1.5 billion ($210m). 
The introduction of cell-phone banking once again tested the AML controls. By its very nature, 
cell-phone banking relies on paperless and convenient non-face-to-face client origination. How 
then to originate new clients while complying with KYC requirements? The regulator approved 
cell-phone banking only for products that fall within the ambit of Exemption 17
28
. The regulator 
also approved non-face-to-face client registration, provided the bank offering the cell-phone 
product obtains a national identity number from the client and then cross-reference this against 
an acceptable third-party database. However, since the regulator is of the view that this model 
introduces higher AML risk, clients who utilise the non-face-to-face registration process cannot 
transact against their accounts for more than R1,000 ($130) a day. Given the unknown nature 
of the risk, the regulator chose to limit the functionality of the account rather than to prohibit the 
business model. Clients are free to exceed this transaction limit once they have submitted to a 
face-to-face KYC procedure, but still within the limits of Exemption 17. 
The formal sector money remittance market is limited in South Africa. The main reason for this 
is limited competition due to strict foreign exchange rules which restricts the dealing in foreign 
exchange (necessary for a cross-border transfer) to institutions holding a banking licence. 
Western Union entered South Africa in 1995, but exited after a few years. MoneyGram offers a 
cross-border service (in partnership with a bank) but its products remain beyond the 
affordability of the mass market (a R500 transfer costs up to R185 (i.e. $70 costs $25)). 
Moreover, only legal residents can purchase foreign exchange. South Africa is host to high 
numbers of undocumented migrants. A 1996 study estimated that between 2.5 and 4.1m 
persons reside in the country illegally
29
, the majority of whom arrive from Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Asia
30
. Other sources put the estimates for illegal migrants at even 
higher levels. No cheap formal options are available to undocumented migrants and low-
income clients wishing to send money cross-border. They continue to place their trust in 
informal money transfer mechanisms, either transferring money in person or using the 
extensive taxi and bus network which is much cheaper than formal systems (sending R500 to a 
neighbouring state with a taxi driver will cost about R50 ($70 costs $7). Even if exchange 
control is abolished, undocumented migrants would still not be able to access formal money 
transfer services due to the provisions of the country‟s immigration legislation. It is estimated 
that 48% of all domestic remittances flow through informal channels, while 42% of all inter-
Southern African Development Community (SADC) remittances are sent informally (Genesis 
Analytics, 2005b). 
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 See South African Reserve Bank, Banks Circular 6/2006 in respect of cell phone banking issued on 13 July 2006. 
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 The study by the HSRC was commission by the Department of Home Affairs in 1996 and although initially posted on the Department 
of Home Affairs website, it was later withdrawn due to methodological issues and flaws. 
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 According to a study released at the end of 2006, the number of undocumented migrants in South Africa could be as high as 10m. 
However, as the fundamental assumptions on which this estimate is based are questionable, we do not use it here. 
 
Evolution of AML/CFT regimes 
  19 
 
4. EVOLUTION OF AML/CFT REGIMES 
Although differing in the levels of AML/CFT controls that have been implemented, the 
implementation paths followed by the five countries included in this study show certain 
common factors as they relate to financial inclusion. 
4.1. AN EMERGING DEVELOPMENT PATH 
Of the three countries that have already implemented AML/CFT legal frameworks (Indonesia, 
Mexico and South Africa), Mexico and South Africa have followed very similar development 
paths. Indonesia followed a different path to reach Phase 3 but still supports the argument for a 
tailored approach. Kenya and Pakistan are still in the process of implementing their AML/CFT 
framework but show signs of following a similar path. Despite these differences, their combined 
experience suggests that there are three potential development phases as illustrated in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1. Emerging implementation evolution 
Source: Genesis Analytics 
During phase 1 financial sector policy makers typically set out to satisfy domestic or 
international pressures to comply with the international standards set by the FATF. In the 
countries reviewed, no significant domestic policy-making process which considered the impact 
of AML/CFT controls on financial inclusion was followed and, as result, laws and regulations 
drafted often did not reflect domestic priorities, risks and capacities. The controls implemented 
were typically based on templates for AML/CFT controls applied in developed countries and 
tailored to conditions in developed countries. In the case of South Africa the insistence on 
physical address verification even surpassed the level of controls normally applied in 
developed countries. The CDD requirements contained in the Kenya AML bill also seems more 
appropriate to a developed rather than a developing country, which would seem to indicate that 
Kenya will also follow this development path. 
However, once the regime has to be enforced (phase 2), reality sets in. FSPs that are already 
well supervised for prudential and other purposes (normally banks) are usually also the first to 
be supervised for AML/CFT purposes. Well-supervised institutions therefore have little choice 
but to implement AML/CFT controls. However, extending AML/CFT controls and their 
supervision beyond this regulated sphere has generally met the same difficulties as attempts to 
extend general financial sector supervision to the unregulated sub-sectors. Passing an AML 
law and regulations present no quick solution to the challenges of formalising informal financial 
services in a developing country. If anything, experience in the five countries show that overly 
ambitious AML/CFT controls will retard rather than enhance formalisation. Even though centros 
cambiarios in Mexico are required to register with the Mexican revenue authority for AML 
purposes and impose AML controls, in practice only 124 out of the estimated 5000 to 7000 
Phase 1
• Developed country 
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• No significant domestic 
policy-making process
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• Selective government 
enforcement
• Determined by 
capacity, foreign exposure 
or presence of a champion
• FSPs unable to comply
Phase 3
• Regulation gradually 
adjusted to domestic 
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• Impact on access mitigated
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centros had forwarded their contact details by September 2006. This environment of selective 
enforcement tends to be unnerving for the well-supervised institutions, particularly if they have 
business relationships with less supervised institutions. 
During Phase 3 regulators start to correct their initial over-reach, gradually adjusting AML/CFT 
controls to domestic risks and capacities. These adjustments typically (although not always 
intentionally) amend some of the negative impacts on financial inclusion experienced in phase 
1 and 2. They are generally two-fold. Firstly, reduced controls are introduced for what 
regulators consider as lower-risk transactions, clients and institutions. Secondly, even if the 
risks are material, limited resources force countries to consciously or unconsciously adopt 
some form of sequencing in the implementation of the controls by sub-sector or categories of 
financial institutions. 
4.2. RISK APPRECIATION 
ML risk. The countries reviewed tended to separate their assessment of ML and FT risk. To the 
extent that regulators in the five countries applied reduced controls to what are considered as 
lower-risk (ML) clients, business relationships or transactions (in order to facilitate financial 
inclusion) these reduced controls were based on one or a combination of four risk 
considerations: 
 Lower value means lower risk (the predominant factor and applied in all five countries); 
 Transactions with a cross-border element are assessed to entail higher risk; and 
 Transactions or institutions which link to the formal payment system are seen to hold 
higher risk for the financial system than transactions or institutions which are not linked (for 
example third tier banks in Indonesia who do not have direct access to the payment 
system). 
In countries where mobile banking and mobile payments are already introduced (the 
Philippines and South Africa) the regulators decided to limit the perceived risk primarily through 
transaction caps rather than stifle the development of these business models. 
However, in none of these cases was there evidence that the risk-based adjustments to AML 
controls were made on the basis of an assessment of actual risk based on intelligence or law 
enforcement experience. Neither could we identify any feedback process from law enforcement 
or intelligence agencies to financial regulators providing information on effectiveness of the 
controls and whether they are set at the right levels. The thresholds for transactions to which 
reduced controls are applied therefore vary greatly across countries, from $140 (daily 
transaction limit for non-face-to-face originated cell phone accounts in South Africa) to $10,870 
(KYC remittances threshold applied in Indonesia). Where categories of financial institutions 
were designated as lower risk, such as popular finance institutions in Mexico or rural banks in 
Indonesia, this assessment was based on the fact that these institutions typically handled 
lower-value transactions.  
FT risk. Where countries did criminalise terror financing and imposed CFT controls, the only 
risk consideration used was the identity of clients and institutions known for their links to 
terrorist organisations. The CFT controls entailed checking the names of clients against lists of 
known terrorists and terrorist organisations provided by the state or international organisations. 
Regulators and financial institutions in the five countries also had a vague sense that informal 
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money transfer operators presented FT risk. However, not a single person or institution could 
articulate the risk or any manner of dealing with it other than to refer to lists of persons and 
institutions provided by intelligence agencies. 
4.3. SEQUENCED IMPLEMENTATION 
None of the countries included in the study has the capacity to implement all of the FATF 
recommendations at the same time across all sectors or even only those areas identified as 
high risk. Accordingly, and by force of circumstance, differentiated levels of AML controls have 
emerged with each country in its own way developing a priority list that shaped the 
implementation of AML/CFT regulation. These levels do not signify a static state, but stages in 
the progression towards a comprehensive regime. Countries also tended to apply different 
levels to different sub-sectors depending on (1) risk perception, (2) the extent to which the sub-
sector is currently subjected to supervision, (3) the capacity of the FSPs in that sector, (4) the 
general capacity of the state to impose controls and ensure their implementation. The levels 
shown below do not necessarily reflect the sequential progression found within countries. 
Sample countries tended, in fact, to aim for level 5 and were then forced to tailor it back to 
lower levels to fit within the enforcement capacity. Furthermore, this progression may apply to 
individual components of the financial sector as the implementation of an AML/CFT regime 
evolves. The observed levels of implementation are shown in Figure 2 on the next page. 
Progress along this sequence can be facilitated by market-related reforms. For example, it was 
found that countries with conservative entry requirements limiting the types of entities that may 
transfer money (SA, Kenya and Indonesia) had less AML/CFT coverage of total transfers than 
countries with liberalised regimes (Mexico and Pakistan). Where non-bank remittance 
providers are categorised as illegal, it is more difficult to bring them onto the official radar 
screen for AML/CFT control purposes than if they are simply unregulated (as was experienced 
with centros cambiarios in Mexico). 
Country evidence also shows that AML/CFT effectiveness is related to available resources and 
can be achieved at each of these levels. The most effective AML/CFT regimes are those that 
manage to correlate the level of control (and, therefore, resources) with the risk of respective 
sectors and within their resource capacity. Similarly, risk of financial exclusion exists at all of 
these levels and mitigating steps have to be taken. Extending regulation beyond regulatory and 
supervisory capacity was found to be counterproductive from both AML/CFT and inclusion 
points of view. 
Along this progression of AML controls the regulator should attempt to maximise effectiveness 
by ensuring that maximum information is available, even if not supplied in the form of STRs or 
other reports, to the FIU and law enforcement agencies. For example, banks dealing with 
MSBs which are only registered or at the level of traceability (see Figure 2), can be required to 
report volumes of transactions to the FIU. Such information can, in turn, inform the sequencing 
process and highlight priorities for stronger controls. 
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Figure 2. Emerging framework of implementation options 
Source: Genesis Analytics 
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Coverage of institutions entails basic registration of the providers of financial services and ensures that they 
become visible to the supervisor and their information accessible to state agencies, even though AML/CFT 
controls are not yet imposed and the institutions not yet supervised to ensure effective compliance. This is 
usually the first step for institutions which have not been publicly regulated and/or supervised previously. 
Example: MTOs in Mexico
Traceability of customers and transactions requires basic customer identification procedures (even though 
verification may be limited) and standardised record-keeping, as well as the availability and accessibility of 
transaction records. This level may be appropriate for community-based institutions, or institutions with no 
previous experience of a compliance function. Example: SACCOs and MFIs in Kenya.
Profiling, verification and monitoring require more extensive verification of customer identify, extended 
profiling of customers and the pro-active monitoring of transactions for suspicious activity. This level may be 
appropriate for most institutions with a history of financial sector supervision. Example: Banks in Indonesia
Enhanced verification and interdiction is possible where the national identification system and capacity of 
financial institutions enable verification with high levels of integrity to be performed and suspicious individuals 
and transactions can be prevented from using the formal financial system. This is the highest level of AML/CFT 
control and requires extensive regulatory and FSP capacity to implement.
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5. DRIVERS OF IMPACT 
The level of impact of similar AML/CFT controls differs across countries and is determined by a 
number of country specific factors and characteristics. This section provides an overview of the 
main impact drivers identified and provides a brief description of the manner in which they 
affect the impact of AML/CFT regulation on financial inclusion. 
5.1. LIMITATIONS IN THE NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Financial institutions: Identifying clients and verifying their identity is a key element of all 
AML/CFT controls. The extent to which financial institutions can rely on public identification 
systems for verification will be a material cost element for them. If there is no national 
identification system, or the system lacks integrity, or the database is not accessible, it will 
force financial institutions to incur additional costs to achieve the requisite verification standard. 
This may result in the institutions withdrawing from low-value, lower-profit transactions and 
markets, a sentiment often expressed, for example, by commercial banks in Mexico. The 
dynamic is even more pronounced with client re-identification and new business models 
involving non-face-to-face client acquisition. These rely on the availability or provision of a 
minimum amount of client identification information which must then be verified against third 
party databases, such as a national identification database or credit bureau databases. If these 
are absent, lack integrity or is expensive to access (a major inhibition for the Wizzit mobile 
banking business model in South Africa) the risk levels may be too high for regulators to allow 
the business model or re-identification to proceed. 
Clients: Similarly, if clients do not possess the required documentation, especially poor or rural 
clients far removed from public offices at which the documents are issued, it will be an absolute 
barrier or at least a cost barrier for them to accessing formal financial services. 
5.2. LIMITED GOVERNMENT CAPACITY 
Three forms of government capacity are relevant: (1) the capacity of the financial 
regulator/supervisor to supervise and enforce the implementation of AML/CFT controls on 
financial institutions, including alternative institutional capacity which can be brought to bear on 
this process; (2) the capacity of relevant law enforcement and intelligence agencies; and (3) 
the general capacity of the state to formalise the economy. 
Supervision: With limited capacity, supervisors will tend to supervise what is within reach – 
usually the largest regulated entities. There will be little compliance pressure on informal and 
unsupervised institutions, who fall within the ambit of AML/CFT regulation and who render 
similar services to those of registered institutions. As a result the compliance cost for 
institutions within the reach of the supervisor will increase, with no similar increase for 
unsupervised institutions. This may result in the well supervised institutions withdrawing from 
low-income markets where they compete with unsupervised institutions. Uneven supervision 
may lead not only to the withdrawal of well supervised institutions from markets, but also the 
severance of business relationships between well supervised and unsupervised institutions. 
For example, the fact that regulators do not have the capacity to effectively supervise MSBs 
increases the risk for formal institutions to have them as clients. Combined with the increased 
liability under AML regulation on the supervised institutions the result is severance of 
relationships.  
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Law enforcement: Deficiencies on the law enforcement side usually mean that risk 
assessments are not based on actual information, but on hypotheses or international 
typologies. In the absence of a clear understanding of risk, regulators will tend to impose 
AML/CFT controls which are more onerous than required, simply to “play it safe”. 
General incapacity to formalise. AML/CFT controls require financial institutions to make 
information on clients available to the state if required (FATF Recommendation 4). When a 
regulator attempts to use AML/CFT controls to gain information which will assist it with a 
general (non-AML/CFT) drive to formalise the economy, notably to combat tax evasion and 
extend its tax base, the results can be perverse. This is one of the key stumbling blocks with 
the implementation of the AML law in Pakistan. Unless the state has a strong enough revenue 
authority or other state agencies to back up its attempt with general law enforcement, clients 
who do have the option to use unregistered service providers may choose to do so rather than 
risk being included in the tax net. 
5.3. THE STRUCTURE, CAPACITY AND INCENTIVES OF FORMAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
In all five countries it was observed that formal financial institutions tend to apply AML/CFT 
controls more conservatively than intended by the regulator. Consequently, where the regulator 
delegates discretion (e.g. on alternative documents allowed for verification) to financial 
institutions the result will be to limit rather than extend the categories of documents accepted 
for verification purposes. This behaviour is an entirely rational response to the structure of 
large financial institutions where the risk parameters are normally set by a central compliance 
function for implementation by frontline staff. In an environment where mistakes can lead to 
vast penalties and costs for the institution (and in some cases even for the compliance officer 
personally), the compliance officer will be reticent to delegate discretion to inexperienced front 
office staff members. The risk of criminal or civil liability can also alter the cost-benefit equation 
of particular markets, making lower-income market segments less attractive.  
5.4. LARGE-SCALE USE OF INFORMAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 
All of the countries in this study have extensive provision of financial services operating beyond 
the effective reach of regulation and supervision. Such informality is symptomatic of existing 
(non-AML/CFT) barriers to entry for informal financial institutions and their users, or simply a 
matter of choice. Yet, their very existence creates vulnerability for the imposition of AML/CFT 
controls to lead to even great financial exclusion. The dynamic works in two ways. Firstly, the 
availability of informal alternatives where the cost of usage and the hassle factor caused by 
AML/CFT controls are absent makes it easier to opt out of the formal sector. The availability of 
informal alternatives therefore increases the elasticity of formal sector usage. Secondly, 
AML/CFT controls make it more difficult to opt in from both an access and a usage point of 
view. Imposing AML/CFT controls will further increase existing barriers to joining the formal 
sector for clients who already find it difficult or inconvenient to do so. 
5.5. LINKAGES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The openness of an economy to international financial markets, both through cross-border 
commercial relationships and transactions, as well as foreign ownership of domestic 
institutions will influence the levels of AML/CFT controls implemented in that economy. Where 
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domestic financial institutions are owned by foreign institutions, they are invariably required to 
adhere to group standards for AML/CFT compliance. These standards are by definition not 
tailored to facilitate domestic financial inclusion. A good example is Mexico, where foreign-
owned banks indicated difficulties to apply group standards designed for investment banking 
activity to essentially retail operations in-country. Applying AML/CFT controls generated by 
foreign owners or correspondents can therefore limit financial inclusion. This problem can be 
limited by the domestic regulator developing and communicating a sound risk-based AML/CFT 
policy which will strengthen the hand of the local compliance officer of an international financial 
group in his deviations from head office standards. 
5.6. FAILURE TO DEVELOP DOMESTIC AML/CFT POLICY 
The negative impact on financial inclusion of the drivers highlighted in 5.1 to 5.5 is invariably 
exacerbated if no explicit domestic AML/CFT policy is developed which considers all these 
drivers. In the absence of such comprehensive policies, AML/CFT regimes tend to be driven by 
law enforcement perspectives rather than seeking to achieve a balance between law 
enforcement and financial inclusion. The problem can be compounded if the financial policy-
maker or regulator has limited research capacity or insufficient mechanisms exist to consult 
with the financial sector. The limited impact of the implementation of the AML/CFT regime in 
Indonesia was indeed a result of careful consideration and extensive consultation with financial 
institutions. 
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6. OBSERVED IMPACTS AND MITIGATING 
RESPONSES 
In this section we summarise the key findings of the impact of AML/CFT on financial inclusion. These 
impacts will be described within the inclusion framework outlined in Section 2.3, identifying particular 
impacts on access, usage and other supply-side features.  
6.1. NON-AML/CFT FACTORS AFFECTING INCLUSION 
AML/CFT regulation is not the only factor impacting on financial inclusion. In recognition of this, the 
impact of AML/CFT regulation on inclusion was evaluated within the context of broader regulatory and 
market dynamics. As noted in Section 2.3, the presence of other barriers to inclusion does not remove 
the imperative to minimise barriers resulting from AML/CFT regulation. It merely confirms that a holistic 
approach is required to support inclusion.  
The most prominent non-AML barriers to inclusion found in the sample countries were: 
Affordability. Without exception, affordability was found to be the most significant barrier to inclusion for 
transaction bank accounts in all the countries reviewed. Significant proportions (Indonesia 75%, Kenya 
95%, Mexico 64%, Pakistan 85%, and South Africa 33%) of the adult populations in the respective 
countries are excluded from access to transaction bank accounts due to the cost thereof relative to their 
income. For remittances, affordability also presents significant constraints in South Africa and Kenya 
where the transfer of small amounts
31
 could cost as much as 37% and 17% respectively
32
 of the amount 
transferred. The extent of exclusion is reflected in the significant informal remittance markets in these 
countries relative to that of the other sample countries with lower formal remittances charges. Of course, 
it is not only the absolute cost, but also the cost relative to informal alternatives that determines the level 
of informal channel use. Although Indonesia, Mexico and Pakistan had much lower formal channel 
costs, they still showed significant use of informal channels at least in part due to the relative cost and 
convenience of using informal channels.  
Non-AML/CFT regulatory barriers. In addition to affordability, a number of explicit barriers were created 
by non-AML/CFT regulation. Regulation in Kenya and South Africa limits international money transfers 
to banks or their agents, thereby limiting competition. This is clearly reflected in the remittance charges 
(noted above) for these countries which far exceed the other sample countries where these regulatory 
restrictions do not apply. Furthermore, regulations across all five sample countries effectively prohibit 
financial institutions from opening accounts or conducting transactions for undocumented migrants. This 
affects an estimated 2.5-4.1m undocumented migrants in South Africa and at least 800,000 in Kenya.  
Doorstep/usage barriers. Although not easily quantifiable, the hassle factor of dealing with formal 
institutions, cumbersome processes and negative perceptions were found to be a significant deterrent to 
using formal financial services, particularly where convenient informal alternatives were available. 
Despite the Pakistan government‟s extensive efforts to encourage formalisation by incentivising lower 
costs and improving service delivery, the relative burden of dealing with formal MTOs remains a 
deterrent to using formal financial services. At least 50% of flows (estimated to represent 75% of 
transactions) remain informal. In addition, the poor perceive traditional banks as institutions for the rich. 
New micro-finance bank, Tameer Bank, is making inroads in the urban unbanked markets simply by 
                                                     
31
 Based on estimate of average amount sent by lower-income households. 
32
 As noted in Section 2.3, quantification of the degree of exclusion as result of affordability is more complicated for remittances than for bank 
accounts as the cost also relates to the value of the transaction and not only the sender‟s level of income. As a rule of thumb, remittances costing 
more than 10% of the value transferred were considered as exclusionary. This was the case for South Africa and Kenya. 
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welcoming poor clients into their branches and softening the doorstep/application barriers. This is 
despite the fact that their charges are the same or higher than traditional commercial banks. 
The observed barriers created by AML/CFT on access, usage and market efficiencies are noted below. 
6.2. AML/CFT IMPACT ON ACCESS 
Access barriers refer to features of the AML/CFT controls which explicitly exclude potential client 
groups.  
Undocumented migrants. The requirement by AML/CFT regulation for foreign citizens to provide 
documentation proving legality of stay excludes undocumented migrants
33
. This affects undocumented 
migrants Kenya. The same problem in the US, at least in relation to Mexican citizens, was mitigated by 
allowing Mexican immigrants to legally access the formal banking system by means of the Matricula
34
 
consular identity card without requiring proof of legality of stay. In this way, the use of informal channels 
was disincentivised, enabling information on the transfers to be captured in the formal financial system 
and made available to law enforcement authorities. 
Inability to prove residential address. Customer due diligence (CDD) regulations requiring address 
verification as additional means of establishing client identity exclude large groups of adults who are 
unable to provide such details. In Kenya, it is estimated that as much as 95% of adults will not be able 
to prove their residential address as required in the proposed AML bill. In South Africa at least 30% of 
adults were at risk of being excluded by the specification of address verification in the initial formulation 
of the CDD requirements. This was mitigated by an exemption removing the requirement for address 
verification for specifically defined low-risk transactions
35
. In Indonesia the information on the KTP 
identity card includes the address of the individual. Despite potential problems with the integrity of the 
identity card, AML/CFT regulation accepts this as best available and sufficient verification of identity and 
address. Client profiling was added to the CDD process to support the deficiencies of the identity 
system.  
Difficulties with client re-identification. The requirement to apply CDD processes to existing clients can 
also prove exclusionary, especially if it proves difficult to obtain documentation from them. In such 
cases, notably Pakistan, regulators have allowed financial institutions to verify the identities of existing 
clients against reliable third party databases. This is proving difficult in Mexico due to a legal prohibition 
on banks accessing the Mexican voters‟ identity database (the most extensive identity database in that 
country). Mexican banks now face penalties for failing to re-identify existing clients who do not produce 
the prescribed documentation. In South Africa the re-identification challenge was dealt with by allowing 
financial institutions more time provided that they implement a risk-based process which places the 
initial focus on re-identifying high-risk clients and then dealing with lower risk clients. 
Access-friendly adjustments to CDD in the UK. The experience of the UK illustrates that similar 
problems are experienced by developed countries. The UK regulator recently refined its AML/CFT 
systems in order to, amongst others, minimise unintended impacts on inclusion. The UK found that the 
banks were sometimes too conservative in their application of client due diligence procedures and that 
this may have impacted on access to financial services. The Financial Services Authority (the UK 
regulator) in 2006 amended the AML/CFT control system by implementing a risk-based approach. This 
approach was complemented by industry guidance. In terms of the new system regulated institutions 
must determine their AML/CFT controls on the basis of their analysis of the risks that they face. Risk 
                                                     
33
 As noted in Section 6.1, the restrictions upon undocumented migrants can also be contained in other financial sector regulation, such as exchange 
controls. However, even if such regulation was abolished, the necessity to prove legal identity could still remain as part of AML/CFT controls. 
34
 See Box 2 in Appendix E 
35
 See Appendix E. 
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management is not an exact science and the FSA acknowledged that risks may be misjudged and 
failures may occur. The FSA therefore stated on record that enforcement action would be unlikely when 
a financial institution is abused for AML/CFT purposes, if it can prove that it acted reasonably to prevent 
such abuse and that its decisions were informed by industry guidance and other relevant facts. This 
aimed to remove what the FSA termed the “fear factor” on the part of banks, which resulted in overly 
conservative application of regulation. The success of the new system in facilitating access has however 
yet to be established. 
It is important to note that all of the above impediments to access can be minimised through transaction-
based exemptions for low-risk, low-value accounts and transactions without undermining sound risk 
management. These are discussed in Section 7.7.  
6.3. AML/CFT IMPACT ON USAGE 
Although not explicit barriers, usage factors were found to be significant deterrents to the use of formal 
financial services in the countries reviewed. AML/CFT regulation contributes to existing usage barriers 
by increasing the process and documentation requirements. This fuels distrust and increases 
inconvenience relative to informal options. 
The proposed Kenyan AML/CFT law requires clients to provide proof of residential address. 
Recognising that this may not be possible for a large proportion of adults, the regulation creates an 
alternative whereby residential address can be verified through a letter from a government official. While 
this provides an alternative, it also creates a significant process burden which fuels the “fear of 
officialdom” and is likely to discourage use of formal financial services. In South Africa, documentation 
requirements in general have been found to be a significant contributor to the doorstep barrier 
intimidating low-income consumers looking to enter the formal system. Resistance to documentation in 
Pakistan is also fuelled by the extent of tax evasion and informality. In Indonesia, the increased 
documentation burden created by requiring information for profiling is partly mitigated by bank staff 
assisting clients to complete the forms. This is possible because of the lack of cost awareness and 
sensitivity found amongst Indonesian banks, a feature not found in any of the other countries. While 
laudable, a closer reflection on the cost and profitability of low-income clients is likely to discourage 
banks from providing such support.  
As with the access barriers, it is important to note that all of the above impediments can be minimised 
by transaction-based exemptions for low-risk, low-value accounts and transactions without undermining 
sound risk management. These are discussed in Section 7.7. 
6.4. AML/CFT IMPACT ON MARKET EFFICIENCIES 
This category of impacts operates at the level of the FSP and impacts on the nature and extent of 
services being offered to lower-income clients and the competitive dynamics in the market.  
Severing relationships between formal and informal/unsupervised. The combined effect of potentially 
significant financial implications of contraventions of AML/CFT laws (criminal penalties, reputational 
damage and potential civil liability) and limited profit opportunities tends to undermine the business 
relationships between formal FSPs and informal or unsupervised FSPs.  
The USA, with its large immigrant population, is one of the largest remittance sending countries in the 
world. As such, the state of access to formal financial services (most notably remittance transfer 
services) is of utmost importance to the livelihoods in a host of developing countries dependent on 
remittance inflows from the USA. Such services are however (unintentionally) undermined by the impact 
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of AML/CFT controls on the ability of money services businesses (MSBs) in the United States to access 
a bank account, which they require for their day to day operations. Though AML/CFT regulations do not 
require banks to close MSB accounts, they do require banks to apply due diligence and to assess the 
ML/FT risks posed by MSB accounts. Banks were uncertain how to respond to their MSB-related 
obligations and, to avoid the risk (and cost) many banks proceeded to close all MSB accounts. In 
reaction, the USA‟s FIU (FinCEN) issued a guidance note allowing banks the scope to classify MSB 
accounts as high or low risk (based on a specified set of criteria) and stating explicitly that accounts 
need not be closed, even where MSBs are classified as high risk. The guidance did however not still 
banks‟ fear of criminal, as well as potential civil, liability. They have furthermore experienced the costs 
associated with risk assessment and monitoring as prohibitive. Thus the tide of MSB account closures 
has not, as of yet, been stemmed. This is of concern as MSBs are direct competitors to the banks in the 
remittance market and serve a large proportion of the lower-income migrant market. The closure will 
therefore probably impact on affordability and availability of financial services for the poor. 
A similar dynamic is unfolding in the relationships between commercial banks and centros cambiarios in 
Mexico. The centros cambiarios are effectively unsupervised (though included in regulation) and several 
commercial banks look upon the risks posed by these institutions as too big for comfort. They are 
accordingly severing their relationships with these institutions which often provide essential “last mile” 
services in the remittance channel. 
In contrast, in Indonesia the impact of AML/CFT regulation on the relationship between traditional banks 
and small BPRs (“peoples banks”) has been limited. This is at least in part due to the positive and pro-
active relationship between the regulator and the FSPs. As was noted above for the UK, pro-active and 
explicit guidance combined with a system that does not insist on zero failure, removed the “fear factor” 
on the part of banks and avoided an overly conservative implementation of the regulation. 
Increased transaction cost of small, low-risk transactions lead to withdrawal from low-income market. In 
a similar manner, the increased process and documentation requirements imposed by AML/CFT risk 
render low-income transactions unprofitable. In particular, the requirement to obtain and store hard 
copies of client identity documentation has proved to be prohibitive. Had this requirement been enforced 
in South Africa, this would render the average low-income remittance value (R500) unprofitable. This 
could represent as much as 80% of formal low-income remittances through banks in South Africa. This 
impact has also been mitigated in Mexico by exempting low-value, low-risk transactions from some of 
the more costly requirements. Mexican regulation removed the need to open a physical file for or to re-
identify clients whose accounts fall within specified limits: the account balance must not exceed $3,000 
and transaction volumes must not exceeding $10,000 in any given month. In the absence of this 
exemption, Banco Azteca, one of the fasting growing banks in Mexico targeting lower-income 
consumers through the Elektra retailer network, would have had to increase its minimum balance 
requirements on its savings accounts significantly and a large proportion of its current clients would not 
have been able to open an account. Since their entry in 2002, Banco Azteca has grown to become the 
second largest retail bank (in terms of number of accounts) in Mexico with 10m accounts held by 4m 
clients. 
Prevents or delays the introduction of new models and technologies. In Pakistan, Indonesia and Kenya 
the AML/CFT regimes prohibit non-face-to-face client origination thereby preventing the introduction of 
mobile banking models relying on non-face-to-face origination to reduce cost. In addition to this 
prohibition, the burden of dealing with AML/CFT regulation has discouraged and delayed the entry of 
new business models into particular low-income markets. In Mexico, some non-bank MFIs have delayed 
extending their lending models to include deposit-taking due to the increased regulatory/compliance 
burden and risk of criminal liability they face under AML/CFT regulation. In South Africa, representatives 
of the FIC and some supervisory bodies insist that identification documents should not only be sighted 
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but should also be copied and those copies retained. This requirement undermined the roll-out of Wizzit 
bank‟s cell phone model where origination is done by mobile agents who do not have ready (or cost-
effective) access to facilities to make copies of documents. Wizzit is an innovative, completely cell 
phone-based bank explicitly targeting the rural and unbanked population and one of the few competitors 
in the concentrated retail banking market.  
Contrast the experience of the largest two cell phone operators in the Philippines (Globe and Smart 
Communications) who have both launched mobile payments initiatives. While Smart‟s model is linked to 
a bank account, G-Cash operates independently of a bank and essentially uses a system of “e-money” 
transfers. Both models incorporate transaction limits and require identification for any cash 
withdrawal/deposit. The AML/CFT controls of this system were approved by the regulators. In 
developing their models and controls, both companies worked closely with the regulators to devise a 
working solution that does not undermine the flexibility or cost-effectiveness of the mobile payments 
service, yet meets the AML/CFT requirements. In this way, the Philippines regulator facilitated the 
introduction of new business models and technology while managing the AML/CFT risks. 
Regulatory bias against small institutions. Small and/or recently formalised FSPs face particular 
challenges in complying with the operational and systems requirements of AML/CFT regulation.  
In Kenya the proposed inclusion of SACCOs, MFIs and even informal MTOs under the proposed 
AML/CFT regulation will require dramatic changes to the way in which these institutions are run, which 
is likely to stretch their already limited resources. Given the systems and operational requirements, 
many (particularly the informal providers) will simply not be able to comply. In light of the need for their 
services and limited enforcement capacity, these institutions may not be forced to close but will be 
forced further underground. In Mexico, centros cambiaros and other smaller and informal FPSs were 
unable to comply with the initial standard of AML/CFT operational and systems requirements extended 
across all FSPs. The Mexican regulator subsequently adjusted the regulations to reflect institutional 
differences, but the requirements on smaller institutions remain onerous. At the same time, the adjusted 
regulations resulted in different regulation for institutions conducting the same transactions, thereby 
creating an unlevel playing field. Furthermore, the regulator staggered the implementation of regulation 
focusing implementation primarily on the large formal institutions and, thereby, allowing time for the 
smaller institutions to comply. However, given the requirements on large FSPs, they are starting to close 
the accounts of smaller unsupervised institutions due to the risk of criminal and other liability under the 
AML/CFT laws. Even though not directly enforced, AML/CFT regulation is, therefore placing significant 
pressure on smaller FSPs. 
Unlike the case for usage and access barriers, transaction-based exemptions may only provide partial 
relief for the above-mentioned supply-side impacts. Institutional requirements/barriers will remain a 
problem and needs to be addressed by regulation. 
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7. TOWARDS GUIDELINES 
7.1. GOAL AND PRINCIPLES 
The goal of these guidelines is to support developing countries in implementing effective AML/CFT 
controls that meet international standards whilst at the same time promoting financial inclusion.  
AML/CFT controls are aimed at (1) combating the abuse of financial systems by persons laundering 
proceeds of crime and (2) combating the funding of terrorists and terrorist activity. The FATF Forty Nine 
Recommendations establish a single minimum international standard for action. Countries are urged to 
implement these recommendations but are allowed some leeway to design the detail of the AML/CFT 
systems according to their particular circumstances and constitutional frameworks. In practical terms the 
recommendations have four objectives: (1) To ensure that countries implement equivalent laws and 
structures to combat ML/FT; (2) to ensure that financial institutions and certain non-financial businesses 
and professions take prescribed steps to prevent the use of their systems for ML and FT; (3) to make 
information available to the state to support action against those who engage in ML/FT and, (4) to 
increase international cooperation in this regard.  
The objective with financial inclusion is that individual consumers, particularly low-income consumers 
currently excluded from using formal financial sector services, must be able to access and on a 
sustainable basis use financial services that are appropriate to their needs and provided by registered 
financial service providers. Financial inclusion is one of the cornerstones of an effective AML/CFT 
system. Without a sufficient measure of financial inclusion, a country‟s AML/CFT system will only 
safeguard the integrity of a part of its financial system. Measures that ensure that financial services are 
formalised, regulated, accessible and used extensively therefore increase the reach and effectiveness 
of the AML/CFT controls.  
The following general principles should guide the design of a national AML/CFT regime that supports 
financial inclusion: 
 Where the FATF allow flexibility and tailoring, AML/CFT measures should be attuned to the 
domestic environment, especially domestic AML/CFT risks. 
 AML/CFT controls should be proportionate to the prevailing or likely risks. 
 AML/CFT obligations of public and private institutions should not exceed the capacity of those 
institutions. If their capacity falls short of what is required by an effective domestic policy or by the 
FATF standards, capacity increases must be closely managed and AML/CFT obligations gradually 
increased in accordance with the resultant improvements in capacity. 
 While all stakeholders must uphold the law, law enforcement is primarily the responsibility of the 
state. The state must not privatise law enforcement by unnecessarily shifting law enforcement 
responsibilities to private institutions.  
7.2. GUIDELINE 1: DEVELOP A POLICY 
Before an AML/CFT regime is enacted or even if already enacted, the domestic financial sector policy-
maker or regulator should consider the interaction between imposing AML/CFT controls and financial 
inclusion. Policy makers should guard against adopting templates or regulations imposed in other 
jurisdictions without first considering the appropriateness and potential impact of those regulations in 
their own jurisdictions. It is important to consider financial inclusion in the policy-making process, but 
ideally the policy should be comprehensive and should also give consideration to other relevant factors 
such as existing and expected crime patterns, law enforcement, regulatory and compliance capacity, 
undocumented migration and market and social development conditions. 
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The rest of these guidelines are intended to support such a policy-making process in respect of issues 
relating to financial inclusion. 
7.3. GUIDELINE 2: FOLLOW CONSULTATIVE AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH 
The effectiveness of AML/CFT controls and their impact on financial inclusion depend on the extent to 
which limited domestic resources are targeted at domestic ML and FT risks. Getting the balance right 
will require regulators to consult on an ongoing basis with the key interest groups. These include FSPs, 
both registered and unregistered, law enforcement agencies, as well as other national agencies, notably 
those responsible for the national identification infrastructure. However, it is important to note that 
consultation with FSPs is likely to yield information on the market currently served. In all of the countries 
reviewed, this would be limited to a small proportion of adults and mostly high-income individuals. The 
regulator needs to ensure that consultations also include those not currently served to ensure a better 
understanding of the potential impact of AML/CFT regulations on those who are excluded from financial 
services.  
7.4. GUIDELINE 3: ASSESS AND DEFINE RISK  
Responsibility: A country‟s AML/CFT system should address the domestic ML/FT risks within the 
framework set by the FATF Recommendations. An assessment of the domestic ML and FT risks must 
be performed. This assessment must be performed by the financial sector policy-maker, relevant 
regulators, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies, drawing upon information provided by the 
agencies concerned as well as formal and informal financial and trade-based institutions and 
designated non-financial businesses and professions. This risk assessment will inform the government‟s 
AML/CFT as well as law enforcement policy but will also assist individual financial institutions to identify 
and manage their institutional AML/CFT risks more effectively. 
Risk of money laundering: ML risk can be identified with reference to categories of clients, business 
relationships (or financial products) and transactions. The risk levels of financial institutions that focus 
on particular categories of clients or transactions can be similarly identified. The following risk 
considerations, amongst others, are relevant from a financial inclusion point of view: 
 Lower value transactions pose a lower risk than higher value transactions; 
 Domestic (in-country) transactions would often pose a lower risk than transactions with a cross-
border element;  
 Transactions or institutions which do not link to the formal payment system hold lower risk for the 
financial sector than transactions or institutions which are linked to the system. 
Although the assessment of the relevance and scale of these considerations within a country can draw 
on international experience and precedents, it is important to consider the risks attaching to particular 
categories of domestic financial institutions, transactions and clients within the context and with the 
information available in that country. Risk should also be viewed in a strategic context. New business 
models, such as mobile phone banking, may introduce an element of AML/CFT risk, but at the same 
time utilise systems that are as capable if not more capable than traditional banking systems to identify 
suspicious transactions. Moreover, these models are able to increase financial inclusion in many 
countries, thereby increasing the scope and effectiveness of the AML/CFT system. The policy maker 
may therefore decide to embrace an element of risk in order to develop a more secure system. If such a 
decision it taken, it would be appropriate to limit that element of risk by requiring the adoption of 
appropriate controls and the setting of transaction limits.  
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Risk of financing of terrorism: Similar risk categorisation has yet to emerge for FT risks. The most 
generally-applied barometer of the risk of FT remains the identity of the parties to the transaction. It is 
submitted that the identification of such high risk persons is the duty of the state and relevant 
intergovernmental institutions. 
Identify risk framework of resultant priorities: The identified risks must be mapped to financial sub-
sectors, institutions, transactions, client categories or other relevant characteristics (e.g. geographic 
area) to produce a risk framework and resultant priorities for regulation and control. At the outset, this 
will probably be quite a rudimentary framework. However, as experience is gained with implementation, 
the framework will be refined. Moreover, the domestic and international ML and FT risks will not remain 
static. The framework will therefore evolve over time.  
Feedback loop to guide evolution: A feedback loop should be established from financial institutions, law 
enforcement agencies and the FIU to inform the policy-maker whether the AML/CFT controls imposed 
actually supports the risk-management objectives of the AML/CFT regime and what further adjustments 
can be made to facilitate financial inclusion. 
7.5. GUIDELINE 4: IDENTIFY EXCLUDED AND VULNERABLE GROUPS 
The levels of financial exclusion as well as the main causes for such exclusion must be identified in 
order to scope the potential impact of AML/CFT controls on financial inclusion. Excluded groups refer to 
all those persons who do not use financial services provided by financial institutions registered with the 
relevant supervisors of financial services and typically include the poor, the informal and undocumented 
migrants.  
The causes of exclusion are normally threefold: 
Access denied: Many, particularly poor, people cannot obtain financial services that are affordable, 
usable and appropriate to their financial needs. Factors that may exclude individuals from being able to 
use a particular product can include the physical distance from service points, the cost of using the 
product, exclusionary terms, such as minimum balances imposed by financial institutions, or regulatory 
barriers imposed by the state. The latter could include a prohibition on undocumented migrants from 
using formal financial services or the necessity to prove a residential address with third party 
documentation not available to a household. 
Attractiveness of services: In some cases individuals decide against using a particular product even if 
they are not explicitly excluded. This usually rational decision can, amongst others, be based on the 
cost of the formal product relative to the cost and convenience of the informal alternative (which is often 
the case with remittance products), the simple hassle of gaining access to the formal product (such as 
providing multiple documents to comply with AML controls before an account can be opened), or a 
prevailing transaction culture, such as exists in cash-based economies. 
Financial institutions are discouraged from providing services to excluded groups while informal 
providers are prevented or discouraged from entering the formal sector: Market efficiency is affected by 
many factors, such as anti-competitive practices, onerous compliance burdens, or a reticence on the 
side of regulators to facilitate new business models and technologies. To the extent that financial 
services providers remain beyond the supervisory reach of the state, their clients remain excluded (and 
their identity and transaction information unavailable to the state for AML/CFT control purposes). 
Excluded groups may also include institutions that may be excluded from formalisation in the same way 
that individuals are prevented from accessing formal financial services. 
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7.6. GUIDELINE 5: ASSESS RESOURCE ENVELOPE 
The imposition of AML/CFT controls which cannot be implemented within the domestic resource 
envelope tends to increase financial exclusion without contributing to effective AML/CFT risk 
management. Even a rudimentary assessment of this resource envelope will contribute to limiting the 
exclusionary impact. The following questions regarding the resource envelope are relevant from a 
financial inclusion perspective: 
Regarding the capacity of financial services providers: What is the nature of their systems, for example, 
is it electronic or manual, can they apply transaction and product restrictions such as daily transaction 
limits; can they monitor transactions through the application of artificial intelligence; what information do 
they currently have about clients (not only electronic, since common bond institutions may have very 
good information about clients simply through personal relationships); what are their reporting 
capabilities; what is the nature and capacity of their compliance function; does their staff capacity allow 
them to apply discretion and judgement on AML/CFT risks; is the legal and regulatory environment so 
strict that institutions will impose stricter controls where the law gives them a discretion to determine the 
relevant controls? 
Regarding the capacity of the financial sector regulator(s): What are the mandate, staff complement, 
systems capacity, skills set and budget of the respective regulators; which consultative mechanisms are 
available to the policy-makers/regulators; if an FIU already exists, what is its capacity; which alternative 
public institutions, such as revenue authorities, can assist to supervise categories of financial institutions 
not currently supervised; are there current policy priorities which could complement or detract from the 
imposition of AML/CFT controls (such as a strong privatisation drive in the banking sector)? 
National identification systems: Are there national or other identification systems which could facilitate 
the verification of clients; what are their coverage, integrity and accessibility? 
Given the (1) assessed risk framework and resulting priority areas for the imposition of AML/CFT 
controls, (2) the levels of financial inclusion and its causes, as well as (3) the resources actually 
available to implement AML/CFT controls within the economy, an AML/CFT regime can then be crafted 
to achieve the twin objectives of controlling ML/FT and extending, or at least not inhibiting, financial 
inclusion. 
Two approaches may assist in the design of an AML/CFT system that supports these objectives:  
 Firstly, apply reduced controls to lower-risk transactions, clients and institutions serving these. 
Guideline 6 provides more details on the design of such reduced controls.  
 Secondly, where the resources of the economy do not allow for effective control of all areas posing 
material risk from the outset, sequence the implementation of controls across sub-sectors or 
categories of institutions so that the best levels of AML control under the circumstances is achieved 
while the supervisory reach of the state is actively extended. Guideline 7 outlines potential 
approaches to sequencing. 
 
7.7. GUIDELINE 6: REDUCED CONTROL FOR LOWER-RISK TRANSACTIONS  
Limited risk-scaling for CFT risk. Before proceeding with guidelines on the risk-based implementation 
and sequencing of regulation, it is important to note that guidelines 6 and 7 focus primarily on ML rather 
than FT controls. None of the countries studied have developed a sophisticated risk-scaling model for 
the design of risk-based FT controls. A risk-based approach to FT is complicated by a number of 
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factors, for instance, more must be known about FT typologies to construct a general model; even small 
value transactions can present FT; and money from legal sources may be used for FT purposes. No 
generally-accepted model for FT risk-scaling has emerged and the FATF, having acknowledged the 
benefits of a risk-based approach to FT, is still continuing with work in this regard. In the countries 
reviewed, controls are mainly structured around the monitoring of client and third-party identity against 
lists supplied by the government and international organisations. In addition, attention is given to 
transactions that are linked to countries and territories with a higher FT risk profile. 
Risk-based ML controls. Reduced controls seek to control a lower level of ML risk effectively and 
proportionately. The level of risk should be determined by the assessment conducted as part of 
guideline 3. When reduced controls are designed it is important to consider, particularly, those factors 
that inhibit access to and usage of financial services. These typically include the inability or difficulty for 
clients to provide documentary evidence to verify identity or residential address; compliance costs for 
financial institutions flowing from systems requirements; and CDD and record-keeping obligations 
(notably a requirement to keep physical records, especially for once-off transactions). In some low-risk 
cases, the risk may justify the adoption of reduced controls.  
It is important to note that where reduced controls are applied as suggested in the examples below, 
transactions must be monitored for abuse and to allow for on-going tailoring of the regulation. 
Examples of reduced controls that may address the following inclusion barriers (especially when applied 
in combination) include the following: 
Documentation and verification barrier: Verification that requires more than sight of one relevant and 
generally available identification document fuels the hassle barrier for clients and will exclude vulnerable 
groups who do not have the necessary documentation. 
Allow the use of appropriate verification documentation that is generally available. A framework that 
allows clients to verify information using any of a range of verification documentation that is reliable and 
generally available to the poor, will facilitate financial inclusion. 
Simplified verification for low-value transactions or products. Limited or simplified verification 
requirements may be set for low-value transactions or for products which limit transaction values to 
specified thresholds, especially where such transactions do not have a cross-border element (where 
attempted transactions exceed these thresholds, full verification should be required before further 
transactions can be processed).  
The cost and burden of verification procedures is particularly problematic for low-income clients. In most 
cases those clients also maintain small account balances and low transaction profiles. In one example, 
a country established through review of bank information that low-income accounts have transaction 
and balance profiles that are far below risk thresholds (e.g. account balances of less than US $100) and 
that transactions are generally restricted to the country concerned. With this information, the country 
could impose a transaction and balance threshold that is sufficient to facilitate the majority of low-
income transactions but conservative enough to control ML abuse. Products and accounts that are 
structured around these thresholds could then be exempted from the more onerous standard verification 
requirements that apply to ordinary, non-limited accounts and products. Provision could be made for 
standard verification requirements to apply if a client with such an account or product wanted to transact 
above the threshold. 
Focus on profiling, particular where the national identification system is absent or weak. Where national 
identification systems are absent, fragmented or lack integrity and cannot support client verification 
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processes, limited or simplified verification procedures may be counterbalanced by more extensive 
client profiling that support monitoring of activity to identify deviations from the profile supplied.  
In one example, a countries with a weak identification systems accepted the national identity document 
as means of verifying identiy but compensated for its deficiencies by requiring FSPs to collect (but not 
verify) further information to construct a more detailed client profile. Such information may include: 
nature of employment, expected levels of income, purpose of account, address, etc. In this way, the 
regulator has avoided imposing significant costs on the FSP that would have been incurred had they 
been required to build an alternative identification system. At the same time, it created a useful profile 
that can be used to monitor for suspicious transactions as well as for building better client relationships. 
The government could then initiate longer term programmes to improve the national identification 
system.  
Verification through 3
rd
 party databases. Allow financial institutions to verify client information against 
reliable third party databases accessed independently by the financial institution instead of compelling 
them to only accept documentary proof submitted by the client. The effectiveness of this control will 
depend on the availability, accessibility and quality of databases of third parties such as credit bureaus.  
This approach proved effective in an example of a mobile bank where the account opening procedure 
was conducted over the phone (i.e. non face-to-face). The FSP in question collected the necessary 
client information but instead of requiring clients to submit a copy of their identification document, the 
details where verified against a third party database.. This measure was also combined with an account 
threshold to limit the risk. Where the clients wanted to exceed the threshold, they had to provide the 
standard verification documentation. In a different example FSPs where allowed to re-identify clients by 
comparing their client information with a government identity database. The database allowed for online 
and batch processing, enabling banks to conduct the re-identification process efficiently and within a 
relatively short period of time.  
Costly MIS systems: Imposing requirements to implement advanced MIS systems will impose 
significant costs on the industry and bias against small players.  
Flexibility on MIS requirements. Allow a control framework that relies on paper-based or simplified 
systems rather than advanced electronic management information systems, if the former is cheaper or 
more manageable and affordable for the relevant FSPs. In one example, the AML/CFT regulations were 
designed to allow FSPs the flexibility to use simpler or even paper-based systems as long as they meet 
the reporting requirements and can demonstrate that appropriate risk management can be done by 
using these systems. This allowed smaller FSPs who individually served a small client base, often on a 
very personal level, to use simple electronic or paper-based systems whereas larger FSPs could benefit 
from using appropriate electronic systems to deal with their larger client bases  
Record-keeping costs: Requiring FSPs to retain paper copies of verification documents results in 
significant costs to construct and maintain document management systems that provide little benefit for 
risk management or client relationships. 
Streamlined record-keeping. Allow reduced or streamlined record-keeping, for example allowing 
verification documentation to be scrutinised and noted rather than copied and allowing electronic 
record-keeping. In one country FSPs are required to verify clients‟ identity through sight of the relevant 
identification documents. However, FSPs are not required to retain a copy of the document or open a 
physical file for the client if the transaction balances remain within a defined threshold. Instead FSPs 
can simply capture the details electronically for monitoring purposes. For a particular FSP targeting low-
income clients this enabled them to manage low-balance accounts and low-value transactions on a 
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viable basis and grow to become one of the largest FSPs in the market (in terms of client numbers). The 
records are, however, sufficient to control ML risk and to facilitate investigations and prosecutions where 
required. 
Delaying or prohibiting the introduction of new technologies and business models (e.g. m-
banking
36
): Uncertainty regarding the nature and implication of new business models and technologies 
often results in regulators following the conservative approach of prohibiting such technology. 
Embrace new technologies while limiting risk. Where regulators are confronted by new technologies or 
business models for which the ML risks are unknown, market development can be facilitated by limiting 
the functionality of new products (for example by capping the value of transactions and/or prohibiting 
cross-border transactions utilising the new technology) whilst monitoring usage to determine and assess 
the actual risks presented. This manages the risk and utilises the benefit of new models that often 
include advanced MIS systems that could facilitate detailed monitoring and reporting at low cost.  
This approach has benefited mobile banking models in a number of countries. In one example, the 
regulator created a tailored regime to allow a mobile phone-based remittance system. Risks were 
managed by introducing account restrictions and by implementing systems to monitor the transactions 
against client profiles. Given the advanced electronic platform used, this could easily be achieved at 
relatively low cost. The fact that this product is targeted at the lower-income market allowed the setting 
of fairly low thresholds and restrictions which limits the risk while still allowing the typical transactions to 
be conducted on this account. The standard regulation required face-to-face origination but the 
regulator allowed origination through agents of the FSP to facilitate the use of retailer and other 
distribution networks. This flexible approach has allowed for the emergence of a large low-income 
remittance system. 
In another example non-face-to-face origination of mobile bank accounts where allowed as long as 
account restrictions were imposed, cross-border transactions prohibited and sufficient monitoring 
conducted to control ML abuse. In addition, this was combined with the use of third-party databases for 
verification of client identity as noted above. This allowed the mobile bank to manage client origination 
efficiently and at low cost to leverage the benefits of their technology.   
7.8. GUIDELINE 7: RISK-BASED SEQUENCING OF AML CONTROLS 
Risk-based sequencing. The sequencing approach acknowledges that all countries should strive to 
meet the FATF standards, but accepts that the domestic resource envelope of some countries may not 
allow full and effective controls to be imposed on all relevant transactions and institutions all at once. 
The level of controls imposed may then have to be scaled to the capacity of the regulator and the 
institutions involved. Levels of control will normally be higher for those institutions that are well-regulated 
and may initially be rudimentary for those institutions that have not been subjected to comprehensive 
regulation. Sequencing and scaling may be appropriate strategies but only if they are coupled with a 
framework to manage an increase in the required capacity to ensure that the international standards are 
reached. Increases in capacity should be accompanied by increased levels of control until the desired 
levels have been reached. 
Levels of AML control. Potential levels of control are the following:  
 Coverage of institutions, which entails basic registration of the providers of financial services. 
Registration ensures that these providers become visible to the supervisor and their information 
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 Assessing and managing the AML/CFT risk in mobile banking models will be dealt with in more details in a forthcoming World Bank paper focusing 
on this topic (due for publication at the beginning of 2008). 
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accessible to state agencies. At this stage AML/CFT controls are not yet imposed and the 
institutions are not yet supervised to ensure effective compliance. This is the first step for institutions 
which have not been publicly regulated and/or supervised previously. This approach was followed 
by one country where regulation had to be extended to money transfer operators but the state 
lacked the regulatory capacity to enforce compliance and the regulated entities did not have the 
ability to implement comprehensive AML/CFT controls. The country therefore used its existing 
regulatory capacity and required money transfer operators to register with the tax authorities for 
AML/CFT purposes. 
 Traceability of clients and transactions, requiring institutions to follow basic client identification 
procedures (even though verification may be limited), to keep standardised client and accounting 
records, and to ensure that those records are available to regulators and investigators.. This level 
may be appropriate for community-based institutions, or institutions with no previous experience of 
a compliance function. In one example, the regulator submitted second tier community-based banks 
to limited regulation but required them to keep certain records which could allow for traceability of 
transactions if this would be required by law enforcement authorities. 
 Profiling, verification and monitoring, which requires profiling of clients, more extensive verification 
of client identity, and the pro-active monitoring of transactions for suspicious activity. This level is 
appropriate for most institutions with a history of financial sector supervision. 
 Enhanced verification and interdiction is possible where the national identification system and 
capacity of financial institutions enable verification with high levels of integrity to be performed and 
suspicious transactions can be interdicted by the state before they are carried out. This is the 
highest level of AML/CFT control and requires extensive capacity to be implemented.  
Along this continuum of AML controls the regulator should attempt to maximise effectiveness by 
ensuring that as much information as can reasonably be expected is available to the state. This includes 
the filing of STRs to the FIU as well as the supply of information to facilitate the management of the 
sequencing and scaling strategies. For example, banks dealing with MSBs which are only registered 
(coverage level), can be required to report volumes of transactions to the regulator. Such information 
can highlight priorities for stronger controls. The duty to report STRs can be imposed already at the first 
or second level of control, if the country can ensure the necessary training and systems to facilitate the 
filing of such reports by the institutions concerned. 
Safeguard formal institutions: The sequencing approach is likely to increase financial exclusion where it 
encompasses business relationships between well-supervised financial institutions and providers of 
financial services which are subjected to lesser AML controls. This is so because the well-supervised 
institution could face both civil and criminal liability as well as reputational damage if ML and CF risks 
materialise in its less supervised client (for example MSBs holding accounts with formal banks). Unless 
the regulator explicitly limits the potential liability for the well-supervised institution, these institutions will 
have an incentive to sever the business relationships in question. 
Explicit regulation required: FSPs often adopt very conservative compliance procedures to protect 
themselves against ML and FT risks. If they are given the discretion to impose reduced controls for 
lower-risk transactions they may decline this option and apply the standard controls. The tendency to 
opt for a conservative approach strengthens a country‟s AML/CFT system but may undermine its efforts 
to increase financial inclusion. To limit financial exclusion, the level of controls required for low-risk 
clients and transactions should therefore be made explicit by government. Clear exemptions may prove 
more effective than a discretion-based approach. 
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7.9. GUIDELINE 8: PROMOTE MARKET-BASED REFORMS FACILITATING 
FORMALISATION 
The twin objectives of effective AML/CFT controls and financial inclusion can be greatly enhanced by 
market incentives that contribute to (1) formalise informal or unregistered providers of financial services 
and/or (2) migrate users of informal financial services to formal or registered providers. Although such 
reforms are not strictly part of AML/CFT regulation, their short-term impact on both objectives may be 
more significant than the actual AML/CFT regulation and should be favourably considered by regulators 
seeking to implement AML/CFT controls. 
Formalise informal providers: The policy instruments available to achieve this objective will depend on 
the market structure and existing regulation in an economy. A first step can be the creation of a 
favourable registration regime with lower entry requirements for particular categories of financial 
institutions (including micro-finance organisations) especially those serving low-income groups. This 
could be made more attractive by a structural or technical support program for institutions preparing to 
register.  
Migrate users of informal services to formal providers: This challenge is particularly acute in countries 
with large informal outflows or inflows of migrant remittances. Policy initiatives that can be taken include: 
 Facilitating the use by undocumented migrants of formal financial services; 
 Encouraging formal financial services to meet the demand characteristics of users of informal 
financial services, such as a code of conduct that approximates the service levels of informal 
providers; 
 Reducing the differential between the official exchange rate and the kerb rate; 
 Support and benefits to migrants who use formal remittance channels; 
 Encouraging new lower-cost and more convenient models, such as mobile banking. 
The national revenue authority has a clear interest in the migration of users of informal financial services 
to formal channels. However, an explicit or implied link between the imposition of AML/CFT controls and 
extending the tax net could have the unintended consequence of discouraging participation in the formal 
sector and thus increase financial exclusion. This is especially the case where tax evasion is 
widespread. 
7.10. GUIDELINE 9: DEVELOP IDENTIFICATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
If a country‟s national identification infrastructure and other private databases lack coverage, integrity or 
is not easily (and cost-effectively) accessible to financial institutions for verification purposes, the state 
should address the deficiencies. The following initiatives could be taken by the government: 
 Provide for legal access by private financial institutions to existing databases, at a fee if necessary, 
 Facilitate electronic access to existing databases; 
 Provide for and fund the establishment of new databases, such as credit information databases, 
and ensure that sufficient mandatory information are kept in these databases to facilitate the 
verification of identity for AML/CFT purposes; 
 Mandate electronic linkages between existing isolated identification databases and provide for a 
common national identification number; 
 Increase the integrity of existing databases where this is lacking; 
 Move to smartcard based national identification systems which facilitate verification of identity using 
biometric information. 
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In the meantime AML/CFT controls should not impose duties on financial institutions to create or 
duplicate such databases. Designers of controls should also be sensitive to the difficulties of verification 
under these circumstances. Client profiling that supports monitoring of transactions and especially 
identification of activity inconsistent with the profile may be an appropriate control while processes are 
implemented to improve identification infrastructure. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY TABLES OF COUNTRY FINDINGS 
GENERAL FEATURES OF AML/CFT REGULATORY REGIME 
General South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Status of 
AML/CFT 
regulation 
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 
passed in 2001 and compliance provisions 
operative since 2002) regulations passed 
2002 (including original version of 
Exemption 17), first guidance notes issues 
in 2004); 
 Exemption 17 amended in 2004 to better 
suit the requirements/nature of low-income 
clients. Current version still does not 
include cross-border transfers. 
 FICA in the process of being amended in 
2007.  
 AML/CFT law not yet in place. The 
Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering 
(Prevention) Bill (2006) has been gazetted 
for introduction to the National Assembly 
(Gazette Supplement No. 77, Bills No. 27, 
November 2006). Regulations have not yet 
been published. 
 Basic AML regulations passed under the 
Banking Act (Prudential Guideline 12 
CBK/RG/12, Sep 2000). More 
comprehensive guidelines issued in Jan 
2006 (Prudential Guideline 8, Jan 2006). 
Both guidelines only applied to institutions 
regulated under Banking Act (i.e. 
commercial banks). 
 Guidelines do not protect banks from civil 
liability if client confidentiality is breached in 
reporting suspicious transactions.  
 Draft of bill approved by cabinet in 2005. 
Yet to be approved by parliament.  
 Reporting of suspicious transactions to 
Anti-Narcotics force (ANF) originally 
imposed through Control of Narcotic 
Substances Act (1997). 
 National Accountability Bureau established 
through National Accountability Ordinance 
(1999) and requires reporting of suspicious 
transactions by financial institutions. 
 Basic KYC regulations under Banking 
Ordinance (covering banks and money 
exchange companies) and Insurance 
Ordinance (covering insurers, stock brokers 
and dealers, trusts, leasing companies, 
charities, NGOs and other non-financial 
institutions). 
 Slightly less onerous regulations for 
microfinance banks. 
 No explicit AML/CFT regulation covering 
PostBank or CDNS. 
 Bank Indonesia issued KYC regulations in 
June 2001. These were found to be 
insufficient and Indonesia was listed on the 
NCCT list in the same month. 
 In response, Law 15 of 2002 Concerning 
the Crime of Money Laundering, which 
criminalised money laundering was passed, 
creating reporting and record-keeping 
obligations for financial institutions and 
established the PPATK as FIU.  
 This was amended by Law 25 of 2003, 
improving money laundering control by 
broadening STR duties, removing previous 
minimum threshold for STRs and by 
criminalising terrorism. 
 Another round of amendments are currently 
underway that will increase the power of 
the PPATK and extend reporting 
requirements to a number of non-financial 
businesses. 
 Indonesia was removed from NCCT list in 
2005. 
 Money laundering criminalised in 1996 
under Article 400 BIS of the Federal Penal 
Code. Money laundering is defined 
generally in the Penal Code and predicate 
offences are not listed. A maximum penalty 
of fifteen years and a fine of up to 5,000 
days‟ minimum wages can be imposed. In 
the case of a money laundering offence 
being committed by a government official, 
the penalty increases by 50%. 
  CFT was criminalised in September 2006 
through an amendment of Article 139 of the 
Federal Penal Code. 
Money 
laundering 
criminalise
d 
 Originally criminalised for drugs in 1992. 
Extended to proceeds of any crime 
irrespective of value by Proceeds of Crime 
Act in 1996. 
 Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) 
was passed in 1998 
 Criminalised under Anti-Narcotics and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1994. 
 Some components of money laundering 
criminalised in 1997.  
 Law 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of 
Money Laundering criminalised money 
laundering. 
 1996 
Funding of 
terrorism 
criminalise
d 
 Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
against Terrorist and Related Activities 
(POCDATARA) Act passed in 2004. 
 Not yet criminalised. Anti-terrorism bill 
tabled in 2003, but rejected due to human 
rights concerns.  
 Criminalised in 1997 through Anti-Terrorism 
Act 
 Law 15 of 2003 Concerning Terrorism 
criminalised terrorism as well as financing 
of terrorism. In addition, Law 15 of 2002 
Concerning the Crime of Money 
Laundering, as amended by Law 25 of 
2003, lists the financing of terrorist activities 
as one of the predicate offences for money 
laundering. terrorism 
 Currently in process. Draft legislation that 
will modify Article 139 and incorporate 
Article 148 into the Federal Penal Code to 
criminalise international terrorism and the 
financing of terrorism is currently being 
finalised 
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General South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Member of 
regional 
body 
 Became FATF member in 2003. Held 
presidency in 2005/2006. 
 Member of ESAAMLG  Member of APG  Member of APG  Became FATF member in 2000; Mexico 
also a member of the Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force and a member of the 
South American Financial Action Task 
Force. It  holds membership in the Egmont 
Group and the OAS/CICAD Experts Group 
to Control Money Laundering 
National 
identificatio
n system 
 Wide coverage, although some concerns 
about integrity of the system exists.  
 Estimated that only 5% of the eligible adult 
population does not have an identity 
document. 
 By law, Kenyan citizens over the age of 18 
must have and carry a national identity card 
issued by Office of the National Registrar of 
Persons.  
 15.6m adult Kenyans out of 17m people 
have one.  
 Cards are issued free of charge and carry 
the name, date of birth, gender, thumbprint, 
and place of birth of holder. 
 Comprehensive national identity system 
managed by National Database and 
Registration Authority (NADRA).  
 52m adults (65% of the adult population) 
have been issued with Computerised 
National Identification Cards (CNICs) since 
the system became operational in October 
2001.  
 On average, 25,000 new cards being 
issued per day  
 Indonesia has a widespread, though not 
uniform, identification infrastructure.  
 Mandatory for all married people or people 
over the age of 17 years to have an identity 
card, known as a KTP, and to carry it with 
them at all times.  
 Possible for a person to have more than 
one valid KTP, with different identification 
numbers. Easy to falsify KTP or to obtain 
KTP corruptly.  
 Indonesia has no single national 
identification number, has up to 40 public 
institutions issuing some form of acceptable 
identification, each with its own database 
and system. 
 Federal Electoral Card, administered by the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), an 
autonomous public organisation, the main 
form of identification.  
 In 2006, around 71m Mexican citizens 
(95% of those eligible to vote) were 
registered on the electoral roll and also had 
a valid voting ID-card (IFE, 2006).  
 Card is provided free of charge and mobile 
units of the IFE service even very remote 
rural areas.  
 Banks and other financial institutions do not 
have access to database on which Federal 
Electoral Card information is stored. 
Foreign 
ownership 
of banking 
sector 
 Barclays Bank (based in UK) has 
controlling stake in ABSA, one of the "Big 
Four" banks. 
 Foreign-owned Barclays and Standard 
Chartered holds 16% and 11.5% of market 
share, respectively. 
 11 foreign banks operating in Pakistan  
 The largest (in terms of assets and 
deposits) being Standard Chartered and 
Citibank. 
 11 foreign banks with branches in 
Indonesia. 
 Foreign ownership of Mexican banks 
exceeds 75% of banking sector assets 
 Prominent foreign-owned banks include 
HSBC, BBVA Bancomer, Banamex and 
Santander. 
Extent of 
informality  
 In 2002/03, informal economy comprised 
29.5% of GDP.  
 24% of economically active population was 
employed in informal sector in 2006. 
 Large informal sector, accounting for 
between 70% and 94% of the economically 
active population. 
 Estimated that 50% of GDP is derived from 
the informal market.  
 65% of non-agriculture workers employed 
in the informal sector.  
 Average ratio of tax revenue (direct and 
indirect) to GDP of 9.5% is very low. 
 Only 1.5m tax payers out of total population 
of 80m. 
 Estimated 11 million small and micro 
businesses and a further almost 32 million 
“productive poor” (individuals selling goods) 
most of whom can be expected to operate 
in the informal sector.  
 Small tax b base. Out of adult population of 
around 144 million, less than 20% are 
registered as tax payers, as few as 3 million 
people (2% of adults) file tax returns. 
 28% of those employed could be classified 
as working in the informal sector  
 Only 4-5m tax payers out of 15m registered 
tax payers paying tax. 
Informality 
of financial 
services 
 Estimated 80,000 to 100,000 burial 
societies (informal insurers) in South Africa, 
while contributions to stokvels (ROSCAs) 
totalled almost $1 billion in 2004.  
 Up to 42% of remittances to SADC 
estimated to be sent through informal 
channels. 
 Size of the informal market is not 
documented, but the CBK estimates that 
informal flows are “at least as large” as 
formal ones. 
 Estimated that 50% of the value (as much 
as 75% of transactions) of inward 
remittances to Pakistan flow through 
informal channels. 
 Informal remittance market estimates vary 
from $2bn (somewhat smaller than the 
formal remittances market) to $12bn (about 
four times the formal remittances market). 
 6,000-7,000 centros cambiarios (small 
money exchange business) operating in 
Mexico.  
 Although required to register, process only 
recently started. At the moment, few are 
registered. 
Key 
features of 
AML/CFT 
regime 
 Complications experienced due to re-ID 
process. Solved by introducing risk-based 
exemption allowing banks to follow risk-
sensitive approach to prioritising re-ID 
 Exemption 17 tailored to bank accounts  
and mainly national transactions and still 
does no resolve problems for cross-border 
remittances 
 Regime extended to SACCOs, MFIs, 
Postbank and "informal" FSPs. 
 No differentiation between capacity of 
different FSPs. 
 No risk-sensitive exemptions for low-value, 
low-risk clients or transactions. 
 Facilitative approach to formalising 
remittance providers. 
 National savings scheme not covered 
under AML/CFT regime. 
 No re-ID for Post Bank. 
 Good relationship between FIC and bank 
sector result in the creation of regime that is 
aligned with realities and capacity of the 
financial sector. 
 Regime utilises available ID system, 
despite its flaws and did not pass on cost of 
identification to banking sector. Support this 
with profiling. 
 Nominal regulation of BPRs. 
 Exemptions for lower-risk transactions. 
 Initial blanket regulation inserted under 
various acts (regulation following 
institutional model).  
 Cajas de ahorro would be unable to comply 
with systems requirements. 
 Exemptions for lower-risk transactions (may 
be too lenient). 
 Nominal regulation of centros de 
cambiarios. 
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BANKING ACCOUNTS: CURRENT LEVELS OF ACCESS AND USAGE 
Banking South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
INDICATORS         
Access % 67% 5% 15% Best case 45%, worst case 35% 36% 
Usage % 46% 19% 8-11% Best case 29%, worst case 20% at most 25% (Mexico City) 
 
BANK ACCOUNTS: NON-AML/CFT FACTORS IMPACTING ON ACCESS, USAGE AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Affordabilit
y 
 Most restrictive access barrier:  33% of 
adult population estimated to be unable to 
afford a transaction account. 
 Affordability found to present biggest 
access barrier: estimated that 80% of 
adults are unable to afford a basic savings 
account and 95% are unable to afford a 
transaction account. 
 Competition is increasing with entry of 
some commercial banks, SACCOs and 
MFIs into low-income banking (deposit-
taking) market. 
 Affordability and minimum balance 
requirements found to present biggest 
barriers to transaction and basic bank 
accounts respectively.  
 Estimate that 85% of adults cannot afford a 
transaction account and 90% cannot meet 
minimum balance requirements of free 
basic bank account. 
 52% of adult population cannot afford 
savings account with basic transaction 
functionality.  
 75% of adult population cannot afford 
savings account with full transaction 
functionality (including a debit order and an 
inter-bank EFT transactions). 
 Affordability key access constraint 
excluding 64% of economically active 
population.  
 Figure likely to be higher for total 
population. 
Proximity 
 Cost implication of travelling to bank 
included in affordability estimates. 
 17 branches per 100,000 adults 
 Less profitable bank branches in rural 
areas have been closed over the last 
decade.  
 85% of branches in urban areas, but 60% 
of population rural.  
 Postbank is only real player with rural 
network. 
 May be limitation for commercial banks but 
Post Office has wide reaching branch 
infrastructure.  
 Large unbanked groups in close vicinity of 
bank branches (even in urban areas), 
suggest that proximity is not the primary 
deterrent to being banked.  
 20% of adult population estimated to be 
excluded on basis of proximity.  
 This would have been significantly higher 
had it not been for BRI Unit Desas and the 
distribution network provided by Pos 
Indonesia. 
 No quantification possible. 
Eligibility 
 No significant impacts identified.  
 Minimum balances do not restrict access 
and banks do not require proof of income 
for low-income accounts. 
 High opening and minimum balance 
requirements estimated to exclude 25-30% 
of adults, but new players are starting to 
break the pattern (some requiring zero 
opening balance). 
 90% of adults do not have access to free 
basic bank account due to restrictive 
minimum balances.  
 Balance on normal transaction account less 
restrictive. 
 90% excluded on basis of opening balance 
(if average balance across banks is used); 
reduces to 45% excluded (if lowest opening 
balance is used (BRI)) 
 55% estimated unable to afford required 
on-going balances. 
 Quantification not available, but not likely to 
exceed affordability barriers. 
Regulation 
(non-
AML/CFT) 
 No significant impacts identified for SA 
citizens. Identity document required as 
standard procedure, but widely available.  
 Between 2.5m and 4.1m undocumented 
migrants excluded due to inability to 
produce valid ID and required work permits 
(work permit required  under section F3.2.2 
of Exchange Control Manual). 
 High interest rates provided on government 
bonds have traditionally discouraged banks 
to seek profit from higher-risk, lower-
income areas, contributing to low usage 
levels from the supply-side.  
 Changing market conditions and 
government policy emphasis on access is 
slowly shifting attitude towards low-income 
banking. 
 Regulation requires banks to offer free 
Basic Bank Account.   
 No barriers identified 
 Identification document is the only statutory 
requirement and is widely available. 
 No evidence to suggest that this present a 
barrier. 
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 South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Usage: 
 Banks negatively perceived by the poor 
who tend to view banks as institutions for 
high-income people. 
 Suspicion of formal banking sector and 
claims of low service levels to low-income 
clients may contribute to low usage.  
 Usage however for the most part in line 
with access, thus low usage explained by 
access barriers rather than individual 
choice/preference. 
 Usage discouraged by unfriendly attitude of 
commercial banks towards the poor.  
 Resistance to documentation due to tax 
evasion and fear of officialdom discourages 
use of formal products. 
 Little need for bank account due to limited 
functionality and general "cash comfort". 
 Previous banking crisis has undermined 
trust of the banking system and resulted in 
preference to save in assets/property (e.g. 
jewellery 
 Electronic payments also significantly more 
expensive than cheques and cash, which 
discourage electronic transactions. 
 Tax evasion generally considered 
discouraging to use of formal sector 
products.  
 Low financial literacy and "hassle factor" 
associated with filling out forms also 
discourage use of formal products but this 
seems to be less pronounced in Indonesia 
than in other countries. Hassle factor is 
reduced by bank staff in some cases 
helping with completing forms and only 
requiring KTP for verification of all details. 
 Electronic payments also significantly more 
expensive than cheques and cash, which 
discourage electronic transactions. 
 Distrust of banks after financial sector 
crisis.  
 Bank accounts may seem affordable 
relative to income, but poor value 
proposition: Client looses money by putting 
into bank 
Market 
efficiency: 
 Relatively concentrated nature of retail 
banking sector may impact on affordability. 
Competitive inquiry currently underway. 
 Government goal of access expansion (to 
which industry is committed under the 
Financial Sector Charter) has prompted 
products aimed at low-income market and 
revision of AML/CFT regulation to allow 
exemption for low-income products, thereby 
increasing offering to this segment. 
 Enabling environment framework being 
introduced for SACCOs and MFIs. 
Especially SACCOs are emerging as 
competitors to banks - positive implications 
for affordability, proximity, etc. via 
enhanced competition. 
 Legislation to create a separate regulatory 
framework for MF banks and thereby create 
a tier of banks to serve the lower-income 
market. 
 Payment system currently has limited 
functionality increasing the cost of 
electronic transactions and undermining the 
value of a transaction account. 
 Regulation creates multiple tiers of banks. 
While not part of a coordinated and explicit 
access policy, this does allow room for 
players that serve the lower-income market 
(e.g. BPRs). 
 Payment system currently has limited 
functionality increasing the costs of 
electronic transfers relative to cheques. 
 Banking crisis of 1995 prompted a 
contraction of credit extension and a focus 
on systemic stability, undermined 
individuals' trust in banking sector and led 
to 75% foreign ownership of banking 
sector. This may aggravate the impact of 
AML/CFT on access as described below 
 High concentration of banking sector may 
undermine competition. Banks not targeted 
at low-income population, "simply too much 
market in-between". 
 But new entrants (e.g. retailers applying for 
banking licence) and popular fin sector 
actively targeting low-income market. 
            
BANK ACCOUNTS: AML/CFT IMPACT ON USAGE, ACCESS AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
  South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Usage 
 Usage may be disincentivised due to 
administrative burden. Exemption 17 (see 
below) has however countered this 
tendency. 
 Efforts to encourage tax and exchange 
control compliance through an amnesty 
agreement was undermined by requirement 
of FICA on financial advisor to report 
identity of such individuals to the tax FIU. 
This problem was resolved by creating a 
temporary and limited exemption from such 
reporting duties. 
 Minimal impact on use of formal financial 
services to date, because: (1) limited scope 
of AML/CFT measures under Banking Act 
(to date only commercial banks subjected 
to AML/CFT regulation) and (2) exclusivity 
of formal financial services (only serve 
small, high-income group).  
 Alternative address verification through 
letter by official is provided but this 
increases the hassle factor and cost 
significantly, opens up opportunities for 
graft and discourages use because of fear 
of officialdom. 
 Requirement to verify identity through these 
additional measures will also irk consumers 
whose culture dictates that identity is 
proven by an individual's "word" and will be 
insulted by not accepting this. 
 Large extent of tax evasion and informality 
means that increased documentation 
component under AML/CFT is likely to 
discourage use of formal products. 
 Verification of identity over and above 
national ID card discourages use of formal 
products by increasing hassle factor.  
 AML/CFT documentation (e.g. expanded 
forms) may discourage use of formal 
channels, but most information would have 
been asked for even in the absence of 
AML/CFT.  
 Identity card is a standard requirement 
even in absence of AML/CFT. 
 Incentive to use may be impacted, should 
KYC be perceived as a drive to document 
the informal economy. 
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  South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Access 
 At least 30% (but up to as much as 56%) of 
the population cannot provide proof of 
address by means of a utility bill as 
required under AML/CFT legislation. 
Without Exemption 17, this meant that 
these individuals would have been 
excluded from the formal financial system. 
 Difficulties in meeting re-identification 
deadlines could have resulted in 80% of 
bank accounts being frozen. Given the 
systemic and business risk to the banking 
sector, the deadline was extended in the 
final hour by the minister and a risk-based 
approach introduced.  
 AML/CFT regulation may soon present 
larger barrier than affordability. AML/CFT 
bill's requirement to verify address with 
utility bill will exclude 95% of the population 
(an estimated 20% have address, but only 
5% can prove this with a utility bill).  
 Alternative verification by a government 
official means that KYC requirements do 
not present an absolute barrier for those 
who cannot verify identity by providing a 
utility bill. As noted above, this alternative is 
likely to discourage usage of formal 
financial services.  
 1m undocumented migrants will be 
excluded from the formal financial system. 
 Limited impact to date due to absence of 
comprehensive law. Guidelines not yet 
clear on sanction. 
 Re-identification risks freezing significant 
proportion of accounts. At the time of this 
report, no official agreement had been 
reached on extending the deadline. 
 Necessity to produce national ID card 
excludes 35% of population, but roll-out of 
cards exceeds that of bank accounts. 
 No impact currently. Widely available 
identity card only form of verification 
needed in practice. 
 Re-identification could have caused 
problems but this was mitigated by the risk-
sensitive approach adopted and flexibility 
on timelines 
 No evidence that AML/CFT regulation is 
leading to the severing of ties between 
banks and lesser or unregulated financial 
institutions (BPRs, BKDs, etc.). This is 
partly due to explicit guidance provided by 
the PPATK on the treatment of these 
accounts. 
 Little direct impact, as any potential impact 
is exceeded by the affordability impact. 
Market 
efficiency 
 By making it difficult to introduce new low-
cost, non-face-to-face banking technologies 
(e.g. mobile banking), it is preventing new 
models entering and competing for this 
market as well as incumbents to adopt such 
technologies 
 Supervisory requirement to obtain paper 
copy of ID has been a major constraint to 
Wizzit's role-out using mobile sales agents. 
 AML/CFT does not present a barrier to 
informal financial entities holding bank 
accounts (e.g. stokvels/burial societies - no 
evidence that KYC is resulting in account 
closures or difficulties). 
 Additional requirements (KYC, re-ID, 
systems, etc.) on FSPs not previously 
covered under AML regime (Postbank 1m, 
SACCOs 2.2m, MFIs 500k clients of whom 
at least 2m will not have a commercial bank 
account) will undermine their ability to 
provide their services. Will impact 
particularly on low-value, low-risk 
transactions. 
 The likely pressure on SACCOs and MFIs 
will be in direct conflict with the enabling 
regulatory framework government is trying 
to create through the introduction of the 
SACCO Societies Bill, 2006, and Deposit-
taking Microfinance Bill, 2005). Onerous 
requirements on MFIs and SACCOs 
(irrespective of their products or their 
clients) may force them to exit or go deeper 
underground. The result will be to further 
limit competition. 
 No exemption of small value, low-risk 
transactions means that these transactions 
will bear the full compliance costs while 
adding little in terms of risk management. 
This will disincentivise the provision of low-
income services. 
 Going forward, the requirement for face-to-
face origination of bank accounts may 
undermine the introduction of new 
technologies such as cell phone banking. 
Current regulation will allow agent banking 
(e.g. using retail stores). 
 Differentiated AML/CFT regulatory burden 
(stricter on commercial banks than MF 
banks, no requirements currently on CDNS 
or Post Bank) may allow these institutions 
to enter the low-income market but also 
creates an unlevel playing field where these 
institutions compete in the high-income 
market. 
 Going forward, the requirement for face-to-
face origination of bank accounts may 
undermine the introduction of new 
technologies such as cell phone banking. 
Agent-based banking is allowed. 
 Systems requirements are flexible 
(guidance notes explicitly accept both 
paper and electronic-based MIS) and does 
not bias against smaller institutions.  
BPR sector not targeted for enforcement 
and no pressure on commercial banks to 
close BPR accounts. 
 Going forward, the requirement for face-to-
face origination of bank accounts may 
undermine the introduction of new 
technologies such as cell phone banking. 
Current regulation will allow agent banking 
(e.g. using retail stores). 
 Impact on institutions (see indirect access 
impact described above): conservative 
compliance with AML/CFT by banks leads 
to severance of ties with smaller, less 
regulated institutions.   
 Concerns that especially cajas will not be 
able to comply, thereby forced to exit 
(thereby increasing concentration) or 
operate informally. Thus "blanket" 
application of AML/CFT may undermine 
certain tiers of the financial sector. 
 The costs of AML/CFT legislation may 
delay entry into deposit-taking services. 
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  South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Impact 
mitigating 
steps 
taken by 
country 
 Impact mitigated by explicit access policy 
objective. This was motivation and driver 
behind Exemption 17 and on-going 
changes to limit the impact of the AML/CFT 
regulation 
 Exemption 17 lifted requirement to obtain 
and verify residential address information in 
respect of most low-income clients (balance 
< R25,000 (+/-$3,500) and transactions( < 
R5,000 per day (+/- $700)) and not 
exceeding R25,000 per month). 
 Directive from SA Reserve Bank (Banks 
Circular 6/2006 issued on 13 July 2006) 
regarding non-face to face account 
acquisition also allowed cell phone banking 
and origination within the transaction limits 
of Exemption 17 (in addition daily 
transaction limits where set at 
R1,000/$130, which is lower than other 
transactions under Exemption 17 and 
identity numbers had to be verified against 
third-party databases) to limit risk. 
 To avoid re-identification crisis, deadline 
was extended by minister by means of a 
risk-based exemption that allowed banks to 
identify and prioritise high risk accounts for 
re-identification).  
 Potential problem with FICA undermining 
tax and exchange control amnesty was 
resolved by creating a temporary and 
limited exemption from such reporting 
duties. 
 None as of yet.  Reduced requirements for MF banks  A focus on up-front identification combined 
with account monitoring (rather than strict 
verification) served to prevent impact.  
 Central Bank mitigated potential impact on 
usage by launching advertising campaign 
aimed at educating the public as to the 
need for AML/CFT and its being 
standardised across FSPs. 
 Flexibility around systems requirements 
(allowing manual and paper-based 
systems). By emphasising traceability 
rather than real-time detection, 
unnecessary expenditure of advanced 
systems have been avoided. 
 Guidance provided by central bank avoids 
impact (e.g. AML/CFT has not lead to the 
closure of BPR accounts) 
 Realistic re-identification plan that was 
tailored to each bank and allowed risk-
sensitive approach. 
 Use of thresholds has allowed authorities to 
limit negative impact on access 
 US$10,000 threshold for the reporting of 
relevant transactions.  
 Physical client files only need to be opened 
for transactions exceeding $10,000 in a 
month or account balances exceeding 
US$3,000. 
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REMITTANCES: CURRENT LEVELS OF ACCESS AND USAGE 
Remittanc
es 
South Africa (significant sending 
volumes) 
Kenya (significant sending volumes) Pakistan (mostly receiving) Indonesia (mostly receiving) Mexico (mostly receiving) 
INDICATORS         
Access % 
 No estimates available, but likely to be very 
low. 
 Undocumented immigrants (estimated 
number between 2.5m and 4.1m) excluded 
since they do not have access to valid ID 
documents required for financial 
transactions. 
 No estimates available, but likely to be very 
low. 
 Cost of 12-17% for a formal sector 
remittance will be unaffordable for a large 
proportion of people. 
 No formal estimates available.  
 Depends largely on conditions in sending 
country.  
 On receiving end, access does not seem 
severely constrained, exceeds usage. 
 Undocumented immigrants and refugees 
(e.g. on Afghanistan border) excluded from 
sending money through formal channels. 
 No estimates available - access constraints 
more likely to be on sending country side 
than receiving end in Indonesia. 
 No estimates available, but seemingly very 
high. 
Usage % 
 No estimates available, but likely to be very 
low. 
 Estimate that 48% of domestic remittances 
and 42% of inter-SADC remittances are 
sent via informal channels. Preferred 
informal channel is to use Taxi drivers or 
friends/relative as cash couriers. 
 Between 15% and 30% of households 
estimated to rely on (domestic and foreign) 
remittances with rural households being on 
the higher side.  
 More than 60% of remitting adults report 
using family/friends or other informal 
transfer mechanisms for domestic 
transfers. 
 21% report to use sambaza airtime transfer 
product 
 $4.5bn estimated to flow in through formal 
channels.  
 At most, 50% of remittances received 
through formal channels. 
 $3bn estimated to flow through formal 
channels. 
 Estimates of informal channel usage vary 
between 40% and 80% of total inflows 
 Formal channel usage estimated at 90% 
            
REMITTANCES: NON-AML/CFT FACTORS IMPACTING ON ACCESS, USAGE AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Affordabilit
y 
 Affordability is single largest barrier.  
 No quantification available, but estimated to 
be an absolute barrier to using formal 
channels for most remitters. 
 Due to limited competition, formal sector 
remittances are expensive and unlikely to 
be affordable for lower-income households 
wanting to do small transfers (12-17% of 
value remitted) vs. 3-4% in informal market. 
 Unlikely to be restrictive - as 70% of formal 
remittances are through bank transfers, 
costs are not excessive. 
 Explicit government subsidy of costs on 
formal inflows through banks where it is 
converted to domestic currency. 
 No absolute exclusion identified.  
 Cost of formal channels not as high as in 
some of the other countries, but could still 
be up to three times more expensive than 
informal.  
 Unlikely to be prohibitive, judging from high 
formal usage and the fact that costs have 
decreased significantly recently. 
Proximity 
 Distribution network of formal channels 
limited to bank and post office network. 
Thus proximity may partly explain 
preference for informal channels. 
 Due to limited competition, proximity likely 
to be a barrier, but no formal estimates 
available. Informal hawala and other 
channels much more wide-spread and 
flexible. 
 May be limitation for commercial banks but 
Post Office has wide reaching branch 
infrastructure and MTOs have wide 
reaching agent system.  
 Large use of informal mechanisms, even in 
close vicinity of formal channels, suggests 
that proximity is not the primary deterrent. 
 Up to 20% may be excluded due to 
proximity.  
 Formal remittances exclusively linked to 
bank and postal services, thus proximity 
estimate mirrors that of banking sector. 
 Unlikely to be significant. 
Eligibility  No significant impacts identified.  No significant impacts identified.  No significant impacts identified.  No significant impacts identified.  No significant impacts identified. 
Product 
features 
and terms 
 No significant impacts identified. Minimum 
transfer requirements not restrictive (less 
than R10 or about $14) 
 No significant impacts identified.  No significant impacts identified.  No significant impacts identified.  No impact identified. 
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 South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Regulation 
(non-
AML/CFT) 
 Undocumented migrants cannot use formal 
financial system (ID barrier). Forex controls 
stipulate that only individuals that are in 
country on a legal basis (resident, legal 
migrant) can send money. Immigration 
status checked by financial institutions in 
terms of Immigration Act and reports filed 
with authorities. 
 Exchange controls limit cross-border flows 
and place identification requirements 
independently of AML/CFT. 
 Cross-border remittances limited by Central 
Bank Act to those with banking 
license/special CBK license.  
 Significant barrier to entry and formalisation 
of money transfer operations.  
 Result in costs which are significantly 
higher than the informal channels. 
 Government support for Pakistanis abroad 
also incentivises use of formal channels. 
 None on receiving side. 
 On sending side, those without a valid 
passport or work permit will be excluded. 
 No impact identified. 
Usage: 
 Trust and convenience (not related to 
access barriers) are among the reasons 
noted for a preference for informal 
channels. 
 Informal transfers using taxis is estimated 
to cost 10% (on average transfer value of 
$75). This is much lower than the 35% 
charged through formal channels and also 
more convenient. 
 Relative cost is big incentive to use informal 
channels. 
 Other usage factors such as trust, 
convenience and tradition also discourages 
use of formal channels. 
 Low usage appears to be largely a result of 
choice, rather than explicit access barriers. 
 Although formal channel costs have 
reduced significantly, informal channels will 
still be less expensive. 
 Hassle factor of dealing with banks cannot 
compete with convenience of dealing with 
informal channels. 
 Fear of officialdom and documentation (e.g. 
for tax purposes) discourages use of formal 
channels. 
 Value proposition of formal channels not 
sufficient to change long-standing 
habit/culture of using informal channels. 
 Incentives to use formal channels may be 
impacted by remitters' preference to stay 
"underneath the radar screen", be it due to 
illicit activities, or because of suspicion of 
the formal financial sector.  
 Prevalent migrant worker labour practices 
(e.g. use of unregulated labour brokers) 
may also disincentivise usage of formal 
sector. 
 No apparent impact, as usage is very high. 
Market 
efficiency: 
 Strict foreign exchange rules (in regulations 
to Currency and Exchanges Act, 1933) 
reduce competition and leads to increased 
prices. Only banks (or operators partnering 
with banks) are allowed to conduct cross-
border remittances. Given that it requires at 
least $35m in capital to obtain a bank 
license, this reduces competition. In 
addition, regulation prohibits the bulking of 
transactions leading to higher costs of 
managing transactions.  
 Average value of MoneyGram transfers 
(outside of CMA) estimated to be around 
$300. Remitting $75 (the average remitted 
within the SADC region) using MoneyGram, 
will cost just more than 35%. This suggests 
that it is beyond the reach of the low-
income market. 
 Low-income "Mzansi" money transfer 
products have been launched for domestic 
and CMA transfers, but have not yet proven 
successful. 
 Only banks allowed to conduct remittances 
transactions. Restricts competition and 
increases prices.  
 Deliberate government attempts to draw 
remittances into formal sector and improve 
the efficiencies of the formal channels.  
 Regulatory framework has been set up to 
facilitate formalisation of informal money 
transfer operators. 
 The result is increased competition, lower 
formal sector costs and faster transfers. All 
of this has facilitated an increase in the use 
of formal channels.  
 Only banks and Pos Indonesia allowed to 
conduct remittances transactions. Restricts 
competition and increases price. 
 Banks do not generally serve lower-income 
market, but this inefficiency is mitigated by 
the fact that remittances can also be 
sent/received via BRI and the Pos 
Indonesia - which account for the widest 
distribution network. 
 No apparent impact. 
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  South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Access 
 Address verification remains a barrier for 
walk-in remittances (Exemption 17 not 
extended to remittance products). 
 Confusion around keeping copies of client 
documentation raises costs for some 
institutions with knock-on effects on access. 
 The need for an official identity document 
excludes undocumented migrants from 
formal remittance services. 
 Requirement to prove identity and legality 
of stay for even small amounts excludes 
undocumented migrants (estimated to be at 
least 800k). 
 Impact unlikely to be significant. 
 CNIC sufficient proof of identity for sending 
and receiving transactions. Do not require 
verification of address details as part of 
CDD process. 
 No evidence of impact. $10,000 threshold 
for KYC applied to walk-in clients (though 
FSPs tend to ask for ID card as standard 
procedure in any case) up to December 
2006.  
 No direct impact - threshold of US$3,000, 
versus average remittance size of US$400 
implies little exclusion due to KYC. 
 Potential indirect impact via severance of 
relationships between banks and cajas, as 
well as severance of ties between banks 
and money services business in the USA 
(the largest source of remittances to 
Mexico). 
Usage 
 Identity needs to be verified even for once-
off small domestic remittances. 
 Usage will be discouraged due to 
inconvenience/mistrust of official 
procedures. 
 The availability of convenient and lower-
cost informal money transfer mechanisms 
(particularly for domestic and regional 
transfers) will increase the elasticity of 
formal product usage to the introduction of 
further administration and compliance 
hassles. 
 Proposed AML/CFT regulation requires 
KYC on all transactions, irrespective of size 
(including once-off), and requires source of 
income and identity to be verified by 
additional documentation, which is not be 
readily available to a large proportion of the 
population. A significant proportion of the 
population will thus have to use the 
burdensome option of having their income 
and identity verified by a government 
official. Administrative burden and 
overwhelming officialdom is likely to be a 
significant discouragement to use of formal 
financial products. 
 Availability of convenient and lower-cost 
informal money transfer mechanisms 
(particularly for domestic and regional 
transfers) will increase the elasticity of 
formal product usage to the introduction of 
further administration and compliance 
hassles. 
 AML/CFT unlikely to have significant impact 
on usage of formal channels (see below). 
 AML/CFT may impact incentives to use 
formal sector, should remitters want no 
record of the transaction (be it because of 
illicit activities, or out of suspicion of 
government's AML/CFT system). 
 No apparent impact, as usage is very high. 
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  South Africa Kenya Pakistan Indonesia Mexico 
Market 
efficiency 
 No significant impact identified.  
 This is mostly because a Foreign Exchange 
regulation has limited players in this market 
to banks and those who partner with banks.  
 If these requirements where to be relaxed, 
the systems and reporting requirements 
under AML/CFT regulation may present 
barriers to smaller institutions entering the 
market. 
 Proposed AML/CFT regulation extends to 
informal money transfer operators. These 
are unlikely to be able to comply with the 
requirements. At least half of remittances 
flows are estimated to flow through informal 
channels. 
 Proposed AML/CFT regulation will also 
extend to transfers of value through airtime 
transactions. This will require cell phone 
companies to comply with the CDD, STR 
and other requirements of the regulation, 
which is likely to increase costs and create 
barriers (even if values may be quite small). 
 Limited capacity of government to 
supervise may lead to the exclusion of 
informal MTOs from the banking sector. 
Given limited regulatory capacity, it will not 
be possible to supervise informal MTOs as 
suggested by the proposed AML/CFT law.  
 The result will be that they will have 
difficulty maintaining their accounts with 
commercial banks as they will not be able 
to prove their compliance and the banks will 
only be able to audit this at high cost. 
 Informal remittance sector is robust and 
indications are that AML/CFT will not be a 
successful tool to formalise 
remittances/close down informal channels; 
depending on way of implementation, it 
may even serve to push a larger part of the 
remittance market underground. 
 Commercial banks are currently the only 
focus of AML/CFT enforcement, thus no 
clampdown on informal remittance 
providers as of yet, though FIU has 
indicated that it needs to be investigated. 
 Market efficiency may be impacted over the 
longer run, should cajas or and other 
entities who are unable to comply, ties with 
banks be severed, thereby denying them 
access to the payment system. 
Impact 
mitigating 
steps taken 
by country 
 Exemption 17 supported the creation of the 
Mzansi money transfer products by the 
banks. Transfers through these products 
cost around 7%, but is limited to domestic 
transfers only. 
 None as of yet.  None as of yet.  $10,000 KYC threshold on once-off 
transactions prevents impact 
 Legislation passed for compulsory bank 
accounts to be opened before migrant 
workers depart - but cannot affect barriers 
on the sending side. 
 Use of thresholds has allowed authorities to 
limit negative impact on access - KYC 
threshold of US$3,000 for walk-in clients. 
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APPENDIX B: INDONESIA 
SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
 Indonesia is a middle-income country with a large informal sector (an estimated 80% of the adult 
population is not registered for tax purposes). 
 The Indonesian financial sector is large and diverse, spanning three tiers of banking services 
providers. Yet only between 20% and 30% of the adult population use a bank account.  
 This is a reflection of low levels of access to such accounts, based largely on the unaffordability of 
certain bank account requirements to the bulk of the population. 
 Indonesia, with its estimated 3m citizens working abroad, is a remittance receiving country. Most 
remittances probably flow through informal rather than formal channels. This may be a factor of 
affordability, but no definite estimates are available. 
 The country has a widespread identification system. The integrity of the system is however often 
questioned and no uniform national identity number exists. 
 The AML regime has been operative since 2002, with the enactment of an AML law, predated by 
Bank Indonesia regulations concerning the application of Know Your Client (KYC) principles in 2001. 
The AML law was amended in 2003. In 2005, Indonesia was removed from the FATF NCCT list, and 
in early 2006, the FATF decided that it is no longer necessary to monitor the country.  
 KYC principles require upfront identification (verified only with the widely available identity card) as 
well as re-identification of current clients. Re-identification is still underway, but Bank Indonesia is 
generally satisfied with progress. 
 We find that there are no major AML constraints to access, as widely available means of 
identification are required for verification purposes. Remittances in Indonesia are, similarly, not 
impacted by AML. 
 Monitoring of accounts (via either an automatic or manual system) is required, based on basic 
profiling information obtained from clients. 
 Systems requirements are realistic and flexible and a risk-sensitive approach is followed in terms of 
enforcement priorities across categories of FSPs and allowed re-identification time lines for various 
risk profile client groups. 
 AML/CFT has not resulted in significant cost increases for FSPs and has not impacted on their 
incentives to serve the lower-income market. 
 The Indonesian system furthermore represents an interesting example in that the AML/CFT regime is 
regulator-led, rather than enforcement-led and is coordinated across government departments at the 
ministerial level. A good relationship, based on regular interaction, exists between regulator, FIU and 
financial service providers. 
 
GENERAL AND MARKET CONTEXT 
Economy at a glance 
Indonesia is a lower-middle-income country, of which more than half the population live on $2 
per day or less. With a population estimated at around 217 million people in 2004 (WDI, 
2006
37
), spread over some 6,000 inhabited islands (out of a total of 13,677), Indonesia has a 
                                                     
37
Some sources, e.g. CIA World Fact Book at a 2005 estimate of 240 million, and Encarta, at a 2004 estimate of 238 million, estimate 
the population to be much larger. The BPS (Indonesian statistics bureau)‟s 2005 population estimate is 222m. We apply the WDI figures 
for consistency with the other WDI figures used.  
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per capita GDP (PPP adjusted) of $3,600 per annum and is classified by the World Bank as a 
lower-middle income economy. About 17% of the population fall below the national poverty 
line
38
 (BPS, 2006). According to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006), 7.5% 
of the population lived on less than $1 per day (PPP adjusted) in 2002, while just more than 
52% lived on less than $2 per day. Approximately 10% of the working age population is 
unemployed. 
Economic growth, bar the Asian crisis experience, has been buoyant. Indonesia experienced 
strong economic growth (averaging 7.5% per annum) for three decades, before being severely 
hit by the Asian crisis of 1997/98, which saw inflation reach 57% in 1997 and GDP shrink by 
more than 13% in 1998 (ADB, 2006). After 1998, growth started to pick up again, with exports 
fuelled by the large Rupiah depreciation during the crisis. GDP growth in Indonesia averaged 
4.2% between 1990 and 2000, despite the contraction of 1997, and achieved an average of 
4.6% between 2000 and 2004 (WDI, 2006). CPI inflation steadily decreased from 12.6% in 
2001 to 5.1% in 2003, before rising slightly to 6.4% in 2004. 2005 was an outlier, when rising 
oil prices, in conjunction with a reduction in fuel subsidies, saw inflation rise to 17.1% for the 
year (Bank Indonesia Annual Report, 2005). 
Indonesia has a large informal economy. It is estimated that there are approximately 43 million 
business establishments in Indonesia, of which only 300,000 are medium to large corporations. 
The rest is comprised of about 11 million small and micro businesses and a further almost 32 
million “productive poor” (individuals selling goods), most of whom can be expected to operate 
in the informal sector (Bank Danamon research, based on BPS, 2004 data). In line with the 
large informal economy, the tax base is estimated to be small. Out of the adult population of 
around 144 million
39
, less than 20% are registered as tax payers (ADB, 2005), and role players 
consulted indicate that as few as 3 million people (2% of adults) file tax returns. Broadening the 
tax base is an explicit policy goal (Indonesian Directorate-General of Tax, quoted in ADB, 
2005). 
Banking sector evolution and structure 
Crisis results in major re-organisation. Key moments in the development of the financial sector 
include the nationalisation of formerly Dutch-owned banks during the Sukarno regime (after the 
country officially gained independence from the Netherlands in 1949), followed by a more 
market-driven approach during the Suharto regime (1968-1998). A policy of bank deregulation 
was introduced in 1982 (at which time 93% of total bank assets was owned by 7 large state-
owned institutions, of which 5 were classified as commercial banks, one as a savings bank and 
one as a development bank). Bank deregulation intensified in 1988, causing the number of 
private banks to more than double, and seeing the private sector‟s share in total banking 
assets grow from 24% to 54%, between the end of 1988 and mid-1997 (McLeod, 2003). During 
the Asian crisis in 1997/1998, the number of private banks halved through mergers and 
liquidations. Among the failing banks were all of the 7 original state banks as well as the 
                                                     
38
 BPS compiles an urban and a rural poverty line of respectively IDR 143,455 (USD 47.27, PPP adjusted, which amounts to $1.55 per 
day; or USD 15.60, should no PPP adjustment be made and the average exchange rate for 2006 to date be applied) and IDR 108,725 
(PPP USD 35.83, or $1.18 per day; USD 11.82, non-PPP adjusted) per capita per month (BPS, 2004). The poverty line is calculated 
from the expenditure necessary to buy a daily food bundle of 52 items to fulfill 2100 kcal per capita per day, as well as non-food bundle 
of 46 items used by the reference population who live just above the poverty line. Therefore we know that about 7.5% of the population 
lives on less than $1 per day, about 17% live on less than about $1.35 per day (the weighted average national poverty line), and 52.4% 
live on less than $2 per day. Therefore quite a significant proportion lives on between $1.35 and $2 per day. 
39
 According to the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators (2006), 66% of the population of 217 million are between the ages of 15 
and 64. According to this measure, around 144 million people can therefore be classified as “adult”. 
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formerly 10 largest private banks, all of which had to be recapitalised by government. 
Government‟s recapitalisation of the banking sector amounted to an estimated 50% of GDP 
(Fane & McLeod, 2002).  
The effects of the crisis still define the financial sector environment. Central bank policy 
focuses on stability, good governance and consolidation (mergers and acquisitions are 
encouraged). Also, as a result of post-crisis restructuring and mergers, many banks have 
installed expensive new IT systems. This enabled easier implementation of KYC and other 
AML systems. 
Indonesia has a large banking system comprised of various types of institutions. As indicated 
by Figure 3 below, the Indonesian banking system is structured into three tiers: commercial 
banks, BPRs (“rural” banks) and microfinance institutions: 
 There are currently 131 commercial banks (versus 239 pre-crisis) (BSR, 2004), 15 of which 
hold 80% of all accounts. One of the commercial banks, state-owned BRI, holds 37% of all 
accounts. Three of the five largest banks, as well as two smaller banks, remain state-
controlled, accounting for 30% of total banking assets and 61% of total accounts.  
 There are almost 2,000 so-called BPRs, or “peoples banks”
40
.  
 MFIs. According to Bank Indonesia records, there are 5,345 village cooperative banks, as 
well as a number of formal (registered) non-bank microfinance institutions, namely 1,097 
saving and loan co-operatives, 1,296 village credit institutions and 850 pawnshops. There 
are furthermore an estimated 3,043 informal cooperatives under Sharia Principles, as well 
as numerous other (no definite estimates are available) non-regulated/unlicensed MFIs, 
some of which are deposit-taking (though illicitly so)
41
.  
                                                     
40
 Also commonly referred to as rural banks, though they are not all located in rural areas. 
41
Many informal sector MFIs are similar, historically, to BPRs, but failed to be licensed after it was proclaimed in the Banking Act of 1992 
that rural banking institutions are to obtain banking licenses to become formal BPRs (Bank Indonesia BPR Regulator, 2006). The exact 
number of such informal institutions and their clients is not known. Though Bapepam-LK, the non-bank financial regulator, plans to 
incorporate them into the formal sector under a planned new Micro-finance Act, such informal institutions fall below the AML radar 
screen in the mean time (Bank Indonesia BPR Regulator, 2006). 
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Figure 3. The structure of the Indonesian banking sector42. 
Source: Genesis representation, based on information from Bank Indonesia Bank Supervision Report, 2004 (for commercial bank data) 
and BPR regulator presentation (for BPR and other MFI data).
43
 
Table 1 provides more information on the structure and nature of the Indonesian banking 
sector, as well as the regulatory set-up of the various parts of the system. (Note that the 
applicable AML regime is included in the table for the sake of completeness; these aspects of 
the table will be referred to in the discussion of the AML environment that will follow below. 
 
                                                     
42
 Note that, though BPRs do not have direct access to the payment system, they can access it indirectly via the accounts that they hold 
with commercial banks. 
43
 One of the largest commercial banks, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, is unique in that it also has 4,600 village units which essentially 
operate as BPRs, though they are allowed to access the payment system. 
Indonesian Banking 
System
135 Commercial Banks 
(Dec 2004 - currently only 131): 
can access the payment system 
1955 BPRs (incl. 89 
Sharia): cannot access the 
payment system 
5 State-
owned banks
74 Private National Banks
26 Regional Devt Banks 
(owned by prov. govt)
19 Joint-venture banks (joint ownership: 
domestic and foreign)
11 Foreign Banks with branches in 
Indonesia
35 Foreign Exchange Banks
39 Non-foreign Exchange Banks
>11,000 other MFIs 
(est) (BKDs and non-bank 
MFIs such as credit and loan 
co-ops, pawnshops; as well as 
informal MFIs)
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Financial 
sector 
institutions 
Functional definition Examples 
# of 
accounts 
(est.) 
Regulator Supervisor 
General 
regulation/ 
applicable 
law 
Applicable KYC regulations (all 
subject to AML law 15 of 2002, 
as amended by law 25 of 2003) 
KYC requirements 
Commercial 
banks 
Conventional & sharia 
banks; have access to 
the payment system 
and can offer current 
accounts 
Bank Central Asia 
(private national 
forex bank); BNI 
(state-owned 
bank); Citibank 
(foreign branch 
bank); ANZ Panin 
Bank (joint 
venture bank); ; 1 
bank, BRI's Unit 
Desas fulfil same 
role as BPRs. 
77m (40% of 
which are 
held by BRI)  
Bank 
Indonesia 
Directorate of 
Bank 
Supervision 
Banking Act 
no.7/1992 as 
amended by 
Act no. 
10/1998 
Bank Indonesia (BI) regulation no: 
3/10/PBI/2001 of June 18, 2001 
concerning application of know 
your client principles, as amended 
by regulation number 
3/23/PBI/2001 of December 12, 
2001 and again by regulation 
number 5/21/PBI/2003 of October 
17, 2003; guidelines to standards 
for application of know your client 
principles are contained in Circular 
letter of BI no 5/32/DPNP of 
December4, 2003, concerning 
amendment to circular letter of BI 
no 3/29/DPNP. 
Account opening: Information on 
name, permanent address, place and 
date of birth,  nationality, occupation,  
source of funds, reason for the 
transaction, specimen signature 
Verification: Official identity card, 
passport, drivers licence  
Walk-in clients: Same, if transaction 
involves more than Rp100m (+/- 
USD10,000) 
BPRs (bank 
MFIs) 
Deposit-taking and 
lending institutions 
with a banking license 
that are not allowed 
direct access to the 
payment system and 
therefore cannot offer 
current accounts 
(debit orders, 
cheques) 
BPR Mitra Dana 
Utama 
6m 
Bank 
Indonesia 
Directorate of 
Rural Bank 
Supervision 
Banking Act 
no.7/1992 as 
amended by 
the Act no. 
10/1998 
BI regulation number 
5/23/PBI/2003 of October 23, 
2003 concerning the 
implementation of know your client 
principles for rural banks. 
As for commercial banks 
BKDs (bank 
MFIs) 
Village-owned credit 
agencies - credit 
provided by the 
agency at the village 
level - management 
done by elected 
village representatives 
n/a 454,000 
Bank 
Indonesia 
BRI on behalf 
of Bank 
Indonesia 
Banking Act 
no.7/1992 as 
amended by 
the Act no. 
10/1998 
 Unknown  Unknown 
Other MFIs: 
formal 
Non-deposit taking 
MFIs (sometimes do 
take deposits, but not 
allowed under their 
licence).  
Non-bank MFIs 
will typically be 
classified as 
either BKDs, 
savings and 
loans 
cooperatives, 
Pawnshops 
(govt-owned) or 
LDKPs (Village 
Fund and Credit 
Institutions - local-
govt owned) 
970,000 for 
LDKPs (no 
figures 
available for 
pawnshops 
or 
cooperatives)  
Cooperatives:  
Ministry of 
Cooperatives 
and SMEs 
Pawnshops: 
Ministry of 
Finance 
LDKPs: 
licenced by 
Governor of 
each province 
Cooperatives:  
Ministry of 
Cooperatives 
and SMEs 
Pawnshops: 
Ministry of 
Finance 
(Bapepam-
LK) 
LDKPs: local 
govt level I 
Cooperatives: 
Cooperative 
Act no. 
25/1992 
Pawnshops: 
n/a 
LDKPs: n/a 
No specific AML/KYC regulations - 
refer to the Minister of Finance-
issued KYC requirements as 
applicable to non-bank financial 
institutions 
No specific KYC requirements - refer 
to the Minister of Finance-issued KYC 
requirements as applicable to non-
bank financial institutions 
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Financial 
sector 
institutions 
Functional definition Examples 
# of 
accounts 
(est.) 
Regulator Supervisor 
General 
regulation/ 
applicable 
law 
Applicable KYC regulations (all 
subject to AML law 15 of 2002, 
as amended by law 25 of 2003) 
KYC requirements 
Non-bank 
MFIs: 
informal 
NGOs, self help 
groups, BMT 
(microfinance based 
on sharia principles) 
Unknown 
1,680 for 
BMTs (the 
rest not 
known) 
not regulated not regulated n/a n/a n/a 
Non-bank 
FSPs 
Securities companies, 
insurance companies, 
etc.  
Unknown Unknown Bapepam-LK
44
   Unknown  Unknown 
Minister of Finance Regulation no. 
74/PMK.012/2006 on the 
implementation of KYC Principle 
for non-bank FSPs
45
. 
Account opening: Information on 
name, permanent address, place and 
date of birth,  nationality, occupation,  
source of funds, reason for the 
transaction, specimen signature 
Verification: Official identity card, 
passport, drivers licence  
Walk-in clients: Same, if transaction 
involves more than Rp100m (+/- 
USD10,000) 
Money 
changers 
Bank or non-bank (in 
which case a license 
is required) entities 
buying and selling 
foreign banknotes and 
travellers cheques. 
Unknown Unknown 
Bank 
Indonesia 
Directorate of 
Monetary 
Management 
(Division of 
Monetary 
Management 
Administration 
and Money 
Changer Non 
Bank)  
 Unknown 
BI regulation number: 
6/1/PBI/2004 of January 6, 2003 
concerning money changers. 
All customers irrespective of amounts 
Money 
transfer 
companies 
International 
remittance companies 
- have to operate in 
conjunction with 
commercial banks or 
Pos Indonesia 
Unknown Unknown 
Bank 
Indonesia 
(resorts under 
normal 
commercial 
bank regime) 
Directorate of 
Accounting 
and Payment 
Systems 
Banking Act 
no.7/1992 as 
amended by 
the Act no. 
10/1998 
BI regulation number 
8/28/PBI/2006 of December 5, 
2006 concerning money 
remittance services 
Remitting and receiving parties 
irrespective of amount 
Table 1. Structure of the Indonesian financial sector and its regulatory framework.46 
Source: Genesis Analytics, based on desktop research, information obtained from Bank Indonesia and information obtained in in-country consultations. 
                                                     
44
 “Capital market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency” - Merged entity (since December 2005): Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam) & Director General for Financial Institutions (DGFI), Ministry of Finance. 
Traditionally, Bapepam was responsible for capital markets supervision, while the DGFI was responsible for the supervision of non-bank financial institutions. 
45
 Recently issued regulation (post-Bapepam-DGFI merger) to merge Minister of Finance decree number 45/KMK.06/2003 of January 30, 2003 on application of KYC principles for non-bank financial institutions and Decision of the 
Chairman of Bapepam number: KEP-02/PM/2003 of January 15, 2003 concerning know your client principles. 
46
 Blank cells denote gaps in our current understanding. 
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The reach of the banking sector 
The private commercial banking sector, as well as most state-owned banks, is focused on the 
middle- to higher-end of the consumer market. Banks believe that there is still scope for growth 
in this market, with cross-selling increasingly taking place. Only one of the large private banks, 
Bank Danamon, is explicitly targeting the lower-income market as a growth strategy (with a 
distinct focus on credit expansion to the micro and small business sector). 
There is also no coordinated government policy effort to extend the reach of the banking 
sector. Government policy on the financial sector is made by the Coordinating Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. In our consultation with them it was, however, apparent that access to 
financial services enjoys no explicit policy attention. This was confirmed in our consultations 
with Bank Indonesia and the various private sector organisations consulted. Government also 
seems to have moved away from pressuring banks to extend services – while SME lending 
quotas were imposed in the past, these have now been removed. Indirectly, though, Bank 
Indonesia attaches some importance to access in stating in its Banking System Policies for 
2006 (Bank Indonesia Banking Booklet, 2006) that it wishes to “expand the services network of 
the banking system … to achieve more widespread coverage of isolated regions”.  
Yet government does play a role in extending the reach of the financial sector, as one state-
owned bank, BRI, dominates the provision of banking services to low-income people. With its 
roughly 30 million bank accounts, BRI is by far the largest bank in terms of clients. It is state-
owned and has its origin as a state initiative to provide credit to small farmers. Apart from 
offering the normal commercial banking services, it operates 4,600 so-called Unit Desas 
(“village units”). It is therefore unique among the commercial banks in that it has an explicit 
mandate to reach out into the rural community and bank the poor – a position in which, BRI 
claims, it has no competition from the rest of the commercial banking sector
47
. 
The “lower-income market gap” is furthermore filled by BPRs, though their number of accounts 
is still limited relative to that of the commercial banking sector. BPRs are distinguished from 
commercial banks in that they are not allowed to offer cheque or overdraft accounts and are 
not connected directly to the payment system. A BPR will typically have one or more bank 
accounts with a commercial bank to access the payment system (BPR regulator, Bank 
Indonesia, 2006). They offer demand and time deposit accounts as well as micro-credit to their 
clients and are the most direct competitors of the BRI Unit Desas. There are currently 1955 
BPRs (down from about 2,100 two years ago)
48
 with about 6 million accounts. 
Pos Indonesia serves as a distribution network for banking services, thereby further expanding 
the reach of the banking sector. There are 207 main branches, 3,404 sub-branches, 264 
extension offices, 3,330 mobile postal units and 12,484 other postal facilities. Pos Indonesia 
claims that these units/facilities span the whole of Indonesia, but the exact geographic 
distribution was not available. Though Pos Indonesia does not provide any financial services 
itself, it acts as an agent for the money transfer products of a number of banks and agencies
49
 
                                                     
47
 In 2005, BRI achieved a return on equity of 38%. Therefore it would seem that the lower income market can indeed by lucrative for 
banks. 
48
 As in the commercial banking sector, Bank Indonesia encourages consolidation of BPRs through mergers. 
49
 Western Union, Citibank, Bank Niaga and Valuta Pos, and savings products of Bank BNI, Bank BTN, Bank Muamalat and Bank 
Niaga. 
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and it acts as a loan collection point for a few banks and BPRs
50
. It also acts as a payment 
point for government tax, custom duties, Telkom, Telkomsel, Indosat, electricity payments, and 
a number of other banks and institutions. Of the distribution points, on-line service networks 
are available at 207 main offices and 906 branches. Of the mobile units, 1,300 are on-line (so-
called “e-mobile units”).  
Despite the fact that BRIs, the BPRs and Pos Indonesia extend the reach to the lower- income 
market, usage of bank accounts among the Indonesian adult population is low. Bank Indonesia 
statistics show there to be only 83m bank accounts, comprised of 77m accounts with 
commercial banks (current, savings and deposit) and 6m BPR accounts
51
. All role players 
agree that there is a large degree of overlap and that one individual is likely to hold more than 
one account with a specific bank as well as accounts with more than one bank. Some 
estimates place the overlap as high as 2.5 to 3 accounts per person. Assuming a more 
optimistic number of 2 accounts per person, it suggests that the 83 million accounts are held by 
41.5 million individuals. This equates to roughly 29% of the 144m adults using formal financial 
sector transaction banking services (reducing to 19% if 3 bank accounts per adult are 
assumed). 
Low usage reflects low levels of access. Our assessment suggests that, at most, 45% of adults 
have access to a savings account. However, as described above, the usage figure is 
significantly lower (between 19% and 29%). To arrive at our access figure, we consider four 
typical drivers of access to banking services: proximity, affordability, eligibility and regulation: 
 Proximity
52
. Our review suggests that as many as 20% of adults may not be able to access 
bank services due to the long distances to be travelled to reach a bank. This would have 
been significantly higher, were it not for BRI Unit Desas and BPRs. 
 Affordability
53
. We estimate that 52% of adults are unable to afford a savings account 
(should transaction services be limited to deposits, withdrawals, statement enquiries and 
intra-bank funds transfers) and that 75% are unable to afford a savings account with full 
transaction functionality (including a debit order and inter-bank electronic funds transfer)
 54
. 
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 BRI, Bank BTPN, Bank BBAI, Bank Niaga and BPR Dana. 
51
 According to Bank Indonesia records, 98% of all current, savings and time deposit accounts have balances below Rp100m 
(approximately $10,900). 
52
 78% (just more than 13,000) of all bank branches (commercial, including BRI Unt Desas, as well as BPRs) are concentrated on Java, 
which is home to almost 60% of the population. This amounts to just fewer than 10,000 people per bank branch. This ratio can range to 
as high as 39,812 people per bank branch for the Maluka Islands. The ratio on the second most populated island, Sumatra, is 23,628. 
There are a total of 4 out of Indonesia's 33 provinces that do not have any bank branches. If, adding the Pos Indonesia distribution 
network, we assume all individuals on Java to be within the banking sector‟s reach, and about half those not living on Java not to be 
denied access on the grounds of proximity, it implies that proximity excludes about 20% of the population from the formal financial 
sector. 
53
 Our calculations are based (unless otherwise stated) on average fees (weighted according to number of accounts) associated with 
savings accounts (that offer unlimited deposits and withdrawals) across a sample of 10 commercial banks. 
54
 The measure of affordability applied by Genesis, in line with that used by Finmark Trust, is to say that a household will be able to 
spend 2% of their monthly income on a banking product. As our $2/day is however an individual income measure, we assume each 
individual to be able to spend 4% of his/her income on banking (based on the assumption of two income earners per household). If we 
apply this cut-off level of affordability to the monthly expenses of maintaining a bank account, just the weighted average monthly admin 
fee associated with a basic type of savings account would approximately equal the affordability threshold of all those (52.4% of the 
population) living on less than $2 per day, as the income needed to afford the weighted average monthly admin fee would amount to 
$2.04 (PPP adjusted) per day. Should we add a debit order and an electronic funds transfer, the daily income needed to afford the bank 
account will amount to $4.80. Therefore we estimate that all those living on $2/day, plus at least half those living on more than $2/day 
will not be able to afford such a transaction profile, amounting to at least 75% of the population. Should “off-us” ATM transactions be 
added, the transaction profile will become even more exclusionary. Note that these are rough estimates, as we do not have adequate 
income distribution data at our disposal. These calculations also do not make provision for the further effect of proximity on affordability 
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 Eligibility. Our review suggests that the main determinant of access in Indonesia is the 
account opening balance required, as more than 90% of the population may not be able to 
provide the required minimum balance
55
. Should we, however, consider the minimum initial 
deposit of the most basic, least expensive savings account in the sample, this figure 
reduces to less than 45%
56
. The minimum maintained balance is generally significantly 
lower than the minimum opening balance and we estimate that at most 55% of the 
population will find it difficult to maintain this balance. The banking products under 
consideration pose few other eligibility requirements. Generally, though “source of funds” 
and “total income” are required fields in the form that clients need to fill out when opening a 
bank account, no salary slip or proof of income is required for a non-credit product and 
people will hence not be excluded on the grounds of being unable to supply such 
documentation. 
 Regulation (excluding AML). We find no major regulatory access barriers in Indonesia. As 
the discussion below will show, an identity document is the only statutory requirement for 
opening a bank account and acceptable forms of identification are widely available in 
Indonesia.  
The four access indicators may not fully explain low usage levels. In addition to the elements of 
access outlined above, many of the role players consulted indicated that other usage factors 
may also play a role in an individual‟s decisions to use financial services, even if they 
technically have access to such services: 
 Tax evasion. The prevalence of tax evasion may make people suspicious of providing 
personal information when opening a bank account or of storing their money in a bank 
account, thereby revealing their true income. 
 Cash-comfortable society. The fact that most people are “cash comfortable” may mean that 
they do not have an incentive to open a bank account – people are used to transacting in 
cash and to saving their money “under the pillow”; insurance and bill payments are also 
commonly conducted in cash in Indonesia and many companies and even some 
government departments still pay employees‟ salaries in cash. 
 Financial literacy and the “hassle factor”. Financial literacy is generally estimated to be low 
in Indonesia
57
. Low levels of financial literacy may undermine usage of the banking sector, 
especially where financial sector products are deemed to be complex and difficult to 
operate, or where people do not perceive a need for formal banking services. The need to 
fill in KYC forms may be perceived as particularly onerous by the financially illiterate. There 
may furthermore be a “hassle factor” preventing some people from opening a bank 
account, for example if they find the opportunity cost associated with accumulating funds to 
                                                                                                                                                          
(costs incurred in reaching a banking outlet). We have furthermore not accounted for the positive effect on affordability of interest 
earned on deposits. The average interest rate payable could range between 3% and 6%. 
55
A recent World Bank study (De Ferranti et al, 2005) determines affordability (in terms of eligibility requirements) by assuming that a 
person could set aside one third of monthly income to make an initial deposit and that half of monthly income can be maintained as 
minimum balance. In the sample of banks used for this study, the weighted average minimum initial deposit would require a person to 
earn more than $10/day to afford it. Therefore all individuals earning $2 or below would be excluded on these grounds, as well as a 
substantial proportion of those earning more than $2 per day. We estimate that as much as 90% of the population could be denied 
access due to the unaffordably high minimum initial deposit requirements.  
56
 The “90% excluded” picture may be skewed by the fact that we took the weighted average minimum initial deposit requirements over 
a sample of 10 banks. Should we take the most basic product available, namely a BRI account without an ATM card, to which it can be 
assumed that the poor and rural will have ready access (though proximity may still be a factor), the picture changes significantly and the 
monthly income (PPP adjusted) needed to afford the product will be only $1.64 per day. Therefore we estimate that between 55% and 
60% of the population could have access to such an account without finding the minimum initial deposit requirement unaffordable. 
57
 This finding was conveyed during in-country consultations, though no research reports were quoted. Building financial literacy was 
also identify as a key issue during the recent World Bank Bilateral Remittance Corridor Analysis mission to Indonesia. 
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open an account and of spending the time to fill in the necessary forms form too high. In 
our consultations it was however indicated that bank staff will assist clients in filling out 
forms that that this may therefore reduce the hassle factor. 
The role of remittances 
Indonesia is a labour surplus country and about 3 million Indonesians legally work abroad. The 
country is therefore a net receiver of remittances. In 2005 there were 3.1 million Indonesian 
migrant workers legally/formally working abroad, typically on 2 to 3 year contracts in the Middle 
East and the rest of South-East Asia. In excess of 80% of these migrants are female and most 
work as domestic helpers (World Bank Jakarta Office, 2006). Should illegal migrant workers be 
included, this number may be substantially higher. A recent Asian Development Bank study
58
 
estimates there to be between 3.8 million and 5 million Indonesian migrant workers (in total). 
All (legal) migrant workers are required to use the services of an employment agency to 
provide them with training and placement. Many workers also use an employment 
broker/mediator as go-between with the agency. These brokers often lend them the money 
required for training, lodging, travel documents and the journey abroad. This creates a 
dependency which may result in abuse and has been noted as cause for concern. 
Indonesian migrant workers send money home via a variety of channels. The following table 
depicts possible means used to send money to Indonesia: 
 
Category Channel Money transfer method 
Formal/regulated 
channels
59
 
Banks Account-to-account transfers 
Money remittances companies (in 
partnership with banks or post-office) 
Walk-in clients - cash deposit abroad and 
cash pick-up locally 
Post Office 
International Money Order - via post office 
links with 14 other countries. 
Informal/unregulated 
channels (includes 
informal channels' 
usage of formal 
financial system) 
Personal Bring cash back in person 
Personal Ask a friend to bring back cash 
Bulked informal remittance transfers 
Agent abroad bulks up informally received 
remittances, sends via financial system to 
recipient agent, who distributes informally to 
recipients; this may or may not be linked to 
employment brokers, or may take the form of 
a hawala-like system. 
Table 2. Remittance channels to Indonesia 
Source: Genesis Analytics, based on desktop research and consultations. 
Though all Indonesian migrant workers are required to open a bank account before departure, 
many still prefer to use other means of remitting money home. Since July 2006, it is mandatory 
for prospective migrant workers to open a bank account via their employment agencies before 
departure (personal communication from Depnakertrans, 2006). There are however indications 
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This study examines remittance flows within South East Asia and covers Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (as net receiving 
countries), as well as Hong Kong, China, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore on the sending side. It is based on surveys (with a target 
sample of 500 per country) and interviews administered in each country during the first half of 2005. The Indonesian survey covered 
550 remittance recipient households from the main migrant worker source provinces. The document states that “due to budget 
constraints the [Indonesian] survey employed a small number of respondents, thus experiencing a higher margin of error” (ADB, 2006: 
69). 
59By law, formal cross-border remittance services can only be provided through commercial banks or the post office (Pos Indonesia). 
Non-accountholders using money remittance services provided by banks in partnership with money remitters such as Western Union 
are classified by banks as “walk-in clients”. 
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that many workers do not necessarily use these accounts, but would prefer other, often 
informal, means. This may be related to preferences, the use of informal labour brokers, or, 
often, to the fact that workers (especially those working abroad informally) may find it difficult to 
access a bank account or formal remittance channels in the sending country): 
 More often than not, the worker will be indebted to the broker/agency and be forced to 
send a proportion of earnings to the broker, at least for the first few months, after which the 
practice is often continued. At a fee, the broker will typically deliver the balance of the 
money (after deducting the loan payment) to the family. Though the transfer to the broker 
may be through the banking sector, the disbursement to family members typically takes 
place in cash. 
 It is furthermore common practice for overseas workers to send cash home via a returning 
friend, or to save up cash and bring it home in person (contracts normally have a duration 
of 2 years). 
 Particularly in the Middle East, where it is against social norms for female domestic 
workers to go out by themselves, workers would tend to ask their employer to remit money 
home via the employer‟s bank account or via a money transfer agency, or would use the 
employer‟s driver to send cash to the broker or agency‟s agent in the destination country 
(PPSW, 2006; World Bank, 2006). 
 In addition, informal remittance service providers may make use of the formal system. This 
happens where an unlicensed/informal money remitter abroad, who is often an agent of a 
mediator/broker domestically, bulks remittances and then transfers the money via the 
banking system to an agent in Indonesia, who then distributes the cash to recipients for a 
fee.  
 The ADB study (2006) also quotes the use of small Indonesian shops abroad to remit 
money (a hawala-type system), though its use does not seem to be pervasive. 
Informal remittances may therefore be significant. The official estimate is that total inward 
remittances for 2005 amounted to $2.9bn (Depnakertrans
60
, 2006). The exact size of the 
market is, however, not known, as this figure excludes those flowing through 
informal/unregulated channels. Estimates of the total remittance market (inclusive of informal 
remittances) vary, and imply that the informal remittance market may vary from $2bn 
(somewhat smaller than the formal remittances market) to $12bn (about four times the formal 
remittances market): 
 Depnakertrans (quoted in ADB, 2006) estimates the potential volume of total annual 
remittances (assuming that the 3.1 million migrant workers remit between 70% and 90% of 
their salaries) to be US$ 7 billion.  
 The ADB study (2006) quotes banking institutions as estimating total remittances (including 
those flowing through the informal market) to amount to between $9bn and $15bn per year 
(based on the estimate that there are between 3.8 million and 5 million migrant workers 
remitting around US$200-250 per month).  
The fact that usage of the formal remittances market appears to be low may be a function of 
low access and/or preference: 
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 Relative cost may be lower for informal channels. The discrepancy between total 
remittances and formal remittances may be a factor of affordability, but it is difficult to 
define a cut-off level of affordability for remittances, as the affordability of a remittance 
product can best be gauged relative to its alternatives. Little evidence is available on the 
relative costs of informal versus formal channels
61
. According to anecdotal evidence 
supplied by one of the large Indonesian banks, relative affordability would seem to vary 
according to the type of formal channel used: formal sending can be just as expensive as 
informal sending, but could also be three times more expensive. 
 Proximity is unlikely to be a major consideration. As formal remittance services are linked 
to the banking sector (and postal network), the same proximity arguments will hold as for 
transaction banking. The convenience of the broker delivering the money to a person‟s 
house may however be a consideration in favour of informal channels. 
 Regulation – a hassle factor, rather than an absolute access barrier. AML requirements on 
the receiving end would not seem to influence remitters‟ choice of informal vs. formal 
channels. Under the Indonesian AML regime, KYC only needs to be applied to walk-in 
clients conducting transactions in excess of Rp100m (roughly $10,900
62
). In practice, 
however, the formal remitters require that an identity card be shown and a form be filled 
out as standard procedure. Some service providers use comprehensive forms that compel 
the client to provide profiling data to the service provider. These forms include questions on 
the person‟s occupation, source of funds, etc. Therefore there will be a “hassle factor” that 
may prompt a worker to rather use an informal channel.  
 Illegal Indonesian overseas workers
63
 would automatically be excluded from formal 
remittance channels, as they would not be able to show the necessary documentation (a 
work permit and passport) in the sending country (should such requirements be in place).  
 Preference, convenience, the need for speedy delivery, or pressure from employment 
brokers may outweigh access and regulatory considerations in channel choice. The advent 
of compulsory bank accounts may erode the share of the informal market, but actual usage 
of such compulsory bank accounts is not assured, especially where product features, cost 
or proximity do not fit the remitter‟s needs (as noted above). If banks with a large rural 
footprint could link remittance services with micro-loans to help migrant workers to go 
abroad, that may break the dependence on the brokers/local sponsors. There are early 
indications that banks are starting to see the remittance channel as a starting point for 
micro-credit
64
.  
Identification infrastructure 
Indonesia has a widespread, though not uniform, identification infrastructure. It is mandatory 
for all married people or people over the age of 17 years to have an identity card, known as a 
KTP, and to carry it with them at all times (Depkominfo, 2006). It is possible for a person to 
have more than one valid KTP, with different identification numbers, should one of the following 
scenarios apply: 
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 The few estimates contained in the World Bank Jakarta Office Indonesian Migrant Workers report (2006) would suggest that informal 
remittances are not much less expensive than formal remittances. This however depends on the sending country. 
62
 At the average exchange rate for 2006 to date. 
63
 It is estimated (ADB, 2006) that there are between 700,000 and 1.9m Indonesians working abroad illegally. 
64
 CEMFIOWS (the Centre for Indonesian Microfinance and Overseas Working Studies) advocates the link between microfinance and 
remittances (Alam, 2006).  
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 The KTP is an identity card issued in a person‟s district of residence. Should a person 
move, a new KTP is issued without withdrawing the previous KTP. 
 One person may also have various KTPs with different versions of his or her names on it. It 
is common practice in Indonesia for a person to have a single name (rather than a first and 
last name). The single name will be indicated on the KTP. Some persons may however 
elect, often based on religion, to add another name to their single name. It is then possible 
to have a second KTP denoting both the first and the last name. These two KTPs would 
not be linked to each other. 
To add to the complexity, all sources consulted indicated that it is easy to falsify the KTP or to 
obtain a KTP corruptly. 
There is no single national identification number. The KTP is furthermore not the only form of 
official identification in Indonesia. According to the Department of Communication and 
Information Technology (“Depkominfo”, 2006), there are up to 40 public institutions issuing 
some form of acceptable identification, each with its own database and system (e.g. driver‟s 
licenses, passports, etc). A person may hold several forms of identification, each with its own 
identity number. These forms of official identification are not linked to one another, making the 
banks‟ task of correctly identifying a person difficult. 
Initiative to create single identification number. In reaction to this problem, the Department of 
Communication and Information Technology is developing a national identification number. 
This number is to be inserted into all the systems of the various institutions currently issuing 
identification documents and will provide the mechanism to link the different forms of identity 
documents of a particular person. Thus, though the issuing structure will remain fragmented 
(no centralised system is planned for the moment, e.g. via a single national identification card), 
each person will be assigned a unique national identification number which will be reflected on 
all the official identity documents. The use of biometrics will also be encouraged. Depkominfo 
has indicated that it plans to roll this system out by 2008
65
.  
AML/CFT ENVIRONMENT 
The development of the AML/CFT system 
In the late 1990s, Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Justice began to consider money 
laundering laws for Indonesia. In June 2001 Bank Indonesia issued its regulations regarding 
the application of know your client principles. Unfortunately the progress was not deemed 
sufficient to prevent Indonesia‟s listing by the FATF as one of the Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Territories in June 2001. The Indonesian government immediately responded by 
undertaking to adopt and implement a comprehensive AML/CFT system as a matter of 
urgency. In 2002, Law 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering was therefore 
enacted. The 2002 Law criminalised money laundering and created reporting and record-
keeping obligations for FSPs. It also established the Indonesian financial intelligence unit, the 
Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan (the “PPATK”). A number of staff members 
of Bank Indonesia were seconded to the PPATK to establish the new agency and by late 2003 
the PPATK was operational.  
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 Note: In testing the potential of this system with other role players, it was however met with some scepticism, as it was stated that 
there have been previous attempts at a national identification system, to no avail. 
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The money laundering control law was improved in 2003 when the Law 15 of 2002 was 
amended by Law 25 of 2003. The 2003 Law made a number of changes to the new AML/CFT 
framework. For instance, it broadened the duty to report suspicious transactions by dispensing 
with the previous minimum threshold of Rp500 million (approximately $54,400) and it 
criminalised the financing of terrorism. Another amendment to the Act is currently being 
prepared. If adopted, it will increase the powers of the PPATK and extend the reporting 
obligations to a number of non-financial businesses. 
In 2005, the FATF deemed the progress that Indonesia made sufficient to remove it from the 
NCCT list and, in February 2006, the FATF decided that is was not necessary to continue with 
special monitoring of Indonesian progress in this regard. 
The AML/CFT system – an overview 
The Indonesian AML/CFT system is characterised by the key offences, key role players and 
key control obligations that are normally encountered in a system of a country that committed 
itself to compliance with the FATF requirements: 
Laundering and terrorist financing offences. Money laundering offences can be committed in 
respect of the proceeds of 25 types of predicate offences, including smuggling, corruption, 
financial crime, environmental crimes, taxation offences and other offences for which the 
prescribed penalty is at least 4 years imprisonment. The law also defines assets that are 
employed to support terrorist activity as proceeds of crime. The maximum penalty for a money 
laundering offence is Rp15bn (about $1.74m) and 15 years imprisonment. A corporation can 
be held liable if the crime was committed by its managers or their agents on behalf of a 
corporation. If convicted, the penalty that may be imposed on the corporation is the maximum 
fine plus 1/3 (one third). In addition, its business licence may be revoked and it may be 
dissolved. A number of convictions for money laundering have been handed down but no 
financial institution has yet been prosecuted for a failure to comply with its AML/CFT control 
obligations. 
Key role players. On a broad government level, the Indonesian AML regime is coordinated by a 
ministerial-level coordinating committee. The key role player on the operational side is the 
financial intelligence unit, the PPATK, but Bank Indonesia, Bapepam-LK and the private sector 
forum of compliance directors also play important roles.  
 A National Coordination Committee on Anti-Money Laundering (the “Komite TPPU”) 
was established in terms of Law 25 of 2003 to coordinate the government‟s AML/CFT 
activities. The Committee is chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and 
Security. The Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs acts as deputy chair. The head of 
the PPATK is the secretary of the Committee. Other members are the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, the Minister of Finance, the Head of the 
Police Force, the Attorney General, the Head of the National Intelligence Agency and the 
Governor of Bank Indonesia. The Committee has working groups consisting of the heads 
of the government agencies that implement aspects of the AML/CFT policies and laws. 
Appendices 
 
 65 
 
65 
 The PPATK’s main function is to receive and analyse suspicious
66
 and cash transaction 
reports
67
. If the PPATK believes that there are sufficient grounds to warrant further criminal 
investigations, they hand the matter to the police to investigate. If the investigation reveals 
possible offences, the police will hand the matter to the Attorney General‟s Office for a 
decision regarding a possible prosecution
68
. It also has the right to audit regulated financial 
service providers for their compliance with the AML/CFT law.  
 Bank Indonesia (and Bapepam-LK as the Ministry of Finance‟s non-bank financial 
institution and capital markets supervisory agency) provides guidance to the regulated 
institutions in respect of their statutory duties and also monitor compliance with these 
duties as part of their general functions. Bank Indonesia has, for instance, given guidance 
(contained in regulations, circulars and guidelines) to banks, rural banks and money 
changers on various obligations. In 2003, the Minister of Finance issued a decree on the 
application of know your client principles by insurance companies, pension funds and 
financing companies, and the chairman of Bapepam published a decision on the same 
principles for security companies, investment advisors and related custodian banks. These 
provisions were recently merged in a Minister of Finance Decree (74/PMK.012/2006) to 
state the principles for KYC for all non-bank FSPs as covered by the combined jurisdiction 
of the merged entity Bapepam-LK
69
. 
 The Communication Forum of Bank Compliance Directors (“FKDKP”) is an industry 
initiative upon which all commercial banks‟ compliance directors are represented. They 
meet to discuss issues of mutual interest and the forum has helped to standardise some of 
the compliance practices in the industry. The forum also interacts with PPATK, Bank 
Indonesia and other role-players on cross-cutting issues.  
Financial service providers must comply with the standard control obligations such as client 
due diligence, record-keeping and reporting. The framework for the AML/CFT control duties in 
Indonesia was created by the regulation on know your client principles that Bank Indonesia 
issued for commercial banks in 2001
70
. AML/CFT control measures are imposed on all 
“providers of financial services
71
”, defined as banks, rural banks, mutual fund managers, 
insurance companies, foreign exchange traders and Pos Indonesia (refer to Table 1 for a 
summary of the anti-money laundering regulatory framework as applicable to the various 
components of the Indonesian financial sector.): 
 Such providers must report any suspicious transactions (“STRs”) within three business 
days after the suspicion was formed.  
 In addition, all cash transactions (not only suspicious transactions) in excess of a threshold 
amount of Rp500 million (roughly $54,400) are to be reported within fourteen business 
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 By 31 May 2006, the PPATK had received 4,566 (“STRs”). 4,421 STRs were filed by 109 commercial banks and one rural bank while 
145 STRs came from 37 non-bank financial institutions. 
67
 By May 2006, more than 1,7 million cash transaction reports were filed with the PPATK. 
68
 The PPATK has voiced its frustration publicly about the handling of the reports and the lack of progress that were made with some of 
the matters that it reported to the law enforcers. Some progress has however been made. By 31 May 2006, 419 cases have been 
referred by the PPATK to the police and the Attorney General‟s Office, resulting in 30 convictions. A further 30 prosecutions were in 
progress. 
69
 Refer to Table 1 explaining the recent merger of Bapepam, as capital markets supervisory agency, and the Directorate General for 
Financial Institutions as non-bank financial institution supervisory agency, into Bapepam-LK, the capital markets and financial 
institutions supervisory agency. 
70
 Amended in 2001 and again in 2003. In 2003 the Bank issued a Guide to Standards for Application of Know Your Client Principles to 
provide further guidance to banks. 
71
 According to Article 1.5, Law No. 25 of 2003. 
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days
72
. The cash transaction reporting (“CTR”) duty may be onerous and the Act therefore 
exempts a number of transactions from the reporting ambit
73
.  
 Providers of financial services must also meet the other general money laundering control 
obligations such as client identification and verification and record-keeping (collectively 
referred to in the Indonesian legislation as “know your client” duties). These duties are 
detailed in various regulations and decrees and are discussed in more detail below. 
Know Your Client duties 
The regulations require all commercial banks to adopt a client acceptance policy, and policies 
and procedures on client identification, account and transaction monitoring and related risk 
management issues. The client acceptance policy is required to follow a risk-based approach 
and guide the bank to refuse services to persons who are deemed to be unsuitable for having 
dealings with the bank. 
“Know Your Client Principles” are defined in the regulation as principles applied by a bank to 
establish (and verify) an existing or prospective client‟s identity, to monitor clients‟ transactions 
(by means of profiling) and to report suspicious transactions (as flagged on the management 
information system). The duties are essentially the same for commercial banks, rural banks, 
money remitters and non-bank FSPs, though contained in separate regulations issued by Bank 
Indonesia
74
 (the first three) and the Ministry of Finance (non-bank FSPs)
75
. In the discussion to 
come, we will unpack the KYC duties in terms of: (i) upfront identification and verification (and 
re-identification), (ii) profiling, and (iii) system requirements. 
Upfront identification and re-identification  
Non-face-to-face origination of bank relationships is not allowed. If banking will be done 
electronically, telephonically or by correspondence the bank must first meet with the 
prospective client. That meeting may take place between the prospective client and a bank 
employee or between the client and another party representing the bank. 
Banks are required to establish a prospective client‟s identity. In this regard, Law 15 of 2002 
compels the person to provide his or her complete and accurate information by filling out the 
relevant forms of the bank and by attaching supporting documents. The regulations require the 
bank to examine the supporting documents to establish their authenticity. This examination 
may include an interview with the prospective client. After sighting the original document, the 
bank is required to keep a copy of the identity document. In the case of an individual client, the 
following information must be provided: 
 the client‟s identity, including name, permanent address, place and date of birth and 
nationality; 
 information about the person‟s occupation; 
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 International travellers carrying cash in excess of Rp100m ($10,870) also need to report the fact to Customs and Excise. 
73
 Transactions with the government and salary and pension payments are, for instance, exempted. In addition, the head of the PPATK 
may also exempt other types of transactions from the CTR obligations. 
74
In 2003 Bank Indonesia issued a regulation that extended the client due diligence requirements to rural banks. In essence, rural banks 
are required to comply with the same control duties that commercial banks must meet. Bank Indonesia issued a regulation concerning 
money changers in 2004. The latter provides for the licensing and regulation of money changers and imposes Know Your Client duties 
on them. The effect of these instruments is that these non-bank financial institutions must comply with the Know Your Client principles 
that apply to a commercial bank.  
75
 The recent Minister of Finance regulation no.74/PMK.012/2006 states the KYC principles applying to the institutions covered by the 
merged Bapepam-LK (all capital markets and non-bank financial institutions). 
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 a specimen signature; and 
 information on the source of funds and reason for the transaction. 
The identity must be verified by an identity card (KTP), driver‟s licence or passport. Should the 
person‟s permanent address differ from the one reflected by the identity document that was 
provided, a document providing information on the permanent address will also be required. 
The information about a person‟s occupation must include the address and the line of business 
of the employer.  
KYC and remittances. Until 2006 money remitters were not required by law to KYC walk-in 
clients that remitted or received an amount below Rp100m ($10,870). This was a liberal 
exemption as the average remittance amount is estimated to be about $250. The PPATK and 
Bank Indonesia indicated, however, that they urged remitters to implement the KYC principles 
also in respect of walk-in clients who engaged in transactions below the statutory threshold. In 
practice many banks and remitting companies adhered to best practice despite this statutory 
exemption. Practices differed from company to company, but generally a sender of money was 
required to furnish his or her name, place and date of birth, occupation and information on the 
source of funds. Key information was verified by comparing it with the information contained in 
the sender‟s KTP or passport. These standard procedures were applied to every remittance, 
irrespective of the amount involved. However, in 2006 Bank Indonesia introduced a regulation 
requiring all new money remitters to be licensed and all existing money remitters to apply for 
licences before 31 December 2008. In this new regime licensed money remitters are required 
to identify and verify the identities of all remitting and receiving parties. The Rp 100m 
exemption to the KYC requirements has fallen away, thereby aligning the practice and the law 
in this regard.  
The 2001 regulations also require a limited re-identification process. If the bank did not have 
the required account opening documents for a particular existing client, the bank was given six 
months after enactment of the regulation to obtain them. Most of the larger banks were not 
able to meet this deadline. In 2003, the regulations were amended to make it clear that they 
must refuse to conduct transactions with and/or terminate business dealings with an existing 
client that did not meet the re-identification requirements or that used an account contrary to 
the purpose stated when it was opened. The re-identification processes of major banks are still 
continuing and are being closely monitored by Bank Indonesia. 
The account opening documents must be maintained for a period of not less than five years 
after the account was closed. 
Profiling 
The regulations require a bank not merely to identify a prospective client before entering into 
dealings with the person but to request information on the purpose and objectives of the 
dealings that the client wishes to conduct with the bank and other information that will enable 
the bank to profile the person. Banks are required to maintain client profiles that reflect at least 
the following information concerning the client: 
 the client‟s occupation or line of business; 
 the client‟s amount of income; 
 information on other accounts held; 
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 the client‟s normal transaction activity; and 
 the purpose for which the account was opened. 
In practice, most of the regulated institutions have a standard client engagement form that 
must be completed by a prospective client for profiling purposes. The form differs from 
institution to institution. In general, the form requires a client to furnish the relevant data by 
ticking the appropriate box.  
The regulations require a bank to update its client data if the information that was furnished at 
the account opening stage changed. 
Systems requirements 
The regulations require banks to have a management information system that can effectively 
identify, analyse, monitor and provide reports on the characteristics of transactions undertaken 
by its clients. The system must allow the bank to trace each individual transaction. 
Characteristics of transactions to be monitored include the nature of transactions conducted by 
the client and the nature of the overall relationship that the client has with the bank. Since the 
initial requirement was expanded in 2003, banks are also required to monitor clients‟ 
transactions and to identify any suspicious transactions. This should be done by either a 
manual or an automatic system. Account entries are required to be monitored periodically. 
Entries must be compared with the client profile to identify discrepancies. Transactions must be 
monitored at the time they take place in order to identify any possibility of a transaction being 
incompatible with the client‟s profile
76
. 
Banks are required to appoint special officers to handle high risk clients, including Politically 
Exposed Persons, and suspicious transactions. 
Compliance and supervision 
Bank Indonesia and Bapepam-LK have taken various steps to fulfil their functions and have 
done compliance audits in respect of the entities that they supervise. They have also shown 
themselves responsive to the needs of supervised entities
77
.  
Bank Indonesia‟s assessment and management of compliance. In 2004, Bank Indonesia 
adopted a new assessment methodology in respect of AML/CFT compliance by commercial 
banks. This methodology is used to manage banks toward full compliance with their statutory 
duties. In essence, the Bank audits a bank‟s compliance with its AML/CFT duties and then 
rates it on a scale of 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor). This rating is calculated into the soundness rating 
of the bank. If the rating is 5, the bank faces additional administrative sanctions. In such a 
case, a commercial bank‟s soundness rating may, for instance, be downgraded; certain of its 
high risk business activities may be frozen; and it may even result in an order for the dismissal 
of the management of the bank. By June 2006, the first round of assessments had nearly been 
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 This implies that it will be difficult to comply with this requirement, should a bank only have a manual monitoring system, unless front-
end staff are trained to detect suspicious transactions as they occur. 
77
 Banks, for instance, reported to Bank Indonesia the fact that many clients were highly suspicious about the new information that 
banks required. The Bank responded by launching a public awareness campaign to encourage clients to cooperate with the AML/CFT 
measures by providing complete and accurate information. All forms of media including television and magazines were utilised in this 
campaign. This initiative was warmly appreciated by the banking community who reported a change in attitude by their clients. 
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concluded. The majority of commercial banks received a rating of 3 (fairly good) and none 
were rated 5 (poor). Large banks are still struggling to re-identify their existing clients. The 
Bank uses the rating system to put pressure on such banks to show reasonable progress in 
this regard. 
KEY FINDINGS 
We find that, though usage of transaction banking is low in Indonesia, there are no major AML 
constraints to access, as widely available means of identification are required for verification 
purposes. Remittances in Indonesia are, similarly, not impacted by AML. Indonesia represents 
an interesting example of where government, at the same time as working for the removal of 
the country from the NCCT list, “did things right” so as not to undermine access to the financial 
system. Below, we expand on the key findings regarding the interplay between AML/CFT and 
access in Indonesia. 
KYC does not have massive impact on access to financial services 
Use of widely available identification documents prevents impact on access. The document 
that is generally presented for identification, as well as verification, is the KTP. As all adults 
have at least one KTP and carry it with them at all times, the need to produce a KTP has not 
proven problematic. Where banks ask for additional identification, e.g. a driver‟s license, or 
request a reference letter or letter from the employer, this is beyond what is required by 
regulation – though the PPATK did indicate that they encourage best practice to exceed the 
baseline requirements
78
. The “hassle factor” is largely removed in that bank staff assists clients 
to fill out the client identification form and, as most clients are used to conducting their banking 
in a branch, the need to visit a branch for re-identification is generally not regarded as onerous.  
Threshold approach avoids impact on walk-in clients (e.g. for remittances
79
). Prior to December 
2006 institutions were not required by law to apply KYC to walk-in clients remitting or receiving 
an amount below Rp100m ($10,870). The average remittance amount is estimated to be about 
$250 (about Rp 2.3m at the average exchange rate for 2006). The law therefore did not 
impede the vast majority of remittances. In practice however most money remitters performed 
KYC processes. This became a regulatory requirement for licensed remitters after December 
2006. However, for the same reasons outlined above, the requirement to submit to KYC 
procedures and in particular the need to produce a KTP has not been experienced as 
problematic.  
Profiling compensates for the low integrity of the KTP 
KTP integrity is questionable. As explained earlier, it is possible for a person to have more than 
one valid KTP (or other form of identification) not linked to one another by a common identify 
number, because KTPs are not issued centrally and various institutions issue acceptable forms 
of identification. It is also easy to obtain a KTP through corruption or to falsify it. Therefore the 
integrity of the verification system is questionable.  
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 The PPATK has indicated to us that it has a best practice focus in which banks are encouraged to implement measures over and 
above that strictly speaking required by law. The legal requirements (e.g. with regard to identification and verification) are therefore 
regarded as the baseline that can readily be implemented, with a step-wise increase of the standard to make the system more efficient. 
We could however not identify any specific policy or guideline in this regard. 
79
 For those remittances sent via account to account transfers, the findings for transaction banking services outlined above apply. 
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KTP is accepted for KYC purposes because it is the best available means of identification. The 
PPATK and Bank Indonesia are aware of the issue but take the view that the KTP, in the 
absence of better alternatives, has sufficient integrity in the majority of cases for it to be used in 
the current system.  
Profiling compensates for lack of KTP integrity. Banks are required to use the information 
obtained from the interview and the KYC form to build a profile of the client and his/her 
expected transactions. The lack of identification reliability is mitigated by the fact that the KYC 
form records answers to a variety of questions aimed at profiling a client, such as a person‟s 
occupation, amount of income and expected transaction activity. This information is retained 
but not verified. Fraudulent applications will either be flagged because it exceeds a risk 
threshold or will keep the criminal to a profile limiting his/her transactions (as transactions 
deviating from the profile will be flagged as STRs). It is to be expected that criminals will not 
have the discipline to keep their transactions within the profile. Profiling is, therefore, a useful 
enhancement to the limitations of upfront identification using the KTP. 
Initiative to improve the ID system. As discussed, a government initiative has been launched to 
improve the integrity of national identification in Indonesia. Until such time as the National 
Identification Number project is implemented successfully, the authorities believe that it is 
practical and realistic to use the KTP as the main verification document, combined with a focus 
on profiling. 
Realistic & flexible systems requirements 
Understanding of bank sector has led to the establishment of realistic rules and system 
requirements. It would seem that the AML regime was designed in such a way as to 
understand and use existing bank systems and minimise additional costs to banks
80
. To 
monitor clients‟ accounts for suspicious transactions, legislation stipulates that banks are 
required to have a management information system in place. It does, however, not dictate that 
these systems should be electronic and of a particularly advanced nature
81
. Advanced 
electronic systems may be prohibitive for small players and unnecessary, given the risk such 
players pose. The regulators are therefore flexible in allowing less sophisticated/manual 
systems that meet basic regulatory requirements. In applying this flexibility, they furthermore 
emphasise the audit/traceability role of account monitoring, rather than real-time detection 
capability
82
.  
Risk-sensitive approach 
Realistically-managed re-identification process. When the deadline set for re-identification was 
reached and it was apparent that re-identification had not been completed yet, Bank Indonesia 
requested banks to draw up an action plan to indicate how they plan to re-identify remaining 
clients. Progress with re-identification and general KYC implementation is monitored each year 
and forms an input into a bank‟s management rating. An inadequate KYC rating will impact on 
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 As noted in the discussion of the effects of the Asian Crisis, post-crisis mergers have implied that many banks have recently-
revamped IT systems and have therefore not needed to incur any additional KYC-induced costs. 
81
 According to the 2003 guidance issued by Bank Indonesia, the system can either operate manually or automatically. 
82
 As explained by the head of the PPATK (2006): “No country can prevent bombings by doing financial analysis. What we can do is 
backward analysis. Once the bomb explodes, and the police find a lead, we can trace their financial transactions. So, our function is 
more to facilitate the police investigation.” 
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a bank‟s soundness rating and, should the overall rating be unacceptable, Bank Indonesia has 
the sanction to remove management under the “fit and proper test”. Flexibility and cooperation 
is therefore combined with a strong sanction in such a way as to enhance the efficiency of the 
system. 
Risk-sensitive approach used to accommodate constraints faced by banks. In their re-
identification action plan, banks are required to re-identify higher-risk clients first. Therefore a 
risk-based implementation process is followed that is sensitive to the management reality of 
banks and in which banks are allowed the space to manage their compliance programmes 
according to the money laundering risk posed by various client categories.
83
 
Threshold amount set for KYC of walk-in remittance clients represents a risk-sensitive rule. 
The level of the threshold is however quite high and exempts most remittances from AML 
requirements. 
Given limited resources, regulatory attention is focused on higher risk institutions 
Similar KYC requirements on commercial banks and BPRs. The requirements for client 
identification, verification and client profiling, are essentially the same for BPRs as for 
commercial banks (though worded slightly differently in the English versions of the two 
applicable regulations). According to the BPR we consulted, it is standard procedure for clients 
to show their KTP and fill out a client identification form
84
. 
Compliance enforcement/monitoring however not focused on BPRs. In practice, indications are 
that compliance with the KYC regime is more strictly monitored in respect of commercial banks 
than in respect of BPRs. This is, firstly, due to the limited auditing resources of the PPATK – it 
is virtually impossible to cover all of the almost 2,000 BPRs
85
. Secondly, the PPATK has stated 
that it does not prioritise BPRs as they are not regarded as posing high money laundering risk. 
The chairman of the PPATK is quoted in a recent interview in the Jakarta Post (2006, as 
posted on the PPATK website) as saying that commercial banks are most compliant (110 out 
of 130 commercial banks report suspicious transactions to the PPATK), but that only one BPR 
has reported to them. This is not regarded as problematic, as "rural banks are not a priority 
because money laundering rarely takes place there” (PPATK, 2006)
86
.  
On-going management of compliance addresses problems as they arise 
Initially, clients regarded KYC requirements as bank-specific. Some clients have expressed 
reluctance to supply source of income information as required on the KYC form, especially 
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 Bank Indonesia has given the majority of banks a „fairly good‟ KYC implementation rating. All banks interviewed indicated 
considerable progress with re-identification, tough none has achieved it in full. 
84
 It is argued that KYC has not placed any additional burden on BPR clients, as they are used to coming into the branch to conduct 
their banking business and only a limited number of BPRs have ATMs in any case. Therefore no difficulties were encountered in re-
identification. Where clients may find it difficult to fill out long and complex forms, BPR staff members typically assist them. This was 
confirmed in our interview with Bank Indonesia‟s BPRs supervision department. 
85
 The Bank Indonesia BPR supervision division indicated to us that they do not monitor BPRs‟ AML compliance, as that is the domain 
of the PPATK. 
86
 The fact that BPRs are “classified” as low-risk could make them vulnerable to money laundering abuse, in which case the lack of 
monitoring of such institutions may be of concern. However, the PPATK has indicated that the total asset base of the BPRs is only 1.4% 
of the banking sector and that BPRs conduct limited banking business (cannot offer current accounts, offer remittance services or 
access the payment system) and therefore pose lower money laundering risk. The decision not to focus on BPRs was explained to the 
FATF reviewers, who concurred (email communication from Chairman of PPATK, 10 November 2006). 
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should they be suspicious of having to declare all income for taxation purposes. Clients 
therefore moved to banks perceived as having lower requirements. Thus the need to create 
public awareness of the necessity for KYC became apparent.  
Bank Indonesia addressed this problem by launching a media campaign. This campaign 
explains the need for KYC and informs the public that all banks will require the same 
information of clients. It was launched in 2005, will be running until the end of 2006, and entails 
radio, television and printed press advertising. Not only does the campaign serve to 
standardise practices across banks by influencing client expectations, but it also prevents 
damage to banks, should clients regard their KYC requirements as onerous and decide to 
close an account and try to open an account with another bank. The FSPs consulted stated 
that they have been greatly aided in their KYC efforts by this regulator initiative. 
Limited AML impact on informal financial service providers’ relationship with the formal 
financial system 
Informal financial service providers often have accounts with the formal financial system. There 
was no indication from the banks and regulators consulted that AML impacts on informal 
financial service providers, though one would expect that their heightened transaction volume 
and values will be picked up by banks as suspicious transactions in their KYC and profiling 
procedures of the owner/operator of such a business. A case in point is the so-called “table 
banks” that bulk remittances from abroad, which are then sent to Indonesia, or informal MFIs 
that have bank accounts themselves.  
A conservative approach by banks may result in closure of accounts simply due to uncertainty. 
This phenomenon has not been encountered in Indonesia. None of the banks consulted 
indicated the need to close existing client accounts. This can mainly be ascribed to the clear 
guidance provided by the PPATK. Informal MFIs/financial service providers may also “prevent 
detection” in conducting transactions with banks due to the fact that: 
 the AML Law only requires a cash transaction report for a transaction exceeding Rp500m 
($54,400);  
 non-accountholders are only subject to KYC for daily transactions above Rp100m 
($10,870);  
 accountholders only need to provide tick-of-the-box source and size of funds information 
(without verification). 
AML legislation has not resulted in significant cost increases for banks 
Limited direct cost implications for banks. None of the banks consulted reported high direct 
costs related to the implementation of AML. Following the crises, most banks have recently 
made large IT system investments and the additional cost of account monitoring functionality is 
not regarded as significant. Some banks have even indicated that the implementation of the 
AML regime has lowered their costs, as Indonesia‟s previous NCCT listing increased their cost 
of credit and made the procedures imposed on them to do business with correspondent banks 
more onerous. 
Absence of cost accounting per market segment has limited impact on access. None of the 
banks consulted have furthermore calculated the additional per-transaction or per-account 
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opening cost incurred due to AML (in terms of staff time, transaction analysis, etc). This may 
be due to the current bank practice of overall, rather than market-segment-specific, cost 
accounting
87
. As banks do not measure transaction cost per income group, they have not 
experienced an increase in the cost of serving the lower-income market
88
 and have therefore 
experienced no disincentive to serve this market segment.  
The success of a bank regulator-led regime 
The development of the KYC regulations and AML regime was bank regulator-led. 
Internationally, the greatest push was often from the law enforcement side. In the Indonesian 
case, however, most PPATK personnel were originally Bank Indonesia or Bapepam-LK staff 
members, who understand and have close interactions with the banking and non-bank financial 
sector. 
Good relationship between banks and Bank Indonesia as the regulator, as well as between 
banks and the PPATK. The PPATK holds regular working group discussion, bringing together 
role players from Bank Indonesia, Bapepam-LK, the law enforcement agencies and private 
sector players to facilitate interaction and learning. As described above, Bank Indonesia has 
also assisted banks by launching its public awareness campaign.  
A coordinated AML regime reduces compliance costs 
The implementation of the AML regime is enhanced by the fact that it is coordinated on a high 
level through the TPPU Committee (National Coordinating Committee for the Prevention and 
Eradication of Money Laundering Crimes), chaired by the Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs. As all relevant agencies and government departments are brought together through 
this committee, it could serve to ensure coherence and buy-in from role players across the 
spectrum.  
On the compliance side, there is once again coordination in the form of the Compliance Forum 
(“FKDKP”), which gives banks the opportunity to standardise compliance procedures and 
systems, thereby facilitating compliance-officer expertise that is not bank-specific. This may 
greatly reduce training costs, should there be churn of staff between banks. This coordination 
is strengthened through the working group sessions held by the PPATK, where all role players 
are represented, as well as through the Bank Indonesia advertising campaign, which builds 
client expectations regarding consistency of requirements. 
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 Clients are segmented for marketing purposes, but not for strategic cost accounting. 
88
 Where minimum balance requirements have been increased, this has been in reaction to a frustration with dormant accounts, rather 
than due to concerns about the profitability of lower value bank accounts. 
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APPENDIX C: KENYA 
SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
 Banking access levels are low: only about 19% of adult residents use some form of savings or 
current account while, from an affordability perspective, only 5% have access to a transaction bank 
account. The fact that usage exceeds access suggests that most of these individuals will only use a 
bank account to receive payments/remittances and not for transactions. This conclusion corresponds 
with the findings of the FinAccess survey completed in 2006. 
 Kenyans rely greatly on incoming remittances, though the poor are not well serviced by the formal 
remittance market. High regulatory barriers to entry into the formal remittance sector means formal 
sector costs are high and most of the poor rely on informal remittance mechanisms, including taxis, 
buses, couriers and hawalas. High formal sector costs are, however, likely to decrease with new 
innovative money transfer products, such as M-PESA, being launched in the Kenyan market. 
 AML and CFT legislation has not yet been enacted. A task force has written an AML bill, which was 
gazetted during 2006 and a changed version re-gazetted during April 2007. 
 Some AML regulation already exists in the form of prudential guidelines for banks. They have had a 
minimal impact on usage until recently because clients who can afford bank accounts (and remitters 
who can afford to use formal mechanisms) are generally able to meet KYC standards. However, the 
low-income market is increasingly starting to use bank accounts. For example, the low-income bank, 
Equity Bank, had a client base of 1.1m individuals in April 2007. 
 It is difficult to accurately assess the future impact of the new AML bill as it has not yet been finalised. 
However, the policy of the task force has been not to adopt a risk-sensitive approach. The Bill (in its 
current form) will impact on virtually every type of financial institution, activity and transaction, 
regardless of AML risk, which will heighten impact unnecessarily. The impact is likely to increase as 
the banking and remittance markets extend beyond current high-use markets. 
 KYC processes currently have a mechanism to avoid absolute exclusion – referees such as existing 
clients of the relevant financial institution, government officials or religious leaders are able to vouch 
for individuals‟ addresses and sources of income. Although it will thus not create an absolute barrier 
for low-income clients it will create significant inconvenience and extra cost in respect of “proving” 
address and source of income and is likely to discourage usage of bank accounts.  
 Compliance with the AML/CFT bill will increase costs for FSPs, especially for non-commercial bank 
institutions, like Postbank, SACCOs and MFIs that are less able to fulfil the requirements of the AML 
rules. As is evident from the draft regulations to the Microfinance Act of 2006, no special exemptions 
are planned for the clients of deposit-taking MFIs with respect to KYC requirements. 
 The AML/CFT bill will also regulate informal MTOs. It is unlikely that they will be able to comply. KYC 
of walk-in remittance clients may incentivise the use of informal channels. This is likely to significantly 
decrease the usage of formal services. 
 
GENERAL AND MARKET CONTEXT89 
Country at a glance 
Poverty and informality characterise the Kenyan economy. Kenya has the most significant 
economy in East Africa which is recovering following a period of recession during the early 
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 Kenya shillings are converted to dollar values by using the Ksh/$ exchange rate of 72.96. This is the average exchange rate for 2006 
up until the end of October 2006 (taken from http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory). 
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2000s. The gross domestic product growth rate for 2005 was 5.8%, up from 0.6% in 2002 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2006:4). The country is characterised by a large informal sector, 
which, according to two estimates (Market Intelligence, 2005:46 & FAO, 2001), accounts for 
between 70% and 94% of the working population. High levels of poverty are prevalent, with 
23% of the population living on less than $1 (PPP) a day (Ksh999/month
90
) and 58% living on 
less than $2 (PPP) a day (Ksh1997/month
91
) (World Bank, 2006
92
).  
Kenya has a small but vulnerable immigrant population. The Kenyan population consists of 
33m individuals, of whom 17m are adults (over the age of 18). The Office of the National 
Registrar of Persons estimates there are 1m foreigners in Kenya of whom 0.8m are present 
without legal documentation. Undocumented migrants arrive mostly from Uganda, Somalia, 
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Ethiopia.
93 
There are also four refugee 
camps on the Somali and Sudanese border. The biggest of these houses over 100,000.  
A national identification infrastructure exists. By law, Kenyan citizens over the age of 18 must 
have and carry a national identity card issued by the Office of the National Registrar of 
Persons. 15.6m adult Kenyans out of 17m people have one.
94
 The cards are issued free of 
charge and carry the name, date of birth, gender, thumbprint, and place of birth of the holder. 
According to the national post office (POSTA), fewer than 20% of Kenyans have a formal 
physical residential address and only a quarter of these could probably produce a utility bill (i.e. 
5% of the population).
95
 
The banking sector structure 
The private commercial banking sector is diversified. There are 42 commercial banks licensed 
in Kenya. The biggest players
96
 are: 
The partially government-owned Kenya Commercial Bank which has 17.9% of market share; 
 the privately and foreign-owned Barclays and Standard Chartered with 16% and 11.5% of 
market share, respectively;  
 the Co-operative Bank, which holds the accounts of 90% of savings and credit co-
operatives (SACCOs) in Kenya and is owned by SACCOs or SACCO members with 8% of 
market share; and  
 the National Bank of Kenya (22% owned by government) which accounts for 6% of market 
share (Market Intelligence, 2006:21). 
Postbank has the largest account base. Operating alongside the commercial banks is the 
government-owned Kenya Post Office Savings Bank (Postbank) which has the largest number 
of accounts in the country with around 1m active accounts (savings only) plus another 1m 
inactive accounts. Postbank has the widest network with 75 branches and outlets in 340 post 
offices, giving it a reach well beyond the commercial banks. The focus of Postbank has been 
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 The $/day figure takes account of Purchasing Power Parity, therefore a person earning Rs999 per month would be able to buy goods 
and services equivalent to $1/day ($30.4/month), even though it only amounts to $13.7 per month (i.e. Ksh999/72.96) should no PPP 
adjustment be made. 
91
 As per the previous footnote, the $/day figure takes account of Purchasing Power Parity, therefore a person earning Rs1997 per 
month would be able to buy goods and services equivalent to $2/day ($60.8/month), even though it only amounts to $27.4 per month 
(i.e. Ksh1997/72.96) should no PPP adjustment be made. 
92
 Reflecting 1997 data. 
93
 Interview with the Office of the National Registrar of Persons, 1 September 2006  
94
 This is the official figure based on an interview with the Office of the National Registrar of Persons, 1 September 2006 
95
 Interview with POSTA on 30 August 2006 
96
 Measured by total assets 
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low-income savers, especially in rural areas. Postbank invests most deposits in government 
paper and also holds accounts with, amongst others, the National Bank of Kenya. 
Commercial banks and Postbank have separate regulatory regimes. Commercial banks 
operate under the Banking Act, 1995 and are regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of 
Kenya (CBK). The Banking Act limits deposit-taking from the public to institutions holding a 
banking licence.
97
 The minimum capital requirement to obtain a banking licence is Ksh250m 
($3.5m). Section 54 of the Banking Act exempts Postbank from the Act. Postbank operates 
independently under the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Act, 1978. Postbank is not regulated 
by the CBK, though it does report to the Ministry of Finance. It is not obliged to comply with the 
prudential guidelines relating to money laundering (described below) and, as a result, a 
situation has arisen where Postbank‟s AML compliance is lower than that of commercial banks. 
For example, Postbank‟s KYC requirements are weaker – they require sight of a national 
identity card but not documents proving or verifying address or source of income. Commercial 
banks, by contrast, are required in terms of the prudential guidelines to ask for all three. In 
addition, the Postbank does not keep all records required of commercial banks, nor does it 
does monitor or report suspicious transactions. Commercial banks are required to do so.
98
 
SACCOs are important non-bank players. Savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) provide 
supplementary service to those who are already banked, and also play a role in providing basic 
savings and loans services where banks do not reach. According to the CBK there are about 
3,600 active SACCOs in Kenya with 2.2 million members.
99
 Some SACCOs are very large - up 
to 85,000 members - but all SACCOs are similar in that they are formed around a common 
bond. In urban areas this bond is usually professional, for example, one SACCO will serve civil 
servants, another lawyers, another taxi drivers and so on. Rural SACCOs tend to be formed by 
farmers who are self-employed rather than salaried but who do nonetheless share a common 
bond e.g. all are coffee farmers, tea farmers or so on. A new member of a SACCO, once 
vetted for membership, buys a “share” in the SACCO and after a set period, usually six 
months, can borrow up to three times the deposited share. SACCOs open a bank account with 
a commercial bank in the name of the SACCO to bank the members‟ payments, thereby 
providing some members who do not have a direct personal bank account with an indirect link 
to the formal banking system. Approximately 1.4m members of SACCOS and MFIs in Kenya 
do not have their own bank accounts and would only have indirect access to a bank account 
through their SACCO or MFI (FinAccess, 2006). About 90% of SACCOs hold their accounts 
with the Co-operative Bank.
100
  
SACCOS are emerging as competitors to banks. SACCOs are registered in terms of the Co-
operative Societies Act
101
 with the Ministry of Co-operatives, and in terms of this act, are limited 
to doing business with their members. They cannot offer deposit services to the public at large. 
However, some SACCOs recently started to offer their members so-called Front Office Service 
Activities (FOSAs), which are more sophisticated “banking-like” services like a personal 
savings account and personal loans approved quickly and at competitive rates. In addition, 
FOSAs are offered through bank-like counter services, with banking-related charges. So while 
FOSAs are technically only offered to members there is an obvious temptation for SACCOs to 
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 Section 16 (1) 
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 Interview with A. Nyambura Koigi, MD, Postbank on 30 August 2006 
99
 Interview with CBK on 31 August 2006 
100
 Interview with Co-operative Bank on 31 August 2006 
101
 Chapter 490 of the laws of Kenya 
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offer services to non-members or to sign up new members with a marginal common bond. 
There are 120 SACCOs offering FOSA services. 
Enabling regulatory framework being introduced for SACCOs. A bill, the SACCO Societies Bill 
2006, is currently being drafted to improve the governance and supervision of SACCOs. It aims 
to establish a new authority, the SACCO Societies Regulatory Authority, under the Ministry of 
Co-operatives, to regulate and establish prudential regulations for FOSA SACCOs.
102
 
Enabling regulatory framework has been introduced for MFIs. It is estimated that there are 
approximately 50-100 MFIs with a total client base of 600,000-800,000 individuals 
(Kashangaki, 2007). Currently, microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide only credit services to 
their clients and are unregulated. A small number of MFIs (currently two) are seeking to 
become deposit-takers in their own right. The Microfinance Act, No. 19 of 2006 was passed in 
December 2006. The Act allows for MFIs that meet certain requirements to become deposit-
takers and be subject to prudential regulation. MFIs that may feasible transform to deposit-
taking institutions account for about 400,000 members. These deposit-taking MFIs will be 
regulated and supervised by the CBK, while the Minister for Finance will prescribe regulations 
to govern the non deposit-taking micro-finance institutions. Although the regulations have been 
drafted (including a set of regulations titled the “Deposit taking Proceeds of Crime and Anti 
Money Laundering Regulations”), they had not yet been finalised in August 2007. 
In addition to FSPs already described, Kenya also has some informal FSPs. These include 
rotating savings and credit schemes (ROSCAs) and village banks. They are not regulated in 
any manner. 
The various FSPs discussed in this section, as well as their governing legislation and AML/CFT 
obligations that apply are summarises in Table 3, below. 
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Financial 
sector 
institutions 
Number Example # of accounts 
Regulated/supervise
d by 
General regulation/ 
applicable law 
Applicable AML/CFT 
legislation 
Applicable KYC 
requirements 
Commercial 
banks 
42 commercial banks 
licensed in Kenya 
Barclays Unkown Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) 
Banking Act, 1995 In 2000, CBK issued 
prudential guidelines 
under Banking Act 
setting out basic AML 
rules for commercial 
banks. Draft AML bill 
has been published. 
Draft CFT bill 
published in 2003, but 
withdrawn. 
Identification by 
identity document, 
proof of address and 
source of income 
required. 
Postbank n/a n/a 1 m active accounts, 
plus another 1m 
inactive accounts 
Not regulated by CGK, 
though it does report to 
the Ministry of Finance 
Kenya Post Office 
Savings Bank Act, 
1978 
Postbank is exempted 
from the prudential 
guidelines that apply to 
banks. Currently no 
legislation applies. 
None currently 
Savings and 
Credit 
Cooperatives 
(SACCOs) 
3,600 active SACCOs, 
some having  members 
of up to 85,000; total 
membership base of 
2.2m 
Unknown Currently not taking 
deposits; 1.4m 
members do not have 
their own bank 
accounts and would 
have access via the 
bank account of their 
SACCO 
Registered with the 
Ministry of Co-
operatives 
Co-operative Societies 
Act (Chapter 490 of the 
laws of Kenya) 
None currently. AML 
draft bill will apply once 
enacted. 
None currently 
Micro-finance 
institutions 
(MFIs) 
Approximately 50-100 
MFIs with a total client 
base of 600,000-
800,000 individuals  
Kenya 
Woman‟s 
Finance Trust 
(KWFT) 
Institutions that could 
feasibly become 
deposit-taking 
institutions have total 
membership base of 
400,000 
Central Bank of Kenya Provide credit services. 
However, the 
Microfinance Act, No. 
19 of 2006, allows for 
MFIs licensed under 
the act to also take 
deposits. 
None currently. AML 
draft bill will apply once 
enacted. 
None currently. 
However, the draft 
regulations to the 
Microfinance Act 
indicate that the same 
KYC requirements will 
apply to MFI clients as 
to clients of 
commercial banks (see 
above). 
Table 3: Kenyan deposit-taking institutions and applicable legislation 
Source: Genesis Analytics, based on desktop research, information and information obtained in in-country consultations
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The reach of the banking sector 
To date, commercial banks have not targeted the lower-income market. Commercial banks 
have traditionally shown little interest in lower-income clients. The high interest rates on offer in 
the government bond market in the 1990s (at their peak T-bills were returning a rate of around 
70%) afforded banks comfortable margins without having to focus too much on intermediation 
and there was little need to move business into new, higher-risk or lower-profit areas. Less 
profitable (lower-income) clients were thus excluded by stringent account opening and 
minimum balance requirements, high operating costs in the form of monthly flat fees (which 
remain in place today) as well as the closure of some rural bank branches. 
The result is low levels of usage. A consequence of that period is that few Kenyans use a bank 
account. Of the total Kenyan population of 17.4m, 19% or 3.3m have a bank account 
(FinAccess, 2006). 
Affordability excludes 80% of adults from banking services
103
. The low usage of bank accounts 
can be explained by access barriers. Even basic accounts are not affordable to the majority of 
the population. We estimate that a client would need a personal monthly income of Ksh2,800 
($38) to afford a basic savings account,
104
 while he or she would need a personal monthly 
income of Ksh19,418 ($267) to afford a transaction account.
105
 Given that 58% of the 
population lives on less than Ksh1,997 per month ($27), we estimate that only 20% of adults 
could currently afford a basic savings account and that no more than 5% of adults could afford 
a transaction accounts.  
Proximity contributes to lack of access. The last decade was characterised by a closure of less 
profitable bank branches, especially in rural areas. In 1997 there were 695 branches 
countrywide; today there are 532 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2005:35; Kabbucho, Sander & 
Mukwana, 2003:3) and 85% of these are located in urban areas in a country where 60% of the 
population live in rural areas. This has left commercial banks with a truncated reach into poor 
rural markets. For this reason, Postbank, operating through the extensive outlets of the 
national post office (POSTA), is an important financial link for the rural poor. 
Eligibility criteria also contribute to lack of access. In addition, a number of commercial banks 
impose high opening and minimum balance requirements on their clients, which lower-income 
clients find difficult to meet. This model has been broken, however, as banks start to move into 
lower-income markets. Equity Bank, for instance, has zero opening or minimum balance 
requirements on its savings and current accounts. It is estimated that 25-30% of the population 
are excluded due to high opening or minimum balances. 
In addition to the access drivers, certain other factors are also likely to impact on usage of bank 
accounts. These are factors that tend to discourage usage of bank accounts, but do not form 
absolute access barriers and include factors such as paperwork and hassle to which people 
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 The measure of affordability applied by Genesis, in line with that used by Finmark Trust, is to say that a household will be able to 
spend 2% of their monthly income on a banking product. However, as we only had personal income data available, we assume that 
there are two earners per household and that an individual will therefore be able to spend 4% of personal income on a transaction bank 
account. 
104
 We took a weighted (by number of branches) average of the monthly charges on the cheapest savings accounts offered by four 
banks serving the low-income market (Co-operative Bank, NBK, Equity Bank and Postbank). The average cost of a savings account 
was Ksh112/month. Personal income to afford a savings account would be Ksh2,797 (using the 4% rule described in footnote above). 
105
 We took a weighted (by number of branches) average of the monthly charges on the cheapest transaction accounts offered by four 
banks serving the low-income market (Co-operative Bank, KCB, NBK and Equity Bank). The average cost of a transaction account was 
Ksh777/month. Personal income to afford a transaction account would be Ksh19,418 (once again using the 4% rule). 
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are subject when opening a bank account, the opportunity cost of opening an account (time 
spent) and the potential intimidating nature of banks to low-income clients. 
A new attitude to low-income banking is emerging 
Changing market conditions enticing some commercial banks to rethink the low-income 
market. Although the access picture described above is not healthy, the attitude towards lower-
income banking is shifting, albeit slowly. Access is now recognised as an explicit policy goal by 
the Ministry of Finance. It is listed as an objective of the Economic Recovery and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programme and formed a key driver of the impetus to create the new 
Microfinance Act. In addition, the banking market is more competitive for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, there has been a dramatic fall in T-bill yields (down to around 8% currently (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 2006:4)), putting an end to the “armchair banking” described above. Secondly, 
capital requirements have been halved and state-owned banks partially privatised, creating 
more competition. Thirdly, as described above, SACCOs and MFIs are starting to operate in 
the banking space. Finally, new entrants like Equity and K-Rep banks are entering the lower-
income market (see below). Combined, these factors are churning up the competitive waters, 
influencing some commercial banks to reassess lower-income market strategy.  
New entrants stir up the market. The path into the low-income-market is being cut by two 
relative newcomers, Equity and K-Rep banks. Equity Bank started out as a rural mortgage 
finance company and grew into a building society and then into a bank. It now bases its 
strategy on serving the informal sector by providing affordable and simple products. A 2005 
banking survey found that on average, established banks charge about Ksh800 ($10) per 
month for services. This compares poorly to the Ksh40 ($0.5) charge by Equity Bank (Market 
Intelligence, 2005:46). During April 2007, Equity Bank had more than 1m clients and asserted 
to have captured 31% of all account holders in Kenya (Muiruri, 2007). K-Rep Bank emerged as 
a bank in 1999 after starting out as a microfinance institution. It has retained its focus on the 
client base previously served as a MFI and also attracted new clients, mostly low-income 
earners and those not in formal employment earning less than Ksh5,000 ($69) per month. 
Mainstream banks testing low-income products. Some “mainstream” commercial banks are 
also looking at lower-income business. At least two low-cost products have been launched: 
Kenya Commercial Bank released the Simba account and National Bank of Kenya launched 
the Taifa savings product.
106
 The marketing tagline for Taifa (“Finally an account you can 
afford”) hints at the problems people have faced in the past with finding affordable accounts. 
The money remittance market 
In terms of formal remittances, Kenya is a net receiving country. The view of the CBK is that 
through the formal sector, at least, Kenya is a strong net remittance receiving country. This 
concurs with information provided by agents of MoneyGram and Western Union, reporting that 
the ratio of inflows to outflows in their business is somewhere between 85:15 and 98:2.
107
 
However, data on volume flows is weak; there is little centralised data as balance of payment 
statistics on remittances are not kept by the CBK. One indication given in 2003, by the Daily 
Nation newspaper who quoted the Minister for Finance and Planning stating that, based on 
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 Both these accounts have very few charges (e.g. no monthly service fee) and affordable opening and minimum balance 
requirements, which make them suitable to the low-income market. The Taifa savings product, however, seems a more appropriate 
product for the low-income market than the Simba account in that the Simba account only allows four withdrawals per year. Once this is 
exceeded the account is automatically converted to a transaction account with normal charges.  
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 Interviews with Co-operative Bank on 31 August 2006 (MoneyGram); and Postbank on 30 August 2006 (Western Union) 
Appendices 
 
 81 
 
 81 
statistics of transfers through Western Union, Kenyans in the United Kingdom send more than 
Kshs50bn ($690m) to Kenya every year, while those in Germany remit up to Kshs30 million 
($410,000) a month (Kabbucho, Sander & Mukwana, 2003). The majority of incoming 
remittances appear to arrive from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Canada.  
Kenyans rely strongly on incoming remittances. A report by the Tegemeo Institute in 1998 
found that a third of Kenyan households rely on remittances to support their financial needs 
(Kabbucho, Sander & Mukwana, 2003:4). Incoming money transfers are used mostly for family 
support in respect of food and hospital expenses and school fees. Similarly, a report by 
Microsave Africa in 2003 estimated that 30% of the rural population rely on some form of 
money transfer system for receiving remittances from family members working elsewhere 
(though not necessarily abroad). The recently released FinAccess (a financial services usage 
survey in Kenya) found that in the twelve months preceding the survey completed in 2006, 
17% of respondents received an internal transfer from persons in Kenya, 3% received money 
from outside Kenya, 17% sent transfer within Kenya nad only 1% sent money outside Kenya 
(Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, 2007). The main sending countries were the United Stats 
of America, the United Kingdom and Uganda (Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, 2007). 
Among low-income users, incoming remittances for family support have been estimated at 
between Ksh500 and Ksh10,000 ($6.9 to $137) per month, which compares to the estimates of 
school fees of between Ksh10,000 and Ksh50,000 per term ($137 to $685) (Kabbucho, 
Sander, Mukwana, 2003).  
Outflows are important too because of the relatively large number of Kenyans who study 
abroad and rely on family support during their studies. The main outbound countries, according 
to the CBK and MoneyGram and Western Union agents, are the United States, United 
Kingdom, India and Uganda.  
Refugees rely on remittances. Kenya has borders with three countries that are or have recently 
been at war, namely Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. Refugees from these conflict areas have 
found shelter in Kenya and in 2004 there were nearly 240,000 refugees in Kenya (UNHCR, 
2004). Some of these refugees rely on remittances for financial and food support. In the 
Dadaab refugee camp on the Somali border, it has been documented that Somali refugees rely 
heavily on remittances sent to the camps (using the hawala system) from relatives in the 
United States, and monthly or occasional transfers of dollars are vital for daily survival as well 
as dealing with contingencies (Horst, 2006). 
Regulation limits competition. While the banking sector faces increasing levels of competition, 
the same is not true for the money transfer market. The Central Bank of Kenya Act limits the 
cross-border remittance of funds to those holding a banking licence or special CBK-issued 
licence. Thus, only commercial banks, Postbank and POSTA can engage legally in cross-
border money transfers. To obtain a banking licence, a capital outlay of Ksh 250m ($3.5m) is 
required. This is beyond the capacity of small and medium informal MTOs, and even the larger, 
global MTOs like Western Union and MoneyGram operate in Kenya only off the back of the 
licence held by a commercial bank or POSTA. Information is not available on what it would cost 
a small or medium MTO to enter into a partnership with a bank, but it is doubtful that 
commercial banks would see smaller, less formal MTOs like one-man hawalas as profitable 
MTO partnership opportunities. In other words, the extant money transfer rules oblige small and 
medium informal MTOs to either obtain a banking licence or to partner with a bank, in order to 
enter the formal market - competition in the formal sector is this limited. 
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New innovative remittance products being introduced to market. During 2007, the 
Vodafone/Safaricom mobile money transfer service, M-PESA, was piloted for remittance 
transfers between the United Kingdom and Keny. The product allows the sender to transfer 
money either via mobile phone or a secure internet site. The fund can be received in either a 
bank account or via the recipient‟s mobile phone in the form of a voucher and a special PIN 
allowing the recipient to exchange the voucher for cash at a participating airtime vendor or 
other agent (Vodafone & Citigroup, 2007). The product was developed with funding received 
from the UK government Department for International Development‟s (DFID) Financial 
Deepening Challenge Fund (Vodafone & Citigroup, 2007). According to recent media reports, 
the M-Pesa will charge almost half of what other players in the Kenyan remittance market 
charge (see below) (Aron, 2007). 
Lack of competition, until recently, means the formal transfer market is relatively expensive (or 
limited to certain destinations). Sending a transfer from a commercial bank via the SWIFT 
system will cost from Ksh1,500 ($21) up to Ksh2,500 ($34) flat fee. In addition, this service is 
limited to account-to-account transfers. Western Union and MoneyGram, primarily servicing 
urban centres, take as much as 12%-17% commission (of the total value of the transfer) on 
small transfers. This is significantly more expensive than the cost of informal mechanisms, 
which mostly charge less than 5% (see below). POSTA offers a relatively good-value money 
order service of 5% commission, but this service is only available to remit money to and from 
the East African Community (Uganda and Tanzania) and from South Africa. The delivery is 
relatively slow (three days). 
Cost of formal remittances fosters informal market. Low-income remitters are discouraged by 
the cost of formal sector services and tend to rely on informal services. The size of the informal 
market is not documented but the CBK estimates that informal flows are “at least as large” as 
formal ones.
108
 Informal money remittances move both into and out of Kenya but there is little 
information on the size of these flows and the ratio between inflows and outflows. 
There are at least three ways to move money informally. They are: 
 Cash carrying. A remitter can carry funds across the border personally or arrange 
for the driver or bus conductor to do so. This costs 3%-10% (of the total value of 
the transfer) depending on the transfer amount, or, if carrying funds personally, the 
price of a fare. The transfer is obviously limited to the destination and route of the 
bus. 
 Transport companies. The second way is to send money with a bus or courier 
company. Bus companies like Akamba and Scandinavian and courier companies 
like Securicor are well established businesses and a trusted means for domestic 
remittances. They operate outside of the law. Although it is not stated policy to 
move money across the border – as it would be contrary to the money transfer 
rules – sending money in parcels to Uganda or Tanzania can be arranged 
surreptiously and by several accounts is a reliable and popular means of moving 
cash to these neighbouring. Commission is 5% or less and delivery occurs 
overnight. Obviously, transfers cannot be made to destinations further afield using 
this method. 
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 Hawala. Hawala is run as part of an informal network of traders in nearby countries 
and are based on ethnic links where trust and peer enforcement are strong. The 
most common hawala links are with Somalia, Sudan and Dubai. Hawala is a cheap 
(3% to 4% commission
109
) and instantaneous method of moving money. Hawala is 
widely used by the poor, especially in rural areas where Western 
Union/MoneyGram and banks do not reach or are considered too expensive. 
Hawala is also used in conflict areas where there are no banks – for instance, in 
the Kenyan refugee camps on the Somali and Sudanese border. Hawala is also 
used by businessmen to move money quickly and cheaply and is a lubricant of 
trade in East Africa and the Horn region. 
Access outlook for remittance sector. Although the CBK has shown an interest in improving the 
remittance systems in Kenya and recognises the role to be played by remittances in 
development, the current laws restrict participation to licence holders and increase the cost of 
formal options. Low-income users are badly serviced by the formal sector, especially following 
the partial closure of rural bank branches, or are excluded by the cost. They are obliged to use 
the more risky (but well trusted) bus and courier service (which operate cross border service in 
contravention of the law), or to transfer money with a friend, taxi driver or to use the hawala 
system – all of which are open secrets in Kenya. In one respect the access outlook is 
improving. POSTA is reportedly set to launch an instant money transfer service (<15min) in 
partnership with Afripayments, which will charge about 7% to 9% commission on small 
transfers (therefore less than Western Union and MoneyGram).
110
 This partnership will provide 
an opportunity for more poor people to make use of a formal channel. The access benefits will 
derive both from cost (this is cheaper than Western Union/MoneyGram or Swift mechanism) 
and proximity (POSTA outlets are wide-spread). 
THE AML/CFT ENVIRONMENT 
AML legislation not yet enacted. Kenya is a member of ESAAMLG
111
 and has committed itself 
politically to enact laws and regulations that comply with international AML/CFT standards. In 
addition, FSPs are under pressure from international correspondents and headquarters to put 
best practice AML/CFT standards in place. Thus, there is significant pressure mounting on the 
government to bring the FATF recommendations into law.  
CFT legislation not yet enacted. An anti-terrorism bill which includes clauses criminalising 
terrorist financing was tabled in parliament in 2003. It was withdrawn under protest from human 
rights‟ groups and parliamentarians who felt that the Bill unfairly infringed on human rights, 
particularly those of the Muslim community. It is unlikely to be re-introduced without significant 
amendments. No timeline has been given for this. 
In 2001, the so-called Charterhouse Affair highlighted the need to introduce stronger AML 
legislation. A suspicious deposit of Ksh2bn ($28m) was made with Charterhouse Bank. It was 
reported to the authorities and duly frozen. The client challenged the legality of the freezing in 
court. Although the client would not say where the money had come from, the court ruled that 
the deposit should be returned as it was not against the law as it stood for a depositor to refuse 
to explain the source of funds. The funds were duly released and, shortly thereafter, withdrawn 
from the bank. 
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 Interview with Mohammed Waldo, MD, Sandi Consulting (a remittance consultant) on 20 August 2006 
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 Interview with Caroline Cherotich, Director, Afripayments and Enoch Kinara, POSTA, on 30 August 2006 
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 The Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (a regional FATF-style body). 
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Some AML regulations passed under Banking Act but not all institutions covered. In 1994, 
money laundering was criminalised in anti-drug legislation.
112
 Then, in 2000, the CBK issued 
prudential guidelines under the Banking Act setting out basic AML rules for commercial 
banks.
113
 From this time on, banks began to implement practices and procedures to comply 
with their AML obligations. In January 2006, the CBK issued new and more comprehensive 
prudential guidelines relating to money laundering.
114
 The prudential guidelines apply to all 
institutions licensed under the Banking Act
115
 with the exception of Postbank. The guidelines 
require banks to:
116
 
 Identify their clients when establishing a business relationship (e.g. opening an account) or 
undertaking a one-off transaction (e.g. walk-in remittance business). (An individual client 
must produce an official record capable of establishing his or her identity such as a birth 
certificate, passport, national identity card or driver‟s licence. In addition, the client must 
provide a current residential address verified by a utility bill or a referee (banks have some 
discretion as to who is an appropriate referee) as well as verify employment or source of 
income (banks also have some discretion here). Where the client has been banked 
previously, he or she must also produce a written confirmation of this from his or her prior 
bank). 
 Report all suspicious transactions relating to money laundering to the CBK. 
 Obtain and retain records for seven years regarding the source of funds and detail of 
transactions in order to enable the identification of unusual or suspicious transactions and 
reconstruct individual transactions. 
 Train staff on a regular basis in the prevention and detection of money laundering.  
 Establish adequate internal control measures to assist in the detection of money 
laundering activities.  
When the guidelines were drafted wide consultation took place and most banks we interviewed 
report they are now largely compliant. One troublesome issue for banks has been potential 
liability for breach of confidentiality should they disclose client information to third parties, 
including the state. Banks who honour their reporting duties fear that they are exposed to civil 
liability for breach of a client‟s confidentiality. The AML bill has thus been drafted to provide 
banks with statutory protection for breach of client confidentiality.  
Task force appointed to prepare AML bill. In 2003, government constituted a 14 member task 
force under the lead of the Ministry of Finance to prepare an AML bill. Members of the task 
force which is still in operation at the time of writing include a wide variety of government 
bodies, regulators, law enforcers and the Kenyan Bankers‟ Association.
117
 The task force 
consulted widely and drew on much international precedent, including the Commonwealth 
model law, the South African Financial Intelligence Centre Act and the Australian AML laws. It 
also took advice from a panel of AML experts drawn from the United Kingdom, United States 
and South Africa. These experts seem to have been qualified in law enforcement or AML 
security and the issue of access ostensibly received little attention. An AML bill
118
 has been 
drafted and was gazetted in 2006 in the Kenya Government Gazette for introduction to the 
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 Anti-Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1994 
113
 Prudential Guideline 12 CBK/RG/12 (September 2000) 
114
 Prudential Guideline No. 8 (January 2006) which superceded Prudential Guideline 12 CBK/RG/12 (September 2000) 
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 That is, any person or institution accepting deposits from the public. 
116
 Part 4.1 of Prudential Guideline No. 8 read with Part 4.3.1 
117
 Other members of the task force are the ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Trade and Industry, the Presidency, the 
Central Bank, insurance officials, the Capital Markets Authority, the Kenya Revenue Authority, the police, intelligence services, the 
Kenyan Corruption Commission and the Attorney-General‟s office. 
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 The Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering (Prevention) Bill, 2006 
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National Assembly.
119
. A changed version of the bill was gazetted in April 2007. According to 
local commentators it is unlikely to become law before the elections in late 2007/early 2008.  
Functional approach extends regulation to a much broader range of institutions. Whereas the 
prudential guidelines apply only to institutions licensed under the Banking Act, the application of 
the draft AML bill attaches to a variety of activities and so widens the net considerably. It 
applies to all FSPs conducting any one of thirteen listed activities, including:  
 accepting deposits and other repayable funds from the public;  
 lending, including consumer and mortgage credit;  
 transferring funds or value by any means including both formal and informal channels; or  
 underwriting and placement of insurance.
120
  
In other words, the Bill, in its current form, will apply not only to all banks and Postbank, but all 
SACCOs
121
, all MFIs, all money remitters formal or informal, all insurers and all cell phone 
transfers, as well as any other institution engaging in the list of thirteen activities. The Bill also 
applies to certain designated non-FSPs, viz casinos, precious stone dealers, car dealers, and 
professionals viz lawyers, accountants and estate agents.
122
 This net is cast exceptionally wide, 
and certain functions or institutions may be excluded in the regulations which are still being 
drafted. At the time of writing, however, we were informed by the task force that no exemption 
was planned for any particular function or institution (even where the risk of money laundering 
is low). 
Creation of an FIU: The Bill establishes a new regulatory entity, the Financial Reporting Centre 
(FRC) and reporting institutions will be required to monitor and report to the FRC all suspicious 
transactions, as well as all cash transactions exceeding $5,000.
123
 
Stricter KYC requirements introduced. The Bill requires reporting institutions to KYC a client 
who seeks to enter into a business relationship with it or carry out a single transaction or series 
of transactions in the following manner (according to the task force this includes an obligation to 
re-identify existing clients – though no deadline has yet been set for such re-identification):  
 They must obtain the client‟s identity by means of a national identity card, passport, birth 
certificate, drivers‟ licence, or other official means of identification as may be set forth in the 
regulations and keep either a copy of the document itself or information as would allow a 
copy of it to be obtained.
124
  
 They must maintain records of all transactions for at least seven years.
125
 Records kept 
must be sufficient to identify the name, physical and postal address, and occupation of 
each person conducting the transaction or on whose behalf the transaction is being 
conducted, as well as the method used to verify the identity of the person.
126
 By 
implication, this suggests the institution must collect records proving address and 
occupation. The Bill does not go any further to explain how addresses must be verified but 
discussions with the task force indicate that the regulations will probably provide that a 
client produces a utility bill in the client‟s name, or a reference from a government official 
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 See Kenya Government Gazette Supplement No. 77 (Bills No. 27), Nairobi, 30
th
 October 2006 
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 Clause 2 
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 It is important to note that as traditional members of SACCOs generally join these institutions for access to credit, AML/CFT 
regulation could complicate the provision of credit services unnecessarily. 
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 Clause 2 
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 Clauses 42 (1) and 42 (3) 
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 Clause 43 (1) (a) read with 44 (1) (b) 
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 Clause 44 (1) (b) 
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 Clause 44 (3)  
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verifying address. Similarly, the regulations will probably require clients to obtain and verify 
the client‟s source of income by means of a letter from his or her employer, or, where the 
person is not formally employed or is self employed, by means of a letter obtained from a 
government official which certifies his or her occupation and source of income.
127
  
Policies and procedures: In terms of the draft bill an accountable institution would be required to 
establish and maintain internal reporting procedures in respect of reporting suspicious 
transactions.
128
   
Conveying monetary instruments to or from Kenya: A person intending to convey a monetary 
instrument, which definition includes coins and paper currency cheques and money orders, of 
more than $5,000 (or its equivalent in Kenyan shillings) must declare it at the port of entry or 
exit.
129
 Failure to do so constitutes an offence. 
Draft AML/CFT regulations to Microfinance Act have been released. The draft AML regulations 
to the Microfinance Act of 2006 were released during 2007 for public comment. These 
regulations, in their current form, impose exactly the same KYC requirements on potential new 
clients as the Bill. No exemptions or lower requirements thus apply to deposit-taking institutions 
serving the low-income market. 
KEY FINDINGS 
The general economy 
There are exceptionally low levels of formalisation in Kenya. This is the case for both the 
banking sector where only 19% of the adult population use a bank account and also for the 
remittance sector where no fixed data is available, but for which there are clear signs of a well-
used informal sector that is at least as large as the formal remittance sector. It has been 
estimated that between 70% and 94% of the working population functions in the informal 
sector.   
The impact of AML measures on usage of financial services 
Minimal impact on usage to date, because of limited scope of AML measures and exclusivity of 
formal financial services. The prudential guidelines apply only to banks. Therefore, SACCOs, 
MFIs and the Postbank have not been subject to AML rules as set out in the prudential 
guidelines. In commercial banks, affordability and eligibility criteria have been set so high that 
clients who meet these criteria tend to be able to meet the KYC requirements as well. Likewise, 
with respect to money remittances, the high prices in the formal sector have limited use of 
these services to those clients who are able to provide the necessary KYC documentation. 
These practices have a more severe impact on access than the AML measures. 
The potential impact of AML measures on access to and usage of bank accounts 
To date, the task force has not adopted a risk-sensitive approach and this is likely to have a 
negative impact on access and future usage. The AML bill has not yet been finalised and 
regulations have not yet been drafted, which makes it difficult to assess its potential impact 
accurately. However, in the interests of providing an analysis we assume that the Bill is passed 
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 A copy of the draft regulations were not available, but during the course of an interview on 31 August and in a follow-up telephone 
interview on 26 October 2006, the task force explained what they are likely to include in respect of KYC. 
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 Clause 45 
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 Definition of Monetary Instrument in Clause 2 read with Clause 12 (1) and (3) and the Third Schedule. 
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as it stands in which case every institution offering a form of financial service will have to 
comply with the prescribed AML controls. Certain functions or institutions may, in due course, 
be excluded by regulations but the task force gave no indication of such intention at the time of 
research. Thus, even institutions where the risk of money laundering is relatively low will have 
to comply with the full set of AML obligations, which will greatly stretch their resources. For 
example, SACCOs fall under the Bill as it stands, but SACCOs are closed membership 
organisations operating around a common bond. Members are usually known to each other, 
and in most cases a new member must be vouched for by a number of other members before 
being accepted. For urban SACCOs, contributions are also usually taken from a payroll. Thus 
the risk of laundering money through a SACCO would be limited. Similarly, an MFI that 
engages only in lending with no deposit-taking would fall within the scope of the Bill even 
though the risk of money laundering would be negligible. Furthermore, the draft regulations that 
have been issued under the Microfinance Act that would apply to deposit-taking MFIs licensed 
under this Act also do not display a risk-sensitive approach. The KYC requirements that apply 
to deposit-taking MFIs are exactly the same as thos contained in the Bill. 
The impact of AML measures on usage is likely to increase as the market develops. However, 
our general assessment is that the proposed Bill will have an increasingly negative impact on 
access and usage. As we have seen, a new interest in the lower-income market is emerging, 
and in time we expect this dynamic to push down the cost of banking, making it affordable for a 
new class of client who will struggle more with the AML requirements than current clients. This 
is also pertinent for clients of Equity and K-Rep- Bank who are generally of lower-incomes. 
KYC will not create an absolute barrier for low-income clients but it will create inconvenience 
and extra cost.  The Bill contains less flexible KYC requirements with less flexibility for FSPs 
than the prudential guidelines. The requirement to produce an identity card will not be a great 
barrier because 15.6m out of 17m adult nationals in Kenya have one and those without can 
obtain one free of charge. More problematic will be address verification. It was indicated that 
verification will need to comply with strict standards and that a utility bill or a reference from a 
government official will probably be required). We estimate only 5% of the population could 
produce a utility bill.
130
 As a result, low-income clients will probably have address (or “living 
location” where there is not address) verified by a government official. In practice this will 
increase the “inonvenience cost” (especially if officials end up using this bureaucratic reliance to 
extort payments) and is likely to discourage rather than encourage clients from accessing 
formal financial services. Likewise, the requirement to verify source of income will increase 
inconvenience and cost in the same way. 
KYC will create an absolute access barrier to bank accounts and formal money transfer 
services for at least 800,000 undocumented foreigners. Only 0.2m out of the 1m foreigners in 
Kenya would have appropriate documentation to access financial services in terms of the AML 
rules. Those without such documents will face an absolute barrier to access (roughly 0.8m 
people). Though this may seem relatively small number, the impact on this group is significant 
because of their social and economic vulnerability. Furthermore, it must be noted that this 
amounts to almost a third of the current banked market. 
AML compliance requirements will increase costs for FSPs, especially for non-commercial bank 
institutions. Though all banks will experience an increase in compliance costs with the 
introduction of the Bill, these will be relatively small for commercial banks. Interviews with 
commercial banks confirm that they are mostly already in compliance with the AML 
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requirements though some additional costs will be incurred in improving storage systems, 
acquiring additional compliance staff and improving monitoring systems. In contrast, non-bank 
FSPs have not yet been forced to face up to AML, including SACCOs, MFIs and, in particular, 
Postbank. Postbank is currently not on the same footing as commercial banks with respect to 
AML. If the AML bill extends duties AML to the Postbank
131
 it will be in for an enormous 
institutional shock, as will its clients. The task of re-identifying 1m poor and rural clients, re-
obtaining copies of records, and complying with reporting duties will be expensive and 
traumatic. Its (mostly lower-income) clients are likely to find it harder than commercial bank 
(mostly middle and high-income) clients to obtain the necessary KYC documentation. Accounts 
for which the identity of the accountholders cannot be verified will probably have to be closed. 
Whether Postbank will be able to afford the increased costs and still provide cheap savings 
products is in question. No exemption for Postbank is currently planned. If (non-FOSA) 
SACCOs and MFIs are included under the Bill, they will also face tremendous institutional 
shocks to become compliant.  
Pressure will also come from commercial banks for non-bank FSPs to comply. Pressure on 
Postbank, SACCOs and MFIs will not only come from the Bill but also from the commercial 
banks who hold their accounts, for instance,  90% of SACCOs hold their accounts with Co-
operative Bank, and Postbank holds an account with NBK. If non-bank FSPs cannot meet the 
compliance requirements of the banks, banks may choose to close down these account to 
safeguard their reputation and risk. Such a course of events is not certain, but in a worst case 
scenario up to 3.2m people could lose their link to the formal banking system.
132
 
Impact of draft bill on money remittance services 
Increased KYC on walk-in clients may incentivise use of informal channels. Based on the 
current wording of the Bill, remitters in the formal sector will have to increase KYC requirements 
for walk-in remittances. Currently formal providers require walk-in remitters (both sending and 
receiving) to present an ID card or passport, an address (not verified), and in the case of large 
value transfers, a reason for the transfer (e.g. an invoice for university fees). This is less than is 
required by the draft AML bill. Under the Bill, clients will have to undergo a comprehensive KYC 
process (i.e. verifying identity, address
133
 and source of funds). Although meeting these 
requirements is not per se impossible, it will raise the inconvenience and cost of transactions. 
Given low levels of formal employment, a large proportion of adults will have to go through the 
cumbersome process of having their income verified by a government official. Some clients are 
likely to shift to the informal sector where KYC requirements are less stringent. Enforcement on 
the formal sector will be made more difficult as people will simply move into the informal. We 
also expect to see an increase in costs for all formal remittance channels as a consequence of 
compliance expenses in relation to the keeping of records, monitoring of transactions and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions. Most commercial banks and Western Union and 
MoneyGram have these in place already but Postbank does not. It is likely that most of these 
costs will be passed back to the client in due course, or will result in selection policies that are 
biased against less profitable clients. The KYC requirements will also make the roll-out of 
innovative new remittance products, such as M-PESA, extremely difficult. The low cost and 
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 There is a difference of views on this point:  the Postbank has indicated that it will not be covered by the Bill; the task force is clear 
that it will. 
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 There are 1.4m SACCO members without a bank account, potentially 0.5m deposit-taking MFI clients without a bank account and, 
most significantly, 1m active Postbank accountholders who are unlikely to have an account with a commercial bank. These institutions 
are their link to the formal banking system. 
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convenience of informal services means that formal services have a high elasticity to the 
introduction of more hassle. 
Functional approach proposed in bill extends to informal providers. Money remitters, whether 
formal or informal, fall into the scope of the Bill because they are involved in “transferring of 
funds or value.”  Any transaction with a money remitter, even small, once-off transactions, 
would oblige the remitter to KYC a client as described above. The remitter would also be 
obliged to maintain records of all transactions, to have internal AML procedures in place and to 
report suspicious transactions to the FRC.  
The impact of the Bill‟s measures to comply with FATF Special Recommendations VI and IX 
will be particularly dramatic for informal money remitters The FATF recommendations stipulate 
that governments should licence or register all informal transfer operators and ensure that they 
are AML/CFT compliant to the level of banks (SRVI), and should put measures in place to 
detect the physical cross border transportation of currency (SRIX). The informal sector exists in 
part because the right to transfer money formally is reserved for licence-holders (banks, 
partners of banks, Postbank or POSTA). For an informal provider to become “formalised”, it 
would be necessary to register as a bank or partner with a bank – both difficult options for 
current informal players.  
Although there is no intention yet in Kenya to shut down informal remitters, this pressure is sure 
to come due to the terrorism threat, the presence of refugees and Kenya‟s importance as the 
economic leader in East Africa. However, no attempt has been made to formalise the informal 
remittance sector or encourage the informal remitters to register and it is not clear whether the 
state has the resources at this point to undertake this process or whether they consider the 
effort worthwhile given the risks involved. On the assumption that the measures currently in the 
Bill will be enforced, it should be noted that the closing down of informal remitters without giving 
them appropriate time to formalise will have a significant impact on remittance flows into and 
out of Kenya.  The informal remittance market is large and well used – mainly due to the dearth 
of affordable options available in the formal sector. Consequently, the results are likely to be: 
 The closure of all informal mechanisms, including services provided by bus and courier 
services and hawala, except those who can register as a bank or partner with a bank, and a 
forced move of those currently using cheaper informal methods (at least 50% of remittance 
market) to more expensive formal mechanisms. Where the user is likely to be unable to 
meet the more expensive fees, transfers will have to be “saved up” for less frequent, larger 
transactions.  
 With the closure of hawala, a drying-up of financing for intra-Africa trade in the Horn and 
East Africa regions, and deprivation of the needs of those in refugee camps. 
 The incurrence of massive state spending on enforcement, including a closure or blockage 
of borders daily to enable the search of buses, courier services, taxi drivers and passengers 
for cash exceeding the threshold.  
 A significant impact on remittance flows into and out of Kenya, as the informal remittance 
market is as least as large and popular as the formal sector. 
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APPENDIX D: MEXICO 
SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
 Mexico is characterised by a large informal economy, with a small number of tax payers. In 2000, 
only 4-5m tax payers out of 15m registered tax payers (10-12% of the economically active 
population) were paying income tax. 
 Although the country does not have an official identity document, 95% of Mexicans that are eligible to 
vote have the Federal Electoral Card which is widely accepted as an official form of identification. 
 A financial sector crisis during the 1990s had a direct impact on the ownership structure of the 
banking sector. More than 75% of bank sector assets are foreign owned. 
 To date, the commercial banking sector has not actively focused on serving the poor. However, this 
segment presents lucrative business opportunities to a number of players, signified by retailers‟ and 
other popular finance institutions applications for bank licenses. 
 The Mexican government is attempting to formalise the popular finance sector. The process is being 
led by BANSEFI, the government-owned savings bank and a number of federations serving as apex 
bodies for popular banks. This sector has been identified by the Mexican government as one way to 
serve low-income individuals. Banks are also recognising the potential of the popular finance sector 
and have started to buy shares in these organisations. 
 We estimate that no more than between 10% and 25% of the Mexican adult population use a bank 
account. Between 50% and 64% of the Mexican adult population do not have access to transaction 
banking services on the basis of affordability. 
 No evidence could be found that AML/CFT KYC requirements pose a serious barrier to access to 
transaction banking services. 
 Due to a large diaspora residing in the U.S., Mexico is the largest remittance-receiving country in 
Central and Latin America and one of the top three remittance-receiving countries in the world. 
During 2005, remittances to Mexico totalled US$20 billion and were expected to grow to US$24 
billion during 2006. 
 A variety of organisations provide formal remittance services, thus facilitating the flow of funds 
through formal rather than informal means. No more than 10% of the total value of remittances is 
transferred through informal channels. 
 The predominant usage of formal remittance channels is indicative of the affordability of remittance 
services. The cost of formal remittance services has decreased significantly since 2001 due to both 
greater competitiveness in the remittance service market and government. 
 AML/CFT identification requirements do not appear to prohibit access to formal remittance services. 
 Mexico became a member of the FATF in 2000.  
 Money laundering was criminalised in 1996 under Article 400 BIS of the Federal Penal Code. 
International terrorism and the financing of terrorism were criminalised in June 2007. 
 AML/CFT legislation impacts indirectly on individuals‟ access to financial services through its impact 
on institutions. The Mexican government initially drafted AML/CFT legislation that was not suited to 
local conditions and pitched the regulations at too high a level. This created a situation where at least 
two sets of institutions serving the low-income market will find it difficult to comply. 
 Mexico has moved from a generic approach to legislation (that applies to all institutions) to a more 
risk-sensitive approach. While a generic approach was followed in the initial drafting of legislation, the 
regulations that apply to FSPs have since been tailored to reflect the differing realities that FSPs 
face, e.g. varying levels of resources, varying levels of money laundering risk due to the nature of 
their business. 
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GENERAL AND MARKET CONTEXT 
Mexico is a middle-income country with high levels of poverty and inequality. The country has a 
total population of 103m (INEGI, 2005). While about 15% of the economically active 
population
134
 is employed in the agricultural sector and 26% in the industrial sector, almost 
59% are employed in the services sector (INEGI, 2005). During 2005, an average GDP per 
capita (constant 2000 US$) of US$6,172 was recorded, placing it in the league of upper-
middle-income countries (World Bank, 2006). However, poverty levels are not low, with 4% of 
the population earning below US$1 a day and 21% earning below US$2 a day (World Bank, 
2006). Approximately 36.5% of income accrues to the top decile of the population, while the 
bottom decile earns only 1.6% of income (INEGI, 2002). 
The country has a large informal sector, with a small tax base. Approximately 28% of those 
employed could be classified as working in the informal sector (INEGI, 2005). However, this is 
likely to be an under-estimate as it is possible that individuals not classified as economically 
active are in fact earning an income from informal activities. The size of the informal economy 
has a direct impact on the number of tax payers. Although there are no recent formal estimates 
available for the number of tax payers, informal estimates place the number of tax payers 
around 20% of the economically active population. In 2000, it was found that only 4-5m tax 
payers out of 15m registered tax payers (or 10-12% of the current economically active 
population) were actually paying income tax (Dalsgaard, 2000). 
Most of the country‟s adult population has access to the main identity document. The main 
form of identification used is the Federal Electoral Card, administered by the Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE), an autonomous public organisation. In 2006 around 71m Mexican citizens (95% 
of those eligible to vote) were registered on the electoral roll and also had a valid voting ID-
card (IFE, 2006). The card is provided free of charge and mobile units of the IFE service even 
very remote rural areas. The card has a number of security features that ensure the integrity of 
the system once cards are produced, though the process of obtaining the card could be 
susceptible to identity fraud
135
. Mexican banks are, however, unable to access the database 
backing the IFE card, making client re-identification processes very difficult. The act that 
governs the functioning of the Federal Electoral Institute prohibits any groups, except political 
parties, from accessing the database. While banks are allowed to query whether a specific IFE 
number does exist, they are unable to verify client information against information contained in 
the database. 
Mexico faces significant money laundering risks. Mexican drug trafficking organisations and 
criminal groups control the majority of the American wholesale drug market, including 
smuggling, transportation and wholesale distribution (National Drug Intelligence Centre, 2006). 
A recent report estimates that “between US$8.3 billion and US$24.9 billion in drug proceeds 
[annually] is smuggled out of the United States by Mexican and Colombian DTOs [drug-
trafficking organisations] across the U.S.-Mexico border, primarily in bulk through South Texas” 
(National Drug Intelligence Centre, 2006). 
Dollarisation is taking place in the northern part of Mexico. The area just south of the US 
border is characterised by so-called “dollar boys” – teenage boys on roller skates moving from 
car to car to exchange dollars for pesos (or vice versa) for people entering or leaving Mexico 
(Servicio de Administración Tributaria, 2006). While cash flowing from the U.S. to Mexico 
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 At least one of the four major banks has expressed reservations about the integrity of the IFE system. 
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facilitates a supply of U.S. dollars, the movement of Mexican migrants and so-called “transitory 
migrants” (immigrants moving from Latin America through Mexico to reach the U.S.) provide a 
strong demand for U.S. dollars. 
Access to financial services will be a strong policy objective for the new administration
136
. 
Government policy on the financial sector is set by the Ministry of Finance (SHCP). Access to 
financial services for low-income households will form a particular focus area and that it will 
enjoy attention during the term of the new administration elected in 2006. 
Banking sector development and structure 
The financial sector crisis of the mid-1990s has shaped the current deposit-taking sector. A 
sequence of political events during 1994 triggered a sharp devaluation in the Mexican peso 
during December 1994 and culminated in a banking crisis in 1995. The crisis had a number of 
consequences for the nature of the Mexican banking sector: 
 It resulted in a sharp contraction in the extension of domestic banking credit, to the extent 
that it declined at an annual rate of 6% in real terms between 1994 and 2004 (Schulz, 
2006). In June 2005, domestic financing by the commercial bank sector totalled 10% of 
GDP (IMF, 2005). 
 Systemic stability and risk avoidance now form key objectives for both banks and the bank 
sector regulator. 
 It had a negative impact on (especially low-income) individuals‟ trust in the formal banking 
sector. 
 It affected the ownership structure of the banking sector. Today, foreign ownership of 
Mexican banks exceeds 75% of banking sector assets (prominent foreign-owned banks 
include HSBC, BBVA Bancomer, Banamex and Santander) (CVBV, 2006). This is a direct 
result of the Mexican government‟s attempt to facilitate recapitalisation after the crisis. 
Error! Reference source not found. defines the various entities comprising the Mexican 
financial sector and summarises their structure and supervision: 
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            AML  obligations 
Institution Legal structure and 
definition 
Examples Number of 
institutions 
Governing law  
and article for 
AML/CFT 
Compliance 
Supervisor Systems 
requirements 
Client due diligence (CDD) 
for Mexican natural 
persons 
Reporting 
requirements 
Banks In the first instance, under the 
relevant law, defined as a 
provider of credit. Also a 
deposit-taking institution. 
Banamex, 
Banco Azteca 
Total of 41 
commercial 
banks. 
Credit Institutions 
Act, Article 115 
(1997) 
CNBV Required to have 
systems that are able 
to: 
• Maintain and update 
clients‟ CDD files; 
• Detect suspicious 
transactions based on 
criteria developed by 
the institution; 
• Detect and monitor 
transactions across 
accounts; 
• Create an audit trail; 
• Aggregate 
transactions to assess 
against thresholds; 
• Retain historical 
data; and 
• Be secure/tamper 
proof. 
Information required: 
names, domicile, date of 
birth, nationality, occupation 
or profession, business 
activity, telephone numbers, 
e-mail.                          
Documentation required: 
Personal identification with 
address, photo and 
signature (Federal Voting 
card, passport, professional 
certificate, national military 
service card, military identity 
card, drivers license, 
Consular ID, etc.); Proof of 
Population Register Code or 
Fiscal Identification Carnet 
(when available); Proof of 
residential address (e.g. 
uitlity bill) different from 
address on identity 
document. 
Required to 
report all 
transactions 
exceeding 
US$10,000 to 
the CNBV. 
Cajas de ahorro Cajas are allowed to take 
deposits and extend credit. 
Two legal forms: Sociedades 
Financieras Populares 
(Sofipos or cajas populares) 
and Sociedaded de 
Cooperatives de Ahorro y 
Crédito Popula (caja 
solidarias). While the cajas 
populares are for-profit 
entities, cajas solidarias are 
cooperatives, owned by its 
members and allowed to only 
provide deposit-taking and 
credit services to members. 
FinComún 
(caja 
populares) 
There are 
roughly 300 
cajas 
populares and 
300 cajas 
solidarias. By 
early 2008, 48 
of these 
entities had 
managed to 
formalise. 
Savings and 
Popular Credit Act 
(LACP), Article 124 
CNBV Same as above Same as above Same as 
above 
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            AML  obligations 
Institution Legal structure and 
definition 
Examples Number of 
institutions 
Governing law  
and article for 
AML/CFT 
Compliance 
Supervisor Systems 
requirements 
Client due diligence (CDD) 
for Mexican natural 
persons 
Reporting 
requirements 
Credit Unions 
(Uniones de Crédito) 
Credit unions accept deposits 
from members, based on 
which it then extends credit to 
members. It is not allowed to 
extend credit to non-
members. 
Alpura   General Law of 
Organizations and 
Credit Auxiliary 
Activities, Article 5 
CNBV Same as above Same as above Same as 
above 
Limited objective 
financial institutions 
(Sociedades 
financieras de objeto 
limitado or 
SOFOLES) 
Credit institutions that are 
allowed to only extend credit 
for specific purposes, e.g. 
automobile loans, home 
loans. 
Finsol In March 
2006, there 
were 60 
institutions in 
operation 
(CNBV, 2006). 
Credit Institutions 
Act 
CNBV Same as above Same as above Same as 
above 
Table 4: Description of credit and deposit-taking institions 
Source: CNBV, various interviews and articles, Mexican legislation 
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The banking sector is heavily concentrated. Approximately 80% of banking sector assets is 
owned by the 5 largest banks, while the two largest banks alone own almost 45% (CNBV, 
2006). However, it is important to note that the high concentration levels are not a result of the 
financial sector crisis – the sector was already heavily concentrated before the crisis. The high 
concentration levels have not gone unnoticed - the Mexican media has recently started voicing 
concerns over the effect of high concentration levels on banking charges and fees. 
Large commercial banks are not actively targeting the low-income market. A recent CGAP 
report, focused on assessing the availability of savings services, concluded that “the prospect 
of traditional commercial banks reaching down on a large scale to serve low-income clients is 
not likely in the near future. There is simply too much market in-between existing bank clients 
and low-income segments to expect traditional banks to invest in technologies for significant 
downreach” (Klaehn, Helms & Deshpande, 2006: 8). This was confirmed by conversations with 
various commercial banks that see the payroll market (formally employed individuals) as their 
primary interest. 
Retailers and other entrants are acknowledging the profit opportunity in the low-income market 
by applying for banking licenses to “fill the gap” left by large commercial banks. An innovative 
low-income bank, Banco Azteca, evolved out of the Elektra appliance and furniture stores and 
forms part of the larger Elektra group. The bank was formed in 2002 and has since managed to 
amass the second largest number of accounts (namely 10m) in the market, held by 4m 
clients
137
. The rapid uptake confirms the necessity of banking services specifically targeted at 
the low-income market. The American retail giant, Wal-Mart, also recently applied for a banking 
license and, if granted, will soon start offering basic savings accounts and credit cards. The 
Mexican Ministry of Finance (SHCP) has granted banking licenses to six organisations during 
the last eight months of 2006. At least half of these licensees plan to target the low-income 
market. Some of the new banks include Banco Ahorro Famsa (owned by the appliance retailer, 
Grupo Famsa), Banco Autofin Mexico (a unit of the car and home financier group, Grupo 
Autofin) and Banco Compartamos (formerly Compartamos, the largest micro-credit 
organisation in Mexico) (Dickerson, 2006). During June 2006, Compartamos transformed from 
a SOFOL to a bank (see Table 4 for a description of the various regulatory forms of deposit- 
and credit institutions). The organisation that had started out as a small MFI with 26,716 clients 
in 1996, managed to grow to a bank with 543,100 clients by August 2006 (Compartamos, 
2006). While it is currently only offering small loans and credit services, it will soon also start 
offering deposit-taking services. AML/CFT regulation has been noted as a reason for the delay 
in finalisation of deposit-taking services. 
Technological innovation in the low-income market is still limited: cell phones are not actively 
used as distribution channel. While during recent years banks have evolved to provide ATM 
and Internet banking services, they have not yet started introducing cell phone technology as 
distribution channel. However, the Mexican Bankers Association (ABM) is completing a 
protocol on cell phone technology and it is likely to be introduced soon. A popular finance 
organisation, FinSol (a SOFOL extending micro-loans to micro-entrepreneurs), is currently 
finalising technology that will allow it to process electronic transactions through a special 
device relying on cell phone technology. The device will be placed in agencies, such as small 
convenience stores, in remote locations. At this stage, FinSol will not use the device to open 
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 At the end of June 2006, only BBVA Bancomer held more demand deposit accounts than Banco Azteca. BBVA Bancomer had a 
total of 10,663,300 accounts, while Banco Azteca had 10,009,084 accounts (CNBV, 2006). Banco Azteca offers consumer credit loans, 
basic savings accounts and even time deposits, specifically targeted at the needs of the low-income market. 
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bank accounts as it still has to resolve a number of difficulties related to remote account 
opening processes, of which the fulfilment of AML/CFT know-your-client requirements is one. 
The popular finance sector 
In the remaining gaps left by commercial banks, a vibrant popular finance sector has emerged. 
As indicated in Table 1, a number of finance institutions, in various legal forms and regulated 
under at least two different acts, i.e. credit unions, SOFOLES
138
, caja de populares and caja de 
sociedades
139
, are providing valuable savings and credit services to the low-income market.  
The government is trying to regularise the popular finance sector. The Ley de Ahorro y Crédito 
Popular (LACP) was enacted in June 2001 with the intention of bringing popular finance 
institutions, specifically Sociedades Financieras Populares (SOFIPOS or cajas populares) and 
Sociedaded de Cooperatives de Ahorro y Crédito Popula (cajas solidarias), under the ambit of 
the law by specifying minimum capital requirements, requiring access to deposit insurance and 
various other regulatory measures (including compliance with AML/CFT measures) (Klaehn, 
Helms & Deshpande, 2005).  
Box 1: The formalisation of the popular finance sector 
Under the LACP, popular sector finance institutions will be supervised by federations representing groups of popular 
sector finance institutions. There are 16 popular finance sector federations that, after receiving authorisation from the 
CNBV to function under the LACP, will provide a variety of services to their member organisations, including delegated 
supervisory functions, technical assistance, representation functions and the development of deposit insurance 
(Klaehn, Helms & Desphande, 2006). It is not clear what precisely the role of these federations in the supervision 
process will entail. 
During 2005, there was estimated to be approximately 300 caja populares and more than 300 caja solidarias (Klaehn, 
Helms & Desphande, 2006). At the time, it was also estimated that 100 of the 300 caja populares would be unable to 
comply with the LACP and would remain outside the reach of regulations or would simply stop taking deposits, while 
only 170 caja solidarias would be able to comply with the LACP. According to BANSEFI, it had approximately 400 caja 
clients during September 2006, of which 300 are actively trying to formalise, 13 have already formalised and a further 
20 will have formalised by the end of 2006, and 52 will simply be unable to comply
140
. BANSEFI is aware of 
approximately 140 “dissident” or “non-cooperating” cajas that are unwilling to establish any relationship with the bank. 
Although BANSEFI does not explicitly form a supervisory body of the popular finance sector, it does provide support to 
the formalisation process. It is intended that the federations to which the cajas belong will eventually buy BANSEFI and 
that it will become a cooperative bank. 
 
The formalisation process of the popular savings and credit institutions is being led by 
BANSEFI, the government-owned savings bank, and a number of federations serving as apex 
bodies for cajas.  In addition to establishing regulations for the popular finance sector, the 
LACP also transformed the former government postal savings bank, PAHNAL, into its current 
form, Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros (BANSEFI). BANSEFI‟s main function 
is to provide deposit-taking services to the low-income market, investing these funds in low-risk 
government financial instruments. As at September 2006, BANSEFI had approximately 3.5m 
clients (BANSEFI, 2006). In addition to deposit-taking services, it distributes government 
transfer payments (into BANSEFI deposit accounts) to 1.2m beneficiaries of the 
Opportunidades government grant programme (BANSEFI, 2006)
141
. 
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 According to the IMF (2006a: 4), SOFOLES can be defined as “nondeposit-taking specialised credit institutions”. 
139
 Popular savings and credit institutions 
140
 This information was accurate at the time of writing. By early 2008, 48 of these institutions had managed to formalise (Banking, 
Securities and Savings Unit, 2008). 
141
 In addition to providing direct deposit-taking services, BANSEFI also serves as meso-level institution for the cajas that are 
formalising under the LACP. It provides a number of services to the cajas, including liquidity investment instruments, a formal point of 
access to the payment system that allows popular finance institutions to pay out remittances and government transfer payments, 
training services and a standardised information technology platform (Klaehn, Helms & Desphande, 2006). 
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The deadline for full compliance with the LACP Act has been extended to 2007. Yet it seems 
likely that many cajas will not be able to comply, even with BANSEFI support. Furthermore, “it 
is unclear if the formalisation that has begun with the LACP will lead to the integration of one 
financial system or to the continued development of a dual system” (emphasis added) 
(Klaehn, Helms & Desphande, 2006: 17). 
The potential of the popular finance market has not gone unrecognised by banks. Banks have 
started to buy shares in popular finance institutions. Thus, for example, Banorte owns a 
SOFOL, while HSBC recently purchased a 36% share in a large MFI (Ministsry of Finance, 
2006). Furthermore, the large SOFOL, Credito Familiar, belongs to Banamex. Although banks 
are refraining from directly targeting the low-income market, they are ensuring a future share in 
the low-income market by utilising a bottom-up approach to market entry. 
The popular finance sector will be the vehicle of choice for serving the poor. The Ministry of 
Finance (SHCP) and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV), have taken the 
stance that the best way to facilitate the growth and availability of low-income financial services 
is to encourage the development of a range of FSPs (the underlying assumption is that 
sufficient diversity will foster competition in the market and, eventually, also suitable product 
offerings and lower fees). The facilitation of this sector has been an explicit attempt by the 
Mexican government to create the regulatory space for multiple entities to operate in the 
market. 
Yet there are some concerns about the popular finance sector‟s ability to serve the poor. The 
sector is not without its problems, including solvency issues and limited ability to comply with 
AML/CFT legislation. Furthermore, it also does not always serve the poor. In 2002, the median 
users of cooperatives or cajas populares was found to be in the 6
th
 income decile, while only 
individuals from the top 25% of the income distribution was found to use NGOs or cajas 
populares for credit purposes (World Bank, 2005). 
Reach of the commercial banking and popular finance sectors 
At most, a quarter of the Mexican adult population use bank accounts. According to recent 
estimates, approximately 20m Mexicans have accounts in commercial banks, 2.9m have 
accounts in popular finance institutions and 2.65m hold accounts with BANSEFI (Klaehm, 
Helms & Deshpande, 2006). Conversations with BANSEFI, however, revealed that since these 
estimates were made, the number of BASEFI accountholders has increased to 3.5m. It is 
expected that there may be some overlap between accountholders in the various types of 
institutions and the total number of accounts thus overestimates the total number of clients. A 
2002 survey of a sample of Mexico City residents found that less than 25% of the city‟s adult 
population have access to any formal financial institution (World Bank, 2005). A similar survey 
amongst the residents of three large Mexican cities found that less than 15% of urban 
Mexicans use a bank account (World Bank, 2005). Usage of banks and other formal financial 
services in rural areas is much lower. A survey during 1999 of sampled households in the rural 
areas of Oaxaca and Huasteca found that that less than 6% of the households used any form 
of formal savings instrument (World Bank, 2001). Given maximum usage of bank accounts in 
Mexico City by 25% of the adult population and low usage levels in rural areas, we estimate 
that no more than between 10% and 25% of the Mexican adult population use a bank 
account. 
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The low take-up of bank accounts is not limited to the poor or unemployed. Although the 
unbanked group generally has lower incomes and tend to be employed in the informal sector, 
the 2002 Mexico City survey reveals that 56% of individuals in managerial positions do not 
have bank accounts, while 75% of formally employed, salaried workers are unbanked. The 
unbanked group also includes a large proportion of the middle class – individuals that earn 
incomes high enough to fall in the 6
th
 to 8
th
 deciles of the income distribution. If these 
individuals, a seemingly easy target market for banks, do not have bank accounts, it is 
apparent that the situation is far worse for low-income individuals. 
Low usage levels reflect an inability to access banking services – the most important 
component of which is unaffordability. A few studies have highlighted affordability as one of the 
key factors in explaining low access to bank accounts in Mexico. Using the affordability rule 
that the total costs of a transaction bank account should not exceed 4% of personal income per 
month
142
, we find that (using two income distribution data sets) respectively 50% of the Mexico 
City adult population and 64% of the economically active Mexican population would be unable 
to access a bank account
143
. It should be noted that these statistics probably underestimate 
access to transaction bank accounts as individuals in rural areas are likely to earn far lower 
incomes than in Mexico City and the second income distribution data set includes only the 
economically active population (i.e. the unemployed are excluded). 
The distribution of financial service access points could exclude individuals in rural areas. A 
recent study on the availability of deposit-taking services in Mexico concludes that “financial 
branch penetration rates remain low and branches are not located in remote rural and poor 
urban areas” (Klaehn, Helms & Deshpande, 2006: 10). A calculation of the number of people 
per financial institution branch
144
 by state found that branch penetration varies from 5,222 in 
Mexico City to 19,604 in Chiapas, with a country average of 9,799 inhabitants per branch 
(Klaehn, Helms & Desphande, 2006). The same calculation using only commercial bank 
branches led to estimates varying from 5,595 inhabitants per branch for Mexico City to 26,315 
inhabitants for Chiapas. It can thus be concluded that proximity could form an obstacle to 
accessing financial services, especially for individuals residing in rural areas, and that it does 
have a cost impact on the affordability of transaction banking services. However, we were 
unable to find information that allows us to quantify this impact. 
Banks‟ eligibility requirements also exclude a large proportion of individuals from the financial 
sector. Furthermore, using the minimum deposit requirements and minimum balance 
requirements applied by the same banks as in the cost sample, one bank‟s minimum deposit 
requirements and minimum balance requirements excludes the 25
% 
of the Mexico City adult 
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 The measure of affordability applied by Genesis, in line with that used by Finmark Trust, is to say that a household will be able to 
spend 2% of their monthly income on a banking product. However, as we only had personal income data available, we assume that 
there are two earners per household and that an individual will therefore be able to spend 4% of personal income on a transaction bank 
account. 
143
 We calculated the affordability measure using cost data for 6 basic savings accounts (with debit cards and transaction capability) of 6 
different Mexican banks. We selected the five large commercial banks (Banamex, Bancomer, Banorte, Scotiabank and HSBC) and one 
low-income bank (Banco Azteca). A basic transaction profile, derived from South African bank research, was used to then calculate a 
monthly average cost for each bank account. These individual costs were then weighted according to each of the banks‟ proportion of 
bank accounts in the sample and an average cost was calculated across all the bank accounts. This cost amounts to $106.57 or 
US$9.79 per month, which implies an affordability threshold of $2,664.25 or US$244.68 personal income per month. (The Mexican $ 
values were converted to US$ using the average exchange rate for 2006, to date.) Two sets of income distribution data were used. The 
first derives from the World Bank Survey on access to financial services in Mexico City during 2002 and consists of thresholds for the 
25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 100
th
 percentiles of the Mexico City adult population (see World Bank, 2005). The second derives from a survey by 
INEGI (the Mexican statistical service) during 2000 and categorises the economically active population in minimum wage categories 
(see Klaehn, Helms & Desphande, 2005). 
144
 For the calculation, financial institutions included all regulated by the CNBV (at the time) and those taking active steps to comply with 
the LACP, e.g. BANSEFI, Caja Popular Mexicana, Caja Libertad, Compartamos and FinComún. 
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population, while a second bank‟s minimum account balance requirements exclude 50% of the 
Mexico City adult population
145
. 
We conclude that the majority of the Mexican adult population will not have access to formal 
transaction banking services on the basis of affordability. Though higher, access levels are 
expected not to be far removed from the estimate of maximum usage of 25%. 
The discrepancy between access and usage can most likely be explained by certain “softer” 
factors. It is important to note (see Section 2.3) that access refers to an individual‟s theoretical 
ability to access financial services, while usage is a measure of the actual take-up of those 
services. A number of “softer”, less transparent factors can influence individuals‟ decision to 
use a specific financial service. A number of low-income FSPs mentioned that the low-income 
market has limited trust in large FSPs, most likely the result of the series of Mexican financial 
crises, and would therefore not want to provide AML-related personal information. Also, the 
formal financial sector environment can be perceived as an unfriendly place by those 
individuals that do not fit the typical bank client profile. The impact on usage of the “hassle 
factor”, generally caused by formal documentation requirements, is likely to be exacerbated by 
the informal nature of a large proportion of the Mexican economy and the existence of a cash 
culture amongst low-income individuals. 
Regulation does not seem to be a major barrier in accessing transaction banking services. 
AML/CFT regulation currently requires presentation of an identification document
146
 with an 
address and signature, as well as proof of residential address (e.g. utility bill) if the address on 
the account application form is not the same as that on the identification document. In addition, 
clients are required to show the Population Register Code (issued by the Secretariat of the 
Interior) and/or the Fiscal Identification Carnet if the client has these documents. More than 
90% of the population have an IFE or Federal Voting Card (the main form of identification 
used). We were also unable to find evidence that suggests that individuals may find it difficult 
to obtain proof of residential address. 
The remittance landscape
147
 
There is a large Mexican diaspora residing in the USA. Annual net migration from Mexico to 
the United States is estimated to have reached 400,000 individuals in 2004 (IMF, 2006b) and 
the number of Mexican born individuals living in the United States is currently estimated at 10m 
(CONAPO, as quoted in IMF, 2006b). Of this group, it is estimated that 6m are undocumented 
workers. A significant number of the undocumented Mexican workers are able to access formal 
financial services by means of the approximately 4m Matricula Consular cards in circulation in 
the U.S (see Box 2 below for a discussion on the Matricula card). In addition to the group of 
Mexican-born individuals residing in the USA, there are 19m second-generation Mexicans 
living in the U.S. There is thus a large Mexican community living and working in the USA and 
remitting money back to Mexico. This is one of the reasons why Mexico is a net remittance 
receiving country.  
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 We use the same assumptions as in World Bank (2005) that the initial minimum deposit requirements should not exceed a third of 
monthly income and that up to half of monthly income can be maintained as a minimum balance. 
146
 Possible identification documents include the Federal Voting Card, a passport, professional certificate, national military service card, 
military identity card, member card of the National Institute for Elderly People, cards issued by the Mexican Social Security Institute, 
drivers license, Consular ID and cards issued by federal and state entities. 
147
 The 2005 World Bank working paper titled the “U.S.-Mexico Remittance Corridor: Lessons on shifting from informal to formal 
systems” provides a detailed description of the Mexican remittance market. 
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The large Mexican diaspora has made Mexico the largest remittance-receiving country in 
Central and Latin-America and one of the top three remittance-receiving countries in the 
world
148
. During 2005, remittances to Mexico totalled US$20 billion (2.6% of GDP) – the result 
of 58m remittance transactions with an average value of US$341 each (Banco de México, 
2006). It is estimated that the amount will increase to US$24 billion in 2006 (Williams, 2006). 
Remittance flows to Mexico have displayed high growth levels during recent years. However, a 
large component of this growth can simply be ascribed to better monitoring and reporting by 
the central bank, Banco de México. 
The benefits of large remittance flows are widely recognised, also by the Mexican government. 
While remittance inflows as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) are still quite low 
(compared to other countries such as Lesotho), it assists in poverty alleviation through the 
provision of a social safety net, stimulates domestic demand and forms an important source of 
foreign exchange (IMF, 2006b). In light of the benefits of remittance flows for the Mexican 
economy and social welfare, the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (part of the Mexican Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Secretaría de Relaciones de Exteriores) has undertaken a number of initiatives 
to facilitate larger remittance flows through formal channels (Institute for Mexicans Abroad, 
2006): 
 It actively lobbied for the wide acceptance of the Matricula Consular card by American 
banks as proof of identity in the opening of bank accounts and sending of remittances
149
.  
 It publishes and disseminates information on the costs of remittances through the Mexican 
government‟s consumer watch agency, PROFECO. 
 It launched a financial information programme reaching Mexican communities in the U.S. 
through identified community leaders. 
 It established Directo a México, a programme that interconnects the U.S. domestic 
payment systems infrastructure (the federal automated clearing house system or FedACH) 
with Mexican payment infrastructure to send remittances between the U.S. and Mexico 
(Banco de México, 2006). This has led to a significant reduction in the costs of transfers 
and the active promotion of account-to-account transfers. 
 Lastly, the formal “3x1” programme was launched by the state of Zacatecas and other 
Mexican states to channel funds back to the hometowns of Mexican migrants residing in 
the USA. For every dollar sent to so-called Hometown Associations for infrastructural and 
other improvements in the town, a dollar each is provided by the federal, state and local 
government. Each dollar sent through the programme thus generates three additional 
dollars for social and infrastructural investment. 
Box 2: The Matricula Consular 
The roots of the Matricula Consular, a card-based identity document issued by Mexican consular offices to Mexicans 
living abroad, dates back to 1871 (Institute for Mexicans Abroad, 2006). The initial purpose of the document was to 
provide Mexicans residing in other countries access to consular services, but with the large growth in Mexican 
immigrants (legal and illegal) residing in the United States, the Matricula (as commonly known) has started to be 
accepted by FSPs as proof of identity. 
Wells Fargo became the first bank to accept the Matricula card in November 2001 and it is currently accepted by 175 
banks as proof of identity (Orozco, 2006). However, the card only became a generally acceptable form of identification 
in the financial sector after concerted lobbying efforts by the Mexican government and, more specifically, by the 
Institute for Mexicans Abroad (that forms part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Banks were offered the incentive of 
being able to open a small bank counter in Mexican consular offices in the U.S. if they accept the card as an identity 
document. Also, a special database was established in Mexico to eliminate duplications and allow banks to confirm the 
authentic nature of cards (see discussion below) (Institute for Mexicans Abroad, 2006). 
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 During 2004, only India and China received greater absolute remittance flows. However, from a relative perspective (i.e. remittance 
flows expressed as percentage of GDP), Mexico is not one of the largest remittance receiving countries. 
149
 It offered banks the incentive of being able to open a bank stall in Mexican Consular offices in the USA if they accept the card as 
proof of identity. Also, the necessary security measures were implemented to safeguard the Matricula Consular from easy fraud. 
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The Mexican government also mobilised support for the card amongst the Mexican immigrant community in the U.S. 
During 2003, members of Congress indicated that they had some concerns on the wide use of the Matricula (Porter, 
2003). The U.S. Treasury Department, consequently, created a period of public comment on the acceptability of the 
Matricula as official form of identification. Individuals were able to log their comments on the card on the website of the 
U.S. Treasury Department. Initially, the majority of comments opposed the use of the card. The Institute for Mexican 
Abroad reacted by sending e-mails to “hundreds” of leaders in the Mexican-American community in which they asked 
leaders to communicate their support for the card on the Treasury Department website. By the end of the public 
comment period, the vast majority of comments were in favour of the Matricula card and the Treasury Department 
announced that they would not oppose banks‟ acceptance of the card as identification documents (Porter, 2003).  
Undocumented migrants should be able to satisfy the following requirements to obtain the card (Institute for 
Mexicans Abroad, 2006): 
 Proof of nationality. A Mexican birth certificate, passport or certificate of Mexican naturalisation has to 
be presented. 
 Proof of identity. Any official identity document issued by the Mexican or foreign authority has to be 
presented. This can include Mexican or U.S. passports, driver licenses, State ID cards, the U.S. Green 
Card, INS working permission, the Mexican Federal Electoral ID card, etc. 
 Proof of residential address. Official documentation proving establishment in the foreign country, e.g. 
utility bill, has to be provided. 
 Fee. A fee of US$29 is charged to issue the card. 
The integrity of the card is protected by a number of features (Institute for Mexicans Abroad, 2006): 
 A number of visible and hidden security provisions to avoid easy falsification, e.g. SRE ultraviolet logos, 
micro lines, high security lines design, ultraviolet text in security laminate. In total, there are 7 visual 
security features and 5 hidden features. 
 The Matricula card is backed by a comprehensive centralised database/system to eliminate duplications 
and confirm the authenticity of required documents. This was established after U.S. banks voiced 
concerns about the integrity of the card. 
 The card relies on the same procedures and requirements of the Mexican High Security Passport 
System. The card may, in fact, be used as a passport when entering Mexico. 
A number of statistics have been generated on the need and use of such of the Matricula during recent years. A survey 
of migrant remitters between February and April 2006 revealed that 59% of the Mexican remitters surveyed did not 
have a bank account because of their legal status (Orozco, 2006), while a survey of Mexicans that were interviewed 
while applying for Matricula cards at Consulate offices found that 32% of respondents required the card to open a bank 
account in the U.S. (Pew Hispanic Centre, 2005). In a survey conducted at 30 FSPs in 12 U.S. states to assess the 
quality of remittance products currently being offered, it was found that 83% of the organisations accept the Matricula 
card as an official form of identification (Orozco, 2006). 
 
Remittance service providers 
Regulation creates four categories of remittance service providers. In Mexico, there are four 
categories of remittance services providers that are regulated and supervised. These entities 
are listed and described in Table 5 below.  
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              AML obligations 
Institution Description and functions Number Example Supervised by Potential money 
transfer service 
functions fulfilled 
Governing 
act for 
AML/CFT 
compliance 
Systems requirements Client due 
diligence 
Reporting 
requirements 
Banks Full financial functionality, 
including wire transfers and 
foreign exchange 
transactions 
Total of 41 
commercial 
banks in 
Mexico, but 
not all 
necessarily 
involved in 
area of 
remittances. 
Banamex, 
Scotiabank 
CNBV (need to 
be licensed). 
Fully supervised. 
*Capturing agent    
*MTO/money remitter         
*Disbursing agent 
*Foreign exchange 
dealer              
*Paying agent 
Credit 
Institutions 
Act, Article 
115 
Required to have 
systems that are able to: 
• Maintain and update 
clients‟ CDD files 
• Detect suspicious 
transactions based on 
criteria developed by the 
institution 
• Detect and monitor 
transactions across 
accounts 
• Create an audit trail; 
• Aggregate transactions 
to assess against 
thresholds; 
• Retain historical data; 
and 
• Be secure/tamper proof 
Information 
required to 
accompany wire 
transfers: Name, 
address, account 
number                                      
Verification 
required for walk-
in/occasional 
clients if transfer 
exceed US$5,000: 
Copy of 
identification (IFE 
card, passport, 
etc.), proof of 
residential address 
Required to 
report to the 
National 
Banking and 
Securities 
Commission 
(CNBV) all 
transactions 
exceeding 
US$10,000 
Foreign 
exchange 
houses 
(Casas de 
cambio) 
Can exchange foreign 
currency without limits. 
Capital requirements 
(US$3m) apply. Can 
perform cross-border wire 
transfers. Must be an 
incorporated entity. 
23 Consultoria 
Internacional, 
Order 
Express 
CNBV (need to 
be licensed). 
Fully supervised,. 
*Capturing agent        
*MTO/money remitter                   
*Disbursing agent       
*Foreign exchange 
dealer              
*Paying entity 
General Law 
of
Organizations 
and Credit 
Auxiliary 
Activities 
Information not available Same as above Required to 
report to the 
National 
Banking and 
Securities 
Commission 
(CNBV) all 
transactions 
exceeding 
US$10,000 
Money 
transmitters 
(Trasmisores 
de dinero) 
Transfer money from one 
country to another. Capital 
requirements apply. Can 
also perform foreign 
exchange transactions. 
200 MoneyGram, 
Western 
Union 
(through 
affiliates 
Orlandi 
Valuta and 
Vigo) 
SAT, but only for 
AML/CFT 
purposes (need 
to be registered) 
*MTO         *Foreign 
exchange dealer 
General Law 
of 
Organizations 
and Credit 
Auxiliary 
Activities, 
Article 81A 
Information not available Same as above Required to 
report to the Tax 
Administration 
Service (SAT) all 
transactions 
exceeding 
US$10,000 
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              AML obligations 
Institution Description and functions Number Example Supervised by Potential money 
transfer service 
functions fulfilled 
Governing 
act for 
AML/CFT 
compliance 
Systems requirements Client due 
diligence 
Reporting 
requirements 
Money 
exchange 
centres 
(Centros 
cambiarios) 
May buy or sell foreign 
exchange up to US$10,00 
in cash. Cash includes bills, 
traveller's cheques and 
money orders. Not allowed 
to perform cross-broder wire 
transfers. Not allowed to sell 
documents. Can act as 
preliminary beneficiary for 
money remitters. Cannot 
accept money to remit. No 
capital requirements apply. 
Allowed to be either 
individual or legal person. 
Estimates for 
centres 
range from 
3,000-3,500. 
If branches 
are inlcuded, 
money 
exchange 
centres total 
around 
6,000-7,000. 
By December 
2007, SAT 
had 
managed to 
register 
2,212 of 
these 
businesses. 
  SAT, but only for 
AML/CFT 
purposes (do not 
need to be 
licensed, merely 
register itself after 
starting 
operations). 
*Foreign exchange 
dealer              
*Paying agent 
General Law 
of 
Organizations 
and Credit 
Auxiliary 
Activities, 
Article 81A 
Information not available Information 
required to 
accompany wire 
transfers: Name, 
address, account 
number.                                      
Verification 
required for walk-
in/occasional 
clients if transfer 
exceed US$3,000: 
Copy of 
identification (IFE 
card, passport, 
etc.), proof of 
residential address 
Required to 
report to the Tax 
Administration 
Service (SAT) all 
transactions 
exceeding 
US$3,000 
Table 5: Description, functions and legal obligations of regulatory categories of money transfer service provider 
Source: Source: Tax Administration Service (SAT), Asociacion Mexicanan de Casas de Cambio, translated AML/CFT regulations 
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While the last two categories in the table are regulated for AML/CFT purposes only, the 
regulatory ambit for the first two categories extends wider than only AML/CFT. Banks and 
money exchange houses are fully supervised by the National Banking and Securities 
Commission (CNBV), while money exchange centres and MTOs are supervised by the Tax 
Administration Service (SAT).  
Centros cambiarios: from regulated to supervised. In 1995, the CNBV made the regulatory 
distinction between casas de cambios and centros cambiarios. Before then, they were simply 
grouped together as foreign exchange businesses. Until 2004, centros cambiarios and money 
transmitters were effectively unsupervised, while banks and casas de cambios were fully 
supervised. The decision to regulate the money transmitters and centros cambiarios for 
AML/CFT compliance was made during 2004 and the necessary changes incorporated into 
law. It was decided that the CNBV simply did not have the capacity to effectively supervise 
these organisations because of the large number of centros cambiarios and their vast 
geographical spread. There are 6,000-7,000 centros cambiarios in Mexico operating in even 
remote areas. These small money changer businesses, often operated as a supplementary 
line of business of a small retailer, pay remittances in rural areas, but are not allowed to make 
cross-border transfers or accept funds for remittance purposes. Due to their geographically 
dispersed nature, the supervision responsibility for these entities was passed on to the tax 
authority, Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT), as (at the time) it was argued that it had 
more staff members available and that its 66 offices spread across the country would enable it 
to reach money exchange centres (centros cambiarios) in even remote locations (SAT, 2006). 
The SAT only actively started supervising the money exchange centres and foreign exchange 
houses in 2005. By December 2007, SAT had managed to register 2,212 centros cambiarios 
(SAT, December 2007). 
Convenience stores: regulated, not supervised. Convenience stores (so-called “mom and pop” 
stores) that are used to pay remittances (but cannot accept money for remittance purposes or 
perform cross-border transactions) forms a fifth category of money transfer providers (not 
reflected on the table). This group is not directly supervised and is simply registered as agents 
or sub-agents of the money transfer company. The money transmitter thus forms the reporting 
and implementing agency for AML/CFT purposes. 
Institutional categories created by regulation do not necessarily reflect the entities‟ functional 
categorisation. The functional categorisation of an entity is often defined by its place in the 
remittance chain. It is possible to distinguish between at least five different functional entities: 
 Capturing agent: The capturing agent interfaces with the client in the sending country and 
collects the money that has to be transferred, as well as information on the sender and 
recipient. 
 Money transfer operator (MTO): The money transfer operator providers the basic 
information platform for the transfer to take place and forms the middle entity between the 
capturing agent and the paying agent. The SAT defines a MTO or money transmitter as the 
party “that in exchange for a commission, profit or benefit receives, by cable, fax or 
electronic transfer, resources in national or foreign currency, to be sent to another point of 
the national territory or abroad, to be delivered to the designated beneficiary” (SAT, 2006). 
 Disbursing agent: Depending on the nature of the MTO‟s relationship with its agents, a 
disbursing remitter may or may not form part of the remittance chain. The disbursing agent 
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receives the information and funds to pay a specific transfer to a specific individual and 
passes it on to the paying agent, with which it has a direct relationship. 
 Paying agent: The paying agent interfaces with the recipient in the receiving country. 
 Foreign exchange dealer: The foreign exchange dealer exchanges one currency for 
another to enable remittance recipients to receive their money transfer in their home 
country currency. Depending on the nature of the selected remittance service (formal vs. 
informal, account-to-account transfer through a bank, etc.), the place of the foreign 
exchange dealer in the remittance chain will vary. Thus, in the case of informal 
remittances, the foreign exchange dealer can be a centros cambiarios or a “dollar boy” that 
simply exchanges dollars for pesos and forms the final agent in the remittance chain. In the 
case of a formal remittance transfer through a bank, for example, the foreign exchange 
dealer could be the foreign exchange desk in a specific bank (in either the sending or 
receiving country) and the recipient of the remittance will never actually receive dollars – a 
peso amount will simply be paid out directly. 
The information flows associated with each functional step in the remittance process is 
discussed in Box 3 at the end of this section. 
More than one function possible for one institutional entity. Table 5 above also reflects the 
functional roles that can be fulfilled by each of the four regulatory categories. It is possible that 
an entity with a specific institutional classification, e.g. a bank, can play the role of more than 
one or even all of these functional entities. Thus, for example, a bank can act as capturing 
agent, can own and act as its own MTO (through being responsible for the cross-border wire 
transfer or generation of the message), can be a disbursing agent and, in the final instance, 
also form the paying agent or entity. Centros cambiarios however form an exception, as they 
are by law only authorised to act as a paying or disbursing agent and may not perform cross-
border wire transfers or accept any money, i.e. act as capturing agent.  
Account-based and walk-in transfers. A further important conceptual distinction relates to the 
sender‟s relationship with the capturing agent. While the sender can have an account with the 
capturing agent when it is a bank and thus not have to undergo a client identification process 
each time he or she wishes to send a remittance, the majority of remittances are walk-in 
transfers were the client does not necessarily have a long-term relationship with the capturing 
agent and has to be identified anew each time he or she transfers money. 
Remittance channel usage 
Although some informal remittances take place, formal channels seem to dominate. 89% of 
total value of remittances received during 2005 was transferred through electronic means (e.g. 
using the services of a MTO), 9% using money orders and approximately 1% through direct 
means such as friends or family members, i.e. informally (Banco de México, 2006). It is 
important to note that this data is collected through surveys and is therefore likely to under-
estimate informal remittances. A recent survey by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-
American Development Bank found that 8% of remittance recipients are receiving their funds 
through informal channels (Orozco, 2005). Conversations with industry players revealed that 
probably no more than 10% of the total value of remittances (even unrecorded remittances) are 
transferred using informal channels, mostly friends or family travelling to Mexico. The relatively 
low usage of informal channels (compared to other countries included in this larger study) can 
be viewed as the result, at least in part, of deliberate attempts by both the Mexican and U.S. 
Appendices 
 
 106 
 
 
governments to lower the prices of formal remittance services in order to facilitate movement to 
formal channels. 
The high usage of formal remittance channels is indicative of the relative affordability of formal 
remittance services. It is difficult to set a threshold for the affordability of remittance services. 
Affordability as access measure can best be determined by assessing the use of alternative 
(informal) services. It does not seem as if affordability forms a large barrier to accessing formal 
remittance services. The costs of formal transfers from the U.S. to Mexico have been well 
documented during recent years. However, no data was found on the cost of informal 
transfers. Table 6 demonstrates how the cost of transferring US$200 from the U.S. to Mexico 
has decreased, due to greater competitiveness and government pressures for lower costs, 
since 2001. Given the fact that the average remittance size today is greater than US$300, the 
average cost will have declined below 6% of the total remittance value. 
 
Year 
Cost expressed as percentage of 
total remittance* 
2001 8.8 
2002 9.3 
2003 7.5 
2004 (January) 7.5 
2004 (November) 6.2 
2005 (December) 6 
Table 6: Cost to send US$200 from the United States to Mexico 
Source: Orozco, 2006a.  
Eligibility requirements and regulation do not represent barriers to formal channels. Walk-in or 
occasional clients of money transfer service providers are required to present an identification 
document and proof of residential address (e.g. utility bill), depending on the threshold imposed 
on the FSPs. The thresholds for centros cambiarios, casas de cambio and money remitters are 
set at US$3,000, while that for banks is at US$5,000
150
 (see table Table 5). These thresholds 
do not present a major access barrier as the average remittance is less than US$400 and, in 
fact, help to limit the potential negative impact of AML/CFT on access. No other eligibility 
requirements or regulation were found that present major access obstacles. 
Formal remittances: capturing agents in the U.S and paying agents in Mexico differ. Interviews 
with various industry players revealed that the majority of formal remittances in Mexico are 
being paid, on behalf of the money transfer/remitter companies, by banks and their network of 
subagents. This network can include retail stores (from large retailers to even small “mom and 
pop” stores), casas de cambios and even the branches of other banks. The table below 
contains data that was collected through a formal survey of MTOs during 2005 and illustrates 
the relative importance of various paying agents in Mexico. Interviews with various industry 
players, however, suggest that the volume of remittances paid out by banks and their networks 
may be higher than the estimate in the table. At least one major remittance player suggested 
that the percentage of remittances paid out by banks in Mexico was estimated to be as high as 
75% of total formal remittance inflows (Banamex, 2006). It is important to note that while these 
                                                     
150
 It is important to note that the US$5,000 threshold has been lowered to US$3,000 in the new draft regulations for banks. 
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statistics give us a clear idea of banks‟ role as paying agent it does not provide a clear picture 
of their role in the actual transfer, i.e. whether they acted as MTO. Furthermore, according to 
the industry body representing 125 money exchange centres and remitter companies, 
Asociación Nacional de Centros de Cambiarios Transmisores de Dinero, the volume of 
remittances paid out by centros cambiarios could be as high as 30-40% of all formal remittance 
flows. 
 
Type of payer Percentage of total 
formal remittances paid 
out 
Bank 55.3% 
Cooperative, credit union, popular bank 2.1% 
MFI 0.0% 
Bureaus of Exchange
151
 2.3% 
Retail store
152
 40.2% 
 
Table 7: Distribution of paying entities in Mexico by type of business for various surveyed MTOs 
Source: Orozco, M., 2006a.  
The relative volumes of remittances being sent by various types of businesses in the U.S. differ 
significantly from the payout patterns in Mexico. For example, bank FSPs in the U.S. do not 
feature prominently as capturing agents. A recent study found that only 5% of money transfers 
are sent through a range of U.S. banks (Orozco, 2006b). However, this is already more than 
the 3% from which it increased in 2004 as banks are actively promoting their account-to-
account and other remittance services through advertising and special deals. The bulk of 
money transfers is currently being sent by small agents or money service businesses in the 
U.S. that have an established relationship with a MTO. 
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 It is not clear what exactly the author meant by this term. It is likely to include either casas de cambios, centros cambiarios or both. 
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 The category “retail store” is likely to include both large retail stores and smaller convenience stores (so-called “mom and pop” 
stores) acting as paying agents. 
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Box 3. The information flows associated with a typical formal remittance sent from the USA to Mexico 
 
In discussing remittance channels, it is important to distinguish between messaging (flow of information) and settlement 
(transfer of funds) processes
153
. Although it is possible to distinguish between different types of information chains, we 
here discuss the typical information chain when sending money from the U.S. to Mexico using a MTO. The discussion 
is intended to highlight certain generic issues that could also be made applicable to the information chain when 
sending money, for example, from one bank to another. At least three parties in the messaging chain have some 
responsibility for information capturing and control: 
 Capturing agent: The capturing agent has to identify the sender, collect sufficient information to identify the 
recipient and also capture information on the value and destination of the remittance. Depending on the size of 
the transaction, this could mean collecting the name, identity number and address of the sender (and verifying 
this information), while also capturing information on the name and identity number of the recipient. Information on 
the size of the remittance should be objectively verifiable once the capturing agent has received the funds that are 
being sent (i.e. the agent should be able to match the amount received against the amount that has to be 
transmitted). 
 Money transfer operator/money remitter: This information will then be entered into an information terminal by the 
capturing agent and stored in the information platform of the MTO (MTO), where it will be available to all agents 
and sub-agents of the MTO in the receiving country. The MTO is the owner of the information platform. 
 Paying agent: The second party that has an obligation to collect information is the paying agent in the receiving 
country. The information that has to be gathered (and also verified) mainly relates to the identity of the recipient, 
e.g. a suitable identification document, possibly address information and the transaction code or other proof that 
the recipient truly is who he/she purports to be. The sender of the funds will also (independently from the MTO) 
communicate the transaction code to the recipient. 
 
AML/CFT ENVIRONMENT 
The government of Mexico became a FATF member in 2000 (U.S. Department of State, 2006). 
In addition, Mexico is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and a member 
of the South American Financial Action Task Force
154
. It also holds membership in the Egmont 
Group and the OAS/CICAD Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Mexico is party to a 
number of conventions, including the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, the UN Convention against Corruption, the UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the Inter-American 
Convention Against Terrorism (U.S. Department of State, 2006). 
AML regulator and supervisors: The Mexican government created a Financial Intelligence Unit 
under the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) in 1997 (U.S. Department of State, 2006). The Unit was 
previously known as the Dirección General Adjunta de Investigación de Operaciones (DGAIO), 
but was renamed to become the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF) in 2004 when a 
consolidation of separate Ministry of Finance offices that were previously responsible for the 
                                                     
153
 This distinction is clearly made in Bank for International Settlements (BIS) & World Bank, 2006. General principles for international 
remittance services. March. Consultative report. 
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 Membership of the latter organisation changed from observer membership to full membership in September 2006. 
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investigation of financial crimes took place. The functions of the UIF include receiving, 
analysing and disseminating financial reports from a wide range of obligated entities. These 
entities, in the first instance, report to their respective supervisory units. The supervisors then 
forward the reports to the UIF. 
The Ministry of Finance is the regulator for AML purposes, whilst the CNBV, SAT, the 
Comisión Nacional de Seguros Fianzas (CNSF, the insurance sector regulator) and the 
Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorra para el Retiro (CONSAR, the pension funds 
supervisor) are the supervisors for the various types of FSPs. 
Development of regime  
The first AML legislation was introduced in the late 1990s. Money laundering was criminalised 
in 1996 under Article 400 BIS of the Federal Penal Code. Money laundering is defined 
generally in the Penal Code and predicate offences are not listed. A maximum penalty of 
fifteen years and a fine of up to 5,000 days‟ minimum wages can be imposed. In the case of a 
money laundering offence being committed by a government official, the penalty increases by 
50%.International terrorism and the financing of terrorism was criminalised through changes to 
the Federal Penal Code, specifically Article 139, in June 2007. 
Mexico follows a scheme of institutional regulation of the financial sector, i.e. different laws 
exist for various types of FSPs. AML-enabling sections were therefore inserted into the 
relevant financial acts, with each section referring to a set of general AML regulations to be 
promulgated. In 1997, one set of general regulations applicable to banks, casas de cambios, 
insurance companies, stock brokerages, bond institutions and limited objective FSPs 
(SOFOLES) was introduced. When the first FATF evaluation took place during 2000, the 
operations of money remitters and centros cambiarios were identified as areas of concerns, 
since these institutions had not yet been included in the regulatory net. In fact, their activities 
were not regulated at all. During 2000, an enhanced version of the original set of general 
regulations was issued, requiring additional due diligence (the identification of PEPs and 
financial beneficiaries, classification of clients based on levels of risk). In the same year, 
Mexico became a member of FATF. 
Money remitters and centros cambiarios were brought into the AML regulatory net in 2004, 
although their activities remain unregulated for other purposes. In the same year, separate sets 
of general AML regulations were also released for mutual funds, financial leasing 
organisations, credit institutions and factoring financing organisations and explicit CDD 
requirements were added to these regulations (also as a result of the FATF evaluation). In the 
sets of regulations issued during 2004, institutions (specifically cajas) regulated under the 
LACP were also brought under the regulatory ambit for the first time. The same set of 
regulations that applied to banks was also made applicable to cajas. New sets of general 
regulations have already been completed for banks (or FSPs regulated under the Credit 
Institutions Act) and cajas (regulated under the Popular Finance and Savings Act), although 
these have not yet been promulgated. 
At the same time the SHCP also created a special dispensation for banks with low-value 
accounts. Banks are required to only open a client identification file for old (bank accounts that 
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existed before the issuing of AML/CFT regulations) and new bank accounts if it satisfies any of 
the following conditions
155
: 
 If during any calendar month, the account has an average balance equal to or greater than 
$30,000 or about US$3,000. 
 If, during the course of the same month, accumulated deposits are equal to or greater than 
the equivalent of US$10,000 in Mexican pesos. 
 If a suspicious or relevant transaction takes place on the account. 
A very interesting pattern in the evolution of the AML regime in Mexico can therefore be 
identified: the original AML controls promulgated were of general application to all the FSPs 
included in the net at that time and did not contain risk-sensitive exemptions. Since then, 
different sets of risk-sensitive regulations have been created for different FSPs depending on 
the transactions which they process and the clients which they serve. This has served to 
significantly limit the impact that the AML regime has had on access to financial services in 
Mexico. 
Basic compliance requirements 
Regulated FSPs are required to adopt and implement a CDD policy that includes: 
The identification of clients; and  
The reporting of “relevant transactions”, “unusual transactions” and “concerning transactions”.  
 Relevant transactions are defined as those that exceed US$10,000 and have to be 
reported to the UIF via the relevant supervisory body.  
 FSPs are required to decide whether a transaction can be classified as unusual based on 
the background and classification of the client, the usual transaction pattern of the client 
and a number of other factors. Transactions classified as unusual have to be reported to 
the UIF via the relevant supervisory bodies.  
 Concerning transactions are those concluded by directors, officials, employees or legal 
representatives that are out of the ordinary and fulfil certain requirements established by 
the bank and set out in the regulations. FSPs also have an obligation to report concerning 
transactions. 
Apart from the criteria used to classify unusual transactions, an unusual transaction threshold 
(related to a monetary value) will soon be applicable to institutions regulated under the Credit 
Institutions Act. This threshold appears in the draft regulations for institutions regulated under 
the Credit Institutions Act (see below). The new regulation will require these institutions to be 
able to aggregate all transactions that exceed US$3,000 (across accounts of the same client) 
and if the total value of transactions exceeds US$10,000 within a thirty day period, the 
institutions will be required to report these transactions as unusual transactions. This regulation 
will require FSPs to have sophisticated electronic monitoring systems for aggregation across 
accounts. 
The FSPs are also required to establish internal structures for AML/CFT compliance and, more 
specifically, to have a Communication and Control Committee to exercise control over all AML 
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policies developed and to oversee the implementation of these policies. The Committee also 
has to decide which unusual or concerning transactions have to be reported to the UIF. 
Furthermore, FSPs are required to develop training policies and have automated systems that 
are able to monitor and profile transactions. The requirements of these systems are set out in 
Table 4 . 
A further obligation on FSPs is the storing of relevant documents. FSPs are required to keep 
copies or reports submitted to the UIF for no less than a period of ten years, and keep the files 
for clients or walk-in (“occasional”) clients for no less than ten years after the ending of the 
relationship with the client. 
Know your client duties 
Identification and re-identification. Banks and other FSPs are required to identify clients as part 
of their general CDD duties and the files of identified clients have to be updated on a regular 
basis. The basic CDD requirements for banks and other FSPs are described in Table 4. It is 
important to note that proof of residential address is only required when the address on the 
client‟s identity document does not correspond with the provided address. Re-identification of 
existing clients to comply with CDD requirement is also required. 
Enhanced due diligence for politically exposed persons. In addition to simply identifying all new 
clients and re-identifying existing clients, FSPs are required to identify clients that are classified 
as “politically exposed persons” or PEPs. These clients are considered to be high-risk clients 
and are therefore subject to more extensive CDD requirements. The value of implementing 
expensive systems to enforce this control for low-income clients is questioned by a number of 
FSPs operating in this market. 
The identification of high risk clients has to be completed by May 2007. Mexican banks are 
currently busy with client re-identification processes. Banks will undergo a preliminary 
assessment by the banking sector regulator, the CNBV, in November 2006 to determine their 
progress. Depending on the individual progress of banks, they will be able to negotiate for an 
extended deadline with the regulator. At this stage, it seems as if a significant amount of 
accountholders still have not identified themselves and will not be doing so in the near future. A 
penalty of US$800 will be levied by the CNBV for each bank account not re-identified. This 
penalty, if imposed on all accounts not re-identified, could amount to more than the total capital 
of some banks (Santander-Serfin, 2006). Given the slow response to requests to existing 
clients to re-identify themselves, the Mexican Bankers Association has decided to launch a 
media campaign to raise awareness of the issue (Santander-Serfin, 2006). This was due to 
start during October 2006. 
The Mexican AML/CFT regulations applicable to banks allow them to do non-face to face 
account origination for payroll accounts. Banks are actively targeting the payroll market for new 
account acquisition. The current and new AML/CFT regulations that apply to banks allow them 
to effectively delegate the CDD process, specifically the know-your-client component, to 
established companies acting on behalf of their employees. The file containing the bank client‟s 
information and copies of his/her identification may thus be kept by his/her employer and only 
provided to the bank upon request. If the client with a payroll-originated bank account performs 
a transaction that exceeds the US$10,000 threshold for relevant transactions, the bank is 
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required to request the information contained in the employer‟s file and integrate it with its own 
client information file. 
Changes in AML/CFT regulations 
Mexican authorities have embarked on a process to redraft the regulations that apply to 
different FSPs. This is an attempt to make the regulations more sensitive to the realities and 
risks that different FSPs face. Whereas the first sets of regulation followed a standards-driven 
approach, it appears as if regulation will be becoming increasingly pragmatic. The first two draft 
sets of regulations that apply to institutions regulated under the Credit Institutions Act and 
institutions regulated under the Savings and Popular Credit Act have been completed. These 
sets of AML/CFT regulations will only be enacted after the completion of a regulatory impact 
assessment, facilitated by the Federal Regulatory Improvement Commission (Comisión 
Federal de Mejora Regulatoria or COFEMER)
156
. COFEMER is an independent government 
body tasked with facilitating regulatory impact assessments for all new legislation. These 
assessments follow a participatory process where all individuals and institutions that will be 
affected are invited to make submissions. The final assessments are completed by its staff 
members
157
. After completion of the review by COFEMER, the deputy minister of the relevant 
ministry (in the case of AML/CFT legislation, the Ministry of Finance) is required to sign off on 
the regulation and it will be published. According to the Ministry of Finance, feedback provided 
through the COFEMER process was of particular importance in shaping the AML regulations 
that were enacted in 2004 and 2006. 
New draft regulations distinguish between different tiers of cajas. The LACP creates four 
categories of cajas, based on the size of their asset bases
158
. The new draft AML/CFT 
regulations for institutions regulated under the Popular Finance and Savings Act distinguishes 
between these different tiers of organisations, with so-called “Type 1” entities in one group and 
“Type 2, 3 and 4” entities in another group
159
. Type 1 entities are subject to less onerous 
requirements than the second group due to their more limited asset base. Thus, for example, 
Type 1 entities are required to have less sophisticated monitoring systems (they need not 
necessarily be electronic) than the second group. The regulations have thus become more 
nuanced to reflect the differing realities of institutions. 
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 At the time of writing, the regulations had not yet been enacted. However, after completion of the regulatory impact assessment, they 
came into power in November 2006. 
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 COFEMER has 60 staff members that consist of mainly lawyers and economists. On occasion and when necessary, it receives 
specialist assistance from groups that will be affected by a particular piece of legislation, e.g. the compliance officers of banks. If a 
particular piece of draft legislation requires specialist input, it also contract help in from outside COFEMER (COFEMER, 2006). 
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 The entities asset bases are defined in terms of investment units (UDIS) rather than monetary values to isolate drafted legislation 
from the impact of changes in exchange and inflation rates. 
159
 At the time when this information was collected, the regulations had not yet been published and Cajas de Ahorro were thus not yet 
under the obligation to implement the regulations. 
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KEY FINDINGS 
Given the high cost barrier, AML/CFT does not directly impact on individuals’ access to 
financial services, but may impact on usage 
Individual access not impacted by AML/CFT. Access to financial services can be considered 
an implicit, if not explicit, policy priority of the Mexican government. However, current usage 
levels are low – survey data reveals that it is likely that no more than 25% of Mexicans use 
transaction banking services. Our access assessment finds that affordability forms the largest 
barrier to accessing transaction banking services. Using two income distribution data sets, we 
find that respectively 50% of the Mexico City adult population and 64% of the Mexican 
economically active population would be unable to access a bank account, should they wish to 
do so. Furthermore, banks and other FSPs are not imposing eligibility requirements (beyond 
the requirements of regulation) that are keeping individuals out of the formal banking sector 
and remittance sectors. AML/CFT regulation has little direct impact on access as any potential 
impact is exceeded by the affordability impact. Less explicit factors related to AML/CFT may, 
however, affect usage and these factors are likely to explain the discrepancy between usage 
and access. Banks‟ compliance with CDD requirements can be experienced as a drive to 
document the (often informal) economy and could be perceived as an increase in the hassle 
factor attributed to banks, even more so by low-income individuals. Although this is not easily 
perceivable or measurable, the impact of such factors on usage of financial services should not 
be underestimated. 
AML/CFT impacts indirectly on individual’s access to financial services through its 
impact on institutions 
Indirect access impact via AML/CFT impact on institutions. We find that although there are no 
direct, major AML/CFT impacts on individuals‟ ability to access financial services, AML/CFT 
legislation is impacting on institutions‟ ability to provide financial services. This is manifesting in 
Mexico in a number of ways. As will be discussed, banks have started to close the bank 
accounts of centros cambiarios that provide essential services in urban and rural areas, thus 
impacting on the proximity (and, consequently, on the affordability) of remittance services. 
Furthermore, it seems as if many cajas will be unable to fully comply with the full set of 
AML/CFT regulations that apply to them and it is possible that these institutions will eventually 
stop providing their deposit and credit services to low-income individuals. 
The Mexican government faces major challenges in extending access to financial 
services to the unserved population 
Although the Mexican government has identified the promotion of access to financial services 
as a public policy objective, facilitating access will not be easy. The popular finance sector, the 
government‟s vehicle of choice in extending financial services, is not without its problems. 
These include uncertainty about the solvency of a number of cajas, as well as limited ability to 
comply (except for a few very large cajas) to comply with the LACP and formalisation process. 
The implementation of AML/CFT legislation will simply form an additional burden on already 
stretched small FSPs. The large commercial banks, mainly foreign-owned, do not have it as an 
explicit goal to actively expand access to the unbanked market. 
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The Mexican authorities initially set high AML/CFT standards 
“Blanket” AML/CFT may undermine certain tiers of the financial sector. Mexico experienced 
significant international pressure to draft its first AML/CFT regulation and it was therefore 
initially not tailored to suit local conditions. Because of the pressure to draft the first set of 
regulations and the high speed at which this proceeded, other government objectives were not 
necessarily taken into account. A situation has now arisen where it seems as if the burden of 
AML/CFT legislation may conflict with the Mexican government‟s objectives of a tiered 
approach to the development of the financial markets. At least two sets of institutions will find it 
difficult to comply with AML/CFT standards: 
 Popular finance institutions. The LACP that regulates popular finance institutions and is 
intended to promote the formalisation of the popular finance sector (more specifically 
cajas) requires these organisations to comply with AML/CFT regulations, albeit soon in a 
graduated manner
160
. However, there are a number of cajas that will simply be unable to 
comply with the full set of regulations. It is likely that cajas that are unable to fully comply 
will choose to do so in a nominal sense, i.e. only selectively comply with those regulations 
that are not too onerous from their perspective.  
 Centros cambiarios. It also seems as if many centros cambiarios will not be able to comply 
with the AML/CFT regulations. These remittance service providers form the last mile of the 
remittance process and provide valuable pay-out services in even remote rural villages. 
The association representing centros cambiarios and money transmitters estimates that a 
significant proportion will be unable to comply with the full set of AML/CFT regulations to 
which they are currently subject. 
The creation of regulation ms that are simply too difficult for small financial services 
organisations to comply with will eventually either lead to the disappearance of the valuable 
financial services they provide, or simply facilitate the enlargement of the underground 
unregulated sector, where, if money laundering or the financing of terrorism activities do occur, 
it will be difficult to detect and trace transactions. 
Ad hoc adjustments, without generalising adjustments to all relevant FSPs, increases 
compliance costs. The Mexican AML/CFT regulations have been subject to “ad hoc” 
adjustments where the regulator passes standard sets of laws and regulations expecting 
smaller institutions to advise it on how the regulations should be tailored to suit their needs. 
Once these changes are made, they are not generalised to the rest of the market. In practice, 
the ad hoc regulation approach has turned out to be problematic as smaller institutions do not 
always have the necessary skills and resources to lobby for changes. When over-regulation (in 
the first instance) occurs, institutions either tend to establish systems and procedures to 
comply with the overly strict regulations (thus incurring unnecessary systems costs) or incur 
lobbying costs in order to change the regulations. 
Conservative compliance with AML/CFT regulation by banks leads to severance of ties with 
smaller, less regulated institutions. In a situation of limited resources, governments often 
choose to actively regulate the cluster of financial service providers that are smallest in number 
and have the largest asset base, thus posing the highest level of risk for the financial system, 
i.e. banks. In addition to the regulated layer of financial service providers, there are often other 
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layers of financial service providers that are greater in number and smaller in asset base and 
therefore more costly to effectively regulate and supervise. The supervision of these lower 
levels of financial service providers then often become the responsibility of the supervised 
financial services layers. Under these circumstances, the thoroughly supervised institutions will 
tend to take the most conservative approach in ensuring compliance with government 
regulation. This can lead to the exclusion of the less supervised FSPs. 
Centros cambiarios are perceived to pose high levels of risk from a money laundering 
perspective. These organisations have only recently been included under the ambit of 
AML/CFT regulation and are not regulated for any other business purposes or functions. A 
number of large commercial banks have started closing the bank accounts of registered and 
unregistered centros cambiarios or have established a policy of simply not opening any new 
accounts for these organisations, in order to minimise the risk of money laundering through the 
banking system. 
This can be viewed as the result of, firstly, discretion provided to banks by the regulator to 
ensure that their clients are complying with AML/CFT legislation. In Mexico, banks carry the 
final responsibility for the CDD applied by centros cambiarios to their clients and this legal 
liability contributes to the implementation of an overly conservative approach. Mexican 
authorities have expressed concerns that centros cambiarios may hold risk of money 
laundering. As discussed, the supervision responsibility of these institutions was passed to the 
SAT due to its greater geographic spread and staff capacity than the CNBV. Centros 
cambiarios do not have to apply for a license before they start operating, but only have to 
register themselves once the have started operating. It is at this stage that the SAT has to take 
responsibility for the supervision of centros cambiarios. The effective supervision of the centros 
cambiarios is difficult. The biggest problem is obtaining a warrant to investigate those centros 
that seem not to be complying. The warrants have to be specified in such detail that it is time 
consuming and leaves much room for the centros use legal technicalities to escape or stall 
supervisory inspections. SAT is in the process of adressing this issue. 
The costs of AML/CFT legislation may delay entry into deposit-taking services. Once financial 
service providers are established in the area of credit services, there appears to be a certain 
hesitance to move into the area of deposit-taking services. In adding deposit-taking services to 
a financial service provider‟s already existing suite of credit services, a significant delay is often 
experienced as it requires time and effort (and thus entails high costs) to change monitoring 
systems and internal policy to comply with the more strenuous AML/CFT requirements for 
deposit-taking services (than for credit services). 
Maintenance of multiple legal forms. One large SOFOL mentioned that it has obtained licenses 
to potentially operate as two other institutional forms, but that it is hesitant to give up its current 
SOFOL license. This approach is the result of the potentially higher AML/CFT compliance 
burdens for the other two legal forms and uncertainty on the direction that AML/CFT legislation 
will move into for the other two legal forms. The different regulatory requirements applied to 
different legal forms could thus be leading to regulatory arbitrage. 
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Mexico has moved from a generic approach to legislation (that applies to all institutions) 
to a more risk-sensitive approach  
While a generic approach was followed in the initial drafting of regulation, the regulations that 
apply to FSPs have since been tailored to become more risk-sensitive and nuanced to reflect 
the differing realities that FSPs face, e.g. varying levels of resources, varying levels of money 
laundering risk due to the nature of their business. This gradual evolution is especially 
prominent in the regulations for banks and cajas that came into force in November 2006.. 
Before these general provisions were enacted, the same AML/CFT regulations  applied to 
commercial banks and loan and savings entities (cajas).  With the new regulations, a more 
adequate and less burdensome system has been created for the popular savings sector. 
Requirements regarding client identification and automatic alert systems were customized to 
the activities of different FSPs
161
. 
The regulations for cajas distinguish between two groups of cajas – a first group so-called 
“Type 1 entities” and a second group consisting of “Type 2, 3 and 4” entities. These entities 
differ in terms of their asset and deposit base: the Type 1 entities are much smaller (in terms of 
assets and deposit base) than the second group. Risk-sensitivity has also been a key driver of 
the use of thresholds beyond which more strict compliance is required. 
However, it is important to note that the more risk-sensitive approach has been characterised 
by an institutional definition of risk. An institutional rather than functional approach was 
followed in the drafting of the regulations. This can create an unlevel playing field when 
different institutions start to play in the same markets with the same risks levels, but are subject 
to different levels of regulations. 
The use of thresholds in the crafting of regulations has allowed the authorities to limit 
the negative impact on access. 
When assessing the affordability of financial services, affordability for the service provider also 
has to be considered, i.e. a supply-side perspective has to be included. Financial service 
providers realise that in order to offer an appropriate service (e.g. a basic bank account) to a 
specific market (e.g. the low-income market) it is necessary to do so at a cost that is affordable 
to the market. Under certain circumstances, the only way to provide appropriate services to the 
low-income market is to create certain thresholds (commensurate with risk levels) that allow for 
regulatory costs to be decreased in critical areas. 
A number of thresholds have been used in the Mexican AML regulations:  
 KYC threshold. A critical threshold is for the implementation of full know-your-client 
requirements for cross-border wire transfers by occasional or walk-in clients. The sender of 
the funds is only required to provide proof of identification and residential address if, 
depending on the entity, the amount exceeds US$3,000
162
. Above this amount, the 
financial institution will be required to open a physical file, with copies of the verified identity 
document and proof of residential address, for the sender.  
                                                     
161
 General Provisions on Article 124 of the LACP, Official Gazette, published on November 28th, 2006 
162
 It is important to note that this threshold has been decreased from US$5,000 to US$3,000 for banks in the new regulations that apply 
to institutions regulated under the Credit Institutions Act. 
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 Relevant transaction reporting threshold. A second threshold is the US$10,000 threshold 
for the reporting of relevant transactions – FSPs do not have to report transactions below 
this threshold (unless they have reason to be suspicious of the nature of transaction or 
client).  
 Physical file opening threshold. If these thresholds did not apply, at least one low-income 
bank would have had to increase its minimum balance requirements on its savings 
accounts significantly and a large proportion of its current clients would not have been able 
to open an account. About 95% of their clients have an account balance below US$10,000.  
Foreign ownership of the Mexican banking sector can negate the positive impacts of the 
risk-sensitive and threshold approaches to regulation. 
The AML/CFT regime in Mexico is characterised by appropriate exemptions and flexibility to 
facilitate access to financial services. The positive impact of such a regime, however, is likely 
to be negated by AML/CFT policy set by the headquarters of the foreign-owned banks in 
Mexico. 
The flexible regulation of remittance service providers has facilitated the evolution of 
multiple players in a vibrant remittance market 
The continued evolution of the remittance market is likely to depend on the continued 
development of non-bank remittance channels. Until 2004, the Mexican government applied a 
very light touch to the regulation of the remittance market. A number of players in the 
remittance industry were allowed to operate without any licensing requirements or regulation. 
This has helped to facilitate the use of formal channels in sending remittances from the U.S. to 
Mexico. Areas of central importance for access to remittance services (on the receiving side) 
are the paying agents (often retailers with whom remittance receivers tend to feel comfortable) 
that have been allowed to operate in an unregulated and unsupervised manner. These 
institutions are now being faced with the challenge of compliance, with system burdens, and 
with the risk of being cut off from the formal financial sector by banks.  
However, it is important to note that the development of a large number of unregulated 
remittance providers also has a negative side to it. The perception seems to exist of an unlevel 
playing field for casas de cambios relative to centros cambiarios. While casas de cambios are 
strictly regulated and supervised, with large minimum capital requirements applying, centros 
are essentially unregulated and unsupervised. Their image tarnishes the image of casas de 
cambios, thus affecting the ability of casas de cambios to transact internationally. The 
challenge, in this regard, will be to regulate and supervise centros cambiarios in such a manner 
as to limit the risk of illegal activities and money laundering, but to also allow their continued 
development. 
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APPENDIX E: PAKISTAN 
SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
 Pakistan is a low-income country with a large informal economy. It possesses a comprehensive, high 
integrity national identity system and roll-out of national identity cards to the adult population is 
progressing steadily. 
 Extending access to financial services is a key objective of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). 
Initiatives include the launch of a national savings scheme offered by government, and a basic bank 
account that all banks are compelled to offer. Take-up has however been limited and commercial 
banks‟ incentives to extend services to the poor remain limited. 
 We estimate that 65% of Pakistani adults have access to a national savings scheme account, 
whereas only 5% actually have/use such a product. We estimate at most 10% of Pakistani adults to 
have access to a basic bank account (BBA), based on the relatively high required opening balance. 
An estimated 15% of the adult population has access to a non-BBA. Usage is estimated at between 
8% and 11% of the adult population.  
 Pakistan is a remittance-receiving country. The SBP has made a considerable effort to increase the 
flow of remittances through formal channels. Nevertheless, it is estimated that at least 50% of the 
value of remittances still flow through informal channels. This phenomenon appears to be the result 
of deliberate choice, rather than clear access barriers. 
 An AML law has been in the making for a number of years and a bill is currently being considered by 
parliament. Until the Bill is passed, the AML legal framework consists largely of prudential regulations 
issued under the Banking Ordinance. Financing of terrorism is a predicate offence for money 
laundering in terms of the Anti-terrorism Act. 
 KYC requirements include verification of identity, monitoring of accounts and transactions, and re-
identification of existing clients.  
 In the absence of a comprehensive AML/CFT law, AML/CFT implementation has been weak and the 
impact thereof muted.  
 Should the potential impact of AML/CFT (under a scenario of full implementation) be considered, we 
find that the presence of a strong national ID system should limit the impact of KYC measures on 
access. Resistance to bank account usage (due to tax evasion and other considerations) may 
however be strengthened by AML/CFT legislation. 
 It will be virtually impossible to formalise or close down the informal remittance market. 
 An unequal AML regulatory burden will affect competition and access. Institutions competing in the 
same market (most notably the providers of the national savings scheme vis-à-vis the commercial 
banks) are not subject to the same regulations.  
 
GENERAL AND MARKET CONTEXT 
Pakistan at a glance 
Pakistan is a low-income country where 74% of the population live on less than $2 (PPP) a day 
(Rs1061/month
163
) and 17% of the population live on less than $1 (PPP) a day 
                                                     
163
 The $/day figure takes account of Purchasing Power Parity, therefore a person earning Rs1061 per month would be able to buy 
goods and services equivalent to $2/day ($60.8/month), even though it only amounts to $17.6 per month (i.e. Rs1061/60.13) should no 
PPP adjustment be made. Rupees are converted to dollar values by using the Rs./$ exchange rate of 60.13. This is the average 
exchange rate for 2006 up until 2 November 2006 (taken from http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory). 
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(Rs530/month
164
) (World Bank, 2006
165
). There are 80m (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2007) 
adult Pakistanis out of a total population of 156m and 66% of the population reside in rural 
areas (World Bank, 2006
166
). 
Large informal, undocumented and cash „comfortable‟ economy. It is estimated that 50% of 
GDP is derived from the informal market
167
 and that 65% of non-agriculture workers are 
employed in the informal sector (Government of Pakistan, 2006). Until recently, most 
transactions could be conducted in cash (i.e. even property and share purchases). Although 
government has implemented steps to move away from cash (e.g. limits on cash purchases for 
property and share transactions and instituting a withholding tax on cash withdrawals), cash is 
still widely used. The ratio of cash (M0 to M2) has steadily been decreasing, but still remains 
high relative to other developing countries (see Figure 4 and Table 8). 
Total revenue from tax is low in Pakistan. The average ratio of tax revenue (direct and indirect) 
to GDP of 9.5% (Khan, 2006) in Pakistan is low in comparison to a comparable sample of 
developing countries (18%) and very low in comparison to members of the OECD (38%) (Tanzi 
and Zee, 2001). On the one hand, this is as a result of the high numbers of people involved in 
the informal economy and, on the other hand, the high levels of tax evasion in Pakistan. There 
are only 1.5m income tax payers
168
 out of an adult population of 80m (Pakistan Economic 
Survey, 2007). The high incidence of tax evasion is conditioned by a number of factors, 
including deficiencies in the delivery of public services. 
Figure 4: Cash in circulation as percentage of M2 (Pakistan) 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, 2006 
 
Country Cash to M2 ratio (M0/M2) 
Ukraine 33.7% 
Russia 29.0% 
Argentina 24.6% 
Pakistan 24.0% 
Nigeria 20.3% 
Columbia 18.2% 
India 16.6% 
Mexico 13.9% 
Egypt 12.9% 
Kenya 12.6% 
Brazil 11.0% 
Indonesia 10.6% 
Nicaragua 10.2% 
South Africa 7.8% 
Turkey 6.4% 
Malaysia 6.1% 
UK 3.1% 
Table 8: Country comparison – cash to M2 ratio  
Source: International Financial Statistics, 2004 
 
                                                     
164
 As per the previous footnote, the $/day figure takes account of Purchasing Power Parity. Therefore a person earning Rs530 per 
month would be able to buy goods and services equivalent to $1/day ($30.4/month), even though it only amounts to $8.8 per month 
should no PPP adjustment be made. 
165
 Reflecting 2002 data. 
166
 Reflecting 2004 data. 
167
 Information from a meeting with Ahsan Javed Chishty (BMA Capital), 23 June 2006. 
168
 Information from a meeting with Shahid Ghaffer (HBL Asset Management), 22 June 2006. 
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Comprehensive national identity system
169
. Pakistan has a comprehensive national identity 
system run by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). Currently, 52m 
adults (65% of the adult population) have been issued with Computerised National 
Identification Cards (CNICs) since the system became operational in October 2001. On 
average, there are 25,000 new cards being issued per day and NADRA expects to provide 
CNICs to the remaining Pakistanis over the next five years. 
NADRA is a self-financing parastatal and, as a result, must maintain itself from user fees and 
other services sold. For example, NADRA charges a fee to verify identity and provide the 
details of someone captured on their database. As a result, banks and other FSPs can access 
the NADRA database to verify the identity of a client. This can happen in two ways: 
 Batch verification. Banks can send a number of old national identity card numbers as a 
batch to NADRA for verification that new CNICs have been issued for the old numbers. 
NADRA can also provide the bank with an unattested copy of the CNIC. However, in order 
to maintain a client‟s account, the bank would still need an attested copy of the CNIC. This 
costs between Rs20 ($0.33) and Rs40 ($0.67) per ID verified. 
 An online system. Using an online system, banks can connect to the NADRA system and 
verify people as they come into the branch. This method is more expensive than the batch 
verification. 
The NADRA system has a high level of integrity and uses an acquisition process (e.g. a 
combination of fixed office locations and mobile units moving around the country using 
technology to collect information rather than a paper process) that is suitable to the profile of 
the population which is largely rural-based and illiterate. 
Banking sector structure and development 
Transactions and savings accounts can be accessed through commercial banks. In addition, 
savings accounts are provided through the National Savings Scheme which can be accessed 
through banks, the post office and the Central Directorate of National Savings (CDNS) outlets. 
The following table summarises the various financial sector institutions in Pakistan as well as 
their regulatory scheme. This table will form the basis for the discussion of the banking sector 
and the overview of the AML/CFT regime to follow: 
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 Information for this section was obtained during a meeting with NADRA officials on 28 June 2006. 
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  Category Functional definition Example # of accounts 
Regulated/ 
supervised 
by 
General regulation/ applicable law 
Applicable AML/CFT 
legislation 
Applicable KYC requirements 
Comme
rcial 
banks 
First tier banks 
The "big five" banks 
holding 54% of all banking 
assets 
MCB, Allied, United, 
Habib and NBP 
26.4m (of which 17m is 
personal) 
SBP 
Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) 
and Banking Companies Rules (1963), made 
under the Ordinance (as amended 31 May 
1997) 
Prudential guidelines XI and XII 
issued by the SBP (under the 
Banking Ordinance - covering 
banks and money exchange 
companies). However not 
sufficient power for SBP to do 
so under the Ordinance. Has 
approach parliament for 
amendment to Ordinance.  
Verification of identity (attested copy 
of ID card or passport, drivers license; 
attested copy of service card for 
salaried person); introduction letter for 
new accountholder; systems to 
monitor accounts and transactions; 
maintenance and updating of client 
records and transactions for 5 years; 
suspicious transaction reporting; 
client profiling; training of staff; 
Re-identification of existing clients 
Second Tier banks 
Mid-sized, locally owned 
banks (19 in total) 
Bank Al Falah,  
Union Bank, etc 
 Unknown SBP 
Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) 
and Banking Companies Rules (1963), made 
under the Ordinance (as amended 31 May 
1997) 
Foreign banks 
Foreign owned banks (11 
in total). High end retail 
focus. 
Standard Chartered 
and Citibank (largest) 
 Unknown SBP 
Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962) 
and Banking Companies Rules (1963), made 
under the Ordinance (as amended 31 May 
1997) 
Other 
Microfinance banks 
3rd tier banks, emerged 
after 2001, fast-growing.  
Kushali Bank 
(largest), Tameer 
Bank, etc 
0.5m  accountholders 
(but significant overlap 
of accounts with 
commercial banking 
sector) 
SBP Micro-finance Bank Ordinance (XXXII of 2000) SBP guidelines for MF Banks 
Fewer and more flexible requirements 
than for commercial banks. Main 
requirement: determine "true identity" 
of client, no clear instructions as to 
which documents/methods needed for 
verification. 
Post office: Post 
Bank 
n/a n/a 
4m National Savings 
Scheme accounts 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Unknown 
Not subject to prudential guidelines therefore currently no specific KYC 
requirements. 
Central Directorate of 
National Savings 
(CDNS) branches  
n/a n/a 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Unknown 
Money exchange 
companies 
Category A foreign 
exchange companies: 
those allowed to remit 
money cross-border and 
trade in foreign exchange 
(min. capital requirement 
of USD1.7m) (Category B 
not allowed to remit cross-
border).  
447 money 
exchange companies 
with Category A 
licenses have been 
registered as of 
2006. 
Walk-in clients; small 
vis-à-vis banks: 70% of 
value of formal inward 
remittances flow 
through banks, rather 
than money exchange 
companies. 
SBP 
Through an amendment to the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (1947) in June 2004, 
informal money changers were required to 
convert and register as foreign exchange 
companies by August 30, 2004. 
Prudential regulations issued 
by the SBP (under the Banking 
Ordinance - covering banks 
and money exchange 
companies). However not 
sufficient power for SBP to do 
so under the Ordinance. Has 
approached parliament for 
amendment to Ordinance.  
For transactions exceeding $10,000, 
establish identify of money 
remitters/receivers through the ID 
card/passport. Obtain (though not 
verify) address of remitter/receiver. 
Additional reporting requirements not 
excessive, applied in step by step 
process. 
Non-banking Finance 
Companies  
leasing companies, 
Investment Banks, 
Discount Houses, 
Housing Finance 
Companies, Venture 
Capital Companies, 
Mutual Funds, stock 
exchange and insurance 
companies. 
n/a n/a 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
and the 
Controller of 
Insurance 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Table 9. Overview of the Pakistani financial sector structure. 
Source: Genesis Analytics compilation, based on information from SBP and other sources. 
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Privatisation is central to banking sector development
170
. In 1974 there was a large-scale 
nationalisation of companies and assets (including banks and insurers). In contrast, the focus 
of the last 15 years has been on privatising and commercialising the economy. In 1990 the 
banking sector was 90% government-owned. This large government share was as a result of 
the government-owned banks at the time, which included MCB, Allied, United, Habib Bank and 
NBP. Policy reforms in 1990, aimed at promoting competition amongst banks, led to an 
increase in the number of commercial and investment banks. In 2006, after a number of 
privatisations (MCB and Allied in 1991, United in 2001 and Habib Bank in 2004), the banking 
sector is 20% government-owned. The privatisation of both United and Habib Bank is quite 
recent and, therefore, the necessity to implement new systems is dominating the agenda of 
these banks. NBP is still government-owned, although part of the shareholding was sold in 
2001. NBP has, however, always been a government-owned bank and was not part of the 
nationalisation process in 1974. 
The period of government ownership of the large banks coincided with an explicit directive to 
open branches in rural areas and provide services to the broader population. This was, 
however, largely unsuccessful and take-up remained low. Rather than putting explicit pressure 
on commercial banks to serve the broader population, the policy directive changed to one of 
improving competition in order to encourage banks to look for new markets. Since the 
privatisation process began, there seems to have been a reduction in the number of bank 
branches with, for example, the number of Habib Bank branches having declined by about 
25% since 1996 (Habib Bank, 2005). 
Relaxation of monetary policy has led to credit expansion. During the financial sector 
restructuring process, interest rate and capital controls were dropped and prudential controls 
developed. Relaxation of monetary policy in 2001 and the improvement of the contractual 
environment for credit (e.g. passing of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Act) have 
resulted in rapid credit expansion. Overall, the advances to deposit ratio has increased from 
55% (2002) to 70% (2005) (State Bank of Pakistan, 2005). 
Today there are 35 commercial banks
171
 in Pakistan, but the banking sector is dominated by 
the big five banks (MCB, Allied, United, Habib and NBP), holding 54% of banking assets (NBP, 
2006). The following categories of commercial banks can be identified: 
 Big 5. Of the big five banks, only NBP is still government-owned and derives a large part of 
its income from acting as a government agent for pension and salary payments. 
 2
nd
 tier. There is also a second tier of mid-sized, locally owned banks, including Bank Al 
Falah and Union Bank.   
 Foreign banks. There are 11 foreign banks operating in Pakistan, the largest in terms of 
assets and deposits being Standard Chartered and Citibank (NBP, 2006). Where operating 
in the retail market, the focus of these foreign banks is on the high end of the retail market. 
 Microfinance banks. Recently a 3
rd
 tier of MF banks emerged (e.g. Tameer Bank). This 
was the result of the Microfinance Institutions (MFI) Ordinance, which was promulgated in 
2001 and provides a separate regulatory framework for microfinance institutions 
(Government of Pakistan, 2006). These banks may not extend loans in excess of 
Rs100,000 ($1,607). The MF bank category is growing fast (i.e. already 0.5m new 
accountholders), but there still seems to be a significant overlap with the currently banked 
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 Information drawn from meeting with Mudassir H. Khan (Habib Bank), 29 June 2006 
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population. For example, Kushali Bank (0.25m), the largest MFI bank, only provides credit 
and all clients also have accounts with other commercial banks
172
. 
Modernisation and improvement in financial sector infrastructure. Years of government 
ownership has undermined the development of an efficient banking system. Clearing took 
place manually, which created risks and prevented the introduction of efficient transaction 
products. One of the results is that the Pakistan economy is dominated by the use of cheques 
and electronic payments are only available at high cost (e.g. Rs50 to Rs150 ($0.8 to $2.5)) per 
transaction vs. Rs3 ($0.05) for a cheque)
173
. Key government initiatives have been launched to 
address the deficiencies. These initiatives that will help improve competitiveness, compliance 
and transparency include: 
 Large-scale IT investment to improve management capacity and move to international best 
practice. This has included bringing banks online and, thereby, improving their regulatory 
reporting. In addition, large-scale IT investments have been made to cope with the 
introduction of AML/CFT regulation and Basel II (of which the first phase commenced in 
June 2006).  
 Establishment of credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies have been established and 
banks are compelled to obtain credit ratings from agencies approved by the SBP
174
. The 
aim is to improve the risk rating process in support of the current rapid credit expansion.  
 Introduction of a new electronic payment system. Government has drafted a Payment 
Systems and Electronic Funds Transfer Act (2005)
175
 to encourage the move to electronic 
transactions.This will facilitate the introduction of more efficient transaction products and 
reduce the risk of manual clearing, and will increase the intermediated and, thus, 
documented flows. 
 Pressure on banks to extend the ATM infrastructure as a means to extend coverage of the 
banking sector. Banks were „pressured‟
176
 to share the same ATM infrastructure (ABN 
Amro or MCB) and, as a result, ATMs have increased from 206 in 2002 to more than 1,200 
in 2005 (State Bank of Pakistan, 2005). 
National savings scheme
177
 
The National Savings Scheme (NSS) was set up by the Pakistan Ministry of Finance (MoF) to 
encourage savings and to also serve as a source of funding for the government. The scheme 
is administered by the Central Directorate for National Savings (CDNS) under the guidance of 
the MoF. A number of CDNS products are offered including: savings accounts (with no 
transaction functionality), savings certificates and bearer instruments (prize bonds
178
). All of 
these compete with and offer higher returns than commercial bank accounts. These CDNS 
products are sold through commercial banks (compelled by government to sell), CDNS outlets 
and the post office: 
 CDNS products are sold through 379 CDNS outlets. 
 There are approximately 12,000 post office outlets (including main branches and 
franchised branches) in Pakistan. The Post Bank operates from 7,500 of these outlets and 
                                                     
172
 Information from meeting with Ghalib Nishtar (Khushali Bank), 27 June 2006. 
173
 Information gathered during bank branch visits in Islamabad, 28 June 2006. 
174
 SBP circular No. 15 dated June 06, 2000. 
175
 Since approved as the Finance Act (2007). 
176
 In a circular issued on August 2002, the SBP „asked‟ banks to join one of these ATM switch networks or come to an agreement on 
their use (Maimbo, Adams, Aggarwal & Passas, 2005). 
177
 Information compiled from meetings with Fazli Sattar Khan (Post Office), 28 June 2006 and Ahsan Javed Chishty (BMA Capital), 23 
June 2006. 
178
 Prize bonds have been introduced as an explicit means to „whiten money‟. No interest or profit is paid on the bonds, but the names 
of the bond holders are put into a lottery. There is then a prize for the anonymous winner of the lottery. If people do no win, they get 
their money back. 
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sells the CDNS products. The Post Bank transfers all funds collected to the MoF and 
receives a 1.5% commission for the total value of deposits collected. 
Access environment 
Extending access to financial services is a key objective of the SBP. Although there is limited 
information on usage and access to financial services, extending access to financial services 
and to transaction/savings products, in particular, is a key objective of the SBP. Evidence of 
this includes: 
 Although not reflected more broadly in government policy, extending access to financial 
services is articulated explicitly as one of the four SBP objectives. This has also been 
echoed more recently in speeches made by the Governor of the State Bank (State Bank of 
Pakistan, 2006b). 
 The introduction in November 2005 of a basic bank account (BBA) by the SBP that all 
banks are compelled to offer. The BBA allows a limited number of free transactions and a 
limited number of free deposits. According to the SBP, data does not yet show significant 
take-up. This may be as a result of a very limited push by banks to market the product and 
other factors (such as a lack of disposable income) which keep the poor out of bank 
branches. The take-up at this stage may also be existing clients changing to a lower-cost 
account rather than new accountholders.   
 Legislation to create a separate regulatory framework for MF banks and, thereby, create a 
tier of banks to serve the lower-income market (Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001). 
This legislation forms part of the explicit government objective to create a multi-tiered 
banking sector, where different bank tiers serve different niches in the market. 
 SBP policy initiatives aimed at catalysing further consolidation amongst banks, in order to 
improve stability and efficiency in the banking sector, may have indirect benefits for 
access. There are still around twenty banks that in total hold less than 10% of total banking 
assets. These banks are gradually losing ground on operational efficiency (as measured by 
the cost of intermediation). Capital adequacy requirements are gradually being increased 
(to Rs6bn ($100m) in 2009) and prudential norms are also being tightened. These 
initiatives are expected to catalyse further consolidation in the market. With consolidation 
there will likely be fewer banks, but stronger competition in the banking market, which may 
drive banks to seek new markets and develop suitable products which will all be positive 
steps for increasing access. 
Limited incentive for commercial banks to extend services to the poor. The major banks are 
occupied with the privatisation process and other government initiatives (e.g. improving risk 
management processes as a result of Basel II and AML/CFT). There is also no pressure on 
banks from government to go beyond the BBA and their focus seems to be on consumer 
credit. In addition, given the limited penetration, there is still much scope for market expansion 
and cross-selling in the high-income market. A limited deposit base may, however, force banks 
to extend accounts to facilitate funding for credit. Extending accounts to a broader population 
will bring banks into conflict with the NSS. 
Limited number of informal FSPs serving the low-income market. There are a limited number of 
informal financial groups that offer savings/transaction products to the low-income market. This 
is probably as a result of the cash-based nature of the Pakistan economy and also of a general 
culture whereby people store their savings in assets such as property and jewellery. 
Evidencersuggests that there are limited numbers of these groups and that they do not 
accumulate funds, i.e. immediately pay out all funds collected to one of the members. There is 
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thus no apparent link between such groups and formal financial providers. (Please note that 
the situation is different for money transfer services.) 
Reach of the banking sector 
We estimate that 65% of Pakistani adults have access to a CDNS savings product/account. 
Although the CDNS products/accounts offer an attractive yield and are available for free, the 
requirement of having to show a CNIC
179
, will prevent those currently without a CNIC (35% of 
adults) from obtaining a CDNS product/account. Given that there is a wide network where the 
CDNS products/accounts are sold and that proximity to such an outlet is unlikely to be a 
problem, we estimate that about 65% of adults have access to a savings product/account in 
Pakistan. 
There is a significant difference between access to and usage of CDNS savings 
products/accounts. It is estimated that there are 4m CDNS account/product-holders (5% of the 
adult population) in Pakistan holding an estimated
180
 Rs.1,000bn ($16.6bn) in deposits, 
compared to Rs.1,107bn ($18.4bn) personal deposits in the banking sector
181
. (It is important 
to note that the CDNS offers higher interest rates than commercial banks.)  As a result, the 
estimate of 65% of Pakistanis who have access to a savings product/account, far outstrips the 
5% that seem to make use of the savings products/accounts on offer. It is difficult to explain 
this large difference between access and usage. The reasons could be economic in that a 
large number of Pakistanis may not have the disposable income to save. Alternatively, the very 
low usage of savings products/accounts could be related to a mistrust of government (the 
CDNS is a government institution) or to general tax evasion. People may be wary of saving 
money through products administered by a government institution, given the potential risk of 
traceability/documentation as a result. This is explored further in the sections below. 
The BBA is still not an access-friendly account. The transaction functionality offered by the 
BBA
182
, which, within limits, is free of charge, seems to be more than sufficient for someone 
wanting a transaction-type account in Pakistan. However, applying the access drivers we find 
that the eligibility requirement of the opening balance (Rs1000 ($16.6)) is restrictive
183
 for the 
majority of Pakistanis and excluded 90% of the population. As a result, although the BBA was 
developed as a low-cost alternative to the other more costly accounts available through 
commercial banks, the fact that the opening balance is as high as Rs1000 ($16.6), presents a 
significant barrier for the majority of Pakistanis. 
15% of Pakistani adults have access to a non-BBA bank account. Of all the access drivers, the 
affordability of bank accounts in Pakistan seems to be the most restrictive: 
 Even a simple account is unaffordable to most. In order to afford an account with limited 
transaction functionality
184
, a person would need a monthly income of at least 
Rs1,204
185
($17). Given that 74% of the population lives on less than Rs1,061/month 
($17.6/month), it would be safe to say that, at most, 15% of Pakistanis could afford a bank 
account.  
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 This is not a requirement of AML legislation, but of the general instructions that have been developed by the CDNS.  
180
 From a confidential presentation made by one of the big five banks. 
181
 From State Bank of Pakistan, 2006 
182
 For example: no monthly service fee, unlimited ATM withdrawals, and two free deposit and cheque withdrawals per month. 
183
 Monthly income to afford this opening balance (using the rule that a third of monthly income can be used for the opening balance) 
would be anything above and including Rs3000 ($49.9). Given that 74% of the population lives on less than Rs1061/month 
($17.6/month), it would be safe to say that, at most, 10% of Pakistanis could afford this opening balance. 
184
 This would be limited to deposits, withdrawals and statements. 
185
 This is calculated by estimating the total monthly cost of a basic savings account at the following banks: Union Bank, Allied Bank, 
Bank Alfalah, United Bank, Standard Chartered, National Bank, Muslim Commercial Bank and Habib Bank. Each banks cost is then 
weighted by the number of branches of that bank and these figures combined to calculate an overall total monthly cost of Rs48/month. 
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 Eligibility requirements are not restrictive. The eligibility requirements with regard to 
opening
186
 balances and minimum
187
 balances do not seem to be overly restrictive.  
 Regulatory requirements pose certain restrictions to currently opening a bank account. At 
this stage, the regulatory impact is dominated by the proof of ID requirement (as laid out in 
the Prudential Regulations – see the discussion of the AML/CFT framework below) and 
65% of adults have the required CNIC. Thus, 35% of adults will not be able to produce a 
CNIC when opening an account currently. New CNICs are being issued quite fast and 
given that they are relatively easy to obtain, the roll-out of CNICs should progress much 
faster than the roll-out of bank accounts. 
Usage of bank accounts remains low. For the purpose of this study, we estimate that there are 
probably about 6m-9m individual bank accountholders (8% to 11% of the adult population) 
in Pakistan. These are likely to be higher-income and urban individuals, but even these groups 
are underserved given that about 33m adults live in urban areas.  
There is very limited information on current usage (and access) levels of bank accounts in 
Pakistan. According to the SBP Statistical Bulletin (State Bank of Pakistan, 2006) there are 
27m accountholders with commercial banks and 17m of these are personal accountholders. 
Through our meetings and interactions with banks and government, it was clear that there is a 
prevalence of dormant and multiple accounts that could range up to 3 accounts per person. 
This phenomenon is, in part, due to the lack of trust in banks following the 1998 foreign 
exchange crisis, but, more importantly, to avoid tax by splitting flows across multiple accounts 
(in the current system there is no way to aggregate accounts across banks – something that 
will change with the introduction of a credit database and AML/CFT identification 
requirements). Assuming: 
 2 accounts/person this would mean that there are 8.5m accountholders in Pakistan; and 
 3 accounts/person this would mean that there are 5.7m accountholders in Pakistan. 
Number of “softer” factors influencing usage. 15% of adults have access to a bank account, 
whereas only a maximum of 11% of adults make use of a bank account. Why the difference? 
Personal choice seems to be a significant factor in determining usage, even where people 
have access. Discouragement to use bank accounts is provided by a number of factors, 
including: 
 Mistrust of the banking system; 
 Reluctance to be documented and, thereby, continuing to avoid being caught in the tax net; 
and 
 Limited need for a transaction account: 
 Pakistan is a cash comfortable economy; 
 The payment system currently has limited functionality and accounts offer limited 
transactions at a high cost; 
 The cost to write a cheque is far lower than the cost of a standing/debit order; and 
 Loans/insurance do not require a debit order (even credit cards are paid by 
cheque). 
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 Opening balance requirements of some of the larger banks with large branch infrastructure (Allied Bank, National Bank and Habib 
Bank) were between Rs100 ($1.7) to Rs500 ($8.3). These would still be difficult for poorer people to afford, but are not an absolute 
exclusion in that once the account is opened, the opening balance can be withdrawn. 
187
 Most banks in Pakistan allow flexibility regarding the minimum balance requirement. Generally, if the minimum balance falls below a 
certain amount then a monthly fee is charged to the account. This fee has been accounted for in the affordability analysis of bank 
accounts, as it is assumed that poorer clientele will generally have balances below the minimum. 
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In addition to the above, even if low-income people had access to bank accounts (i.e. accounts 
were more affordable), there are other factors to consider that may also prevent take-up of 
accounts at traditional commercial banks. This is evidenced by the significant take-up of newly 
launched MF Bank accounts in urban areas. These factors include: 
 Bad treatment of lower-income individuals (MF Banks are finding that previously unbanked 
individuals are opening accounts with them as they do not feel welcome at commercial 
banks); 
 Lack of marketing to low-income individuals, as they are not a priority for banks; 
 Hassle factors – having to fill out forms, produce certain documents etc. (51% of the 
population is illiterate (World Bank, 2006
188
)). 
Money transfer services 
Pakistan is primarily a remittance receiving country from a wide range of countries including 
Gulf States, the US, UK and other parts of Europe. The bulk of value comes from the US 
(estimated at about 30% of the total), UK and Europe, with the largest number of remittances 
deriving from the Gulf States. Although there is exists little information on the extent and nature 
of remittance outflows, it is clear that remittance inflows far outstrip outflows. The bulk of 
outflows are likely to come from about 2.6m Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan and 2m 
immigrants of mixed nationality in Karachi. 
Given that Pakistan is primarily a remittance receiving country, the discussion in this section 
will focus on the market for remittance inflows. 
Political turmoil and the balance of payment crisis in 1998 led to a decline in remittance inflows 
through formal channels. Nuclear tests by the Pakistani government in 1998 resulted in the 
West imposing sanctions on Pakistan and the IMF cutting off its assistance, which led to a 
balance of payments crisis. To stem mass withdrawals, foreign currency accounts were frozen 
by the Pakistani government, resulting in a loss of faith in the formal sector and further capital 
flight. Workers remittances fell to as low as $0.9bn per annum (from previous levels of $1.5bn) 
through formal remittance channels. 
The SBP has made a considerable effort to increase the flow of money through formal 
channels
189
. Since the 1998 crisis, the SBP has made attempts to increase the flow of inward 
remittances through formal channels. This has mainly been driven by the Pakistani 
government‟s attempt to capture increased amounts of foreign exchange coming into the 
country. Efforts to increase flows through formal channels, by the SBP, include: 
 Reducing transfer costs. A subsidy equivalent to SAR25
190
 ($6.7) for every remittance 
transaction sent through bank channels where the transaction is converted to rupees and 
where there is no charge to the sender or recipient. 
 Increasing competition. The creation of a regulatory framework to facilitate formalisation of 
money transfer exchange companies by registering such companies and to improve 
competition in the money exchange market (discussed below).  
 More attractive exchange rate. Reducing the differential between the official exchange rate 
and the kerb rate. 
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 Reflecting 2004 data. 
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 Information from a meeting with the State Bank of Pakistan, Exchange Policy Department, 21 June 2006 
190
 Saudi Arabia Riyal 
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 Support for Pakistanis abroad. The establishment of a loyalty programme (through the 
Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF)) for Pakistanis working abroad to support, amongst 
other things, the sending of money through formal channels. 
 Improving efficiency of the formal channels. The drafting of codes of conduct for formal 
channels, which, for example, include a maximum delivery time through formal channels 
(e.g. 48 hours instead of 2 to 3 weeks). 
September 11 and, to a lesser extent, the 2005 earthquake in the North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) have been the main drivers of the formalisation of remittance flows. Following 
September 11, total remittance inflows have increased through both informal and formal 
channels. Firstly, many Pakistanis who previously invested their funds in other countries, 
decided to repatriate funds back to their home country, preferring that investment to 
investments abroad. This and the earthquake in NWFP, which forced people to use formal 
channels in an emergency situation, have been the main drivers in increasing flows through 
formal channels, although the various efforts by the government to formalise the informal 
MTOs and to increase the attractiveness of the formal channels, have also contributed. Formal 
channels have shown significant increases and inflows have risen consistently to the current 
estimate of $4.2bn for 2006. 
Through an amendment to the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 in June 2004, informal 
money changers were required to convert and register as foreign exchange companies by 
August 30, 2004. These companies are then allowed to exist separately from banks. Two 
categories of foreign exchange companies were created: (i) category A operators who are 
allowed to both remit money cross-border and trade in foreign exchange (the minimum capital 
requirement for category A is Rs100m ($1.7m)), and (ii) category B operators who cannot remit 
funds cross-border, but can buy foreign exchange and sell rupees (the minimum capital 
requirement for category B is Rs20m ($0.3m)). The SBP has also encouraged the 
consolidation of smaller players into larger entities and the exit of smaller, badly run exchange 
companies. To date, 447 money transfer companies with category A licenses have been 
registered. 
70% of inward remittances through formal channels flow through banks. Only banks and 
category A money transfer companies are registered to receive inward remittances. As a 
result, money transfer agencies such as Western Union or MoneyGram must partner with 
either banks or money transfer companies. It is estimated that 70% of formal inward 
remittances in value flow through banking channels. Banks are not geared for smaller 
amounts, which will tend to flow through MTOs. 
There is a strong and thriving informal remittance sector in Pakistan. The informal remittance 
sector includes the Hawala/Hundi network and the carrying of cash. The Hawala/Hundi 
network
191
 is an informal, unregistered channel through which to remit money. It has been 
estimated that 50% of the total value of inward remittances to Pakistan flow through informal 
channels
192
. 
Although there has been pressure to use formal channels to remit money into Pakistan, a far 
greater number of households still receive remittances through informal channels. The cost 
and efficiency differential between formal and informal channels has been narrowed 
considerably, given the SBP efforts and increased competitiveness amongst formal providers. 
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 See http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp for a good description of the Hawala system. 
192
 Interview with registered money transfer companies at the SBP on 23 June 2006 
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Even so, about 1m households are estimated to receive remittances through formal channels, 
whilst 4.5m households receive remittances through informal channels
193
. 
There do not seem to be explicit barriers to receivers using formal channels. For money 
remittance products, access to formal channels seems to be much greater than usage of 
formal channels. Affordability does not appear to be an exclusionary barrier if remittances are 
sent/received through banking channels. There are no specific eligibility requirements that 
make formal channels restrictive for receivers. From a regulatory point of view, all that is 
required from the receiver is proof of identity, through a passport, driver‟s license or CNIC. The 
family of a migrant is more likely to have a CNIC card, given that such a card is required for the 
migrant to get a passport and that OPF provides support to migrant families and would assist in 
this regard if there was a problem. Proximity to a point of collection may be an issue, but when 
combining the likely reach of banks, the post office and money transfer companies, most areas 
could potentially be reached. As a result, the relatively low usage of formal remittance channels 
can only be explained as being the result of deliberate choice on the side of remittance 
senders and receivers.  
“Soft” factors condition the use of informal remittance channels. As there do not seem to be 
barriers to using formal remittance channels, it would seem that the use of informal remittance 
channels is probably driven by issues like familiarity, habit, culture, convenience and possibly 
relative cost. In addition, and similar to banking, low-income individuals are likely to resist using 
formal channels as they mistrust these channels, are not treated favourably by formal channels 
and do no want to face the hassle factors of producing documents and filling out forms. (This 
does, however, not take into consideration the barriers to using formal remittance channels that 
may exist on the sending side.) 
AML/CFT ENVIRONMENT 
An AML law has been in the making for a number of years. In 1997, terrorist financing and 
some aspects of money laundering were criminalised through the Anti-Terrorism Act and 
reporting of suspicious transactions to the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) was required as a result 
of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act. In 1999, the National Accountability Ordinance 
provided for the setting up of a National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The purpose of NAB is 
to eradicate corruption and hold accountable all those persons accused of corruption. In this 
regard, NAB requires FSPs to report suspicious transactions. At this stage, NAB is operating 
as a Financial Intelligence Unit, given its legal and operational framework. These laws all 
include provisions to allow investigators to access financial records and conduct financial 
investigations. In 2002 a working group coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and comprising 
key stakeholders such as law enforcement agencies, other ministries, the SBP and SECP was 
formed to draft the AML law. The purpose of this law is to strengthen the existing legal 
framework, to establish a Financial Monitoring Unit, to include further offences deemed to be 
money laundering
194
, to provide for the investigation and prosecution of money laundering 
offences, and to bring Pakistan‟s AML regime in line with international best practice. In 2005 
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 In order to come to this conclusion, a number of pieces of information were put together. (i) Total population in Pakistan is 156m with 
an average household size of 7 (Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2003). As a result, there are about 22m households in Pakistan. (ii) About 
25% (5.5m) households in Pakistan receive remittances from abroad - this is based on information provided in meetings with money 
exchange companies and the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (26 June 2006). (iii) Given that $4.2bn flows in through formal 
channels/year and the average size of each remittance through formal channels is $665 (from meeting with United Bank, 22 June 
2006), there are about 6.3m incoming remittance transactions/year through formal channels. (iv) And assuming that a household 
receives a remittance once every 2 months, thus six times a year, then there are about 1m households receiving through formal 
channels (if a household received every month, 12 times a year, then there would only be about 0.5m households receiving through 
formal channels). (v) As a result, the rest of households, 4.5m, must receive their remittances through informal channels. 
194
 The provisions of the AML bill are in addition to the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, the Anti-terrorism Act and the National 
Accountability Ordinance 
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the draft AML bill was approved by Cabinet and was forwarded to the standing committee of 
the National Assembly in Parliament. According to discussions with a number of players in 
Pakistan, the approval of the draft bill now appears to be stalled in Parliament. Pakistan is an 
active member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and in 2005 the APG 
conducted a review of the Pakistan situation regarding AML/CFT laws, rules and procedures. 
As a result of this review, a number of deficiencies were noted and the importance of a 
comprehensive and finalised AML law was highlighted (US Department of State, 2006). At the 
moment, the SBP and SECP have independently established AML units. As far as financing of 
terrorism is concerned, it is still a predicate offence for money laundering in terms of the Anti-
terrorism Act. 
Until the Bill is passed the current AML legal framework consists largely of prudential 
regulations. The SBP has issued prudential guidelines (under the Banking Ordinance and 
covering banks and money exchange companies) to be consistent with the FATF 
recommendations. These guidelines cover the areas of KYC policies, record-keeping, due 
diligence of correspondent banks and reporting of suspicious transactions. Separate guidelines 
have been issued for MF Banks that are slightly less onerous. The SECP has issued KYC 
regulations under the Insurance Ordinance, which cover insurers, stock brokers and dealers, 
trusts, leasing companies, charities, NGOs and other non-financial institutions. Importantly, no 
AML requirements have been passed pertaining to the activities of institutions like the Post 
Bank and CDNS outlets that sell CDNS product/accounts. There are, however, general 
instructions developed by the CDNS under guidance from the MoF, which seeks to establish a 
framework to „encourage‟ institutions to know their clients better before they deal with them. 
These instructions are not related to the AML regime. When selling a CDNS product or 
opening an account, what is required is an introduction and verification of identity by the CNIC. 
The AML policies in the prudential guidelines issued under the banking ordinance require 
commercial banks to: 
 Undertake reasonable efforts to determine the true identity of every prospective client. This 
would include obtaining the minimum set of documents: 
 An attested photocopy of the CNIC
195
 or passport. 
 In the case that the CNIC does not contain a photograph (this occurs most regularly 
where strictly observant Muslim women refuse their photos to be taken), any other 
document (e.g. drivers license), in addition to the CNIC, that contains a photograph. If 
the individual does not have a suitable document with a photograph, then a copy of a 
duly attested photograph and a written statement “to the effect that the individual has 
no other document bearing (a) photograph”. 
 In the case of a salaried person, an attested copy of their service card or any other 
evidence of service. 
 In the case of an illiterate person, a passport-size photograph of the new 
accountholder together with their right and left thumb impression. 
 Obtain an introduction for the new accountholder. This introduction can come from a 
current accountholder of the same bank or different bank or from an employee of the bank. 
 Put in place systems to monitor accounts and transactions. 
 Maintain and update client records and transactions for a minimum period of 5 years. 
Interestingly, there do not seem to be any thresholds for this record keeping which could 
place quite an onus on banks of having to keep records of all transactions. 
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 In cases where the prospective client has not yet obtained a CNIC, banks may obtain attested copies of the old National Identity 
Card and a receipt from NADRA of evidence that the client has applied for a CNIC, along with an undertaking in writing that a copy of 
the CNIC will be submitted when it is received. 
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 Train staff to be able to comply with the prudential guidelines. 
 Lay out profiles of clients in order to support monitoring of suspicious transactions. 
 Report suspicious, complex or unusually large transactions to SBP. 
In addition, banks are required to re-identify existing clients following the procedures applicable 
to new clients. The deadline for re-identification was 30 June 2006, but according to 
discussions with government officials during our country visit (just prior to the deadline) this 
deadline was to be extended as banks were struggling with the re-identification process. One 
of the largest banks, with significant rural distribution, has only been able to re-identify 30% of 
their clients and expects difficulties in re-identifying the remaining clients (particularly rural 
clients). Once again, it should be noted that the Post Bank and CDNS are not required to re-
identify existing CDNS product- or accountholders. 
In comparison to the guidelines for commercial banks which are extensive and quite 
prescriptive, the guidelines for MF Banks are fewer and also more flexible. In this regard, MF 
Banks are only required to determine the true identity of clients and, although it is suggested 
that MF Banks try obtain the CNIC of clients, this requirement is not rigid. It is accepted that 
clients of MF Banks in far-flung regions, particularly women, may not be able to produce a 
CNIC and then it is left to the MF Bank to establish clients‟ identities through other appropriate 
means. 
Foreign exchange companies are now subject to prudential regulations and stricter monitoring. 
These regulations lay out certain AML requirements around establishing the identity of money 
remitters/receivers through obtaining the CNIC or passport. Exchange companies must also 
record the address of the person sending and receiving remittances, although they are not 
required to verify it. In addition, reporting for exchange companies is not excessive (more 
lenient on category B exchange companies) and is being applied in a step-by-step process. 
According to the SBP, online reporting for exchange companies may be introduced towards the 
end of the year, which will enhance the capability of the SBP to monitor and check compliance 
on a real-time basis. This is primarily for the monitoring of foreign exchange flows, but will also 
help in the supervision of AML compliance. 
KEY FINDINGS 
Impact of AML/CFT on usage to date 
In the absence of a comprehensive AML/CFT law the impact of AML/CFT implementation on 
usage has been muted. At this stage, the prudential guidelines are not entirely clear as to the 
sanctions that can be imposed to enforce AML/CFT compliance. Commercial banks find 
themselves in a difficult position on two counts regarding their AML responsibilities: 
 Firstly, banks have no way of forcing existing clients to produce the documents for re- 
identification, as the prudential regulations under the Banking Ordinance do not provide for 
account closures by the banks where clients fail to comply with the controls as laid down in 
the regulations. Where banks freeze accounts in an attempt to pressurise clients to re-
identify themselves, they face the threat of legal action.  
 Secondly, although banks are required to report suspicious transactions, they find it difficult 
to file a report without breaching client confidentiality. The AML bill will provide protection to 
FSPs for lawful disclosure of information, but for now it is difficult to persuade banks to 
report suspicious transactions.  
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The result is that implementation has been weak and impact on usage muted. 
Potential impact of AML/CFT on access 
Presence of strong national ID system should limit impact of KYC measures on access. Given 
the high level of integrity of the NADRA identification system, KYC for both new and existing 
clients will rely strongly on the CNIC. For re-identifying existing clients, it should be sufficient 
that their details are captured on the NADRA database. The obligation to acquire an attested 
copy of the CNIC should fall away. The number of adults in possession of CNICs is at least six 
times the size of the current banked market. In addition, the pace of roll-out of CNICs seems to 
be quicker than the roll-out of bank accounts. The potential market for bank accounts is likely 
to have CNICs before they have the opportunity to open an account. This suggests that if CNIC 
is sufficient for identification purposes, KYC requirements alone are unlikely to impact on 
access. However, the requirement of an introduction will remain a potential barrier for persons 
who are unbanked or from an area where few people are banked. Given the strong integrity of 
the NADRA system, there would seem to be space for relaxing the other verification 
requirements. 
Potential impact of AML/CFT on usage 
Usage of bank accounts likely to be impacted by AML/CFT legislation: Pakistan is a country 
with high levels of tax evasion. Providing all manner of documentation to banks for KYC 
purposes will be resisted because clients do not want their money to be traced too closely. As 
a result, the implementation of AML regulation will be conditioned by the wider attempt to 
document the economy. Although current and potential clients may in general not be resistant 
to the AML process, they will be resistant to the potential use of the information they have to 
provide, through the AML process, to the government. From a usage point of view, this may 
have the following consequences: 
 A reduction in the usage of accounts by existing clients. 
 Prospective clients may choose not to take-up/use accounts. They will prefer to keep their 
money in cash, property and institutions with lower levels of compliance. This is quite 
feasible, given the informal nature of the economy and the high levels of cash usage. 
 Low-income clients are also going to be resistant. This is borne out by our findings 
regarding the significant gap between access to and usage of the CDNS products. We 
hypothesise that this gap is driven by, at least in part, a reluctance of people to save 
money through products administered by a government institution – indicating their distrust 
of government and their caution in having their money traced too closely. 
Thus, in a largely cash-based economy like Pakistan, trying to achieve AML compliance and 
tax enforcement at the same time is likely to result in neither being achieved. A cash-based 
and informal society affords people other means to transact, which are well away from both 
documentation for tax and AML purposes and also more convenient. 
It will be virtually impossible to formalise or close down the informal remittance market. Despite 
dedicated and far-reaching attempts by the government to formalise the money transfer 
market, a large informal market remains (estimated to be at least 50% of the total remittance 
market). Reasons for the continued pervasiveness include cost, convenience, familiarity and 
cultural preference. In addition, there are no formal banking ties between Pakistan and India – 
the transfer of funds linked to trade, commerce and remittances therefore has to be facilitated 
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via the informal sector or through third countries which do have formal banking ties with India. 
The increased remittance flows through formal channels since 2001 has been largely triggered 
by non-government and non-AML reforms. In fact, remittances through both informal and 
formal channels into Pakistan have increased as a result of external factors such as the post-
9/11 impacts. Additional attempts by government to close down informal money transfer 
companies will be costly and will probably force remittance flows further underground into a 
world where they are not monitored, where no records are kept and where tracing the 
proceeds of crime or the funding of terrorism will be increasingly difficult.  
Unequal AML regulatory burden will affect competition and access: In comparison to the AML 
requirements for commercial banks, the requirements for MF Banks are fewer and more 
flexible. On the one hand, this is a positive for access, in that these banks will find it easier and 
more affordable to serve poorer clients. On the other hand, there is the risk that higher-income 
and higher-risk individuals could use MF banks as a means to launder money and, thus, 
undermine Pakistan‟s AML regime. The fact that commercial banks do not have to comply with 
the same lower levels of controls for low-income clients will also make commercial banks less 
prepared to serve that market if MF banks can serve the same clients at lower regulatory costs.  
Institutions competing in the same market are not subject to the same regulations. The CDNS-
administered National Savings Scheme (sold mainly through the Post Bank and CDNS outlets) 
accounts for 4m product/account-holders, compared to the estimated 6m to 9m commercial 
bank accountholders. These institutions, therefore, compete directly with the banks for 
deposits. Yet, they are not subject to prudential regulations in the same way. For example, 
currently the Post Bank and CDNS outlets have no regulatory AML/CFT KYC requirements 
and are not required to re-identify clients. This undermines the AML regime in that it allows 
more risky individuals a place to deposit their money without having to be identified. In addition, 
this may skew the market into depositing funds with a government scheme (supporting 
government spending) rather than into private institutions like banks. Not having these deposits 
will curtail the ability of banks to on-lend funds to borrowers (e.g. small businesses), which will 
be to the detriment of private sector investment and enterprise. 
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APPENDIX F: SOUTH AFRICA 
SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
 The South African economy is characterised by a large informal sector and high unemployment 
levels. Depending on the unemployment definition used, unemployment levels could be as high as 
40% of economically active population. 
 South Africa has a well-developed formal financial sector, characterised by high concentration levels 
in the banking sector. At the end of 2005, the assets of the four largest banks constituted nearly 90% 
of total bank assets. 
 After the 1994 democratic transition, the South African government focused on the expansion of 
banking services to the adult population. This led to the creation and introduction of the Mzansi 
account, a basic bank account, by the four major banks and Postbank. 
 During 2005, 47% of the South African adult population used bank accounts. Given an affordability 
measure, 67% of the adult population has access to bank accounts. 
 Although South African has a comprehensive national identification system, it is susceptible to fraud. 
Recent estimates placed the number of fraudulent identification documents as high as 25%. 
 The use of formal remittance channels is low, mainly due to foreign exchange rules that limit 
remittance services to FSPs with bank licenses and high prices. 
 Money laundering was first criminalised in the early 1990s. The current AML compliance regime was 
constructed in 2001, with CFT legislation enacted in 2004. 
 South Africa became a member of the FATF during 2003 and held the presidency during 2005/06. 
 The overall negative impact of AML/CFT legislation on access to bank accounts was to have been 
mitigated by Exemption 17. Exemption 17 eliminates the need to obtain and verify the residential 
address details in respect of low-value, low-risk accounts. However, the conditions imposed by this 
exemption proved too strict to be of real assistance to the poor. The exemption was amended in 
2004 on the strength of research into financial exclusion and the financial reality of the poor. The 
amended Exemption 17 has proved crucial to the success of the Mzansi account.  
 No impact of AML/CFT legislation on the affordability of low-income bank accounts has yet been 
perceived. The political imperatives on banks to retain these accounts will prevent any costs 
generated by AML/CFT legislation from being passed on to low-income accountholders. 
 Regulatory identification barriers, due to foreign exchange rules, AML/CFT legislation and control 
requirements under the Immigration Act, exclude some South Africans and all undocumented 
migrants from formal remittance services. 
 
GENERAL AND MARKET CONTEXT 
Country at a glance 
Although experiencing generally buoyant economic circumstances, unemployment is high and 
the informal sector large. South Africa is a middle-income country with a population of 47.4m 
(Statistics South Africa, 2006). It found its way back into the international fold with the ending of 
apartheid and election of a democratic government in 1994. Owing to its discriminatory history, 
the country is characterised by the presence of two unevenly developed economies, one 
sophisticated and developed, the other serving the poorly educated, low-income majority. The 
economy as a whole has grown on a consistent basis since 1993, with growth in GDP 
(constant 2000 prices) between 2000 and 2005 averaging almost 4% (South African Reserve 
Bank, 2006). GDP per capita for 2005 totalled US$12,161 (IMF, 2006). However, levels of 
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unemployment remain high at 25.6%
196
. In 2002/03, the informal economy comprised 29.5% of 
the economy (Schneider, 2005) and about 24% of the economically active population were 
employed in the informal sector in 2006 (Statistics South Africa, 2006). 
Urbanisation continues apace: 60% of the population now live in urban areas (Centre for 
Development and Enterprise, 2005). The 2001 Census found that there are 9.1m households 
in South Africa and about a third of these live in informal or traditional dwellings (Statistics 
South Africa, 2001). 
The banking sector structure and evolution
197
 
Table 10 below captures some salient features of the South African banking sector: 
 
Bank sector indicators 2000 2005 
Bank assets to GDP 81% 140% 
M2 to GDP 51% 87% 
Number of registered banks 45 36 
Total liabilities to GDP 67% 128% 
Share of assets of top 4 banks 75% 85% 
ROA (after tax) of banking sector 1.1% 1.1% 
Interest margin of banking sector 2.9% 3.1% 
Efficiency ratio (all banks) 62.5% 66.3% 
No. of ATM's Not available 12,488 
No. of online POS devices Not available 114,286 
Table 10: Various bank sector indicators for 2000 and 2005 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, PWC Banking Survey 2005 
Sophisticated, though concentrated banking sector. The retail market is dominated by four 
banks - First Rand, Standard Bank, ABSA and Nedbank – known as the “Big Four”. At the end 
of 2005, the assets of the Big Four plus Investec Bank (the fifth largest bank) constituted nearly 
90% of total bank sector assets. All commercial banks are privately owned and three of the Big 
Four are locally owned, the exception being ABSA in which Barclays Bank plc UK purchased a 
controlling stake in 2005. The Big Four have 19.8m retail clients – the projected number for 
2008 is 22.8m clients (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). 
In addition to the Big Four, a second tier of smaller niche banks exists. Three of these focus on 
the low-income market viz African Bank, Capitec and Teba Bank. The government-owned Post 
Office Savings Bank (PostBank), a division of the South African Post Office, also offers basic 
savings and transaction accounts (though no lending).  
Mixed revenue model with high bank charges. Banks derive a large proportion of income from 
transaction-based fees. A 2006 study found that 38% of the banking industry‟s joint income for 
2004 derived from transaction-based fees (Feasibility, 2006). Bank charges and the structure 
of the banking sector, more generally, is currently the subject of an enquiry by the competition 
(anti-trust) authorities. 
Comprehensive branch infrastructure. In 2005, there were about 3,000 bank branches
198
 
offering commercial banking products, as well as 2,000 post office outlets carrying Postbank 
products (South African Post Office, 2006). Given a population of 30m adults, this translates to 
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 The expanded definition of unemployment (i.e. including discouraged work seekers) brings the number closer to 40% (SAPRN, 
2005). 
197
 This section draws heavily on Porteous, 2004. 
198
 According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005), the “Big Four” had 2,500 bank branches during 2005. If allowance is made for growth 
in branches since 2005 and a rough estimate of the branches of other banks added, this approximates to 3,000 branches. 
Appendices 
 
 136 
 
 
about 17 branches per 100,000 adults or almost 11 branches per 100,000 individuals (adults 
and children).  
The informal financial sector is active. Lower-income financial needs are often met by informal 
bodies like burial societies and stokvels (rotating savings clubs). It is estimated that there are 
between 80,000 and 100,000 burial societies to which 6.2m members belonged in 2003 
(Genesis Analytics, 2003), while contributions to stokvels totalled around R6.2bn ($936m
199
) in 
2004 (FinScope 2004). Burial societies or stokvels are not licensed or regulated. 
The history of access 
Historically, poor people in SA had low levels of access. The exclusionary effect of apartheid 
locked many poor South Africans out of the formal financial system and FSPs have traditionally 
not been geared to servicing the poor. In the past, they focused on corporate and middle- and 
upper-income retail markets. Lower-income financial needs were largely met by informal 
bodies like burial societies and stokvels. 
A change in attitude around 1994. This attitude changed in the early 1990s and the first foray 
into the lower-income market was made in 1994 by Standard Bank with the launch of its E-Plan 
account. Two other large banks, ABSA with its Flexi-Banking transaction products, and FNB 
with its Smartsave product, followed suit. The state banking institution, PostBank, also 
facilitated the roll-out of bank accounts to the mass market in the late 1990‟s. 
The Financial Sector Charter (FSC). Since the democratic government came to power in 1994 
and as part of a broader movement to empower black South Africans, it has sought to make 
the financial sector more accessible. From the late 1990s, government started to request 
banks to do more to offer services to neglected clients. Negotiations within the financial sector 
resulted in 2003 in the Financial Sector Charter (the Charter) in which the banking industry 
committed itself to the provision of access to basic banking services to 80% of lower-income 
consumers by 2008. 
The Financial Sector Charter facilitated the Mzansi initiative. From this commitment to access 
was born the Mzansi bank account, a savings account with basic transaction capability, 
launched in collaboration by the Big Four and PostBank in October 2005. The Mzansi banking 
project has been startlingly successful – according to the Banking Association, by June 2006, 
around 3.29m accounts had been opened (Banking Association, 2006)
200
. This was followed 
by the Mzansi money transfer product, a cheap means of transferring money domestically (but 
only domestically). This has enjoyed less success in take-up than the Mzansi bank account. 
New players emerge to serve the low-income market. From 2001 onwards, new banks 
emerged with a specific focus on the low-income market. These include Teba Bank which 
evolved out of the mass provision of financial services to miners, and Capitec Bank, the result 
of the financial consolidation of a number of micro-lenders. 
The recent period has seen the introduction of new banking technology, development of virtual 
banks and cellular banking services. Given that 30.7m people have access to cell phones
201
, 
they potentially provide banks with a large network to reach prospective clients. The launch of 
Wizzit Bank in 2004 and MTN Banking, a virtual banking partnership between Standard Bank 
and cellular network operator MTN, in 2005 signal the first steps in the cell-phone banking 
market.  
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 All dollar conversions are based on average year to date exchange rates as obtained from www.oanda.com.  
200
 It is important to note that this is a slightly controversial statistic as there are some issues around double counting and already 
banked individuals opening Mzansi accounts to benefit from lower costs. 
201
 This figure was arrived at by adding the market sizes of the three largest cell phone network providers (MTN, Vodacom and Cell C) 
during July 2006. The information was collected from their most recent annual reports and financial statements.  
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Partnerships with retailers. Banks have also started to form distribution partnerships with 
retailers. In 2006, Capitec Bank launched a money transfer product with Shoprite, a low-to-
middle-income food retailer with extensive geographic reach. Although retailers wanting to offer 
banking services currently have to do so in partnership with a bank, the Dedicated Banks Bill (a 
new regulatory framework for second-tier banking) will, if enacted, allow retailers and other 
non-core banking institutions to become deposit-taking institutions in their own right, increasing 
competition in the banking sector. 
Cross-border money transfer market  
The formal sector cross-border money transfer market is not well developed. Although the 
need for remittances is significant, the money transfer market in South Africa is not competitive 
or well diversified. The reason for this is foreign exchange rules which limit full dealing in 
foreign exchange (necessary for a cross-border transfer beyond the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA)
202
) to those holding a dealers‟ licence – at present such a licence is reserved for banks. 
A non-bank money transfer operator (MTO), short of registering as a bank, must thus partner 
with a bank. The minimum capital requirement for a banking licence is R250m (+/-$35m). 
These high barriers to entry limit competition in the international money transfer market and 
push up the price of formal remittance mechanisms. 
Formal sector mechanisms few and expensive. Commercial banks offer account-to-account 
transfers through the SWIFT system, but this presupposes the holding of an account. For non-
accountholders, options are limited. Western Union entered South Africa in 1995 but struggled 
to comply with foreign exchange controls, and exited in 2001. MoneyGram provides it services 
in South Africa through Bidvest Bank (previously known as Rennies Bank) and Standard Bank, 
though clientele of MoneyGram are mainly higher-income individuals and legal economic 
migrants who remit money home. The average transaction value of a MoneyGram transfer is 
R2,000 (just more than $300), while the average size of remittances to the SADC
203
 group of 
countries is lower at around R500 ($75.50) (Genesis Analytics, 2005b). This reflects the less 
skilled labour migration from SADC. However, an international transfer of a small amount, say 
R500, using MoneyGram, will cost up to R185, i.e. more than 30% the total amount sent (i.e. it 
costs up to $28, or 37%, to send an amount equal to about $76). This arguably remains 
beyond the affordability of the mass market.  
The Mzansi Money Transfer product was launched in 2005 by the Big Four banks and 
Postbank. This service offers a person-to-person, cash-to-cash product based on the Western 
Union/MoneyGram transfer model, but at a lower cost of only up to R35 for a R500 transfer 
(i.e. $5.28 for a $75.50 transfer, amounting to roughly 7%). However, Mzansi transfers are 
restricted to domestic transfers only – this is one of the reasons the product has not seen great 
take-up.  
South Africa a net sender by volume of transactions; a net receiver by value. In terms of total 
remittance flows, accurate data are largely absent. However, conversations with formal 
industry players lead us to conclude that 50-75% of total remittances measured by value are 
inflows, while 25-50% are outflows.
204
 It is likely that the value entering the country exceeds the 
value exiting the country, but that numbers of transactions is higher going out than coming in. 
This apparent anomaly is explained by the fact that formal remittance inflows come are mostly 
originated by higher-income South Africa diaspora, especially those living in the United 
Kingdom, United States and the Antipodes, and from families who are supporting foreign 
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 South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia are members of a common monetary area. 
203
 Southern African Development Community consisting of Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. 
204
 These figures are based on conversations with MoneyGram and banks acting as agents for MoneyGram, namely Standard Bank and 
Rennies Bank.  
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students studying at South African colleges. In contrast, formal remittance outflows are mainly 
originated by SADC economic migrants engaged in lower-income work in mining and farming. 
It has been estimated that there are 2.1m legal migrants from SADC alone working in South 
Africa, accounting for R6.1bn (US$921m) in cross-border remittances from South African into 
SADC (Genesis Analytics, 2005b). In other words, remittance outflows are characterised by 
lower-value, high transaction volumes, and inflows by higher-value and lower transaction 
volumes.  
Informal networks are widely used: The most common informal mechanism is the transfer of 
money in person or via a driver on the extensive taxi and bus network. This is cheaper than 
formal systems: sending R500 ($75.50) to a neighbouring state with a taxi driver will cost about 
R50 ($7.55, amounting to 10% of the sent amount). There is no evidence of a ubiquitous 
hawala system in South Africa, although certain ethnic groups certainly use these covertly, 
particularly communities of Somalis, Pakistanis and Indians. Genesis Analytics (2005b) 
estimates that 48% of all domestic remittances flow through informal channels, while 42% of all 
inter-SADC remittances are sent informally.  
Regulatory overview of the financial markets  
The Ministry with overall responsibility for financial markets is the National Treasury. The basic 
regulatory and supervisory structure is as follows: 
 Banks are supervised by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), specifically the 
Office of the Registrar of Banks.  
 Non-banking FSPs including insurance, retirement funding and collective investment 
schemes are supervised by the Financial Services Board (FSB).  
 The provision of any form of credit is supervised by the National Credit Regulator.  
 Informal sector financial service providers, like stokvels and burial societies, are not 
regulated, unless their size and/or activities bring them within the regulatory net. Even 
where they do strictly fall within the regulatory net, the limited resources of the 
regulator would mean that they are effectively unsupervised. 
 Issues relating to AML/CFT are handled by the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) 
which is housed in the National Treasury. Supervisory powers were not given to the 
FIC but to existing financial services supervisory bodies. Thus, the Reserve Bank, as 
supervisor of banks, supervises compliance by banks; the FSB supervises compliance 
by non-banking FSPs and advisors; the Law Society by attorneys, and so on. 
 South Africa also has exchange controls which restrict the movement of funds in and 
out of the country. They are contained in the Exchange Control Regulations issued in 
terms of the Currency and Exchanges Act, 1933, and are administered by the 
Exchange Control Department of the SARB. Only authorised dealers may exchange 
currency. Currently, the SARB licences only banks to act as full authorised dealers. A 
few bureaux de change are licensed as limited dealers. To send money out of the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) from an authorised dealer, the remitter will be required 
to show that he or she is a citizen, legal resident, or temporary resident with a valid 
work permit. Every foreign exchange transaction, irrespective of its size, must to be 
individually reported to the SARB utilising a reporting system as specified by the 
SARB
205
. 
For a diagrammatic overview of the broader financial sector regulation see  
Figure 5 overleaf.
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 As foreign exchange controls was not the focus of this study, no quantitative information on the costs of reporting requirements were 
collected. 
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Figure 5: Overview of SA AML/CFT and other financial regulation applicable to financial institutions 
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National identification system 
Comprehensive national identity system. The national identification system is administered by 
the Department of Home Affairs. Bar-coded Identity documents are issued to citizens and 
permanent residents 16 years or older. Identity documents are required to vote in national and 
local elections. Approximately 1.75m eligible South Africans do not have an identity document, 
but could obtain one free of charge at any Home Affairs office (Department of Home Affairs, 
2006a), although the process may be quite lengthy for some applicants. According to recent 
press reports, however, the integrity of the system is in question and many cases of identity 
fraud or corruption have been reported.  
South Africa is a regional economic hub and attracts economic migrants, particularly from the 
other SADC countries. It has been estimated that there are 2.1m legal migrants from SADC 
alone in South Africa (Genesis, 2005b). Legal migrants are issued with work permits by the 
Department of Home Affairs. 
There are high levels of illegal migrants in the country. Due to their furtive nature, numbers of 
undocumented migrants are difficult to measure. A 1996 study estimated that between 2.5 and 
4.1m persons reside in the country illegally
206
, the majority of whom arrive from Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Asia (Department of Home Affairs, 2006b)
207
. Other sources put the 
estimates for illegal migrants at even higher levels. 
Residential address infrastructure 
The majority of the population do not have residential addresses. About 44% of the population 
has a residential address (i.e. does not live in an informal settlement or in rural areas on 
communal or farm land where it is difficult to attach “an address” to the dwelling). This amounts 
to just more than 4m addresses out of 9.1m households (Genesis Analytics, 2004a)
 
 The 2001 
Census found that approximately a third (31.2%) of South African households resides in 
informal or traditional dwellings. 
Internal migration is high. There is significant internal migration among South Africans. A 2003 
study on internal migration showed that between 1992 and 1996, 38% of South Africans 
moved house at least once (Kok et. al., 2003). There is also a general migratory movement to 
metropolitan areas (Collison, Kok & Ganene, 2006). The high mobility means that formal 
address details, to the extent they exist, date relatively quickly. 
Current levels of access and usage: bank accounts 
Less than half of adult South African population use a bank account. As a result of the number 
of initiatives explicitly targeted at promoting access to banking services in South Africa, access 
levels have improved in the last decade. However, they remain low compared to the developed 
world, with only about 46% of the adult population (14m people) being currently banked 
(FinScope, 2005).
208
 Approximately 12% of adults are previously banked (but currently 
unbanked), while about 41% (13m) have never been banked (FinScope, 2005). 
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 The study by the HSRC was commission by the Department of Home Affairs in 1996 and although initially posted on the Department 
of Home Affairs website, it was later withdrawn due to methodological issues and flaws. 
207
 According to a study released at the end of 2006, the number of undocumented migrants in South Africa could be as high as 10m. 
However, as the fundamental assumptions on which this estimate is based are questionable, we do not use it here. 
208
 FinScope is a national household survey, underwritten and coordinated by the FinMark Trust. It is focused on measuring financial 
services needs and usage across the South African population. The FinMark Trust was created in March 2002 with funding received 
from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). Its mission is “making financial markets work for the poor”. 
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Number of 
individuals 
Percentage 
Currently banked 14.3m 46.6 
Previously banked 3.8m 12.3 
Unbanked 12.6m 41.1 
Total 30.7m 100 
Table 11: Banked status in South Africa 
Source: FinScope 2005 
Given the average monthly costs of a basic transaction bank account, just two thirds of adult 
South Africans have access to banking services. We find affordability to be the largestp barrier 
to accessing basic transaction banking services. If we assume that the total costs of a 
transaction bank account should not exceed 2% of household income per month
209
, we find 
that (using income distribution data from FinScope 2005)
210
 33% of adult South Africans would 
be unable to afford transaction banking services. We include the average cost of travelling to 
the bank in our calculation to control for the influence of proximity on affordability. 
Eligibility requirements are limited. Although most banks have a small initial deposit and 
minimum balance requirement, these cannot be considered exclusionary. Banks do not 
generally impose eligibility requirements in excess f what is required by regulation. One bank 
interviewed does require proof of income to open its most basic account (other than Mzansi). 
Given the size of this bank‟s branch network, the total access impact of eligibility requirements 
is negligible. 
Regulatory ID barriers pose a significant barrier to access to undocumented migrants. A citizen 
or legal resident must, as a general rule, produce an official identity document to open an 
account or to transfer money (a foreigner must produce a passport). This requirement excludes 
(but not absolutely) the 1.75m eligible South African citizens or 6% of the adult population who 
do not have identity documents until such time as they obtain them. It also excludes any 
person who is in the country illegally (conservatively estimated as 2.5m people). In terms of the 
Immigration Act, financial institutions are required to endeavour to ascertain the status or 
citizenship of persons with whom they enter into commercial transactions. They must then 
report to the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs any illegal foreigner, or any 
person whose status or citizenship could not be ascertained. 
Current levels of access and usage: remittances 
Formal remittance services cannot be considered affordable to low-income individuals. As 
described above, formal remittance products are, on the whole, unaffordable for the low-
income market. Foreign exchange rules severely limit competition in the remittance market – 
as a result, prices remain (for now) beyond the reach of most low-income consumers. 
However, remittances are not ad hoc voluntary transfers but a financial necessity. The remitter 
is left with little choice whether to remit or not, given the financial circumstances of his/her 
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 The measure of affordability applied by Genesis, in line with that used by Finmark Trust, is to say that a household will be able to 
spend 2% of their monthly household income on a banking product. 
210
 We calculated the affordability measure using cost data for 8 basic transaction accounts at 8 South African banks. We selected the 
four largest commercial banks (ABSA, Nedbank, First National Bank and Standard Bank) and three low-income bank (Capitec, Teba 
and Post Bank), as well as one retailer bank (Pick „n Pay Go Banking). A basic transaction profile, derived from South African bank 
research, was used to then calculate a monthly average cost for each bank account. These individual costs were then weighted 
according to each of the banks‟ proportion of bank accounts in the sample and an average cost was calculated across all the bank 
accounts. This cost amounts to R23.61 ($3.56) per month to which travel cost (assuming two round trips to the bank) of R25.76 ($3.89) 
was added, which implies a total monthly cost of R49.37 ($7.45) per month and an affordability threshold of R1288 ($194.46) household 
income per month. Income distribution data was derived from FinScope 2005. Using this data we calculated that 33% of adult South 
Africans would be unable to access transaction banking services or, alternatively, that 67% of South African adults have access to 
transaction banking services, given the affordability threshold. All dollar conversions were made based on average year to date 
exchange rates obtained from www.oanda.com.  
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family in his/her country of origin. The choice is, thus, not whether to remit but how much 
money and through which channel (formal or informal). This choice is likely to be significantly 
influenced by the affordability of the product. 
The prevalent usage of informal remittance services in South Africa could be considered 
indicative of the low affordability of formal remittance services. 
Eligibility requirements seem negligible. Currently, the only eligibility requirement imposed by 
banks is a minimum remittance amount of about R100 or $15 (even lower for Mzansi transfer 
product) which is set low enough that all prospective remitters are able to meet it. Eligibility 
factors do not, therefore, impact on access to remittance services. 
Proximity may pose a barrier. Currently, formal remittance services can only be provided by 
FSPs with a bank license. This includes the Big Four and other smaller banks (e.g. Rennies 
Bank), as well as the Post Bank. Although traditional commercial banks have limited reach in 
rural areas, the Post Office has a wide distribution network, also extending into rural areas. 
Even though the Post Office‟s distribution network provides it with wide reach, its clients can 
only transfer money to a limited number of countries in Africa and the rest of the world
211
. 
Regulatory ID barriers exclude some South Africans and all undocumented migrants from 
formal remittance services. Some individuals (those without proof of residential address and 
proper identification) that need to remit money across South African borders and especially 
undocumented migrants (those that cannot prove legality of stay as required by the Foreign 
Exchange Control Regulations
212
) will be excluded from the formal money transfer system. As 
with transaction banking services, there are 1.5m eligible South Africans (or 5% of the adult 
population) without identity documents, while about 2.5m undocumented migrants will also be 
excluded from these services. 
THE AML/CFT ENVIRONMENT 
Highly committed to the FATF recommendations. South Africa is strongly committed in both the 
private and public spheres to implementing the FATF recommendations. South Africa is one of 
the few developing country FATF members. It became a FATF member in 2003 and held the 
presidency in 2005/2006.  
History and AML/CFT evolution 
Money laundering criminalised in the early 1990s. South Africa was quick off the mark to 
criminalise money laundering, and drug-related laundering was criminalised as long ago as 
1992. In 1996, the Proceeds of Crime Act broadened this to the proceeds of any type of 
offence irrespective of the amount involved. Money laundering is currently criminalised by the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998 (POCA). This Act provides draconian penalties for 
money laundering offences, including offences of negligence, ranging from fines of up to 
US$13 million and 30 years imprisonment to US$130 million and life imprisonment where 
proceeds of racketeering are laundered. POCA did not, however, create standard AML control 
duties for FSPs. To this end, the South African Law Commission, as it was then known, was 
asked to prepare a money laundering control bill.
213
  
Cognisance taken of potential impact but no quantified impact assessment. In 1998, the 
Minister of Finance appointed a task team to advise him on the appropriateness of the money 
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 The countries to which electronic transfers can be made are Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, Kenya, St. Helena and 
Zambia. Postal money orders can be sent to the United Kingdom, Jersey, Botswana, Kenya, St. Helena, Zambia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Switzerland and Sri Lanka. 
212
 Section 3.2.2 of the Exchange Control Manaul issued by the SARB. 
213
  For the development of the framework, see De Koker South African Money laundering and terror financing law (Service Issue 7, 
2007) Chapter 2. 
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control laundering bill. The task team consulted widely but owing to the fact that there was a 
lack of hard statistics and research available, could not accurately assess how the Bill would 
impact on FSPs. Some assumptions were made about the ability of banks to comply which 
later proved incorrect.  
FICA forms the framework for the current AML compliance regime. The draft bill eventually 
served as the basis for the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA), 2001 which is the key 
piece of AML legislation. A more detailed description of the main obligations imposed by FICA 
is set out below in Table 12.  
FICA regulations require identity and address verification. The regulations to FICA (now known 
as the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations) were drafted during the 
course of 2002 in consultation with relevant stakeholders. Amongst others, the regulations set 
out the identification and verification requirements for various types of clients. The standard 
requirement in respect of natural persons is that banks must verify the identity of a client by 
means of an identity document and by comparing the person‟s residential address details with 
information that is reasonably practical to obtain and can reasonably be expected to achieve 
such verification.  
Producing an identity document not an insurmountable barrier to most clients. The identity 
document was an obvious choice for identification because South Africa has a national identity 
system and most citizens and residents have access to an identity document.  
Address verification as additional check on identity proved difficult. However, law enforcement 
agencies wanted the regulations under FICA to insist that clients produce more than an identity 
document in order to make it more difficult for launderers and terrorists to commit identity fraud. 
The address verification requirement appears to have been chosen to act as such a safeguard. 
The drafters did in fact identify address verification as a potential obstacle for the poor. As a 
result, the regulations were drafted to include a specific exemption (Exemption 17) which 
relieved institutions of the obligation to obtain and verify residential addresses if the financial 
product in question met certain stringent criteria. This exemption was later modified because, 
while the initial exemption was in itself a prescient achievement, the relief offered was subject 
to conditions that proved impractical for both poor clients and banks.  
Implementation schedule was not based on research about the financial sector‟s capacity or on 
workable timelines. When the regulations to FICA were released on 20 December 2002, banks 
were faced with a huge compliance challenge. Although the core duties were set out in FICA 
itself, the banks were not able to design and implement any compliance processes before the 
detail was made available in the regulation. So when the regulations to the FICA were 
released, the banks effectively had six months to redesign their internal systems before all new 
clients had to be properly identified and verified (30 June 2003) and only 18 months to 
simultaneously complete the identification and verification requirements in respect of all 
existing clients (30 June 2004).  
New procedures and systems had to be developed and implemented, which included the 
drafting of training materials and training of between 120,000 to 140,000 staff members across 
the industry. Although the banks largely succeeded in reaching their target date for the 
identification and verification of new clients, it placed great strain on their internal compliance 
resources. According to National Treasury, these timelines were based on information provided 
by the banks themselves.  
Potential for pro-access outcomes of bank consultation in drafting process undermined by 
compliance focus. Little research was available at the time on the financial services needs and 
transaction patterns of the unbanked. The regulations were formulated in consultation with 
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banks but the key input was provided by staff who lacked sufficient knowledge about the 
unbanked market and their needs, to provide practical guidance to the drafters. It is natural for 
a banker to be familiar with the banked market, but far fewer bank employees are in a position 
to give meaningful views about the needs of the unbanked market. For limited impact on 
access is to be limited, such a view is vital.  
Discretion granted to banks not successful, as banks chose most conservative route. Certain 
unforeseeable bank practices made the account opening processes even more difficult than 
the drafters envisaged. Although the regulations had been crafted to include leeway for banks 
to accept alternate documents if the client was unable to produce an official identity document 
for an “acceptable reason”, some banks declined to exercise this leeway. Compliance officers 
were reluctant to leave the judgment as to what constitutes an acceptable reason in the hands 
of junior employees and tellers. Many compliance officers, whose job it is to mitigate risk, 
applied their discretion conservatively and drafted standard and rigid procedures that did not 
leave space for employee discretion. In addition, when it came to accepting certain documents 
for purposes of address verification, banks tended to be stricter in their approach than the 
regulator had envisaged. The high penalties for money laundering offences under South 
African law appear to be one of the main driving forces behind the conservative compliance 
approach. 
Guidance issued for clarification. The FIC attempted to address the uncertainty around 
acceptable documentation and a number of other issues by means of guidance notes issued in 
terms of FICA. These notes, the first of which was released on 30 April 2004, proved helpful 
where they provided institutions with an official interpretation of their statutory obligations, but 
were issued after institutions had formulated and implemented their initial procedures. 
Re-identification of existing clients even more challenging than new client identification. While 
identifying new clients brought its own challenges, it was the re-identification process of 
existing clients that proved most difficult. The industry had to apply the identification 
requirements to a national client base comprising millions of accounts - and they had to rely on 
voluntary cooperation by their clients. It is not clear why parliament decided that the process 
could and should be completed within one year after the FICA identification requirements for 
new clients came into effect. The statutory deadline may have been based on information 
obtained from the industry and assumptions made about the existing systems of banks and the 
quality of existing client records and interactions, which in fact were not as sophisticated, 
comprehensive and regular as assumed.  
Deadline extended and risk-based implementation introduced to prevent catastrophic impact 
on banking sector. By early 2004 it was clear that none of the larger banks would meet the 
deadline. Banks increased their expenditure on the process by engaging temporary staff and 
by keeping certain branches open after hours to assist clients who wished to present their 
verification documents. They found some clients were loath to attend at a branch to provide 
identity documentation, especially when they had been banking with the institution for many 
years. Some co-operated, understanding the reasons behind the requirement, but others 
simply ignored repeated requests to present the required document to their banks. Calls thus 
went out from the industry for an extension of the deadline, in the absence of which banks 
estimated they would have to freeze 80% of their accounts, a step posing great systemic risk to 
the banking system. In the month before the deadline, the Minister of Finance was convinced 
by the regulators and industry to step in. Thus a temporary and conditional exemption was 
issued that provided some relief to the institutions. This exemption reflected a risk-based 
approach in that it required banks to categorise their clients in terms of risk, and then re-identify 
high-risk clients within a few months, medium-risk over a longer period and low-risk clients over 
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an even longer period. The banks were given discretion to categorise their clients as they saw 
fit. The re-identification deadline expired in September 2006. 
Re-identification at considerable cost to banks. The exemption provided welcome respite to the 
industry, and indications are that banks succeeded in re-identifying the majority of 
accountholders. Even so, the re-identification project has been a massive and costly 
undertaking. Estimates of costs to the industry have been put by an independent consultant at 
least R600m ($85m) and other estimates range between R750m ($105m) and R1,5 billion 
($210m). It is clearly difficult to estimate this accurately. One of the Big Four banks reports that 
it had to employ 700 new staff in call centres and in branches to collect and copy 
documentation. These costs are in addition to the general expenditure in relation to money 
laundering control duties. Larger banks have purchased state-of-the-art management 
information and monitoring systems which can cost up to R30m ($4m) a piece – these will also 
enhance the banks‟ ability to understand their clients and manage risk more effectively. All 
banks have incurred costs in respect of increased training (though some training expenditure 
was shared because banks worked together to produce a standard set of training materials 
with government funding). The training material requires employees to spend at least a half 
day in training and also to undergo several assessments. Banks found that they had to invest 
thousands of person days on AML/CFT training to meet their new requirements. 
Finding appropriate exemptions for the poor. In the same period that banks were struggling to 
meet their re-identification obligations, the Big Four banks were developing the Mzansi account 
to meet their Charter obligations. By 2004 it was clear that the original Exemption 17 was not 
going to provide a suitable framework for this product because it did not take into account the 
product needs of the poor. Research conducted in the FinScope survey gave a much clearer 
picture of these needs. It enabled the drafting of a new Exemption 17. This did away with the 
address verification requirements on accounts where the balance does not exceed R25,000 
($3,300) and in which individual transactions do not exceed R5,000 ($660). This exemption 
also covers certain single transactions that meet the criteria of the exemption. The new 
Exemption 17 allowed the launch of the Mzansi account. As mentioned, this account has been 
opened by more than 3m people in the past two years. 
The state of AML/CFT presently 
AML law as its stands in SA is mainly set out in FICA. FICA imposes on so-called “accountable 
institutions”, which range from banks to lawyers to casinos, the duty to obtain and verify the 
identity of their clients, to keep records and to put in place the internal procedures necessary to 
combat money laundering. These institutions, together with all other businesses in South 
Africa, also have the duty to report suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Centre 
(FIC) that was set up by FICA.  
CFT introduced in 2004. The current AML/CFT framework was completed when South Africa 
criminalised terrorist financing as part of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities (POCDATARA) Act of 2004. This act ensures that South 
African law complies with the core FATF recommendations on terrorist financing. 
A brief analysis of how the elements of FATF recommendations have been implemented in 
South African law under FICA and POCDATARA is provided in Table 12. 
Dealing with cell phone banking 
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Regulation adapted to accommodate technological banking innovation. As markets shift and 
new products and technologies emerge, so the need arises for policymakers to revisit the 
AML/CFT regime. One new development in South Africa has been the introduction of cell-
phone banking. By its very nature cell-phone banking relies on paperless and convenient non-
face-to-face client origination. How then to originate new clients while complying with KYC 
requirements? A solution was approved by the regulator for products that fell within the ambit 
of Exemption 17
214
 which allows non-face-to-face registration of clients by obtaining from the 
client his or her identity without having to verify address. However, because the regulator is of 
the view that this model introduces higher AML risk, the product is required, amongst others, to 
meet the conditions of Exemption 17 and to limit debits from such accounts to R1,000 ($130) a 
day. The bank must also obtain a national identity number from the client and then cross-
reference this against third-party databases including those of the Department of Home Affairs. 
It is not yet clear whether the use of credit bureau databases and the voters‟ role would also be 
acceptable. 
Undermining of flexibility by other regulatory developments underlines importance of holistic 
policy framework. Cell phone banking is also subject to other regulatory developments relating 
to the cell phone industry. A bill was introduced to parliament in 2006 to amend the Regulation 
of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act, 
2002. The bill provides for registration of cellular phones and SIM cards. At their own cost, 
telecommunication service providers will be required to provide a system of information 
storage, giving full names, identity numbers, and addresses of all subscribers. They would 
have to verify the full names and identity number of the owner with reference to his or her 
identification document and require the client to submit documentation in which his or her 
residential and business addressed are identified to the satisfaction of the service provider. 
The cell phone banking industry took cognisance of the impact of the bill at a very late stage. In 
essence, the bill, if passed into law, would neutralise in respect of the mass market the space 
that was created by Exemption 17.  
Other regulations may also pose unforeseen issues for AM/CFT regulation to deal with. 
Despite the earlier compliance challenges, the South African money laundering and terrorist 
financing control laws appear now to be embedded within the legal and regulatory structure. 
The money laundering control laws have developed into important tools to combat crime. In 
certain cases, however, the government has had to view the laws in their broader law 
enforcement context and therefore treat AML/CFT regulation with some flexibility to not 
undermine policy goals as encapsulated in other legislation. 
For instance: compliance exemptions had to be created to support specific amnesty schemes. 
South Africa had strict exchange controls in the past and, despite some relaxation, this system 
remains. In the 1970s and 1980s exchange controls were often evaded by persons who 
wished to shield assets from political risks. Tax morality was also low. The new government 
invested in building the capacity of the revenue authority and in changing the national mindset 
about tax morality. After tax revenues increased dramatically, the government declared an 
exchange control and tax amnesty that allowed persons to legitimise property that they held in 
violation of exchange controls. Many applicants had to utilise the services of a financial advisor 
in this regard. Under FICA, however, a financial adviser had an obligation to report such a 
client to the FIC. Government therefore created a temporary and limited exemption from such 
reporting duties to promote the success of the scheme. More than 42 672 amnesty applications 
involving nearly R68,6 bn ($9bn) was received. This amnesty was followed by a tax amnesty 
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for small businesses in 2006, and a similar exemption was created in October 2006 for the 
same reason. 
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FATF 
Essence of 
recommendation 
Given effect in SA law 
by: 
What is required of accountable institutions to comply with the AML law? 
R5 
Perform client due 
diligence 
S21 FICA, read with 
regulations and 
guidance notes 
For an ordinary bank account 
For SA citizens and legal residents: 1) Obtain client's name, date of birth (DoB), identity 
number, and verify these against official Identity document, or if client has no official ID for an 
acceptable reason, other suitable photographic ID. 2) Obtain residential address details and 
verify against recommended proof of address document  
For foreign nationals: 1) Obtain client's identity details, and verify them against official 
passport. 2) Obtain address details - no need for address verification  
For legal persons: Obtain name, address, registration number, legal form of legal person, and 
registered address (verify against founding document) , and names, DoB and identity of CEO,  
and representative (verify against ID document), and address of representative (no need to 
verify) as well as particulars of major shareholders (verified as required for natural and legal 
persons) 
For Exemption 17 account 
For SA citizens and legal residents: Obtain client's name, DoB, and identity number, and 
verify them against official identity document, or if client has no official ID document for an 
acceptable reason, other suitable photographic ID. No address requirements 
For foreign nationals: cannot open Exemption 17 account ("citizen and residents" only - 
meaning of resident likely to be taken as permanent residents only) 
For person to person cross 
border remittance  
Same as ordinary bank account above. This applies to both originators sending money, and 
beneficiaries in SA receiving money. Note: cross border cash transfers are also subject to the 
foreign exchange control rules which require identity to be verified against ID document, and 
for address, contact details, and reason for foreign exchange transaction to be obtained 
For Exemption 17 remittance Exemption 17 can only be used to make domestic remittances, not cross-border 
R10 
Firms must maintain all 
records for five years  
S22, 23 FICA  read with 
regulations and 
guidance notes 
For ordinary bank account 
A record must be kept of documents used to verify identity and address particulars as well as 
transaction details; records must be kept for five years after business relationship ended 
For Exemption 17 account 
A record must be kept of documents used to verify identity and address particulars as well as 
transaction details; records must be kept for five years after business relationship ended 
For cross border remittance 
A record must be kept of documents used to verify identity and address particulars as well as 
transaction details; records must be kept for five years after transaction 
For Exemption 17 remittance 
A record must be kept of documents used to verify identity and address particulars as well as 
transaction details; records must be kept for five years after transaction 
R13 
Firms must report 
suspicious transactions to 
the FIU 
S29 FICA  n/a 
A firm must have systems in place to monitor and identify suspicious transactions. These 
must be reported electronically to the FIC using their website 
SRIV 
Firms must report 
suspicious transactions 
related to TF 
S 29 FICA and s 12 of 
POCDATARA 
 n/a 
All businesses must file reports with the FIC and the South African Police Service regarding 
suspected terrorist financing, including persons of the UN SC list. (In terms of S28A of FICA 
accountable institutions must report to the FIC if they possess or control property linked to 
terrorist activity.)  
S 28A of FICA  n/a 
A firm must report to the FIC if it possesses or controls property linked to terrorist activity, 
including persons on the UN SC list 
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FATF 
Essence of 
recommendation 
Given effect in SA law 
by: 
What is required of accountable institutions to comply with the AML law? 
R15 
Policies and training for 
firms  
S49 FICA  n/a 
Firms must formulate and implement policy document and AML/CFT internal rules; employees 
must be trained; compliance officer must be appointed 
R11 
Firms must pay special 
attention to complex, 
unusual, large transactions 
S29, 52 FICA  n/a 
All businesses and employees (irrespective of size or type) must be vigilant and must file 
reports, if suspicious. 
R21 
Firms must give special 
attention to transactions 
linked to NCCT 
No statutory obligation  n/a 
No statutory obligation, but firms comply anyway because of reputational risk. They perform 
CDD duties on correspondents. Relationships have been terminated. 
R7 
Ensure integrity of cross-
border correspondent 
relationships 
No statutory obligation. 
Guidance note 3 from 
FIC urges compliance 
but this has no force of 
law.  
 n/a 
No statutory obligation. Firms comply anyway because of reputational risk. They perform CDD 
duties on correspondents. Relationships have been terminated. 
R8 
Firms must pay special 
attention to threats that 
may arise from new 
technologies 
No statutory obligation. 
Guidance note 3 from 
FIC urges compliance 
but this has no force of 
law.  
 n/a 
No statutory obligation. Firms comply anyway because of reputational risk. Common sense 
measures are taken. 
R22 
Branches and subsidiaries 
must apply 
recommendation to the 
extent permitted  
No statutory obligation.   n/a 
No statutory obligation, but firms comply anyway because of reputational risk. Foreign 
branches are expected to comply to SA standard or their own AML/CFT laws, whichever is 
higher. Common sense allowance is made for local conditions. 
R19 
Govt-run threshold 
transaction reporting 
regime 
Not in force  n/a Not in force 
SPVII 
Accurate and meaningful 
originator information to 
accompany wire transfers  
S21 FICA  n/a 
The same ID and verification procedures apply as listed for cross-border remittances above 
(R5). 
SRIX 
Regulate and police 
physical cross-border 
transportation of currency  
1) Exchange control 
regulations. 2) Customs 
law.  
 n/a 
1) Exchange control regulations control the transfer of currency out the country 2) In addition; 
travelers are required to provide information, including the amount of cash as well as the 
denomination of notes, as part of customs declaration when they enter the country.  
Table 12: FATF recommendations in South Africa law 
Source: Genesis; laws of South Africa 
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KEY FINDINGS 
Policy priority on access and willingness to compromise minimises access barriers 
Compromises reached to meet both AML and access goals. South Africa is strongly committed 
to complying with the FATF recommendations and increasing levels of access and has 
adopted some pragmatic compromises to accommodate both.  
Initial impact of legislation on access was underestimated 
Role of access research. At the time of the initial drafting of AML/CFT legislation, little research 
was available on the financial needs and transaction patterns of the unbanked. Although the 
legislation was formulated in consultation with banks, the key input was provided by staff that 
lacked sufficient knowledge about the unbanked market and its needs. Certain assumptions 
were made about the ability of banks to comply which later proved incorrect. Moreover, the first 
Exemption 17 offered relief that proved inappropriate to meet the financial needs of the poor. 
Research conducted through the FinScope survey gave a much clearer picture of these needs, 
which enabled the re-drafting of a more appropriate Exemption 17. This, in turn, facilitated the 
launch of the popular Mzansi account. 
Where FSPs were given discretion, they tended to the more conservative option. The 
regulations to FICA were crafted to include leeway for banks to accept alternate KYC 
documents. However, banks in general declined to utilise this space because they were 
reluctant to place discretion in the hands of junior employees. Compliance officers applied their 
discretion conservatively and drafted standard and rigid procedures that did not leave space for 
employee discretion, even though it was available in the law. The conservative compliance 
approach seems to be driven in part by the draconian penalties for money laundering offences, 
including offences of negligence. 
The impact of FATF recommendations on bank accounts 
Exemption 17 (as amended) helped to minimise impact on access. While the requirement to 
verify residential address with documentary evidence initially posed a major barrier, its impact 
has been greatly softened by the introduction of the pragmatically amended Exemption 17 
which does away with the requirements for low-value, low-risk accounts. KYC requirements 
now create limited barriers for access to basic bank accounts. 
AML/CFT legislation unlikely to impact on the affordability of low-income bank accounts. There 
are no indications that FICA and other AML/CFT legislation is impacting directly on the 
affordability of basic accounts. This is not to say that significant compliance costs have not 
being incurred by FSPs. Some banks interviewed indicated that costs of this magnitude will 
eventually feed back to clients but it is unlikely, in our view, to impact on the affordability of low-
income accounts because of the political imperatives on banks to retain these accounts. It is 
more likely that costs will filter back to middle- and upper-end bank users, with no loss of 
access to low-income users. The counterbalancing access policy objective has thus protected 
low-end users from an increase in charges. 
Regulatory ID barriers do pose a barrier for undocumented migrants. A citizen or legal resident 
must, as a general rule, produce an official identity document to open an account or to transfer 
money (a foreigner must produce a passport). This excludes any person who is present in the 
country without documentation (conservatively estimated at 2.5m people). 
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The impact of FATF recommendations on remittance services 
Foreign exchange rules limit competition in the formal sector. Cross-border money transfers 
can only be undertaken by a bank or entity acting in partnership with a bank. The sector is thus 
not competitive or well diversified. 
Verification remains a barrier for walk-in remittances. In terms of FICA, a walk-in client must 
produce an identity document as well as proof of address. These are the same requirements 
as when opening a (non-Exemption 17) account. Though an exemption was created to do 
away with the address requirements on the opening of low-value bank accounts (Exemption 
17), the equivalent exemption was not carried through to cross-border money transfers. Full 
identification and verification are required for transfers, as well as full observance by the 
institution of the other AML/CFT requirements (i.e. record-keeping and reporting of suspicious 
transactions). Proving residential address remains problematic for those without a formal 
address or without the ability to prove their address.  
Confusion around keeping copies raises costs for some institutions with knock-on effects on 
access: The compliance duties on FSPs can push up costs, making small remittance transfers 
unattractive or even unviable. We have seen some evidence of this. Many South African 
institutions adopted the practice of photocopying identity documents presented as verification. 
FICA, by contract, only requires a record to be kept of the documents that were used to verify a 
client's identity. Some institutions regard this as a best practice procedure while others are 
under the impression that it is actually required by FICA. An interview with one of the Big Four 
banks revealed that 80% of walk-in remittance business constitutes small transfers of less than 
R500 ($70). The bank in question found that considering the diminutive profit made on such 
transfers, it was not viable to take a copy of the identity document and address verification 
document. Instead, the bank resorts to only capturing identity details (not keeping any copies). 
Although this practice was compliant with their statutory obligations, the bank was under the 
impression that its practice breached the law. In cases like this, open communication channels 
between the regulator/supervisor and FSPs could assist in eliminating the use of overly 
conservative practices. 
Regulatory ID barriers exclude undocumented migrants from formal remittance services. 
Undocumented migrants will be excluded from the formal money transfer system on the basis 
of the documentation requirements, since they are unlikely to be able to provide documentary 
proof of their residential address (note that they also face the non-FATF barrier of proving the 
legality of their stay in the country to be able to purchase foreign exchange – a requirement of 
the Exchange Control regulations). This group consists of about 2.5m individuals that will have 
no access to formal remittance services, yet have a very strong need for such services. 
Compliance with FATF requirements to monitor informal remittance sector virtually impossible. 
FATF recommends that governments regulate the informal remittance sector and detect if 
funds are being carried across the border illicitly. Considering the levels of money being carried 
in and out of South Africa and how unstructured the informal cash courier sector is, this would 
be difficult. Effective compliance will be costly as it will rely on individual searches of every 
person and vehicle crossing every border point. It would also be necessary in terms of the 
special recommendations to register or licence the hawalas that are presently operating under 
the radar. If the present regulatory regime for remittances is retained, a hawala would have to 
register as a corporate entity and then either register as a bank, or partner with a bank. The 
high capital requirements and the risk inherent in such a joint venture make both options 
unattractive. Effectively, these informal operators will be left with no space to operate legally 
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and would be forced to close down (if current regulation could be effectively enforced), with a 
concomitant loss of access to the services by their current users.  
Appendices  
 153 
 
 
APPENDIX G: CASE STUDIES  
In this part of the analysis, we consider three case studies illustrating respectively:  
 adjustments to the AML/CFT regime in the United Kingdom to facilitate access;  
 the potential for unintended access-consequences of AML/CFT, as witnessed in the United 
States; and  
 the interplay between AML/CFT technological innovation in the Philippines, with emphasis 
on how cell phone banking was implemented in an AML/CFT compliant way.  
Though there is no single theme cutting across the case studies, each represents an 
interesting aspect of AML/CFT from which potential lessons for other jurisdictions facing similar 
circumstances can be drawn
215
.   
ACCESS-FRIENDLY ADJUSTMENTS TO CDD IN THE UK 
This case study explores the recent changes in the UK CDD regime aimed at facilitating 
greater access to financial services.  
The case study illustrates that: 
 Access and unintended regulatory barriers to access are universal issues and not 
restricted to developing countries. 
 Even developed economies require on-going adjustments to ensure efficient regulation. 
 The UK regulator recently refined its AML/CFT systems to minimize unintended impacts on 
access 
 Initial discretionary approaches were not effective in a regulatory environment that 
engendered the conservative treatment of risks. 
 A risk-sensitive approach complemented by industry guidance was used to create more 
flexible system. 
 Account restrictions and monitoring could be used to compensate for imperfect 
identification systems. 
Access is a universal issue. Lack of access to formal financial services by vulnerable groups in 
society is by no means exclusively a developing country phenomenon. Similarly, the 
unintended impact of regulation access is an issue faced by developing and developed 
countries alike. This dynamic is illustrated by recent developments in the UK AML/CFT 
regulatory framework. 
AML/CFT constrains efforts of UK government to extend access. At the turn of the century the 
UK‟s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), the regulator of financial services, found that around 
1.5 million households (or 7% of the households) in Britain lacked any financial products at all 
and a further 4.4 million (or 20% of households) were on the margins of financial services and 
usually had little more than a bank account. In response, the UK government required banks to 
develop the Basic Bank Account to address exclusion from banking services. These accounts 
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are normally current accounts that exclude cheque or credit facilities but are linked to a cash 
card that allows withdrawals from ATMs. The government also required the large banks to 
allow the operation of their basic bank accounts through local post offices. By October 2000 
these accounts were available at all UK banks. Despite their general availability, the Basic 
Bank Accounts were not being taken up at the expected rate. Apart from a lack of 
information/consumer education, the stringency of AML/CFT client identification and 
verification (CIV) requirements were flagged as a stumbling block.  
The former identification and verification requirements 
In the absence of a national identification card, reliance is placed on alternative documents to 
verify identity. The UK lacks a national identification system. The Identity Cards Act was only 
enacted in March 2006 and the first identity cards are expected to be issued in 2008/2009. As 
a consequence CIV requirements that were document-based were set by the government and 
supported by guidance formulated by key representatives of the financial services sector. The 
government requirements were set out in the Money Laundering Regulations and the FSA 
Handbook, while industry guidance was contained in the previous set of Guidance Notes 
issued by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group. In essence, this system required a 
prospective client to produce at least one document (e.g. a passport or driving licence) to verify 
his name and another document (e.g. a utility or council tax bill) to verify his residential 
address. The standard identification system therefore relied on two documents of which one 
verified a person‟s identity and the other his residential address. 
References accepted by exception for those without required documentation. It was realised 
that this system may create an access barrier for those who lacked the standard identification 
requirements. The FSA Handbook therefore allowed a firm to accept a single, alternative 
document if it had reasonable grounds to conclude that an individual client was not able to 
produce the standard evidence of his identity and could not reasonably be expected to do so. 
In such a case the firm was allowed to accept as verification evidence a letter or statement 
from a person in a position of responsibility who knew the client, that tended to show that the 
client was who he said he was and that confirmed his permanent address if he had one. 
Examples of persons in a position of responsibility included solicitors, doctors, ministers of 
religion, teachers, hostel managers and social workers. A firm that wished to employ this 
measure had to keep a record of its reasons for doing so. 
“Fear factor” undermines discretionary space created in support of access. Despite the 
availability of this simplified CIV procedure, the CIV requirements still had an adverse effect on 
access to financial services. It seemed as if banks opted for a conservative approach to client 
due diligence (Financial Services Consumer Panel, 2002). Firms indicated that the FSA‟s 
supervisory approach and enforcement actions caused them to take a very conservative 
approach to CIV procedures to reduce the likelihood of regulatory sanctions (FSA, 2005). The 
FSA refer to this phenomenon as the “fear factor”.  
Move to risk-sensitive approach. In 2004 the FSA began to reconsider the CIV requirements. 
Apart from exacerbating financial exclusion the two document verification system appeared to 
be unnecessarily onerous and expensive, while not necessarily adding proportional value. The 
FSA formed an ID working group and they indicated, for instance, that the second document 
may add limited additional corroborative value as many of these documents, such as utility 
bills, can be easily forged (FSA, 2004). In addition, the FSA began to consider a new approach 
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to compliance and supervision. In terms of its regulatory model the FSA determined rules and 
procedures based on its general analysis of risk. The premise was that a company would 
mitigate its risks if it complied with the rules. However, in many cases such a rule-based 
system would not mitigate a particular company‟s unique risks. In other cases the rules would 
be unnecessarily onerous, given the company‟s low risk profile. The FSA therefore decided to 
adopt a risk-sensitive system that recognises the responsibility of the management of a 
regulated financial services provider to manage the AML/CFT risks of their business. 
The risk-sensitive approach 
Rules replaced by principles. In 2006 the new regulatory approach as well as new approach to 
CIV was introduced. In terms of the new regulatory approach regulated firms are expected to 
assess their AML/CFT risks and to adopt proportionate and appropriate measures to mitigate 
those risks. The FSA simplified and streamlined much of its detailed money laundering 
guidance. In essence, it replaced it with high-level principles that regulated providers must 
uphold. The key industry role-players, grouped together in the Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group, issued a new set of Guidance Notes to assist firms to design, implement and 
monitor their AML/CFT risk controls. Firms are not compelled to implement the guidance, but it 
has been accepted by the UK Treasury and firms are at least expected to take cognisance of 
the contents of the guidance notes.  
Firms expected to implement reasonable measures to manage their risks. In terms of the new 
approach a firm is required by the FSA principles to consider and mitigate its AML/CFT risks. 
Every firm must adopt control measures that comply with the law (e.g legal duties such as 
client identification, verification, monitoring and record-keeping) and the principles set by the 
FSA. When designing and implementing its controls, the firm should consider industry 
guidance and practices. This would imply that a firm would recognise that some clients may 
pose a higher risk than others and that more controls need to be applied to the higher-risk 
clients and their transactions. A firm may, however, decide to design unique controls if it 
believes that such controls are required to manage its unique risks effectively. The FSA 
addressed the “fear factor” by stating on record that a risk-sensitive approach means that 
things may sometimes go wrong. It accepted that zero failure is impossible to achieve and that 
a zero failure objective may make for bad regulation. If the firm therefore misjudges risk, 
enforcement action would be unlikely as long as it acted reasonably and its decisions were 
informed by industry guidance and other relevant facts. 
The new identification and verification requirements 
Range of CIV options allowed. The new system allows firms a range of options in relation to 
CIV requirements. The JMLSG Guidance Notes:  
 increased the number of circumstances where firms may rely on a single document for 
purposes of verification, rather than the standard two documents;  
 recognised the use of electronic ID verification methods, where appropriate;  
 provided a range for clients who do not have standard identity documents such as 
passports; and  
 puts less reliance on ID checks and more on wider KYC procedures and monitoring.  
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Range of acceptable documents expanded and made more explicit. According to the Guidance 
Notes, a firm should obtain a personal client‟s full name, residential address and date of birth. 
The information should be verified by means of a documentation produced by the client or 
should be verified electronically by the firm or by a combination of the two methods. If identity 
is verified electronically, the firm could perform the procedures directly or through a service 
provider. One match on an individual‟s full names and current address and a second match on 
an individual‟s full name and either his current address or his date of birth would normally 
provide reasonable assurance in this regard. If reliance is placed on a document produced by 
the client, a valid passport or photocard driving licence should enable most individuals to meet 
the new verification requirements in face-to-face situations. The Guidance Notes provide a list 
of alternative documents for persons who may struggle to meet the standard requirements. 
The Notes indicate specifically that these documents will generally be appropriate for opening 
a Basic Banking Account. Examples of categories of clients and acceptable documentation 
include the following: 
 In respect of those in care homes/sheltered accommodation/refuge - a letter from care 
home manager/warden of sheltered accommodation or refuge;  
 In respect of homeless persons who cannot provide standard identification documentation - 
a letter from the warden of a homeless shelter, or from an employer if the client is in work; 
and 
 In respect of travelers who are not able to produce standard identification evidence - a 
check with the local authority, which has to register travellers‟ sites, may sometimes be 
helpful to verify a person‟s address. 
Any such documents must be current and letters must be of recent date.  All documents must 
be originals. In case of need, consideration should be given to verifying the authenticity of the 
document with its issuer. As with all retail clients, firms should take reasonable care to check 
that documents offered are genuine (not obviously forged), and where these incorporate 
photographs, that these correspond to the presenter. 
Account restrictions and monitoring to facilitate access where limited identification is possible. 
The new scheme again makes specific provision for those who are financially excluded. The 
Guidance Notes advise firms that staff should be discouraged from citing the Money 
Laundering Regulations as an excuse for not opening an account when a prospective client 
produces non-standard documents. Employees should rather be guided to give proper 
consideration to the available evidence and refer the matter to management for advice, if 
necessary. If a firm concludes that an individual client cannot reasonably meet the standard 
identification requirement or furnish any of the standard or listed alternative documents it may 
accept as identification evidence a letter or statement from an appropriate person who knows 
the individual, that indicates that the person is who he says he is. On the other hand, the 
Guidance Notes also recognise that the “financially excluded” are not a homogenous category 
of uniform risk. Some financially excluded persons may represent a higher AML/CFT risk 
regardless of whether they provide standard or non-standard documents to verify their identity. 
In this regard firms may wish to consider whether additional KYC information or monitoring of 
the size and expected volume of transactions would be useful control measures in respect of 
some financially excluded categories. In other cases, where the available evidence of identity 
is limited and the firm judges that the individual cannot reasonably be expected to provide 
more, it should consider instituting enhanced monitoring arrangements over the client‟s 
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transactions and activity. In addition, the firm should consider whether restrictions should be 
placed on the client‟s ability to migrate to other, higher risk products or services. 
Conclusion 
The initial approach of the UK regulator resulted in unintended and unnecessary barriers to 
access. Firms indicated that their reluctance to apply their discretion to extend services to 
clients that lacked the standard identification documents was caused by their fear of the FSA‟s 
supervisory approach and enforcement action. 
In response, the UK introduced a more flexible system of identification and verification. One of 
the objectives with the new system is to facilitate access to financial services. The FSA argues 
that this system will prove more effective to counter money laundering and terrorist financing 
than a rule-based system. It focuses on risk and requires the firms, which are in the best 
position to judge their risks, to assess and manage those risks. The system is new and its 
effectiveness could only be assessed at a future date. However, the UK financial sector 
reacted very positively to the new regime and there are encouraging signs that the FSA 
identified key elements of a proportional and effective AML/CFT system. 
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MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES 
This case study explores the impact that AML/CFT regulation has had on the relationship 
between Money Service Businesses (MSBs) and banks in the United States. 
This case study illustrates that: 
 The impact of AML/CFT on access is not exclusively a developing country concern 
 Regulation may indirectly impact on access by severing the link between banks and the 
financial service providers serving lower-income groups and migrants. This has been the 
case with MSBs in the United States.  
 The US financial sector regulators are aware of the problem and it has prompted them to 
issue guidance allowing banks the scope to apply a risk-sensitive categorisation of MSB 
clients 
 However, even with clear guidance, a risk-sensitive approach may incentivise an overly 
conservative approach by banks 
 This illustrates that utilising banks as enforcers of regulation subjects implementation to 
narrow commercial objectives 
Access to financial services is often facilitated through a variety of intermediary organisations. 
One such category of intermediaries is MSBs, who utilise the banking sector to provide 
remittance services to (often low-income) immigrant populations. This case study considers the 
impact that anti-money laundering regulation has had on the relationship between banks and 
MSBs and, thereby, on the ability of MSBs to operate. 
Over the past few years, anti-money laundering regulation has resulted in many US banks 
closing down MSB accounts due to the perceived risk of such accounts. Only a few still offer 
banking services to MSBs making it difficult and costly for MSBs to operate. This is the 
unintended result of regulatory attempts to manage money laundering risk and illustrates the 
dangers of following a risk-sensitive approach. It furthermore emphasises the possible 
unintended consequences, should regulation create uncertainty that leads to fear of regulatory 
sanction or reputational risk.  
The following discussion introduces MSBs and the chain of events leading to the current 
situation. We place particular emphasis on how the federal banking agencies
216
 tried to rectify 
the impact on access by issuing guidance on following a risk-sensitive approach and, 
importantly, why the guidance did not have the desired effect.  
What are MSBs? A money services business is defined by the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) as any financial service provider: (i) dealing in or exchanging currency; (ii) 
cashing cheques; (iii) issuing, (iv) selling or redeeming traveller‟s cheques, money orders or 
stored value; or (v) transmitting money. Apart from money transmitters (to which no minimum 
threshold applies), such providers will only be regarded as MSBs, should they engage in 
transactions exceeding $1,000 per client per day in any number of transactions (FinCEN, 
2005a).  
                                                     
216
 Consisting of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network, the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision. 
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Money transmitters are an important MSB category: there are in excess of 23,000 licensed and 
regulated remitters, as well as a further estimated 20,000 informal remittance businesses in the 
USA operating from convenience stores, restaurants and small shops (Forbes.com, 2005). It is 
estimated that the 40 MSBs who are members of the National Money Transmitter‟s Association 
(NMTA) alone were responsible for $14bn in cross-border remittances in 2004. 
MSBs serve predominantly immigrant and lower-income communities. FinCEN notes that 
MSBs “provide valuable financial services, especially to individuals who may not have ready 
access to the formal banking sector” (FinCEN, 2005b). 
Regulatory set-up. MSBs in the USA are licensed at state level, but are required to register 
with the Department of the Treasury (represented by FinCEN) at the federal level
217
. MSBs, 
like other FSPs, are subject to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)
218
 of 1970 (as amended) and the 
USA Patriot
219
 Act of 2001. Under the BSA, MSBs are required to have an AML programme 
and, for transactions above certain thresholds, to record and verify clients‟ identity and 
address, file CTRs and STRs and keep records (FinCEN, 2006b)
220
.  
Banks are required to apply due diligence to MSB accounts. MSBs manage the cross-border 
payment instructions relating to the transaction and receive or pay out cash, but require a bank 
account to settle transactions and store money. Under banks‟ BSA requirements, they must 
apply the following minimum due diligence when opening and maintaining accounts for MSBs 
(Federal Banking Agencies, 2005b): 
 apply the banking organisation‟s Client Identification Programme; 
 confirm FinCEN registration, if required; 
 confirm compliance with state or local licensing requirements, if applicable; 
 confirm agent status, if applicable and 
 conduct a basic Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering risk assessment to determine 
the level of risk associated with the account and whether further due diligence is 
necessary. 
Banks are uncertain on how to respond to their MSB-related obligations under the BSA and 
USA Patriot Act as it relates to their relationship with MSBs. This uncertainty is the result of the 
strict requirements for bank examination purposes (which would tend to classify banks with 
MSB accounts as “high BSA risk”
221
, even though banks may argue that they have applied the 
basic due diligence as required in the legislation) and, importantly, the illustration of risk when 
first JP Morgan Chase (in late 2004) and later the Bank of America were prosecuted or 
threatened with prosecution for holding an account for MSBs suspected to be involved in 
money laundering. Bank of America subsequently closed all MSB accounts in early 2006, 
including those of Western Union and MoneyGram. These instances have increased the 
regulatory pressure on banks.  
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 As Passas (2006) notes, there is no standard regulation of MSBs across states and licensing procedures differ from state to state. 
218
 Supervised by the Internal Revenue Service (FinCEN, 2006a). 
219
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. 
220
Identity should be verified by means of an acceptable identification document for transactions amounting to more than $10,000 (refer 
to 31 CFR103:22 and 103:28); CTRs are to be filed for cash transaction amounts exceeding $10,000 per client per day (from $3,000 per 
client per day in the case of traveller‟s cheques or money order cashing); STRs should be filed for suspicious transactions of more than 
$2,000 in value; and records are to be kept of money transfers of more than $3,000 per client in any one day, or currency exchanges in 
excess of $1,000 per client per day. 
221
 One of the criteria stipulated in the BSA AML manual for bank examiners in whether a bank should be regarded as posing high 
BSA/AML risk, is “… a large number of high-risk clients and businesses.  These may include check cashers, convenience stores, 
money transmitters, casas de cambio, import or export companies, offshore corporations, PEPs, NRAs, and foreign individuals. 
Conducting a significant amount of businesses with “high-risk” geographic locations, is also deemed a high-risk indicator. Remittances, 
even for legitimate purposes, are often sent to such countries (NMTA, 2006). 
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To avoid the risk, many banks proceeded to close all MSB accounts. In the words of the 
Federal Banking Agencies: “money services businesses are losing access to banking services 
as a result of concern about regulatory scrutiny, the risks presented by money services 
business accounts, and the costs and burdens associated with maintaining such accounts” 
(Federal Banking Agencies, 2005a). MSBs have objected to this trend arguing that legitimate 
businesses are cut off from banking services, thereby denying access to financial services to 
clients that are not served by the banking sector. These clients are likely to resort to other 
informal means should they no longer be able to use MSBs (American Banker, 2005; NMTA, 
2005a).  
A recent World Bank survey of MSBs in the United States (Andreassen, 2006) ranks getting 
access to, maintaining or opening accounts with banks as the main obstacle experienced by 
MSBs in their business environment. AML requirements rank fourth: 40% of firms noted AML 
as one of their main expenses, while 50% reported that it is necessary to hire outside expertise 
to meet AML standards (Andreassen, 2006). 
Federal banking agencies issued guidance to curb the trend. In March 2005 the federal 
banking agencies convened a fact-finding meeting
222
 during which banking institutions made 
submissions regarding the cost and difficulty of identifying and monitoring MSBs, as well as the 
increased regulatory and reputational risk that they associate with this duty (FinCEN, 2006a). 
Following the meeting, the federal banking agencies issued a joint statement (on 30 March 
2005) to reiterate the importance of granting access to banking services to law-abiding MSBs. 
According to the statement, the closing of MSB accounts is due to “a misperception of the 
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and the erroneous view that money services businesses 
present a uniform and unacceptably high risk of money laundering and other illicit activities”. In 
April 2005, the federal banking agencies also issued a guidance note with the purpose of 
addressing the fears that banks were required to act as de facto regulators of MSBs and to 
create clarity as to what is expected of banks in terms of their MSB clients. The guidance note 
states that “it is essential that banking organisations neither define nor treat all money services 
businesses as posing the same level of risk”.  
Guidance advocates a risk-sensitive approach. According to the guidance, banks must know 
the business of their MSB clients. This includes: 
 the types of products and services offered by MSBs; 
 the location(s) and market(s) served by MSBs; 
 anticipated account activity; and 
 the purpose of the account. 
Using this information, banks need to classify their MSB clients as either low or high risk. The 
guidance also provides examples of risk indicators. Where an MSB is classified as high-risk, 
enhanced due diligence is required. This may include a review of the MSB‟s AML programme, 
on-site visits, a review of the list of agents and their locations serviced by the MSB account, a 
review of the written procedures for the operation of the MSB, a review of written employee 
screening practices for the MSB, etc. These steps are explained in the guidance note to the 
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act as the minimum steps that banking organisations should 
take when providing banking services to MSBs.  
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 Jointly hosted by the Non-Bank Financial Institutions and the Examination subcommittees of the Bank Secrecy Act Advisor Group of 
the Federal Banking Agencies. 
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Banks not required to close MSB accounts. It is stated that “FinCEN and the Federal Banking 
Agencies do not expect banking organisations to act as the de facto regulators of the money 
services business industry” (Federal Banking Agencies, 2005b). Furthermore, banks are not 
required to close the accounts of MSBs that are subject to suspicious transaction reports or of 
high-risk MSB clients, even if it is found that they are not properly licensed. “The decision to 
maintain or close an account should be made by a banking organisation‟s management under 
standards and guidelines approved by its board of directors” (Federal Banking Agencies, 
2005b).  
Guidance note did not stem the closing of MSB accounts. In spite of the guidance, there have 
since been numerous cases of MSB bank accounts being closed. Between mid-2005 (when 
the guidance was issued) and mid-2006, at least three national banks as well as a number of 
state banks have ceased to offer banking services to MSBs (House Committee on Financial 
Services, 2006). The NMTA estimates that 90% of banks do not to accept MSBs as clients any 
more
223
.  
Why has the guidance not achieved its goals? The three main reasons quoted are: 
i. Uncertainty created by the risk-sensitive approach. MSBs have more often than not been 
classified under a blanket high-risk classification, as the guidance has not managed to 
remove banks‟ fear of regulatory action or reputational risk. The NMTA ascribes the lack of 
success of the guidance note to the fact that no clear limits were defined as to the level of 
due diligence required as “reasonable”, or the penalties banks will face. It is argued that 
the guidance is not specific enough and that words such as “reasonable” or “appropriate” is 
insufficient to create the right incentives for banks in the absence of clear minimum and 
maximum actions required of banks. Banks are given no sense of security (no guarantee 
against regulatory action, should they classify some MSBs as lower risk, e.g. based on the 
fact that they are licensed). Therefore banks still find it less risky to rather close such 
accounts.  
ii. Cost of enhanced due diligence for high-risk accounts. Once MSB accounts are classified 
as high risk, many banks have found the cost of monitoring and managing their relationship 
with them too high to continue keeping such accounts. Some banks, e.g. the Bank of 
Florida (as quoted in American Banker, 2005), have informed its MSB clients that it will 
charge them $975/month to monitor their accounts, in an effort to shift the cost of the 
requirements onto the MSB clients. Should they be unwilling or unable to afford such 
monthly fees, the account would need to be closed
224
.  
iii. Lack of uniform regulation applied to MSBs at the federal level. The regulatory scheme 
governing MSBs is claimed to be problematic. According to the NMTA: “despite its 
assertion that banks were not [the] de facto regulator, the Joint Guidance could not say 
who was [the] regulator because, at the federal level, [MSBs] have no functional regulator. 
Despite the assertion that „zero tolerance‟ was not being practiced, there was no onus lifted 
off the banks‟ shoulders” (NMTA, 2005b). The NMTA therefore advocates MSBs to be 
regulated at the federal level
225
 to provide a federal stamp of approval of the level of 
AML/CFT compliance, which banks can then accept for opening or maintaining an MSB 
                                                     
223
 The result has been that MSBs need to bulk up more and more cash before depositing it and then need to make use of armoured 
vehicle services to transit cash, often to another state, where it can be banked. The cost and liquidity implications for the industry have 
been severe (Landsman, 2006). 
224
 Note that this was according to letters sent out by the Bank of Florida to clients in August 2005, to take effect from 1 October 2005 – 
we have not been able to confirm whether this has, in fact, happened. 
225
 By means of voluntary, AML-centric federal certification of MSBs, non-pre-emptive of state licensure, which will be AML-centric 
(Landsman, 2006). 
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bank account. This would remove the burden on banks to classify MSBs into a certain risk 
category and to monitor accounts accordingly (which can be costly).  
As a result of continued concerns, there have been further public hearings (e.g. that by the 
Bachus Subcommittee of the House Committee on Financial Services to Review Effect of BSA 
on MSBs, on 21 June 2006) to ascertain the extent of the problem and devise strategies to 
address this. The verdict is however still out on the future of MSBs in the United States.  
Conclusion 
The impact of AML/CFT on access is not exclusively a developing country concern. The MSB 
situation in the United States illustrates that not only developing countries grapple with issues 
surrounding access to financial services. Even highly developed countries with sophisticated 
legislation drafting processes and well-equipped regulators may introduce regulations with 
unintended consequences for access. 
Even with clear guidance, a risk-sensitive approach may incentivise an overly conservative 
approach by banks. The case study has shown that, even though banks are allowed to classify 
MSB clients as high or low risk, their exposure to risk may guide them to opt for the most 
conservative option. Furthermore, determining risk categories and monitoring high-risk 
accounts is costly. Where MSBs are classified as high risk, the increased regulatory cost could 
undermine the profitability to the extent that it is no longer viable for the bank to maintain the 
relationship. A rule-based system where the state determines the risks and lays down the 
control measures in terms of clear rules and exemptions (e.g. transaction limits) or clear 
maximum measures to be taken by banks (e.g. verifying the licence) may prevent this problem. 
If an approach is followed where banks must determine the risk, rule-based exemptions for 
clearly-defined categories of low-value, low risk clients and transactions must be made, if this 
problem is to be avoided.  
Utilising banks as enforcers of regulation subjects implementation to narrow commercial 
objectives. Banks hold different and more narrowly defined (commercial) objectives compared 
to that of government policy. Where the state utilises banks to implement AML/CFT regulation, 
this results in a more conservative implementation of regulation, which lacks the temperance of 
impact achieved by counter-balancing government objectives such as social or market 
development.  
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BOX 4. COMPARISON OF APPROACHES: UK AND USA 
The above description of the chain of events relating to MSBs in the United States, in light of the discussion of the 
implementation of a risk-sensitive approach to client due diligence in the UK, begs the question: how do the 
approaches followed by regulators in the UK and the USA compare and why the different experiences? 
In both of these case studies the initial regulatory framework impacted on access. In the UK, the impact was felt on the 
individual client level due to difficulties in identity verification (though flexibility was allowed, the “fear factor” regarding 
enforcement prevented FSPs from using the scope available to them). In the USA case study, however, the access 
impact is experienced on the institutional level through the lack of access of MSBs to bank accounts. Thiscan then 
undermine MSBs‟ viability, which in turn can trickle down to the access of their clients (often immigrants and low-
income individuals) to formal sector money transfer services.  
Both of the case studies furthermore illustrate how government/regulatory entities realised the system‟s potential 
impact on access and acted to adapt the framework so as to rectify the situation. Different approaches were however 
followed in the two countries: 
 In the UK, the FSA streamlined and simplified its AML guidance, essentially replacing it with high-level principles 
to be upheld by regulated providers. The new set of guidance notes allow a broader range of options for client 
identification and verification, combined with account restrictions and monitoring to facilitate access where limited 
identification is possible. Importantly, the FSA addressed the “fear factor” by stating on record that a risk-sensitive 
approach means that zero failure is impossible – if a firm therefore misjudges risk, enforcement action would be 
unlikely as long as it acted reasonably and its decisions were informed by industry guidance and other relevant 
facts. 
 In the USA, likewise, guidance was issued to state that banks are required to followed a risk-sensitive approach in 
dealing with MSBs and that no banks are required to close MSB accounts, even if such accounts are found to be 
high-risk. Yet the desired effect has not been achieved and account closures have continued. This can be 
ascribed to the fact that, in contrast to the FSA, the federal banking agencies did not remove/reduce the 
responsibility placed on banks to correctly determine the nature of risk posed by their MSB clients. Therefore the 
guidance has not managed to remove banks‟ fear of regulatory action or reputational risk. Secondly, the guidance 
did not manage to reduce the costs to banks. Whereas in the UK a broader range of documents are now 
accepted, thereby making the requirements placed on them less onerous, the actions required of banks in the 
USA are expanded by the guidance: the onus is on banks to monitor MSB client accounts, ascertain the level of 
risk and manage their relationship with the MSB. Most banks have simply found the additional costs (coupled with 
the reputational and regulatory risk) too high vis-à-vis the revenue generated from such accounts, to maintain the 
accounts.  
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CELL-PHONE BANKING IN THE PHILIPPINES 
This case study explores the conflicts arising out of technological innovation and managing 
AML/CFT risks in compliance with the FATF standards. 
This case study illustrates: 
 The potential of cell-phone banking (and technological innovation more generally) to 
extend access to financial services 
 The dilemma facing regulators when that which they are regulating evolves quicker than 
the regulation itself and when non-bank entities such as telecoms companies want to 
provide services that are essentially banking services. 
 That the Philippines have managed to overcome this dilemma through a process of 
negotiated regulation incorporating identity verification by means of generally available 
documents, face-to-face origination and, importantly, transaction and account balance 
limits that were agreed between the regulators and the FSP. 
 In this way, money laundering and financing of terrorism risk is minimised (or at least not 
aggravated), while not undermining access to financial services. 
 
Cell-phone banking in the Philippines has enabled the extension of banking and remittance 
services to lower-income households previously not served by the formal banking sector. Cell-
phones have not only been used as communication device to effect transactions on an existing 
bank account but also to transform airtime systems into an innovative e-money payment 
system competing with the services offered by banks. All of this has been achieved in 
compliance with the AML/CFT regulation. The process through which this technology has been 
adopted presents an interesting picture of how regulators are dealing with the challenges of 
rapidly changing technology, harnessing the benefits while managing the risks. 
Two cell-phone providers (Globe Telecom and Smart Communications - between them 
accounting for more than 95% of the cell-phone market – Manila Times, 2006) have introduced 
two different business models involving different partnerships and with different regulatory 
characteristics. The evolution of these models alongside the regulatory adjustments required to 
facilitate this will be the focus of this case study.  
The rise of cell-phone banking in the Philippines 
Pioneering use of cell-phone technology in low-income market. The Philippines is a pioneer in 
using cell-phone technology to successfully extend financial services to the poor. More than 
other developing countries where this technology has been introduced
226
, the take-up in the 
low-income market has been significant. Although at 5m users the take-up is much lower than 
the total cell-phone population (36m), growth has been fast and there is much potential for 
expansion. 
Advanced assimilation and use of cell-phone technology. The country is considered to be the 
“texting capital of the world”, as its population of almost 89.5m
 
(CIA World Factbook, July 2006 
estimate) sends more than 300m SMS
227
 messages per day. 43% of the population has mobile 
phones and up to 95% is estimated to have access to a cell-phone through friends or family 
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 E.g. South Africa, Kenya, Zambia and the DRC. 
227
 “Short message service”, also commonly referred to as “text message” or “texting”. 
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(Forbes, 2006b). This is facilitated by the low cost of text messaging and the liquidity 
of the market for low-cost used handsets (Roman, 2006). The fact that mobile phone 
penetration is so much higher than the estimated 27% of the population that is “banked” 
(Scanlon, 2006), illustrates the pro-access potential of mobile technology innovation in the 
banking sector.  
Large migrant population remitting into the Philippines. The Philippines is the fourth largest 
remittances receiving country in the world (IMF, 2006), with approximately 10m overseas 
Filipino workers (OFWs) in 2004 remitting an estimated $8.5bn (excluding informal 
remittances) (Roque, 2005). Cell-phone banking presents a particularly convenient way for 
migrant workers to remit money home, especially since it can be offered at a fee much lower 
than traditional alternatives.  
Mutual benefit. For the telecoms companies, cell-phone banking has the advantage of creating 
additional revenue per client (in the form of the additional SMSs sent
228
) and of building client 
loyalty. Retailers, in turn, benefit by earning transaction revenue. It also serves as a cash 
management tool and draws additional feet to their outlet (CGAP Focus Note, 2006). 
SmartMoney 
Smart Communications is the largest mobile phone operator and has a subscriber base of 
roughly 20 million people. The SmartMoney product was launched in 2000 and now has in 
excess of 3.5m clients. It is offered in partnership with a large Filipino bank, Banco de Oro and 
also provides the option to obtain a MasterCard debit card
229
. Essentially the product offers a 
bank account on which transactions can be effected through a cell-phone.  
Extensive features and distribution network. The product combines the full features of a 
transaction account with access to the account features through the cell-phone. Users can 
make cash deposits or withdrawals, load airtime, transfer funds to another phone (which, in 
turn can be cashed in), make bill payments and remit funds back home from abroad. Funds are 
transferred directly to the recipient‟s SmartMoney-Banco de Oro account, and can be cashed 
at selected outlets, including gas stations, department stores and even McDonald‟s (InfoDev, 
2006)
230
. The network includes 700,000 agents where airtime can be loaded, and 20,000 
agents/retailers where the rest of the transactions can be conducted (Smart CEO, quoted in 
Infodev, 2006). The wide distribution network
231
 is regarded as one of the key contributors to 
success. 
The Smart remittance product, named Smart Padala (“send”), has proven very popular. Only 
launched in 2004, it is already used by about 1m OFWs (InfoDev, 2006). Smart has 
partnerships with Travelex and a range of other money remittance agencies and banks in 17 
countries abroad. Each of these agencies holds a SmartMoney account in the Philippines. An 
OFW deposits cash at an office of one of these agencies by completing a Smart Padala cash 
slip and showing an ID/passport. The recipient‟s SmartMoney account
232
 held with Banco de 
Oro in the Philippines is then credited (confirmed by an SMS) and he/she can then visit any of 
                                                     
228
 Both cell-phone banking models in the Philippines work on the basis of SMS-communication. 
229
 Should they opt for the debit card, deposits and withdrawals can also be made at ATMs and the card can be used for all normal debit 
card purposes. 
230
 More information on the way in which transactions are made is provided in the Globe discussion (as it is basically the same for the 
two models). 
231
 This is partly the result of the fact that SmartMoney‟s banking partner, Banco de Oro, is owned by the largest retailer in the 
Philippines, whose shopping centres attract in excess of 1m clients per day (CGAP Philippines Savings Assessment, 2005). 
232
 Effectively a transfer from the agent‟s Philippine SmartMoney account to the recipient‟s SmartMoney Account. 
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the 20,000 outlets to redeem the cash (upon showing an ID)
233
. When cash is redeemed, the 
client transfers the amount from their SmartMoney-Banco de Oro account to the retailer‟s 
SmartMoney-Banco de Oro account by means of an SMS instruction. Therefore the 
international remittance (from cash paid in to cash paid out) essentially involved two “money 
transfer” transactions
234
. 
Fee structure (obtained from InfoDev, 2006). All costs are transaction related. No monthly, 
admin or opening fees are charged apart from the ongoing annual fee of about $4, should the 
debit card option be chosen. The following transaction charges apply: 
 P2.5 ($0.05) for every client-initiated transaction (inter-account transfers, etc). 
 P1 ($0.02 – the standard SMS fee) for retail purchases using the phone; no charge if the 
card is used. 
 1% of the transaction value for cash deposits or withdrawals through a cashier (accruing to 
the retailer); free cash deposits using the card. 
 P3 ($0.06) for cash withdrawals at a Banco de Oro ATM, and P11 ($0.21) at other ATMs. 
G-Cash 
Globe Telecom, with its 12m subscribers, launched the G-Cash product towards the end of 
2004 and has gained about 1.3m users. The product is not linked to a bank account and 
creates an e-money payment system competing with the services offered by banks.  
More limited distribution network than SmartMoney, but added functionality. G-Cash offers 
basically the same services and functionality as SmartMoney, but has also teamed up with 
some organisations (such as utility companies or education organisations) to enable 
consumers to pay bills via G-Cash. Globe currently has about 400 partners with 3,000 outlets 
where G-Cash transactions can be made (Globe CEO, quoted in an interview with InfoDev, 
2006). G-Cash has furthermore reached an agreement whereby micro-loan clients of banks 
belonging to the Rural Banker‟s Association will soon be able to make loan repayments via G-
Cash. G-Cash‟s remittance product can be used to/from 15 countries via Globe‟s 27 remittance 
partners‟ 200 outlets abroad. Unlike SmartMoney, G-Cash does not offer a debit card.  
E-money backed by deposit in bank account. Globe‟s system keeps records of the e-money 
balances of all its clients. Globe sells e-money to wholesalers (using normal bank transactions 
to effect payment for the e-money), who in turn sell it to retailers (on the same principle as 
airtime). The retailer then on-sells the e-money to the consumer in exchange for cash (once 
again according to the same principle as airtime). For all transactions, authorisation and 
confirmation are given by means of an SMS. Therefore the instruction to the system to conduct 
the transaction is sent via SMS, as is communication of the fact that the transaction has been 
successful. Transactions are settled via the e-money account balances of the clients or 
retailers/agents on Globe‟s settlement system, G-Exchange. When clients deposit cash at a 
retailer, their e-money account will be credited, while the retailer‟s e-money account will be 
debited. The sales of e-money by G-Cash is the only actual flow of value
235
 (wholesalers and 
retailers are likely to buy e-money in bulk). G-Cash has deposit accounts with a number of 
                                                     
233
 In stead of redeeming cash, the balance can of course also be used to make a funds transfer or conduct any of the other 
transactions possible on the SmartMoney account. 
234
 More details on the transaction settlement is given in the discussion of the G-Cash remittance product (which works according to the 
same principle as the Smart product).  
235
 That is: this is the only point at which value is transferred from one bank account to the other. For the rest it is all „accounting‟ entries 
on the e-money clearing system (i.e. within the e-money payment system and not within the bank payment system). 
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banks where the pooled funds that back its e-money accounts are kept and which are used for 
settlement purposes (CGAP, 2006).  
As with Smart an OFW has to visit a G-Cash accredited agent/retailer abroad to conduct an 
international remittance. The overseas agent has a G-Cash account in the Philippines and 
buys e-money from Globe. After having shown an identity document/passport, the remitter 
makes a cash payment to the agent. The agent, in turn, effects a transaction between their G-
Cash account in the Philippines and the recipient‟s G-Cash account. The instruction for the 
transaction is sent from the agent to G-Exchange via SMS. The G-Exchange system then 
generates an SMS confirmation sent to the recipient
236
. The net value of transfers is cleared via 
transfers between the agent‟s bank account and Globe‟s bank account. Because the money 
transfer agent saves on wire transfer expenses and information flows via the SMS system, G-
Cash (or Smart) remittances can be offered at a lower fee than traditional wire transfer 
remittances (Forbes, 2006b). 
The following diagram captures the cash, e-money and information flows in the G-Cash model, 
indicating the flows where (i) a G-Cash transfer is made between clients‟ G-Cash accounts (top 
half of the diagram), and (ii) when a cash-related transaction is made at a retailer
237
: 
 
Figure 6 Information, e-money and cash flows/transfers in the Globe G-Cash model. 
Source: Genesis Analytics, based on information gathered on the products from various sources. 
Fee structure. The retailer receives a transaction fee, which is a flat amount of P10 ($0.19) for 
each transaction below P1000, and 1% of the value for transactions in excess of P1000 
($19.33). Globe receives only the revenue of the SMSs generated by the transaction (P1, or 
                                                     
236
 This message can include a salutation such as “happy birthday”. 
237
 Note that the flow of funds between retailers and Globe, in exchange for G-Cash balances, is not indicated on the diagram. An 
international remittance would entail the same flows as that of the bottom half of the diagram, except that the information flow will be 
from abroad. 
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$0.02, per SMS)
238
. The international remittance agent receives a transaction fee that may 
differ from agent to agent, but is generally lower than the fee charged for a “traditional” wire 
transfer. 
The Filipino AML regime 
Joint challenges of AML compliance and facilitating innovation. The development of cell-phone 
banking in the Philippines coincided with the development of the country‟s AML/CFT regime. 
The Philippines was placed on the FATF NCCT list in 2000, to be removed only in 2005. Thus 
AML and KYC requirements have been a priority to Filipino policy makers and regulators over 
the past few years. Yet, at the same time, two initiatives heralded as among the most 
innovative and successful in the mobile commerce scene have been implemented.  
The AML Act
239
 holds that “covered institutions” (which includes inter alia banks and “money 
changers, money payment, remittance and transfer companies and other similar entities”, as 
which G-Cash is classified) must:  
 Establish and record the true identify of their clients “based on official documents”
240
. This 
duty is detailed in the regulation
241
, which lists a number of aspects on which information 
should be supplied
242
, but does not require the information to be verified apart from 
providing an official photo identity document (e.g. an identity document or passport). Both 
of these requirements are satisfied by account origination and cash transaction procedures 
in the SmartMoney and G-Cash models. 
 Keep records of all transactions for at least five years. 
 Prohibit the opening of accounts without face-to-face contact
243
. Accounts may however be 
opened by an agent of the “covered institution”.  
 Report all covered transactions (defined as any cash or “other equivalent monetary 
instrument” that exceeds 500,000 pesos (roughly $10,000) within one banking day) to the 
AMLC.  
 Report all suspicious transactions to the AMLC. Suspicious transactions are defined as 
transactions with covered institutions, regardless of the amounts involved, where, among 
others, the client is not properly identified or the transaction deviates from the client‟s 
profile. Therefore the covered transaction threshold does not need to be exceeded for a 
suspicious transaction report to be generated.  
 There are no explicit requirements for account monitoring, though deviations from the 
clients‟ profile or past transactions may determine whether a transaction is suspicious, 
thereby implicitly implying the need for account monitoring. 
The regulation of Filipino cell-phone banking  
The regulation of Smart and G-Cash is done by BSP (as banking regulator), in cooperation 
with the AMLC where AML/CFT measures are concerned
244
. As SmartMoney was launched in 
                                                     
238
 Philippine peso amounts as stated on www.myglobe.com.ph/gcash/. USD equivalents calculated applying the average PHP/USD 
exchange rate for 2006 to date, as available on www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory.  
239
 AML Act of 2001 (Republic Act no. 9160), as amended in 2003 by Republic Act no. 9194. 
240
 Sec. 9a.  
241
 According to the “Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations to R.A. no 9160, as amended by R.A. no 9194”, issued by BSP in 
2003. 
242
 Name; date & place of birth; nationality; address; nature of work & name of employer or nature of self-employment; contact numbers; 
tax identification number, social security system number or government service and insurance system number; specimen signature; 
source of funds; and names of beneficiaries in case of insurance contracts and whenever applicable (as contained in Rule 9.1c of the 
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations). 
243
 Rule 9.1.f 
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partnership with Banco de Oro, its financial regulatory aspects are all handled by Banco de Oro 
and aligned with its normal KYC and other requirements. Under its normal banking licence, 
Banco de Oro takes full responsibility for audit, account security, fraud management and other 
aspects (InfoDev, 2006). The fact that it is not directly affiliated with a bank means that G-Cash 
is an accountable (“covered”) institution under the AML Act (AMLA). As G-Cash posed a 
unique proposition for which no specific rules existed, Globe had intensive interactions with the 
BSP and the AMLC before launching the product.  
Specific AML requirements on cell-phone accounts. In addition to the general AML 
requirements, the regulators imposed the following negotiated measures on cell-phone banking 
accounts: 
 The AMLC has access to both Smart Communications and Globe Telecom‟s databases 
and records to check for suspicious transactions and has instructed them to install 
electronic monitoring systems to guard against suspicious accounts and transactions 
(Cabuag & Estayo, 2005)
245
.  
 Systems must have the capability to detect whether there is one subscriber using several 
SIM cards, or should more than one cash-in/cash-out transaction take place at more or 
less the same time using one subscriber name. The systems must therefore be able to 
track transactions.  
 Both products furthermore incorporated transaction limits (negotiated with BSP, not the 
AMLC) to limit ML/FT risk
246
. In Globe‟s interactions/negotiation with the regulators, it was 
agreed that transactions will be capped at P10,000 (approximately $189) each with a 
maximum of P40,000 per day and P100,000 per month (Roman, 2006). Because of 
Smart‟s banking status, its transaction limits are higher: ten transactions per day are 
allowed to a maximum value of P100,000 (approximately $1,933) (Forbes, 2006a). 
 BSP furthermore sets KYC requirements so as to ensure the security and integrity of the 
system. Both initiatives require face to face origination and that an official identity 
document be shown (and a form with information on the client be filled out) for cash-related 
transactions.  
 Both systems are furthermore closed loop systems with payments only possible between 
existing cell-phone subscribers. 
 BSP has the powers to investigate KYC and security systems. In this regard, it has 
established a “Core Information Technology Supervision Unit” (CITSU), which evaluates 
new products through a series of product presentations and may look at the telecom 
company‟s databases to establish whether the necessary security, integrity and 
confidentiality measures are in place, and that KYC and AML requirements are adhered to 
(Jimenez & Roman, 2006; Chemonics, 2006).  
The success of the negotiated system is ascribed to the open relationship between the BSP 
and the AMLC and between the regulators and the two companies. In addition the transaction 
limits minimise the risk of abuse.  
                                                                                                                                                          
244
 Apart from the AML aspects as regulated by the AML Act, cell-phone banking, as a form of electronic banking, is covered under the 
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. The General Banking Law of 2000 also applies to Banco de Oro and hence its partnership with 
Smart for the SmartMoney initiative. Furthermore, some BSP Circulars have been issued that relate to technology risk management 
(Circular 511 of 2006) and consumer protection for e-banking (Circular 542 of 2006). 
245
 Note that the instruction for SmartMoney and G-Cash to monitor accounts exceeds the requirements place on covered institutions in 
general by the regulation (as discussed above). 
246
As well as to limit the risk to clients that their money will be lost, should Smart or Globe go bankrupt. 
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Now that the regulatory framework for cell-phone banking has been established, BSP feels that 
they are comfortable with the product and any new companies wishing to enter the arena may 
be accredited by the Association of Banks (after having informed the BSP of their intention).  
What can we learn from the way in which AML/CFT was reconciled with cell-phone 
banking in the Philippines? 
The adoption of innovative new technology for the provision of financial services to the low-
income market has been facilitated in the Philippines by a regulatory approach which does not 
aim to constrain the technology, but to manage the relevant risks. In particular, there are five 
key features of the Philippine market and AML regime which are of interest: 
 The financial services providers knew who they wanted to serve. They were explicitly 
targeting low-income consumers and, hence, they knew that the product needed to be 
simple and inexpensive. This allowed them to negotiate a regulatory environment to 
facilitate this.  
 Negotiated regulatory implementation. The Philippines regulator was not threatened by the 
new technology and was willing to enter into negotiations with the providers. This allowed 
them to gain a thorough understanding of the product features and the nature of the risk 
involved. The regulations were implemented accordingly. 
 Limited verification. The Philippine AML regime does not require verification of address and 
identity is verified through official documents that are readily available. The absence of 
verification beyond the ID document reduces the hassle factor and cost significantly (both 
for the client and for the provider). 
 Face-to-face origination. Although the AML regulation insists on face-to-face origination, it 
allows origination to be done by agents of the FSP. This facilitated the use of retailer and 
other distribution networks to distribute the product.  
 Account restrictions and transaction monitoring. Risks were managed by introducing 
account restrictions and by implementing systems to monitor the transactions and client 
profile. The fact that this product is targeted at the lower-income market allowed the setting 
of fairly low thresholds and restrictions which limit the risk while still allowing the typical 
transactions to be conducted on this account.  
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GLOSSARY 
AML/CFT Anti-money laundering/Combating the financing of terrorism 
CDD Client due diligence 
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
DFID Department for International Development 
FinMark Trust The FinMark Trust is an organisation created in March 2002 in South 
Africa with funding received from the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID). It is an independent trust with the 
mission of “making financial markets work for the poor”. This is 
achieved through  
FIRST Initiative Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) Initiative 
FIRST Initiative 
Management Unit 
This division of the FIRST Initiative is responsible for the technical-
assistance project-related activities of the FIRST Initiative. 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit 
FSA Financial Services Authority (UK) 
FSP Financial services provider 
FT Financing of terrorism 
KYC Know Your Client 
MFI Micro-finance Institution 
ML Money laundering 
MSB Money Services Business 
MTO Money transfer operator 
Indonesia terms  
BPRs Second tier, “rural” or peoples banks 
CTR Cash transaction reporting 
FKDKP Communication Forum of Bank Compliance Directors 
KTP Indonesian identity card 
PPATK Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, Indonesian 
financial intelligence unit. 
STRs Suspicious transactions 
TPPU National Co-ordination Committee on Anti-Money Laundering 
Kenya terms  
CBK Central Bank of Kenya 
ESAAMLG The Eastern and Southern African Anti Money Laundering Group 
FOSA Front office service activities 
FRC Financial Reporting Centre 
POSTA National Post Office of Kenya 
ROSCA Rotating Savings and credit schemes 
SACCO Savings and Credit Co-operatives  
Mexico terms  
ABM Mexican Bankers Association 
CNBV National Banking and Securities Commission 
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CNSF Insurance sector regulator 
COFEMER Federal Regulatory Improvement Commission 
CONSAR Pension funds supervisor 
IFE Federal Electoral Institute 
LACP Ley de Ahorro y Credito Popular 
SAT Tax Administration Service 
SHCP Ministry of Finance 
SOFOLES Non-deposit taking specialised credit institutions 
UIF Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (Financial Intelligence Unit) 
Pakistan terms  
APG Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
ANF Anti-Narcotics Force 
BBA Basic Bank Account 
CDNS Central Directorate of National Savings 
CNIC Computerised National Identity Card 
NAB National Accountability Bureau 
NADRA National Database and Registration Authority 
NSS National Savings Scheme 
NWFP North West Frontier Province 
OPF Overseas Pakistanis Foundation 
SBP State Bank of Pakistan 
South African terms  
CMA Common Monetary Area 
FSB Financial Services Board 
FSC Financial Sector Charter 
FIC Financial Intelligence Centre 
FICA Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 
NCR National Credit Regulator 
POCA Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 
PCDTARA Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act, 2004 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SARB South African Reserve Bank 
Case Study Terms  
CIV Client verification and identification 
FSA Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom 
MSB Money Service Business 
NMTA National Money Transmitters Association in the United States 
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MEETING LISTS 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Organisation Persons met 
National Treasury Raadhika Sookoo, Jonathan Dixon 
South African Reserve Bank 
Micheal Blackbeard (Deputy Registrar of Banks: Support, Bank 
Supervision Department), Wilfred Lautenberg (Assistant General 
Manager, Bank Supervision Department) 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) Adv. Pieter Smit (Legal), Ursula McCrystal (Forensic and Risk) 
Banking Association of South Africa Stuart Grobler 
Standard Bank 
Gideon Serfontein (Director: Operational Risk Services), Nadio Hoff 
(Compliance Officer) 
Standard Bank 
Saanjeev Orie (Senior Manager: Low Income Products), Gary 
Austin, Manager: Compliance and Operational Risk, Banking 
Products Group) 
ABSA Roy Melnick (Forensic and AML),  
ABSA 
André Snyman (ABSA Capital, Regional Head: Indian Sub-
Continent, Asia Pacific and Latin America), Haroon Ravat (ABSA 
Capital, Regional Head: Middle East and North Africa) 
ABSA Dave Liebenberg (Flexi-Banking Services: Delivery and Distribution) 
Firstrand Group Linidiwe Zikhali-Ngobese (Group Money Laundering Control Officer) 
Nedbank André Wentzel (Nedbank Group Regulatory Risk Services) 
Nedbank Alfred Ramesedi (Middle Market) 
Capitec Jan-Hendrik de Beer (Compliance Officer) 
African Bank 
Charles Chemel (Formerly with Banking Association of South 
Africa) 
Teba Bank Thabo Moorisi (Chief Compliance Officer) 
Wizzit Bank 
Terry Kilpatrick (Chief Compliance Officer), Kevin Bingham (Bank of 
Athens, Compliance Officer), Kevin Smith (Consultant) 
Post Bank Isaac Kgaphola (Manager: Compliance) 
Rennies Bank (renamed Bidvest Bank) Erica Gibbons (Compliance Officer) 
MoneyGram International Limited 
George C. Pearson (Regional Compliance Officer, Middle East and 
Africa), Nikki Spottiswoode (Marketing Manager Middle East and 
Africa) 
KPMG 
Kevin West (Director: Forensic), Manet Basson (Manager, Financial 
Advisory Services: Forensic) 
Compliance Risk & Resources (Pty) Ltd John Symington (Compliance Consultant) 
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KENYA 
Organisation Persons met 
Afripayments Caroline Cherotich (Director) 
Amal Group of Companies Mohamed A. Waldo (Consultant) 
Central Bank of Kenya 
Cassian J. Nyanjwa (Assistant Director, Bank Supervision) 
Daniel K. A. Tallam (Manager Alternative Financial 
Services/Microfinance, Bank Supervision) 
James O. Manyonge (Legal Officer, Financial Institutions 
Supervision) 
G.Omino (Assitant Director, Treasury) 
Rebecca K. Obare (Policy Analyst, Financial Institutions 
Supervision - also on the AML task force) 
Steve Mwaura (Payment Systems) 
CFC Bank Lawson Naibo (Internal Audit Head) 
Commercial Bank of Africa 
Phillip K. Ole Perrio (Manager - Security Services, Audit and 
Security) 
Co-operative Bank 
Jared Obong'o (Compliance Manager) 
Francis Ngambi (Marketing) 
DFID David Ferrand (Technical Manager FSD) 
Equity Bank 
Julius Turuchiu (Security Officer) 
Papius Muhindi (Head of Risk Management) 
Major (Rtd) Marcus Mutua (Head of Security and Administration) 
ESAAMLG Wayne Blackburn (UN Mentor ESAAMLG) 
Financial and Legal Sector Technical 
Assistance Project (FLSTAP) 
Bob Porter 
Genesis Analytics Richard Ketley (Director) 
Harambee SACCO John O. Odima (Principal Loans Officer) 
Independent Consultant John Kashangaki 
Independent Consultant Andrew Lovegrove 
Kenya Bankers Association J.K. Wanyela (Executive Director) 
Kenya Commercial Bank 
John Ndegwa (Senior Manager, Compliance) 
David Korir (Fraud Investigator) 
K-Rep Bank 
Michael K. Mutisya (Support Manager) 
Antony Wamatu (Internal Auditor) 
Annabelle W. Mugo (Management Trainee) 
Fredrick O. Nyasaka (Internal Auditor) 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Kenya 
Henry K. Rotich (Economic Affairs Department) 
Barrack O. Amollo (Under Secretary and Head of the AML Task 
Force) 
Hellen A. Olima (Senior Insurance Officer) 
National Bank 
George Mutua (GM, Operations and Business Development) 
Steve Ndile (GM, Audit and Security) 
Philip K. Bor (Manager, Corporate Banking and Custody Services) 
National Registrar of Persons, Government of 
Kenya 
Kisabuli Mumia (Senior Assistant to Principle Registrar of Persons) 
NIC Bank Patrick N. Mwaniki (Head of Internal Audit) 
POSTA Kenya Enock O. Kinara (Product Manager Financial & Agency Services) 
Kenya Post Office Savings Bank A. Nyambura Koigi (MD) 
Standard Chartered Walter Mungai (Head of Operational Risk Assurance, East Africa) 
UNDP Abdusalam Omer  
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PAKISTAN 
Organisation Persons met 
Bank Alfalah Limited 
Falak Sher (Chief Compliance Officer) 
Syed Habib Mustafain (Relationship Manager) 
BMA Capital Ahsan Javed Chisty (VP & Chief Economist Equities) 
Canadian High Commission 
Francois P. Dupuis (First Secretary Development) 
Yasin Janjua (Development Economist) 
Citigroup International 
Zubyr Soomro (MD) 
Yawer Shameem (VP & Country Compliance Officer) 
Saleem Merchant (VP) 
Dubai Islamic Bank Syed Liaquat Ali (Chief Internal Auditor) 
Habib Bank 
Mudassir H. Khan (Senior VP & Chief Compliance Officer) 
Jamil Iqbal (Senior Executive VP) 
Nadeem Ahmad (Executuve VP and Head Regulatory/Operations 
Compliance Division) 
Habib Bank Asset Management Shahid Ghaffar (CEO) 
Independent Consultant Sadia Khan 
Inter-American Dialogue Dr Manual Orozco (Senior Associate) 
KASB Bank Muneer Kamal (President & CEO) 
Khanani & Kalia International (exchange 
company) 
Naeem Butt (Head of Operation) 
Khushali Bank Ghalib Nishtar (President) 
Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Pakistan 
Nazrat Bashir (Joint Secretary) 
National Accountability Bureau, 
Government of Pakistan 
Omer Bin Zia (Deputy Director) 
Lt. Col Aftab Haseeb (Additional Director) 
National Bank of Pakistan 
Muhammad Rafique (Senior VP) 
Khalid Mahmood (Senior VP) 
National Database and Registration 
Authority 
Brig (Retd.) Saleem Ahmed Moeen (Chairman) 
Brig Aleem M. Ahmad (Member & DG Projects) 
Syed Shayan Kamaal (Project Director, PS Directorate) 
NBP Exchange Company Muhammad Naeemuddin (MD) 
Overseas Pakistanis Foundation Mohammed Yar Bhutter (Director) 
Pakistan Microfinance Network 
Syed Mohsin Ahmed (GM) 
Moazzam Iqbal (Manager-MIS & Administration) 
Mehr Shah (Capacity Building Specialist) 
Pakistan Postal Services Fazli Sattar Khan (Deputy Director General & Secretary Board) 
Securities Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan 
Razi-ur-Rahman Khan (Chairman) 
Amber Darr (Executive Director - Law) 
Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana (Joint Director - Law) 
Shafaat Ahmad (Executive Director) 
Hasnat Ahmad (Joint Director) 
Ahmed Qadir (Deputy Director) 
State Bank of Pakistan, Agricultural Credit 
Department 
Saleem Ullah (Director) 
State Bank of Pakistan, Banking 
Inspection Department 
Amer Aziz (Director) 
State Bank of Pakistan, Banking Poilcy 
Department 
Inayat Hussain (Senior Joint Director) 
Syed Mansoor Ali (Joint Director) 
State Bank of Pakistan, Exchange Policy 
Department 
Azhar Kureshi (Director) 
Syed Samar Hasnain (Senior Joint Director) 
Najm-us-Saqib Shabbir (Joint Director) 
Muhammad Akmal (Joint Director) 
Tameer Micro Finance Bank Nadeem Hussain (President & CEO) 
The World Bank  
Isfandyar Zaman Khan (Specialist Finance and Private Sector 
Development, South Asia) 
UNDP 
Faiza Effendi (Assistant Resident Representative/Chief, Poverty 
Reduction & Gender Unit) 
Union Bank 
Shaukat Tarin (President and Group CEO) 
Waqar A. Khan (Executive VP & Head of Compliance) 
Sami Ahmed Siddiqui (Country Compliance Manager) 
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Organisation Persons met 
United Bank 
Bahauddin Khan (Group Executive Operations and Business Support) 
Ahmed Hafeez (Group Head Business Development and Strategic 
Initiatives) 
Muhammad Ejazuddin (SEVP/Group Executive Audit and Inspection) 
Najeeb Agrawalla (Executive VP, Business Head - Commercial Bank) 
Zarco Exchange Company Syed Zamir Haider (MD) 
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INDONESIA 
Organisation Persons met 
CEMFIOWS (Centre for Microfinance and 
Indonesian Overseas Workers Studies) 
Dr Dipo Alam (Chairman) 
PPATK: representatives from legal and 
compliance departments 
Nella Hendriyetty, Evi, Rasyid, Fithriadi, Ivan 
BCA: international remittances division 
Eva Sumampouw (Division Head, International Payments), 
Haryanto Tanudjaja (Senior Manager, International Payment 
Specialist) 
Bank Indonesia: Banking Research & Regulation 
Directorate Bank Supervision Departments & 
Payment System Directorate 
Betty Parinussa (Executive Researcher, Banking Research and 
Regulation Bureau), Antonius Moerdianto, Ny Yulia Usmanij, Ida 
Nuryanti and 4 others, as well as Patricius Randa,(Head of 
Department, Compliance Desk, BRI) 
Attorney General's Office 
Thomson Siagian (Head of Transnational Crime & AML Task 
Force) and Yusfidli (also part of task force, as well as 
International Legal Cooperation).  
Depkominfo (Department of Communication and 
Information Technology) 
Cahyana Ahmadjayadi (DG for ICT Applications); Lolly Amalia 
Abdullah (Director for Information System, Software & Content); 
Muhammed Neil El Himam (Section Head, Software Program) 
McKinsey Jakarta Office (ad hoc short meeting) Larry Burger (Head) 
IMF, Jakarta Office Armando Morales (Resident Representative) 
Bank Indonesia: Directorate of rural bank 
supervision 
Libraliana Badilangoe (Executive Bank Analyst – took the lead); 
Nugroho (Assistant Manager, Rural Bank Licensing, Research 
and Regulation Division); Ayahandaani Kussetyowati (Bank 
Analyst). 
Financial Sector Volunteer Corps Ms Dian Adhitama 
PPATK  
Dr Yunus Husein (Head), Djoko Kurnijanto (International Relation 
Officer), Susno Duadji (Deputy Head), Dr I Gde Sadguna (Deputy 
Head), Tri Priyo (Director of Inter-Agency Cooperation) 
Nitra Dana Utama (a large BPR) 
Suherman & Soebroto Gondo (Directors), as well as their 
supervisor [BPR regulator] from Bank Indonesia 
World Bank Jakarta Office 
Chitra Buchori and team (Social Development Team); Yoko Doi 
and Djauhari Sitorus (Financial Development team) 
Coordinating Ministry of Econ affairs (DC & LdK) 
Dr Mohamad Ikhsan (Deputy Minister, as well as director from 
the Institute for Economics at the University of Jakarta) 
Bank Indonesia  
Mrs Murniastuti (Head of Banking Research and Regulation 
Bureau), Rosalia (Senior Analyst/Researcher) 
PPSW Endang Sulfiana 
BNI 
Tonny Indartono (Senior Vice President & Division Head, 
International Division); Dr I Supomo (Managing Director), Herry 
Trianto (Head of Financial Institutions), Pieter Siadari (Deputy 
General Manager) 
Citibank 
Tjit Siat Fun (Assistant Vice President & Senior Compliance 
Officer); Nirah Wiryoatmodjo (Compliance Director) 
Bapepam-LK 
Dr A Fuad Rahmany (Chairman) and Gonthor Azis (Head of 
international affairs and public relation division) 
Financial Crime Prevention Project (USAID 
sponsored, located in the PPATK) 
Ken Lawson and Hezti Oktivianti Dewi 
Donor meeting (IMF, World Bank, AusAID - ADB 
and USAID could not attend) 
Stephen Schwartz (IMF country representative); Djauhari Sitorus 
(World Bank); Jivan Sekhon (Second secretary: governance, 
AusAID) 
Bank Mandiri  
Mr Bambang Setiawan (MD); Mrs Mustaslimah (Group Head of 
Compliance); Himawan Subiantoro (Department Head of 
Compliance) 
Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro Counsellors 
at Law 
Gregory Churchill 
Federation of Indonesian Associations of Banks Bambang Setijoprodjo (Chairman) and other members  
Bank Central Asia 
Edmund Tondobala (Deputy Division Head, International Banking 
Division); Arif Singgih (Senior Advisor); Yonatan Hermanto (Head 
of Internal Legal Counsel and Compliance); Rustiningsih Singgih 
(Head of International Business Solution); Subur Tan (Director) 
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Organisation Persons met 
World Bank Jakarta Office P.S. Srinivas & Yoko Doi 
BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia) 
Dede Suherman (General Manager, Compliance Desk); 
Bambang Spoepeno (Managing Director)  
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 
Mrs Lisna Yoeliani Poeloengan (Director of Indonesian Overseas 
Workers Empowerment) and 2 colleagues 
Bank Mega 
Adhiputra Tanoyo (Senior Vice President, Risk Management 
Head) 
Bank Swadesi 
Wikan Aryono (Director); L.G. Ropas (Commissioner); Suroso 
(Director); Lisawati (President Director) 
BRI Unit 
Office staff, accompanied by Mr Dede Suherman from head 
office 
FKDKP (Forum for Compliance Directors) 
Mr Bambang Setijoprodjo (Chairman, Bank Ekspor Indonesia); 
Mr Tutwuri Anggarwani (Bank Ekspor Indonesia); Ms Anika 
Faisal (Secretary of FKDKP, Compliance Director of Bank 
Danamon), Ms Lucy Susiana Noor (Bank Danamon); Mr Rendi 
Hellianto (Permata Bank) and others 
Bank Danamon 
Ms Anika Faisal (Compliance Director) and Ms Lucy Susiana 
Noor 
Bank Niaga  
Mr C Heru Budiargo (Executive Director Compliance & Human 
Resources); Ms Ismiantari Soerjadi (Assistant Vice President, 
Compliance Management Group) 
Pos Indonesia 
Arief Supriyono (Direk Bisnis jasa Keuangan); San Herib 
(Direktur Bisnis Komunikasi); Soebandi (Direktur Bisnis 
Kurir/Operasi) and other colleagues 
PPATK feedback meeting Dr Yunus Husein (Head); Mr Garda Paripurna 
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MEXICO 
Organisation Persons met 
Mexican Bankers' Association Héctor Hernandez Gatica (Compliance) 
Banamex 
Héctor Hernandez Gatica (Compliance and AML Director) and 
Guillermo Horta Montes (Anti-money laundering head) 
Secretaría de Economica (Microfinanzas) 
Héctor Díaz Escobar Figueroa; C.P. Jorge Charles Creel (Consultor 
de Apoyos Financieros) 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
(SHCP) 
Guillermo Zamarripa Escamilla (Head of Banking and Savings 
Directorate) 
BANSEFI David Estefan G. (Director of Technical Coordination) 
Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos (CEMLA) 
Kenneth G. Coates (Director General), Corina Artech Serra (Credit 
Information Systems Coordinador),  René Maldonado 
(Coordinador), Ana Laura Sibaja Jiménez (Western Hemisphere 
Payments and Securities Settlement Forum Coordinator) 
Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas 
(CNSF) 
Luis Eduardo Iturriaga Velasco (Director General Juridico 
Consultivo, de Contratación, Intermediarios y Coordinación 
Regional 
Comisión Nacional para la Protección y 
Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios 
Financieros 
Marco Carrera Santa Cruz (Director of Market Studies) 
Federal Regulatory Improvement Commission 
(COFFEMER) 
Gustavo Adolfo Bello Martínez (Senior Regulatory Policy Officer), 
Eduardo Esteban Romore Fong (Director of Special Studies 
HSBC Leopoldo Rodríguez Barosa (Compliance Officer?) 
Kroll Karla Sotomayor Romano (Associate Managing Director) 
Banco de México  
Guillermo Giiémez Garcio (Deputy-governor), Eduardo A. Gómez 
Alcázar (Manager of Financial System Provisions) 
Mexico Country Office, World Bank Anna Wellenstein 
Institute for Mexicans Abroad Carlos González Gutiérrez (Executive Director), Luisa Medina Mora 
Planet Finance  Pedro Valdez (Deputy Director for Development) 
FinComún Martha Pastelin Palacios (Director of Operations) 
Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UFI) Concepción Patiño Cestafe (Head of Unit) 
Banco Compartamos Lizette Escamilla Miranda (Compliance officer) 
Asociacion Mexicana Casas de Cambio Salvador Arroyo 
Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT) 
Paulina Morfin (SAT), Luis Naranjof (SAT), María Elena Plata (AML 
Compliance Director, Western Union), German Valdés Sánchez 
(Team Leader, Foreign Exchange Services, Ammerican Express), 
José Ramón Bordes Abascal (Compliance Director Mexico, 
American Express) 
BANSEFI Aarón Silva 
Asociación Nacional de Centros Cambiarios y 
Transmisores de Dinero 
José Carlos Armenta Fong (General Manager), Carmen Guerrero 
Hernández (Legal advisor) 
Santander 
Francisco Javier Lorenxo Muradas (General Director, Commercial 
Banking) 
Tecnológico de Monterrey Dr. Mauricio de la Maza Ambell (Director of Masters in Finance) 
Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores  
(CNBV) 
Pablo Gomez del Campo Gurza (Director of Prevention of Illicit 
Operations), Andres Colmenero Becerril (Development of Systems 
for Prevention of Illicit Operations), Mario A. Bolaños Michelena 
(Development of Systems for Prevention of Illicit Operations) 
Finsol Jorge Aguirre Bauer (Assistant Director of Risk Control) 
Banco Azteca Alejandro Vargas Durán, Fernando Torres Ramírez 
 
